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Nikki Marczak and Kirril Shields
As two of the newest members of the Australian Institute for Holocaust and
Genocide Studies, we are humbled to have been entrusted with the editing
of Genocide Perspectives V, the Institute’s official publication. This, the fifth
volume in the series, features Australian scholarship on genocide with essays
written by established and well-known authors, as well as emerging scholars.
The volume has also given contributors the chance to reflect on Professor
Colin Tatz’s significant contribution to Genocide Studies and his influence on
their own paths and chosen areas of study.
In the early stages of developing this book, Tony Barta suggested Genocide
Perspectives V be made a Festschrift to Colin. We felt this was perfect timing
and the right volume to dedicate in his honour. Contributors agreed; Douglas
Booth and Jennifer Balint had been discussing the idea of a book dedicated to
Colin, and many others felt compelled to write on topics inspired by Colin’s
own work.
In recent years, Colin Tatz has released The Magnitude of Genocide (co-au-
thored with Winton Higgins), his memoir, Human Rights and Human Wrongs,
and his latest book, Australia’s Unthinkable Genocide (published May 2017).
At age 83, the speed at which Colin writes puts both of us, many decades his
junior, to shame. His eloquence, ability to reach audiences, and original think-
ing remain a source of admiration for friends, family and colleagues alike. It
is with a sense of the utmost respect and gratefulness shared by all contribu-
tors that we dedicate this volume of Genocide Perspectives, a publication he
founded, to Colin.
The first essay is a piece by Douglas Booth, who has been able to fulfil his
longstanding goal to write about Colin as a teacher, scholar and activist. The
essay includes comments from several of Colin’s colleagues. Readers who are
familiar with Colin’s work will see much truth in Doug’s essay, and we hope
it introduces Colin as a truly inspirational figure in the study of genocide and
human rights to those who do not know him.
Influenced by Colin’s work on Aboriginal issues, Anna Haebich, John
Maynard and Jennifer Balint write on aspects of genocide in Australian history
through different and complementary lenses. Anna reflects on Bringing Them
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Home 20 years after the landmark Human Rights Commission report focused
the nation’s attention on the Stolen Generations and the legacy of forced
removal of children. John Maynard discusses statements from journalists, gov-
ernment officials and other prominent people from the late 1800s and early
1900s in which the genocidal treatment of Aboriginal communities was ex-
plicitly acknowledged (though the term “genocide” had not yet been coined),
and provides a personal view on the early work of Aboriginal rights activists
including his own grandfather, Fred Maynard. Australia’s refusal to grapple
with its own history of genocide, and its poor record of prosecuting war crim-
inals who settled in Australia, is explored by Jennifer Balint.
Essays discussing two of the “core” genocides of the twentieth century,
the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide, present new research and fresh
perspectives. Michael Robertson, Edwina Light, Wendy Lipworth and Garry
Walter write on psychiatry under the Nazi regime, highlighting lessons learnt
and ignored, and analysing the continuing relevance of the Holocaust to med-
ical ethics today. In a case study of the Nazis’ use of medical experiments,
Konrad Kwiet, a stalwart of Holocaust Studies in Australia, and his co-author
George Weisz, present newly discovered evidence of medical experiments
conducted on Australian prisoners of war by Nazi doctors.
Geoffrey Robertson QC has generously allowed us to publish the powerful
speech he gave at Sydney’s Armenian Genocide Commemoration Ceremony
for the 100th Anniversary of the genocide in April 2015. Nikki Marczak, who
presented at that year’s commemoration event in Melbourne, sheds light on
how women were affected during the early stages of the Armenian Genocide.
Another case study focusing on women, by Annie Pohlman, explores women’s
survival after the Indonesian mass killings and arrests of 1965–1966. Parallels
between women’s stories emerge clearly in those two essays. Also examining
a case study from Asia, The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG presents an insider
view of the situation in North Korea and questions whether the case consti-
tutes genocide.
Several authors have taken a theoretical approach to their essays, asking
profound questions about the nature of genocide and Genocide Studies, mem-
ory, legacy and the future of genocide prevention. Tony Barta analyses the
(often competing) perspectives and prejudices within studies of genocide, re-
flecting on his own experiences and applying his concept of surrealities to
genocide memory. Also tackling the complexity of genocide memory, Kirril
Shields looks at how our understanding of the Holocaust is influenced and
shaped by postmemory, exploring the legacy of Holocaust-era amateur pho-
tographs taken from a Nazi viewpoint. Deborah Mayersen’s essay examines
the issue of religious faith in the aftermath of genocide and adds a new dimen-
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sion to that discussion by analysing genocide through the medium of graphic
novels, one dealing with the Holocaust and two set in Rwanda.
On the factors contributing to genocide and the possibility of prevention,
Winton Higgins expands on ideas raised in The Magnitude of Genocide con-
cerning the culpability of the West, especially the United States, in fomenting
genocides around the world, or failing to prevent them. Finally, we leave read-
ers with the words of Colin himself, on the art of teaching about the Holocaust
and genocide. A broad overview of his philosophy of teaching, the essay pre-
sents his personal views, developed over three decades, on the most effective
multidisciplinary approaches to teaching how and why genocides occur, who
contributes to them, the factors of racism, science and governance, and that in-
sidious final stage of genocide, denialism.
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COLIN TATZ: “COMPELLED TO REPAIR A FLAWED
WORLD”
Douglas Booth
Genocide Perspectives V pays tribute to Colin Tatz, the founder of the journal,
and its official host, the Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide
Studies. In this article I outline Colin’s path to becoming an internationally
renowned scholar of genocide; I highlight his influence as a teacher and ac-
tivist, and dissect the form of his scholarship. Colin’s research interests in
genocide and suicide may appear, on the surface, macabre and morbid, but I
will reveal him as a committed humanist with a passion for life and remark-
able verve and exuberance.
My father introduced me to Colin’s work. He sent me several of Colin’s
newspaper articles on the politics of sport.1 Those articles constituted
a landmark in sports criticism in Australia.2 My father also paved the
way for correspondence that led to Colin supervising my PhD research
(1989–1993) in which I investigated apartheid in South African sport and
analysed the politics of the sports boycott. Colin was the consummate
supervisor: available, organised, thoroughly engaged with the subject, in-
sightful, sharing, firm, scholarly, a master communicator and raconteur,
hospitable and generous. His greatest pedagogical gift—that I now offer
my students—was urging me to present my own arguments. He explains
this approach in Race Politics in Australia. Citing Doris Lessing who de-
plored the education system for stifling fresh thought and creativity, Colin
wrote, “She asks (and I am with her), ‘why don’t you read what I have
written and make up your own mind about what you think. . . . Never
mind . . . Professors White and Black.’ ”3 Our relationship continued and
grew after I graduated and we co-authored several pieces.4 Colin and I,
1 Between 1980 and 1983 Colin wrote 20 feature articles on sport, 19 for the Australian and one for
the Sydney Morning Herald.
2 Colin advanced the concept in his inaugural professorial lecture at Macquarie University, “Race,
Politics and Sport” (1983), which was published in the first edition of Sporting Traditions 1, no. 1
(1984), 2–36, the journal of the Australian Society for Sport History. For a recent elaboration, see Colin
Tatz, “Transient Triumphalism: Oi, Oi, Oi–The Australian Way,” Griffith Review 53 (2016), 228–36.
3 Colin Tatz, Race Politics in Australia: Aborigines, Politics and Law (Armidale: University of New
England, 1979), i.
4 Douglas Booth and Colin Tatz, “South Africa: A Prisoner of History?” Current Affairs Bulletin
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and our wives, Sandra and Gaye, have now enjoyed each other’s company
for nearly 30 years. Like many of the contributors to this volume, Gaye
and I have watched, admired, appreciated and taken pleasure in the in-
defatigable and complete relationship between Colin and Sandra. We are
privileged that they have included us in their lives.
I met Professor Colin Tatz in 1996 while he was head of the Centre for Com-
parative Genocide Studies at Macquarie University. Each time I heard him
lecture, I was intrigued by his in-depth knowledge of the history and politics
of genocide. I was inspired to join as a volunteer for the Centre that same
year. Colin became a great mentor and an inspiration for me to research and
write on the Armenian Genocide. When the Genocide Centre closed at Mac-
quarie, Colin helped form the Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide
Studies. We did not have a permanent office to hold our meetings, but Colin
and Sandra opened their hearts and home for our monthly meetings (which
included a home-cooked meal). I consider it a great honour and privilege to
have been associated with an historian of his calibre and integrity—VICKEN
BABKENIAN
The best of teachers. Enrolling in “The Politics of Genocide” at Macquarie
University set me on the path I continue on today. Sitting with Colin as he
supervised me in my Honours thesis in 1991 on the definitions of genocide
opened my eyes to an expansive critical engagement with the world. His other
students and I were so fortunate to have him as our guide that year. Colin’s
unwavering demanding ethic of social justice has been a beacon in this coun-
try. He has been a pathbreaker in so many fields. I constantly meet activists
and academics who sing his praises. And even now when I meet with him and
Sandra in their home he opens my eyes still further—JENNIFER BALINT
The making of a genocide scholar
Colin’s journey to genocide scholar began as a young boy.5 Growing up in Jo-
70, no. 6 (1993), 4–11; Douglas Booth and Colin Tatz, “Swimming With the Big Boys? The Politics
of Sydney’s 2000 Olympic Bid,” Sporting Traditions 1, no. 1 (1994), 3–23; Douglas Booth and Colin
Tatz, One-Eyed: A View of Australian Sport (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2000).
5 Colin offers several accounts of his journey to genocide scholar. See Colin Tatz, “Breaking the Membrane,”
in Pioneers of Genocide Studies, eds. Samuel Totten and Steven Jacobs (London: Transaction Publishers, 2002),
195–216; Colin Tatz, With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide (London: Verso, 2003), 1–16; “Colin
Tatz Explores Life as an Outsider Through Racial Discrimination,” by Richard Fidler, ABC Radio, November
6
hannesburg, South Africa, on the eve of and during the Second World War, he
first became aware of “social injustice” and that “something was particularly
amiss for Jews”—and blacks. One cue recalled by Colin was the separation
of Jewish and non-Jewish students at King Edward VII high school: “We
were kept truly apart . . . with no explanation or justification.”6 This embry-
onic awareness launched a lifelong journey into the study of politics and race.
The journey began in earnest with postgraduate studies at the University of
Natal (MA, Public and Native Administration) and the Australian National
University (PhD in Political Science and Public Administration); it proceeded
to lectureships in politics and sociology at Monash University (where he also
founded and directed the Centre for Research into Aboriginal Affairs, subse-
quently the Monash Indigenous Centre), and continued on to professorships in
politics at the University of New England and Macquarie University. Geno-
cide was not a prominent feature of Colin’s journey until the mid-1980s when,
following a series of visits to Yad Vashem (Israel’s official memorial site and
research centre on the Holocaust), his experiences, observations and analyses
of racism “merge[d] into a stream of Holocaust consciousness.”7 After Yad
Vashem, Colin began teaching the politics of genocide and launched the Cen-
tre for Comparative Genocide Studies at Macquarie University, subsequently
the Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the Shalom In-
stitute, University of New South Wales. In this section I look at Colin’s early
life experiences in South Africa to which he attributes the “accretion of val-
ues” that laid the foundations for a lifelong anti-racism project; I then turn to
the 1980s and 1990s during which Colin identified genocide as the “ultimate
form of racism.”8
Colin describes his early “socialisation” in South Africa as critical to
his life direction and goals. He says that his early years were “beset by
wars—against . . . family, empty ritual, solitariness, school bullies, street
thugs, boxing opponents, Nazi hat makers”—and locates his first encounters
with “race hatred, vilification [and] humiliation” in the private realm of the
home. There he saw black servants constantly “berated, demeaned or de-
humanised.” “Indignation arose within, perhaps instinctively, but certainly
viscerally” and he developed a deep empathy for victims. A Rubicon moment
came in the mid-1940s. After witnessing a white man plough his car into a
29, 2011, http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/11/29/3379167.htm; Colin Tatz, Human Rights and Human
Wrongs: A Life Confronting Racism (Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2015).
6 Tatz, Human Rights, 28 and 44; Tatz, “Breaking the Membrane,” 196.
7 Ibid., 204 and 205.
8 Tatz, Human Rights, 10; Tatz, “Breaking the Membrane,” 211.
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black African riding a bicycle, Colin made a statement to the police who later
asked him to alter his testimony in order to cast more blame on the cyclist. He
refused.9
During the Second World War, white South Africa swayed between support
for the Allies and the Axis powers. Colin’s grandparents had left Lithuania
amid growing restrictions on Jews and rising antisemitism in the Tsarist
Empire. The South African state classified Litvaks, who made up 90 per
cent of South Africa’s 120,000 Jews, as white, but neither Afrikaners nor
British descendants, the dominant white tribes, were welcoming. The pro-Axis
Afrikaner Ossewabrandwag (Ox-Wagon Guard) “attacked synagogues [and]
Jewish shops . . . and printed and distributed Nazi leaflets and propaganda.”
Jews formed vigilante groups in response.10 D. F. Malan, the Afrikaner na-
tionalist who would lead the apartheid government as South African Prime
Minister between 1948 and 1954, deemed Jews an “unabsorbable minority.”11
At home, Colin followed the war through daily BBC broadcasts, which he
translated for his maternal grandmother whom he called Bobbe. He reported
the Axis forces overrunning Vilna, Kovno, Ponevezh, Shadove, Telze, and
heard Bobbe cry, “Our family is gone.” It was not until mid-1945 that the
young Colin finally figured the meaning of “gone”: the last clue came during
a newsreel at a Saturday afternoon movie matinee showing corpses bulldozed
into mass graves at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp.12
Collectively, these experiences planted a seed in Colin that blossomed into
a mission to tackle racism. It was only much later in his career, though, that the
Holocaust became part of that mission. Initially, he baulked at analysing the
“appalling years” between 1941 and 1945. The turning point was Yad Vashem.
It opened the door to the “death factory domain” and provided a new “ana-
lytical toolbox” in which the Holocaust connected seemingly disparate cases
of racism, such as those experienced by Aboriginal Australians and Native
Americans, that at first glance “have little in common with processes in the
Third Reich.”13 The key to this connection is a profound definition of geno-
cide as “the resort to biological solutions to real or confected social, political,
or religious problems.” The power of this definition, which underpins The
Magnitude of Genocide, immediately reveals itself in comparative cases. For
example, “Australia—while seemingly a far cry from the heaped corpses at
9 Tatz, Human Rights, 8, 28 and 42.
10 Tatz, “Breaking the Membrane,” 197.
11 Milton Shain, A Perfect Storm: Antisemitism in South Africa, 1930–1948 (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball,
2015), 14.
12 Tatz, Human Rights, 10; Tatz, “Breaking the Membrane,” 196.
13 Ibid., 204.
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Bergen-Belsen or the death marches that Turkish authorities visited on their
Armenian subjects—responded to its ‘Aboriginal problem’ by finding . . . a
solution in biology” based on “the forcible removal of Aboriginal children
from their parents, and their subsequent assimilation by intermarriage into
white society.”14 The definition also launched Colin’s subsequent research into
youth suicide among Aboriginal Australians: “many of the suicides are ei-
ther removed children or descendants of those forcibly removed” and can be
linked to the “destruction of culture and language,” the physical relocation of
communities, “confinement to reserves and mission stations,” “physical and
economic abuse,” “destruction of religious sites” and “solace in alcohol.”15
Colin’s journey to a scholar of comparative genocide studies commenced
with experiences of racism in South Africa and culminated in a fresh com-
prehension and conceptualisation of genocide. This, in turn, led to a new
paradigm of racism and intellectual renown. In a later section I explore the
form of Colin’s scholarship; first, I discuss his influence as a teacher.
Long before I knew him personally, Colin’s writing had always seemed to me
to stem from a deep and profound awareness of the devastating consequences
of racism. He expressed something that existed inside me as well. I felt strongly
the experiences of the Stolen Generations and Australia’s refusal to recognise
our own history of genocide. Colin embodies the relationship between the Jew-
ish community and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. In my own
journey from working with Indigenous communities to studying the Holocaust
and Genocide, I am treading carefully in footsteps already made by Colin.
Now he is there to guide me in person as well as through his writing, and
he will continue to inspire new generations of scholars committed to raising
awareness of history and human rights—NIKKI MARCZAK
The personal tributes in this article acknowledge, implicitly and explicitly,
Colin’s influence as a teacher. He recognised very early that good teachers
could “promote human dignity” and “change the order of things” by using
their skills of observation, inquiry, writing, talking and, where necessary,
preaching.16 Perhaps not surprisingly then, Colin chose teaching as the pri-
mary vehicle for his anti-racism mission as well as to help produce what his
co-author Winton Higgins calls “socially aware and morally informed” citi-
14 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 6. See also Colin Tatz, Australia’s Unthinkable Genocide (Bloomington:
Xlibris, 2017).
15 Tatz, “Breaking the Membrane,” 211–12.
16 Tatz, Human Rights, 347.
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zens who understand those “central modern western values” of “justice, the
dignity of the individual human life, and sensitivity to the suffering of oth-
ers.”17 In the following section I delve further into “Colin the teacher” who
one former student calls “very gifted.”18
Teacher
The motto of Macquarie University is “And gladly teche” (adopted from
Chaucer’s description of the Clerk of Oxenford in the prologue to The Canter-
bury Tales). Colin taught at Macquarie for more than 17 years and as numerous
voices in this volume attest, no one better embodied the University’s motto.
Across his teaching career Colin “triggered many career—and life-changing
priorities among students.”19
After training as a nurse I enrolled in a degree in ancient history at Mac-
quarie. In my final year I gained special permission to enrol in “The Politics
of Genocide.” That course, taught by Colin, changed my life and the lives of
those around me. The history was significant—the biomedical vision of race,
the distortion of science and medicalised care, the role of doctors and nurses
in killing—and, combined with the urgency of Colin’s message, had an im-
mense impact upon me. Today, I still share what I learned from Colin with
others—doctors, nurses, students. I am indebted to him for inspiring me to be
a better person, a better scholar, a better teacher, and unafraid to point out the
indignity suffered by those who are marginalised and humiliated, and indeed
murdered, by others’ misperceptions, fabrications and machinations. This is
profoundly the case when a genocidal regime inverts the “duty of care” of
medicine—DARREN O’BRIEN
There are some people who come into one’s life who set about a process that
changes direction and creates opportunities for seeing the world anew. In
1991 I met Colin Tatz. That meeting proved pivotal: his passion for truth and
justice, for making this world a better place through teaching and ensuring
that the past, no matter how uncomfortable, was not lost, left a profound mark
on me. As mentor, teacher, companion and friend, Colin demanded nothing
less than the best I could give. The debt I owe this extraordinarily humble man
17 Cited in Tatz, With Intent, 172–73 and 182.
18 Robert Orr, review of Human Rights and Human Wrongs, Indigenous Law Bulletin 8, no. 27 (2016), 26.
19 Winton Higgins, personal correspondence, May 9, 2016.
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is one I can never repay. The Talmud says there is no greater obligation for a
student than to honour their teacher (Talmud Torah Chapter 5, Halachah 1). I
honour my teacher, Colin Tatz—PAUL O’SHEA
Colleagues, too, recognise Colin’s influence on their lives. John Maynard,
Director at the Wollotuka Institute of Aboriginal Studies at the University of
Newcastle and Chair of Indigenous History acknowledges Colin as “a source
of great inspiration” throughout his career and comments that he “has al-
ways been willing to offer support, encouragement and advice.”20 Just as
colleagues and students sing their praises of Colin, so is he quick to identify
those who inspired him and who continue to do so. His first inspiration was
a teacher at Yeoville Boys’ Primary School (Johannesburg) who Colin says
“changed my life”:
My first lessons in injustice, inhumanity and the width and depth of moral
divides came not from family or Judaism but from Phil Green. He took
us through prisoner-of-war camps, death camps, refugee camps, and South
African military camps. . . . The embodiment of life learning rather than
book learning, [Green delivered an invaluable] lesson: there is simply noth-
ing better than an inspirational teacher in the flesh.21
Others followed Green, including Edgar Brookes and Arthur Keppel-Jones at
the University of Natal, and Yehuda Bauer at Yad Vashem. In 2015 Colin still
described Bauer as his “mentor and inspiration.”22
Colin the teacher neither merely imparts knowledge nor simply assigns
readings. He performs and projects his entire persona onto subject matter. At
the heart of Colin’s pedagogical performances lies a modulated voice with a
highly controlled tempo and cadence that instantly commands the attention of
those who meet and listen to him. Tony Barta and Raimond Gaita both refer
to the power and presence of Colin’s voice. Tony underscores a radio inter-
view in which Colin “tells us about his early life and the way his values were
formed in South Africa.”23
Genocide Perspectives is about different voices. Colin’s writing voice is known
to people concerned about genocide all round the world. Now, wherever they
20 John Maynard, personal correspondence, November 16, 2016.
21 Tatz, Human Rights, 41–42.
22 Ibid., 257.
23 “Colin Tatz,” by Richard Fidler.
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are, they can hear his unforgettable speaking voice as well. It will make the
same impression it immediately made on me 30 years ago, resonant and direct.
His radio interventions still resonate his national importance in Australia. In
this conversation he tells us about his early life and the way his values were
formed in South Africa—TONY BARTA
What I most admire about Colin’s work—as a writer, a “doer” (as he puts it)
and as a teacher—is the way he is present in it, the way his voice informs and
is informed by the content of what he says and does. To paraphrase Wallace
Steven: Colin is a man whose fine character passes through him like a thread
through a needle. Everything he does is stitched with its colour. To explain
why a “doer by nature” should have been a teacher for much of his life, Colin
refers to Elie Wiesel. Asked what anyone could do about the Holocaust Wiesel
replied, “one must teach and teach again”— RAIMOND GAITA
Although less than enamoured with the “excruciating elocution lessons” that
he endured as young boy,24 Colin encourages his students to practise and
develop their communication skills, to expel jargon, to use plain lan-
guage—especially when explaining complex subjects—and to craft their writ-
ing. He leads by example on each of these fronts. Colin’s alliterations inject
life into his prose: “Suicide is fraught with faith, fear, folk lore, demonology,
dogma, dread, mystery, secrecy, speculation and tradition.”25 He sharpens
focus by juxtaposing seemingly disparate descriptions: “At Mitzpe Ramon
[Negev desert] we saw some spectacular ibex goats tip-toeing on precipices.
We also observed and talked to a few Russian immigrants trying to tip-toe into
life in a new and very different place and culture.”26 He is creative: who else
would describe a cardiac operation as “a cross between mediaeval butchery
and Belgian tapestry making!”27 He playfully exposes the follies of his oppo-
nents: Professor Goldney, a prolific writer on suicide, “embraces the real estate
slogan of ‘location, location, location’ when he calls suicide ‘depression, de-
pression, depression.’ ”28 Above all, Colin marries lucid and vivid writing with
a sharp eye and ear to capture profound insights. The following account of an
24 Tatz, Human Rights, 39.
25 Colin Tatz, “Suicide and Sensibility,” Death Studies, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
07481187.2017.1333358
26 Tatz, Human Rights, 342–43.
27 Ibid., 287.
28 Tatz, “Suicide and Sensibility.”
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exchange in the foyer of the Moree bowling club in rural New South Wales
illustrates Colin’s view that sport is a “passport to respect”:
A very short, very fat Aboriginal bowler, complete with bowls case and
creams, approached a very blue-rinse matron, visibly, undoubtedly a Na-
tional Party conservative: “Heather, would you care to play with me in the
mixed next month?” he asked. “Harold, I’d be delighted,” was the unhesi-
tating reply.29
Irrespective of whether they agree with Colin’s arguments, peer reviewers al-
most universally praise his style with phrases such as “dramatic,” “sharp,”
“enthusiastic,” “passionate,” “poignant and powerful,” “forcefully argued,”
“thought provoking” and “compelling.”30 Perhaps the ultimate accolade for
style and presentation comes from Israel Charny, Executive Director of the
Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide (Jerusalem), who describes The Mag-
nitude of Genocide as “an amazingly readable intellectual tour de force. Rarely
have I seen the dread topic of genocide addressed so humanely and interestin-
gly. Strangely, this is even a book to enjoy.”31
Curriculum development is one area of Colin’s teaching that warrants
comment. He has been a prominent advocate for courses about Aboriginal
Australians in contemporary society, antisemitism and the Holocaust in uni-
versities and teachers’ colleges. Aboriginal activist, and Australia’s first Abo-
riginal magistrate, Pat O’Shane, observes that in the 1960s Colin “fought a one
person battle” to bring Aboriginal Australians into the curriculum beyond such
traditional discussions as prehistoric and historical artefacts.32 In the 1980s
and 1990s he advocated for teaching genocide and Holocaust studies. His ac-
counts illuminate the nature of this advocacy and, in particular, the inordinate
energy expended on advancing pedagogical justifications and translating them
into (typically bland and lifeless) administrative and bureaucratic goals, ob-
29 Colin Tatz, Obstacle Race: Aborigines in Sport (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1995),
257.
30 Gill Cowlishaw, review of Aborigines and Uranium and Other Essays, Mankind 14, no. 3 (1984), 236;
Bret Harris, review of Obstacle Race, Australian Aboriginal Studies 1 (1996), 71; Rob Hess, review of Obstacle
Race, Victorian Bulletin of Sport and Culture 5 (1995), 17; Robert Goldney, “Is Aboriginal Suicide Different? A
Commentary on the Work of Colin Tatz,” Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 9, no. 2 (2002), 257; Sam Garkawe,
review of With Intent to Destroy, Current Issues in Criminal Justice 17, no. 1 (2005), 164 and 166; Emma
Kowal, review of Aboriginal Suicide is Different, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 30, no.
4 (2006), 394. See also Pat O’Shane, review of Race Politics in Australia, Australian Quarterly 51, no. 3 (1979),
114; Sally Weaver, review of Race Politics in Australia, Aboriginal History 4, no. 2 (1980), 223; Joseph Reser,
“What Does It Mean to Say That Aboriginal Suicide Is Different?” Australian Aboriginal Studies 2 (2004), 34.
31 The Magnitude, back cover.
32 O’Shane, review of Race Politics, 110.
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jectives and mission statements, lobbying peers and colleagues for support,
mobilising resources, and negotiating compromises in the hotly contested and
highly charged political environment of higher education.33
I worked with Colin primarily during my tenure as Education Director at the
Sydney Jewish Museum. An enduring memory I have of Colin was his absolute
commitment to teaching the difficult topics of Holocaust and genocide to sec-
ondary school teachers. Despite a demanding academic schedule and many
other commitments, Colin was so convinced of the importance of this work
that he undertook these initiatives voluntarily. His dedication and passion
for educating at all levels was palpable to all who attended these seminars.
His contribution will resound as the next generation of teachers undertake
their work, enriched by the knowledge conveyed so expertly and movingly by
Colin—AVRIL ALBA
Curriculum changes invariably ruffle the feathers of academic conservatives.
Proposals for change may be couched in the scholarly jargon of evidence and
objectivity but they are no less biased and barbed. Colin constantly confronted
this conservatism. In several places he tells the story of the colleague who
asked him how he would balance his presentations of genocide. Never slow,
Colin retorted that “there could be no such thing as a pro-genocide viewpoint”
and that he would never give an ex-Nazi camp Kommandant the opportunity to
lecture to his students.34 Advocacy slides into activism in such circumstances;
in the context of genocide this is particularly apt. Activism is commensu-
rate with Colin’s anti-racism project. Tony Barta puts activism at the fore of
Colin’s work: “Out of the dire South African environment [Colin] brought to
Australia his ability, and passion, to make everything he wrote a political in-
tervention. He made sport an activist concept. He made Aboriginal Affairs an
activist site. So Lemkin’s activist concept found in Colin Tatz the kind of ac-
tivism that made his intellectual contribution count for so much.”35
Activist
Activism typically evokes discomfort in the academy where it is widely
deemed incompatible with detached reflection and scholarly objectivity and
33 Tatz, Human Rights, 273–84.
34 Ibid., 277. See also Tatz, “Breaking the Membrane,” 207.
35 Tony Barta, personal correspondence, May 10, 2016.
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integrity. Of course, these traits are more closely associated with the positivist
philosophies and methods of the hard natural sciences that conceptualise
truths as independent realities that can be counted, calculated, computed,
measured and weighed. By contrast, researchers in the social sciences and
humanities, who opine about social phenomena, and the structural and ideo-
logical forces that bear on them as well as the overt political struggles that
they entail, are more receptive to truths as the social products of contextu-
alisation, historicisation and reason. These are Colin’s primary “sources of
knowledge, of discerning and perceiving.” Reasoning, he explains, provides
the means by which to identify “paradoxes and contradictions between stated
aims and actual behaviour,” to reveal “inconsistencies, why are they present,
and how [to encourage] people . . . to see, even accept, the need for reasoned
congruence.”36
Reasoning is political, moral, and an element of activism. Citing the
Hungarian-born scholar of politics Robert Berki, Colin declared that:
political thought is not only descriptions and explanations in the so-called
neutral sense, but also . . . evaluations and advocacies: “they are factual
statements, philosophical arguments and value judgments all at the same
time.” Further, “they are consequential: their importance reaches into the
realm of future alternatives. They pronounce on the morality, the rights and
wrongs of actions connected with changing or maintaining the character of
the state.” Those are the “visions” of political (science) workers: they are
also mine.37
By its very nature, political and moral reasoning compels researchers to insert
themselves into their research, to make clear their judgements and values, and
to assign responsibility. These practices resound in Colin’s writings. “My bias
is clear,” he affirms in Obstacle Race, his major treatise on racism in Aus-
tralian sport:
it is pro-Aboriginal in most things and anti-racist in all things. I am not po-
litically correct and do criticise some Aboriginal attitudes and behaviour.
Every effort is made to be meticulous about matters of fact, but I cannot
hide my anger or frustration at facts that by their nature embody either evil,
moral turpitude or professional negligence.38
36 Colin Tatz, “Criticism of Criticism: A Reply to Thiele,” Mankind 14, no. 5 (1984), 401.
37 Ibid.
38 Tatz, Obstacle Race, 8.
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Such statements have brought charges of polemics. Colin does not recoil.
“Yes, I am a ‘polemical scientist,’ ” he told one critic: “[I] engage in contro-
versial discussion or argument, attacking or refuting the opinions of others. I
have spent a lifetime controverting the doctrines and belief systems of many,
especially in the fields of race relations and genocide studies.”39
Colin is unwaveringly committed to frank engagement with justice and social
equity. His scholarship in race relations and genocide studies has been all the
more rigorous and energetic for this commitment, which ultimately rests on a
fierce fidelity to truth. While truth-seeking has won him a well-deserved in-
ternational reputation as an intellectual, it has also attracted the toxic enmity
of those who have a vested interest in untruth. The latter have included revi-
sionist “historians” of Australian race relations, the Turkish government in its
century-old struggle to obliterate the memory of the Armenian Genocide, and
lunar-right bloggers. Colin has drawn their fire because he has not contented
himself with academic publications—he has also sought to publicise his find-
ings and arguments, thus becoming an un-ignorable public intellectual. One
with the moral fibre to stand up to the inevitable thuggish hostility—WINTON
HIGGINS
Colin readily assigns responsibility. In The Magnitude of Genocide he and
Winton Higgins blame the West for the “lion’s share” of genocide in the
twentieth century and for “replenishing” the “swamps” in which genocide con-
tinues to “fester” in the Middle East and North Africa.40 While many activists
stop short of solutions, Colin is always alert to answers. Genocide prevention
may have attracted little attention from scholars,41 but he proposes an inter-
national agency to identify potential politicides, ethnocides and genocides. Of
course, he is the first to acknowledge that any solution will require the politi-
cal will to act.42
Colin’s activism has not hinged on criticism. He also employs celebration.
This is strikingly evident in his encouragement of Aboriginal Australians
to celebrate their sporting successes achieved despite colossal obstacles in-
cluding, inter alia, “geography, isolation, incarceration, prejudice, racism,
alienation, exclusion, children stolen.”43 Significantly, Colin did not just en-
39 Colin Tatz, “Rejoinder to ‘Is Aboriginal Suicide Different?’ A Commentary on the Work of Colin Tatz,”
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 9, no. 2 (2002), 260–61.




courage; he also acted, conducting research to prove these achievements and
helping to compile the inaugural Aboriginal and Islander Sports Hall of Fame
to highlight the accomplishments.44 Colin published the research and the Hall
of Fame in Obstacle Race; he and son Paul subsequently twice updated the
Hall in Black Diamonds (1996) and Black Gold (2000).45
Obstacle Race articulates the three pillars of Colin’s activist project: cri-
tique, celebration and scholarship. Colin is at his critical best in the opening
chapters, exposing the fallacies, myths, untruths, inconsistencies and
hypocrisy of Australia’s anti-Aboriginal racist alliance of miners, pastoralists,
big business, conservative politicians, lobbyists and policy advisers, newspa-
per editors, columnists and talk-back radio hosts. The final chapter, “Aborigi-
nal and Islander Sports Hall of Fame,” bestows dignity on the best Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander athletes and helps restore confidence among vic-
tims of racism. Between these two bookends Colin showcases his research
skills. Some dozen chapters describe, analyse and evaluate the circumstances
of around 1,200 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander athletes and entire com-
munities within the contexts of a “welfare” system and public prejudice. The
historian of sport, Rob Hess, rightly calls this research, based in part on visits
to 80 Aboriginal communities across Australia, “a considerable feat.”46
Obstacle Race won the non-fiction section of the 1995 Australian Human
Rights Awards and received glowing peer reviews. Hess recommended it
as “essential reading for all historians” and the Australian Studies scholar
Daryl Adair later acknowledged that Colin’s research in this field “has been
instrumental” in raising “awareness of the extent of discrimination against
Aboriginal people in Australian sport, past and present.”47 Clearly, Colin has
achieved his goals as an activist scholar.48 But a scholar is judged on more than
unearthing facts and raising awareness. While there is much ambiguity about
43 Tatz, Human Rights, 287.
44 For details of the selectors, see Colin Tatz and Daryl Adair, “Darkness and a Little Light: ‘Race’ and Sport
in Australia,” Australian Aboriginal Studies 2 (2009), 9.
45 Published by Allen & Unwin, and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies
respectively.
46 Hess, review of Obstacle Race, 17.
47 Ibid; Daryl Adair, “Indigenous Australians and Sport: Critical Reflections,” in Beyond C. L. R. James:
Shifting Boundaries of Race and Ethnicity in Sport, eds. John Nauright, Alan Cobley and David Wiggins (Fayet-
teville: University of Arkansas Press, 2014), 67. See also Richard Broome, review of Obstacle Race, Sporting
Traditions 12, no. 1 (1995), 175–77; Annemarie Jutel, review of Obstacle Race, Journal of Sport History 25,
no. 2 (1998), 335–57; Douglas Booth, review of Obstacle Race, International Journal of the History of Sport
12, no. 3 (1995), 202–04.
48 In 1997 Colin was awarded Officer of the Order of Australia (AO) for “service to the community through
research into social and legal justice for people disadvantaged by their race, particularly the Aboriginal commu-
nity, and to promoting the equal participation in community life of all Australians.”
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what precisely constitutes scholarship, in the following section I focus on the
form of Colin’s deep explanation of events and the reception of those explana-
tions by his peers.
Scholar
Colin defines himself as a contextual historian, “an action-oriented field-
worker” with “an anthropological and sociological bent, and a particular in-
terest in comparative analysis.”49 History is a cornerstone of Colin’s political
project. In his words, “if one wants to begin the very difficult journey of over-
coming racism, one has to start facing history, looking down the tunnel of
its ugliness, not dismissing it, orchestrating amnesia or sanitizing history.”50
Here, however, I am interested in the form of Colin’s historical practice.
The two most prominent forms of explanation in history are argument and
narrative. The latter contains a plot, a mode of organising evidence as a genre
of story (for example, romance, tragedy, comedy, satire) in order to “add
meaning—usually a moral meaning”—and to “wrap” the subject up “in an ac-
count . . . from which instruction can be derived.”51 Arguments often contain
key elements of a narrative such as the origins of the subject and conclusions
that contain moral lessons. Without a plot, however, the narrative dimensions
of an argument remain “impressionistic.”52 Colin occasionally veers into nar-
rative, particularly in his research into Aboriginal sport; mostly, he presents
his history as formist and contextualist arguments. The Magnitude of Genocide
contains both forms.
A formist explanation engages empirical evidence, rather than pre-formu-
lated concepts, in order to emphasise the unique, distinctive and peculiar, and
49 Tatz, Human Rights, 284.
50 Tatz, Obstacle Race, 159.
51 Hayden White, The Practical Past (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2014), 83. While
White deems the Holocaust “the most significant event in the internal history of the West in our time” (“The
Public Relevance of Historical Studies: A Reply to Dirk Moses,” History and Theory 44, no. 3 [2005],
337), he maintains that history is not especially well suited to establishing its meaning. He suggests that the
“significance” of the Holocaust—“its meaning, its relevance to us, today, tomorrow [and] for the next genera-
tion”—transcends “a discipline devoted to establishing ‘the facts of the matter.’ ” Consistent with his views that
narratives are more fundamental to representations of the past than evidence and that historians impose narra-
tives on the past, White argues that “better narratives,” “imagination and poetic insight,” rather than more facts,
are required if we are to “divine” the meaning of the Holocaust (“The Public Relevance,” 336 and 338). White
identifies Saul Friedländer’s The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945 (New York:
Harper Collins, 2007) as an exemplary ethical and intellectual representation of the Holocaust (White, Practical
Past, 76–92).
52 Hayden White, “The Structure of Historical Narrative,” Clio 1, no. 3 (1972), 6, 9 and 11. Arthur Danto
argues that even non-narrative forms of presentation, such as statistics and economics, are typically translated
into narratives. Arthur Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
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to avoid abstraction and reductionism.53 In The Magnitude of Genocide Colin
and Winton use comparison as a formist explanation for different grades of
genocide. While acknowledging that all genocides impose “seismic calami-
ties” on the victims, they argue that the term itself is “a single, flat word that
covers a spectrum of behaviours and processes.” Thus, one genocide is not the
same as another and analysis demands the differentiation of events according
to “type, scale, scope and intensity,” and “outcome and legacy.”54 The philos-
ophy of history is largely silent with regard to the rules of comparison other
than to note that cases should be culturally appropriate and share a common
context. In the end, comparison requires judgement, discernment and perspi-
cacity on the part of the researcher who is the final arbiter of what constitutes
an appropriate comparison.
Colin presents his best history as contextualist explanations, setting his sub-
jects, whether genocide, racism or sport, within clear contexts. Contextualist
explanations proceed from the assumption that “ ‘what happened’ . . . can be
accounted for by the specification of the functional interrelationships existing
among the agents and agencies . . . at a given time.”55 Establishing a con-
text is no simple task: one does not simply integrate every event and trend.
Rather, the art of contextualisation involves selecting particular “threads” and
joining these into “chains of provisional and restricted” explanations that con-
stitute a “manifestly ‘significant’ occurrence.” Advanced contextualisation
also means tracing the threads outward into the surrounding social environ-
ment in which the event occurred, and both backward and forward in time.
Tracing the threads backwards enables the scholar to determine the origins of
the event; tracing them forwards allows them to determine the impact or in-
fluence of the event on subsequent events. Contextualisation ends when the
“threads either disappear into the context of some other event or converge to
cause the occurrence of some new event.”56 Like comparison, contextualisa-
tion always involves judgements and distinguishing between the significant
and the insignificant.57
The Magnitude of Genocide contains powerful and persuasive examples of
53 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 13–17.
54 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, xiii and 7; Tatz, Human Rights, 261.
55 White, Metahistory, 18.
56 Ibid., 18–19. See also White, Practical Past, 90.
57 While contextualisation is primarily a matter of judgement, Arthur Marwick offers a model for a systematic
approach that opens the process to the broadest possible perspectives. Marwick’s model comprises four principal
components: major forces and constraints, events, human agents, and convergences and contingencies. Arthur
Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974 (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 23–25.
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systematic contextualisation such as locating the Holocaust in the context of
Germany’s response to the forces of modernisation. This piece of contextu-
alisation begins with a defective German state and a particularly reactionary
“ethnic version of nationalism and national identity” that nurtured antisemi-
tism. The First World War was a critical event that set the stage for the
Holocaust:
[It] exacerbated [Germany’s] social breakdown and administrative dislo-
cation; this, in turn, overwhelmed the fragile democratic republic that
replaced the second Reich, and ushered in the yet more disfigured Third
Reich. It pursued mass support by appealing to fanatical antisemitism.58
These events subsequently facilitated the rise of the key agents of the Holo-
caust, videlicet, the fascist movement and its Nazi elite, and provided them
with “both a camouflage and a pretext for . . . genocide.” The Holocaust also
involved a convergence between its agents and a number of emerging forces
associated with modernisation such as “ bureaucratic organization,” advanced
“technology and infrastructure,” a scientific culture built on “social engineer-
ing and the dehumanization of victims,” and a mass media that pacified and
lulled the broader population into “moral indifference.”59 Venturing toward the
literary style of a meaningful narrative, Colin and Winton conclude that “if
any event deserves the title ‘a modern tragedy’—or better still, ‘a tragedy of
modernization’—[the Holocaust] is it.”60
Beyond history, Colin champions multidisciplinarity. “To probe genocide,”
he and Winton write, “we need the analytical tools of several humanities and
social science disciplines, as well as some from the natural sciences, medi-
cine, and law.”61 A notable element of Colin’s penchant for multidisciplinarity
is his criticism of narrowly constituted research bogged in jargon and con-
stricted and constricting social theory; in these regards anthropologists and
medical researchers are prime targets.62 Some scholars in turn have questioned
the absence of theory in Colin’s work.63 Others, such as Tim Rowse, note that
58 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 78.
59 Ibid., 84–85.
60 Ibid., 78. White, however, argues that the Holocaust poses unique problems of historical representation.
See Note 51 above.
61 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 8.
62 Colin Tatz, Aborigines and Uranium and Other Essays (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1982), 3. For example,
see Colin Tatz, “Aboriginality as Civilisation,” Australian Quarterly 52, no. 3 (1980), 362; Tatz, “Rejoinder
to ‘Is Aboriginal Suicide Different?’ ” 260–261; Tatz, Human Rights, 302; Colin Tatz, “Innovation Without
Change: Suicide Prevention is Going Nowhere,” +61j, March 19, 2016, www.plus61j.net.au.
63 For example, see S. J. Thiele, “Anti-intellectualism and the ‘Aboriginal Problem’: Colin Tatz and the ‘Self
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Colin’s research involves “strategic evaluations” and political objectives, not
theoretical positioning, while Robert Orr, Special Counsel at the Australian
Government Solicitor, makes the pertinent observation that Colin wants to rise
above “easy or accepted answers” and has no qualms querying “group enthu-
siasm for fashionable trends.”64 Colin’s editorship of Genocide Perspectives
[I–IV] offers perhaps the clearest evidence of his engagement with theory. Ju-
rist and academic, The Honourable Michael Kirby, who launched Genocide
Perspectives IV and whose work appears in this volume, praises the journal for
its “outstanding contributions” to “both the theoretical and practical issues of
genocide: past, present and potential.”65
By any measure of assessment, Colin’s scholarship is deep, rigorous, log-
ical and systematic. It has been scrutinised and acknowledged for its impact
by peers such as Michael Kirby and John Maynard; it has contributed to social
knowledge and debate across a wide range of fields including the politics of
race, Holocaust and genocide studies, youth suicide studies, migration studies
and sport history.66 For purely illustrative purposes, I single out four of Colin’s
contributions. I begin with his definition of genocide as a biological solution
to social, political or religious problems. As discussed above, this definition
has facilitated a new paradigm of racism that is contributing to a richer un-
derstanding of the term and its deadly consequences. The second contribution
involves Colin’s mediation in the international legal definition of genocide
that includes a broad range of acts from physical killings, to removal of chil-
dren, preventing births, and causing mental harm to a group. Responding to
the breadth of these acts, Colin proposes different levels of culpability, like the
laws around murder in the United States. Under this schema the law would
recognise “first degree” genocide for acts such as mass murder, second degree
genocide for less serious acts, and other lower degrees for even lesser acts.
Thus, while removal of children from their families would still be considered
genocide, such acts would be legally distinguished from the mass slaughters
associated with the Holocaust and Rwanda.67 There are two particular merits
in this position. First, it intellectually disposes of comparative trivialisations
Determination’ Approach,” Mankind 14, no. 3 (1984), 170–72 and 177; Christopher Anderson and Ian Keen,
“On the Notion of Aboriginality,” Mankind 15, no. 1 (1985), 42, 43 and 44.
64 Ibid., 45; Orr, review of Human Rights, 27.
65 Michael Kirby, personal correspondence, July 1, 2016. Kirby was the Chancellor at Macquarie University
between 1984 and 1993; he presented me with my PhD in 1993.
66 In early 2016 Colin’s curriculum vitae included 11 sole-authored books, five co-authored books, seven
edited books, 75 chapters in books and 112 journal articles.
67 Colin Tatz, Genocide in Australia, Canberra Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Studies, Research Discussion Paper Number 8, 1999, 28-32; Tatz, Unthinkable Genocide; Tatz, With Intent,
146.
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such as comparisons of My Lai (Vietnam) with Auschwitz (Germany). “If
everything that results in the killing of more than a handful of people is geno-
cide,” Colin argues, “then nothing is genocide. There is no need for the word,
the idea, the crime or its analysis.”68 Second, it offers a potential solution for
dealing with some of the legal issues around genocide, including restitution
for victims and their families.
Highlighting the role of the law in fostering social change is another area
where Colin has contributed to social knowledge. This is no idealistic posi-
tion proffered from an ivory tower. Colin fully acknowledges that the “law
has been, and will continue to be, an impediment” to social change, empow-
erment, and access to rights and dignity. Nonetheless, he correctly identifies
sets of laws that have had positive effects on social behaviour. These include
laws that prohibit discrimination, allow for positive discrimination (for exam-
ple, affirmative action), establish “protective legal incorporations” and provide
“recourse to civil law.”69
Finally, Colin has shown that there are different cultural values and beliefs
around suicide. He argues that indigenous values warrant a “contextual an-
thropology” to first understand the acute sense of helplessness that fuels the
problem and second, to generate targeted solutions (such as personal em-
powerment, literacy training, highlighting positive role models, anchoring
communities in their own histories).70 Colin’s research in this area has brought
him into sharp conflict with the medical profession, which insists that suicide
is a medical problem grounded in depression, mental ill health, genetic tenden-
cies and chemical imbalances.71 But it has won him more academic plaudits.
Damien Riggs, for example, believes that Colin has demonstrated “that In-
digenous suicide is indeed ‘different’ . . . to non-Indigenous suicide,” and
commends his work for its “original and cutting edge approaches” with respect
to “intervening in, or alleviating, suicide within Indigenous communities.”72
Thus far I have touched on Colin the teacher, activist and scholar. What
of Colin the person? In concluding this article, I draw attention to the verve,
exuberance, grace and humour of a man who thinks about, teaches and finds
68 Ibid., 147.
69 Tatz, Race Politics, 49 and 52; Tatz, Genocide in Australia, 31. Interestingly, Sir Graham Latimer, former
president of the New Zealand Māori Council, believed that the New Zealand courts had been instrumental in
getting Māori and Pakeha talking to one another. Neville Glasgow, interview by Sir Graham Latimer, Te Ahi
Kaa, Radio New Zealand, June 12, 2016, http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/teahikaa.
70 Tatz, “Suicide and Sensibility.”
71 For example, Goldney, “Is Aboriginal Suicide Different?” 259.
72 Damien Riggs, review of “Aboriginal Suicide is Different,” Australian Aboriginal Studies 2 (2005), 83.
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inspiration in genocide. “Clearly,” as one reviewer laconically puts it, “this is
not everyone’s cup of tea.”73
Conclusion
Colin immerses himself in genocide and suicide. Yet neither subject subsumes
him. On the contrary, he retains a keen sense of perspective. An insight into
this dimension emerges from his comments on life in the Centre for Compar-
ative Genocide Studies where, amid reflections on death, there was “warmth,
camaraderie, even excitement” and “insider jokes” that helped relieve some of
the suffering and “ever-present tears.”74 Colin is also pragmatic. While justifi-
ably confident that his words have improved the “understanding” of genocide
among “many students and members of the public,” he makes no claims to
having alleviated, much less prevented, the crime.75 He disagrees with Chris-
tian notions of justice founded on “guilt, admission, absolution, expiation,”
that include “a prohibition on any criminal or civil action against the con-
fessed perpetrator by the family of the deceased.” Nonetheless, he concedes
that the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example,
is a “reasonable compromise” between those who wanted a Nuremburg-type
trial and those who wanted nothing.76 Notwithstanding the acquittal of three
Australians for war crimes in the late 1990s, Colin places “more value on
the evidence that emerges from trials than on conviction and punishment.”77
“Trial,” he said in his inaugural Abraham Wajnryb Memorial Lecture in 1994:
is an articulation by the state that an evil of some kind is believed to have
occurred. . . . Trial is about as much of a public declaration as we can get
that there are moral and ethical values which society wishes, or needs, to
sustain. Trial records . . . are . . . infinitely more powerful educative tools
about contemporary social and political history than the passive voice and
indirect speech of history texts.78
73 Garkawe, review of With Intent, 166.
74 Tatz, Human Rights, 278.
75 Tatz, With Intent, 184.
76 Tatz, “Breaking the Membrane,” 208.
77 Tatz, Human Rights, 280.
78 Colin Tatz, “Reflections on the Politics of Remembering and Forgetting: The First Abraham Wajnryb
Memorial Lecture, 1994” (North Ryde, NSW: Centre for Comparative Genocide Studies, Macquarie University,
1995), 31–32.
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Colin plunges to the depths of genocide and suicide but an intense and wide-
ranging curiosity means that, paradoxically, he also dives head first into life.
Love of and engagement with life shines through Colin’s accounts and sto-
ries of his experiences. He injects intense feelings into his descriptions of new
places, sights—architecture, customs, geography—sounds and tastes.79 Hu-
mour is a constant companion. At the 2003 Canadian Association for Suicide
Prevention conference in Iqaluit (Baffin Island), the roads on the banks of Fro-
bisher Bay were “simply frost with soil covering” and “some wag had planted
a road sign in the permafrost: ‘Beware of the Kangaroos.’ ”80 Reflecting on
his humour, Colin writes, “to be funny, you first have to think sad. And seeing
how much of my life has been about things that are sad, I do see the funny
side—or at least part of it, part of the time.”81
In the final chapter of his memoir, Colin discusses his Jewish identity.
He refers to the ethnic and intellectual traditions to which he feels strongly
attached, and he highlights the concept of tikkun olam in which one is “com-
pelled to try to repair a flawed world.”82 Tikkun Olam invokes considerable
debate within Judaism but as a moral dictate to make the world a better place
through your own actions, it has framed Colin’s life. All of us who have been
taught by Colin, worked with him, read his words, listened to him or sought
his advice, and especially those who have been championed by him, have ben-
efitted from his unyielding commitment to this commandment.
79 For example, see Tatz, Human Rights, 259, 333 and 336.
80 Ibid., 335.









Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Bringing
Them Home Report)2 was released in 1997. It represented a crucial break-
through in exposing the system of forced removals and placements of Abo-
riginal and Torres Strait Islander children from colonial times to the present,
across all Australian colonies, states and territories. The report caused an un-
precedented outpouring of public shock, grief and shame that was followed
by counter-attacks on the veracity of the findings, igniting one of the nation’s
most emotional and toxic public debates. This is all well known to us, or is
it? 20 years on, it is time for Australians to join with members of the Stolen
Generations and their families in assessing the nation’s response to the report’s
findings and its 54 recommendations. In this essay I reflect on the backstory
and reception of the report, the remembering and forgetting of what happened,
and the continued fragmenting of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander fami-
lies in the present day.
Recalling the Bringing Them Home Report
The Bringing Them Home Report was destined for controversy on several
counts. The nation was rocked by its findings of an endemic system of forced
child removals and placements in institutions, foster homes, adoptive families
1 This essay draws on my own research, in particular: Anna Haebich, “Indigenous Child Removal and
Settler Colonialism: An Historical Overview,” Australian Indigenous Law Review 19, no. 1 (2015), 20–31;
Anna Haebich, “Forgetting Indigenous Histories: Cases from Australia’s Stolen Generations,” Journal of Social
History 44, no. 4 (2011), 1034–43, 1035.
2 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry
into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (Canberra: Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997).
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and forced employment, and the extent of the system through time and in all
states and colonies:
Nationally we can conclude with confidence that between one in three and
one in ten Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families
and communities in the period from approximately 1910 until 1970. In cer-
tain regions and in certain periods the figure was undoubtedly much greater
than one in ten. In that time not one Indigenous family has escaped the ef-
fects of forcible removal (confirmed by representatives of the Queensland
and WA Governments in evidence to the Inquiry). Most families have been
affected, in one or more generations, by the forcible removal of one or more
children.3
The findings revealed systematic racial discrimination, practised by targeting
children of mixed descent. This system did not reflect the standards and
practices legislated by state governments to protect the best interests of chil-
dren. Evidence from over 500 testimonies showed forced removal and the
emotional, physical and sexual abuse of children who were denied family,
language, culture, country and their sense of identity and belonging. The trans-
generational legacy for individuals, families and communities was presented
in stories told to the Inquiry of family breakdown, ongoing medical, psycho-
logical and emotional problems, addictive behaviours, incarceration, violence,
self-harm and suicide.
Sympathisers shed genuinely felt tears, made their apologies, and called
for a national apology to ensure a safe future for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander children and families. A people’s movement emerged, expressed in
the advent of an annual national Sorry Day on May 26, and public signings of
Sorry Books occurred, while Journeys of Healing and reconciliation marches
in major cities were undertaken. Given the depth of public sorrow, it is painful
to read Tony Birch’s troubling observations on the passing nature of non-Abo-
riginal responses to the Bringing Them Home Report. Birch writes that:
a reaction for and of the moment allowed “colonial listeners confronted
with a narrative of their own violence . . . to simultaneously absorb and
purge themselves of trauma.” This outcome lacks the ethic of responsibility,
reflecting Slavoj Žižek’s observation that “in order to forget an event, we
must first summon up the strength to remember it properly.”4
3 Human Rights, Bringing Them Home, 30.
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Meanwhile, Birch continues, Indigenous communities were left to “carry
alone the burden of being left to live with the sense of injustice” and the
weighty responsibility of remembering the past.5
Remembering “properly” became increasingly difficult in the vitriolic pub-
lic debate that emerged. Media reports of attacks on the credibility of the
Bringing Them Home Report began to eclipse accounts of public goodwill.
Denialists questioned the primacy and authority given by the Inquiry to the
truths of Indigenous testimony as the official voice of Stolen Generations
history. They challenged the credibility of evidence not given under oath
and claimed witnesses were repeating circulating variations of a “constructed
Stolen Generations narrative” originating in research conducted in the 1980s
by historian Peter Read.6 The newly-elected conservative Prime Minister, John
Howard, had reluctantly inherited the Report, introduced by the Keating Labor
government in 1995. Howard allowed the critics free reign and, with his min-
isters, openly supported claims that children were rescued from physical and
moral danger, and treated humanely by standards of the time. He rejected any
generational responsibility for practices sanctioned by previous governments.
Some accused Howard of playing the race card to denigrate the report and split
the nation. Whatever his immediate political purpose, the lasting effect was to
create a culture of denial and recrimination that irrevocably disfigured public
debate on the issue.
The report’s use of the language of international human rights and geno-
cide served to further polarise public debate. United Nations instruments
included in the report are the “Declaration of Human Rights” and the “Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”;
the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repara-
tion for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” (“van Boven Princi-
ples”); and the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide” (the “Genocide Convention”). The report found evidence of gross
violation of human rights and systematic racial discrimination that continued
after Australia had endorsed the United Nations Declarations of Human Rights
4 Tony Birch, “ ‘I Could Feel it in My Body’: War on a History War,” Transforming Cultures Journal 1, no. 1
(2006), 19.
5 Tony Birch, “ ‘The First White Man Born’: Contesting the ‘Stolen Generations’ in Australia,” in Imagining
Australia: Literature and Culture in the New World, eds. Jan Ryan and Chris Wallace-Crab (Cambridge, MA:
University Committee in Australian Studies, 2004), 106.
6 Bain Attwood, “Learning about the Truth: The Stolen Generations Narrative,” in Telling Stories: Indigenous
History and Memory in Australia and New Zealand, eds. Bain Attwood and Fiona Magowan (Crows Nest,
NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 183.
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and the abolition of racial discrimination as a member of the United Nations
in 1945:
Official policy and legislation for Indigenous families and children was
contrary to accepted legal principle imported into Australia as British com-
mon law and, from late 1946, constituted a crime against humanity. It
offended accepted standards of the time and was the subject of dissent and
resistance. The implementation of the legislation was marked by breaches
of fundamental obligations on the part of officials and others to the detri-
ment of vulnerable and dependent children whose parents were powerless
to know their whereabouts and protect them from exploitation and abuse.7
From the “van Boven Principles” the report created a detailed road map for
governments to follow in responding to the report.8 These principles advo-
cated a full range of reparation measures, including restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, a formal national acknowledgment of responsibility, guarantees
against repetition, measures for restitution of land, culture and language, re-
habilitation of those individuals, families and communities affected, monetary
compensation through a national tribunal, and an apology. These recommen-
dations panicked Prime Minister Howard, who feared a blowout of payments
consuming millions of dollars of government money. He announced that there
would be no apology and no compensation payouts. Six months after the re-
port’s release, the government introduced a four-year package of $63 million,
principally to address family separation and its consequences through fam-
ily support, parenting programmes and counselling services to be provided by
government departments and community organisations that had been giving
culturally appropriate expert services to members of the Stolen Generations
for decades.
One of the Bringing Them Home Report’s most controversial conclusions
was that the system of forced removal and placements of Aboriginal and Tor-
res Strait Islander children was a form of genocide:
Forcible removal was an act of genocide contrary to the “Convention on
Genocide” ratified by Australia in 1949. The “Convention on Genocide”
specifically includes “forcibly transferring children of [a] group to another
group” with the intention of destroying the group.9
7 Human Rights, Bringing Them Home, 275.
8 Ibid., 280–314.
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Genocide is not only the mass killing of a people. The essence of genocide
is acting with the intention to destroy the group, not the extent to which
that intention has been achieved. A major aim of the forcible removals was
to “absorb,” “merge” or “assimilate” Indigenous children into mainstream
Australian culture. Authorities may have also believed this was in the chil-
dren’s best interests; however, citing debates from the drafting of the Genocide
Convention, the Bringing Them Home Report argued that a “policy is still
genocide when it is motivated by a number of objectives. To constitute an
act of genocide the extermination of a group need not be solely motivated
by animosity or hatred.”10 This claim of genocide was inflammatory for most
Australians who were ignorant of the complexities and nuances of the con-
vention. For them, genocide signified the engineered mass race murders of the
Holocaust. The finding of genocide also coalesced with the bitter history war
over British colonisation on Australia’s colonial frontiers—was it peaceful and
benign, or violent and genocidal?
As a leading scholar of genocide, Colin Tatz made several important ob-
servations concerning genocide in the context of the Stolen Generations. He
noted Australia’s hysterical rejection of any association with genocide evident
in debates in Federal Parliament in 1949 that ratified the Genocide Conven-
tion. Tatz cited Labor member Leslie Haylen’s assertion that “the horrible
crime of genocide is unthinkable in Australia . . . [this] . . . arises from the fact
that we are a moral people.”11 Tatz explained:
As Australians see it, we can’t be connected to, or with, the stereotypes of
Swastika-wearing SS psychopaths, or crazed black tribal Africans. Apart
from Australia’s physical killing era, there are clear differences between
what those perpetrators did and what we did in assimilating people and re-
moving their children. But, images notwithstanding, we are connected by
virtue of what Raimond Gaita calls “the inexpungable moral dimension”
inherent in genocide, whatever its forms or actions.
Commenting on “genocide denialism, memory and the politics of apology,”
Tatz noted his concern with the politics and motives of those in power and
that “exploration of what propels these people might help to develop more ef-
fective strategies to deal with, or perhaps nullify, their activities.” Concerning
9 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, “Bringing Them Home Community Guide Update,”
December, 2007, http//:humanrights.gov.au.
10 Human Rights, Bringing Them Home, 238.
11 Colin Tatz, With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide (New York: Verso, 2003), 67–68.
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denialists at the highest levels of government in Australia, including “Prime
Minister John Howard, two ex-state premiers, several retired senior bureau-
crats, a small group of senior journalists and a quartet of academics with
scholastic credentials,” Tatz observed that their motives had “little in common
with the Holocaust denialists but they strongly echo and parallel the Turkish
denial industry.”12
Public debate reached extremes of hostility that threatened to leave the
integrity of the Bringing Them Home Report in tatters. Strategies of denial
and character assassination supported by the Howard government (and the
counter-attacks), polarised and confused public opinion causing many to avoid
the issue. In this toxic environment, the Commissioners of the Bringing Them
Home inquiry, Sir Ronald Wilson and Professor Michael Dodson, and even
the highly respected national Aboriginal leader Lowitja O’Donaghue OAM,
were publicly vilified. This drove many Aboriginal people back into a safe
but painful silence. In this context Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander artists
turned to the potent space of visual and performing arts to reflect on stories of
family separation.13 Their works highlight the productive ways that Aboriginal
people continue to recreate and take charge of the past: going beyond politics
and divisive debate to use creative art and performance to elicit affective re-
sponses that are otherwise difficult to achieve.
Prime Minister Howard must have felt vindicated for his stance by the ad-
verse court findings and media endorsement of two findings handed down
by the courts over two high profile Stolen Generations cases: Lorna Cubillo
and Peter Gunner suing the Commonwealth government for damages
(1996–1999), and Joy Williams’ compensation claim against the New South
Wales government (1994–2000).14 Howard did not escape censure by his
peers, however, and in 2000 the Senate Legal and Constitutional References
Committee Inquiry roundly condemned his stance in their Healing: A Legacy
of Generations Report.15 The Committee found that the government had failed
the Inquiry and its recommendations, and that Howard should show proper
leadership and supervision. They recommended the government begin by es-
tablishing a reparation tribunal, national memorial, national apology and a
12 Ibid., 122–23.
13 Anna Haebich, “A Potent Space: Witnessing Abuse and Violence through Visual Testimony,” in Volatile
Substance: The Pressure of the Past in Ireland and Australia, eds. Katie Holmes and Stuart Ward (Dublin: Irish
Academic Press, 2012), 104–24.
14 Richard Guilliatt, “Their Day in Court,” Sydney Morning Herald, November 20, 1999,
http://www.smh.com.au/national/their-day-in-court-20130526-2n51u.html.
15 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Healing: A Legacy of Generations Report (Can-
berra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000).
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national summit. Only a memorial to the Stolen Generations was added to
Reconciliation Place in Canberra in 2004.
When, after 11 years, Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd finally delivered
a national apology to the Stolen Generations, it was stripped of the interna-
tional human rights contexts that laid such heavy responsibilities on the nation.
These were conveniently forgotten, allowing the luxury of expressing sorrow
and remorse to the Stolen Generations without the threat of unpaid debts. The
word genocide was not mentioned. Most Aboriginal people generously ac-
cepted the apology as a gesture of goodwill. No Australian government, before
or since, has seriously attempted to address the moral obligations imposed by
the charges of genocide and gross violation of human rights. No definitive ac-
tion has been taken to stop separations. The nation has continued on, largely
untroubled by the debts still owed.
Reflecting on Aboriginal remembering and activism
Here I call up some of the past that Tony Birch reminds us was left for Abo-
riginal people to “carry alone.” The past discussed here is the many decades
of activism by Aboriginal leaders and families battling to save their children.
This history recounts the protesting and lobbying over many decades, a signif-
icant backstory to the Inquiry in 1995 and the Bringing Them Home Report.
This is still relatively unknown outside of Aboriginal communities. There are
important reasons to document these narratives of activism treasured by local
Aboriginal communities but lost in the fog of colonial amnesia. The retelling
honours the achievements of people who had to fight for their rights against
insurmountable odds and at great personal cost, often without achieving their
goals and being punished for their efforts instead. These stories of courage,
creativity and ingenuity can inspire community pride and further action. There
are lessons to learn from strategies for change that draw on Aboriginal values,
knowledge, experience and ways of working together for cultural healing.
These narratives may be from the past but they resonate with experiences of
injustice today. It is a truism that the past is never past in the recycling of in-
justices to settler colonies like Australia.
Patrick Wolfe argues that settler colonialism is not a distant moment in
history but is very much part of the present: “. . . settler colonialism is a struc-
ture, not an event.”16 It is a force set in motion to possess the land and its
resources, to exterminate or assimilate Indigenous peoples and their cultures,
16 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of
an Ethnographic Event (London: Cassel, 1999), 163.
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and to replace them with settler populations and colonial governance and cul-
ture. I add that Indigenous child removal is integral to both. There is some
room for movement in the system: settler colonialism can fluctuate—it con-
solidates and then kilters off centre, opening opportunities for change, only to
seek equilibrium again. Activists learn to act quickly; they can achieve incre-
mental change but the pendulum always swings back to the rigid centre. In the
meantime, they continue the groundwork for change.
Relocating entire communities to missions, settlements and reserve camps
has been colonial main business for centuries and activists have resisted and
protested in many ways against this intention to erase Indigenous populations
from the colonial landscape. Documenting this in Nyungar country I used the
term “incremental genocide” to describe governments’ cumulative punitive
initiatives and bungled outcomes that added to community racism and pushed
officers to ever more drastic interventions, culminating in the 1930s in the
genocidal policy of biological absorption to make the unwanted population
disappear altogether.17 There are many parallels with Raphael Lemkin’s “tech-
niques of genocide” that aim to destroy the “essential foundations of the life”
of human groups but not as a “coordinated plan,”18 and also with Tony Barta’s
account of “inevitable rather than intentional” consequences of “genocidal re-
lations” inherent in settler colonialism that make coexistence impossible.19 Yet
the Nyungar protest continued, even in this travesty of human rights, by re-
sisting removals, escaping from institutions, writing letters and petitions and
keeping culture and memories alive in covert gatherings. At Carrolup in the
late 1940s the children began creating sophisticated art works with potent new
meanings and messages for settler audiences, in the manner of the artists men-
tioned earlier. An official report in 1949 described their living conditions as
“barbarous,” “most unsatisfactory,” “unhygienic,” “evil smelling,” “wholly in-
adequate,” and “needs immediate rectification.” In these sorry circumstances
the children created beauty in pastel and acrylic works that recalled their mem-
ories of life in bush camps with their families and landscapes from rambles in
the bush around the settlement. They started the Carrolup art movement and
left enduring symbols for the Nyungar nation and the Stolen Generations.
A consequence of assimilation policy from the 1950s was the foundation of
an expanding new industry of government departments and non-government
agencies working with Indigenous children and families that brought greater
17 Cited in Anna Haebich, “ ‘Clearing the Wheat Belt’: Erasing the Indigenous Presence in the Southwest of
Western Australia,” in Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Aus-




surveillance of family life and more interventions to remove the children to
missions, foster homes and for adoption. One family’s experiences of the loss
and abuse of their children led to decades of trying to bring their children
home. In 2013 the family finally exposed their sorrows to public scrutiny in
a compensation case in Perth that showed the tenacity of official attitudes.
The elderly litigants, Donald and Sylvia Collard, explained to the court how
in 1959 Child Welfare officers took their baby from the local hospital without
their knowledge or consent, and two years later eight more of their children
were taken into state care.20 They were seasonal rural workers living in a camp
on the edge of a wheat belt town. Collards’ lawyers argued that the state gov-
ernment had breached its obligations and duty of care to the family and in the
process denied their children their biological parents, their natural familial re-
lationships and their cultural heritage, and that the children were exposed to
various forms of abuse, including isolation and trauma. The government ar-
gued it was “in the children’s best interest.” Mr. Collard told the court it was
due to racism, not “squalor and neglect.” They had lived in a racist society
with no Aboriginal Legal Service or any way to plead for their rights; “they
had no-one and nowhere to turn to.”21 The case was dismissed. The court ruled
that the removals and wardships were reasonable by standards of the time and
made for the children’s welfare; that the state was not subject to the fiduciary
duties alleged; that there was insufficient evidence of a policy of assimilation
using the wardship of children to force Indigenous people into white Aus-
tralian society; and that “all the decisions were in regard to their welfare.”
The decade of the 1970s marked a turning point for activists to make Abo-
riginal child removals a public issue. This came about through a combination
of new policies of self-determination and renewed Aboriginal activism, col-
laborations with non-Aboriginal supporters in positions of authority, and an
interested media following the 1967 referendum, all of this culminating in
1979 in the United Nations International Year of the Child. Of several con-
troversial cases in the media, it was events in Darwin in 1973 that exposed
polarised opinion about the placement of Aboriginal children with white fos-
20 Gerry Georgatos, “ ‘Nothing to Live For,’ Said Stolen Generations Father,” Stringer Independent News,
February 15, 2013, http://thestringer.com.au/nothing-to-live-for-said-stolen-generations-fa-
ther-3-444#.VhdE1qSEJJM; Gerry Georgatos, “WA Supreme Court in an Unbelievable Decision Dismisses
Stolen Generations Compensation Claim,” Stringer Independent News, December 29, 2013,
http://nationalunitygovernment.org/content/wa-supreme-court-unbelievable-decision-dismisses-stolen-
generations-compensation-claim.
21 “WA Supreme Court Dismisses Stolen Generation Compensation Claim Launched by the Collard Family,”
ABC News, June 10, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-20/stolen-generations-test-case-dismissed-in-
wa-court/5169640; “Stolen Generation Family Ordered to Pay Costs After ‘Test Case’ Fails in WA,” ABC News,
May 9, 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-09/stolen-generation-family-must-pay-court-costs/6457256.
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ter families.22 Bill Ryan, Director of the Northern Territory Legal Service and
a member of the Stolen Generations, together with social worker John Tom-
linson, audaciously removed an Aboriginal girl from foster care in Darwin
without official permission, boarded a small plane and returned the girl to
her family in a remote community. The media endorsed the department and
foster parents who had detained the girl for six and a half years despite the
fact that she was not a ward of the state and her parents’ repeated requests
for her return. Headlines exposed the depths of public ignorance, fantasising
the forced return of a “civilised miss” to a “stone age world” and marriage
to a middle-aged “promised husband.” The then Minister for Aboriginal Af-
fairs in the Whitlam government, Gordon Bryant, showed a refreshing new
stance when he announced that he would return all Aboriginal children in
foster care in the Northern Territory to their families. Nothing came of this
and in the end, Bryant, Ryan and Tomlinson were punished for their actions:
Bryant was dropped from the ministry, Ryan was dismissed as Director of
the Aboriginal Legal Service, and Tomlinson was demoted. The girl disap-
peared from the newspapers but Aboriginal leaders continued to protest. In
1974 Joe McGinness, President of the Federal Council of Aboriginal and Tor-
res Strait Islanders, called the official equating of Aboriginal family life with
neglect “an absolute insult to the Aboriginal people of Australia.” The new
National Aboriginal Consultative Committee demanded an inquiry into foster-
ing of Aboriginal children, but the matter was shelved.
Public memory of these sensational events may have been short but other
important structural changes were happening on the ground in new Aborig-
inal community service organisations. They were blazing a trail of activism
that would lead to the 1995 Inquiry. Legal representation by Aboriginal Legal
Aid Services meant that parental rights could now be supported in court. In
a landmark case in the Northern Territory Supreme Court in 1972, the judge
ruled in favour of returning a two-year-old boy placed with American fos-
ter parents to the “love of his mother and extended family in which, as he
grows older, he will probably feel more at home than with a white family.”23
In Melbourne, the Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service (VALS) documented
high rates of breakdown in adoptions of Aboriginal children—90 per cent be-
fore 1977—and related youth incarceration.24 Collaboration between Molly
Dyer from VALS and the National Adoption Conference, which led opposi-
22 Anna Haebich, Broken Circles: Fragmenting Indigenous Families, 1800–2000 (Fremantle WA: Fremantle
Arts Centre Press, 2000), 592–600.
23 Anna Haebich and Steve Mickler, A Boy’s Short Life: The Story of Warren Braedon/Louis Johnson
(Perth: University of Western Australia Publishing, 2013), 46.
24 Haebich, Broken Circles, 601.
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tion to forced adoption within white families, gave impetus to efforts to stop
forced Aboriginal adoptions. The lead up to the 1979 International Year of
the Child helped to progress the policy of indigenising child and family wel-
fare through vital meetings held with Indigenous organisations in the United
States and Canada funded by the federal Office of Child Care. By the late
1970s a range of Aboriginal organisations—Aboriginal Child Care Agencies,
Link-Up and the Secretariat of National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Child Care (formed in 1981)25—were already assisting with family reunions,
placements with Indigenous families, programmes for family maintenance,
and policies to sustain Aboriginal families and cultures. In 1986 the Aus-
tralian Law Reform Commission recognised Aboriginal customary family
law. By the 1990s the Aboriginal Child Care Placement Principle was oper-
ating in some jurisdictions.
The impetus for a government inquiry grew into a movement of lobbying
and political activism during the 1990s. In 1991 the Royal Commission into
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody announced causal links between child removal
and deaths in custody and alarming statistics of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander incarceration. In the following year Prime Minister Keating acknowl-
edged that “we took the children from their mothers” in his now iconic speech
at Redfern in Sydney. A large gathering at the 1994 Going Home Conference
in Darwin announced that “public ignorance of the history of forcible removal
of Aboriginal children was hindering the recognition of the needs of its vic-
tims, their families and the provision of services.”26 In May 1995, the Keating
Labor government appointed Sir Ronald Wilson and Professor Michael Dod-
son of the Human Rights Commission to lead the federal Inquiry into the
Separation of Indigenous Children from their Families.
Reflecting on white Australian forgetting
Most Australians claimed to be ignorant of practices of Aboriginal child re-
moval exposed by the Bringing Them Home Report. “I’m sorry I just didn’t
know,” sobbed a woman at the 1997 National Adoption Conference in Perth.27
Her heartfelt cry was echoed around the country. Inga Clendinnen, delivering
her Boyer Lecture Series True Stories in 1999, confessed, “I didn’t know any-
thing about the policy.”28 The claim not to have known is puzzling. Certainly,
25 Ibid., 600–11.
26 Coral Dow, “Sorry: The Unfinished Business of the Bringing Them Home Report,” Social Policy Section,
Parliament of Australia, February 4, 2008, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamen-
tary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/0708/BringingThemHomeReport.
27 Haebich, Broken Circles, 563.
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compelling forces operated to maintain social distance and limit the flow of
information. In most states and territories segregation had been enforced by
a combination of legal sanctions and informal “caste barriers.” These barri-
ers, however, were never impermeable. They were cut across by relations with
employers, shopkeepers, police and bureaucrats reporting to their ministers,
while the press picked up on the details. Child removals were discussed in the
public domain from early times and, as we have seen, there were sometimes
passionate public debates. There seemed to be a pattern of recurring surges of
“waking out of [and back into] forgetfulness,” to paraphrase Roland Barthes.29
This conundrum of otherwise informed people “not knowing” that emerged
publicly in response to the report has driven my studies of institutionalised
denial, national forgetting, ignorance and racism, to find out, not as Henry
Reynolds asked “Why weren’t we told?,” but how so many people could
claim not have known about the Stolen Generations. This collective Australian
amnesia seems particularly cruel in the context of denialists’ rebuttal and de-
rision of Stolen Generations’ remembering of their own personal experiences
of trauma.
Australians’ ability to forget when it comes to Indigenous history has not
gone unnoticed by scholars. In his 1968 Boyer Lectures W.E.H. (Bill) Stan-
ner described this as:
a structural matter, a view from a window which has been carefully placed to
exclude a whole quadrant of the landscape. What may have begun as a simple
matter of forgetting of other possible views turned under habit and over time
into something like a cult of forgetfulness practised on a national scale.30
More recently Tatz wrote of the “major tributary of forgetting, which claim[s]
that there was nothing to remember in the first place.”31 Raimond Gaita argued
that in the past colonists were “often culpably ignorant of the wrong done
to Aborigines because, in racist ways, they were blind to their full human-
ity.”32 There are also insights from studies of bystander amnesia and denial
of genocide in post-war Germany; for example, the seemingly contradic-
28 Inga Clendinnen, “Lecture 4: Inside the Contact Zone,” True Stories: Boyer Lectures, ABC Radio National,
December 5, 1999, http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/ boyerlectures/lecture-4-inside-the-contact-
zone-part-1/3562462#transcript.
29 Haebich, Broken Circles, 565.
30 W.E.H. (Bill) Stanner, After the Dreaming: Black and White Australians - An Anthropologist’s View (Sydney:
Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1968), 24–25.
31 Cited in Anna Haebich, “ ‘Between Knowing and Not Knowing’: Public Knowledge of the Stolen Gener-
ations,” Aboriginal History 25 (2002), 75.
32 Ibid., 71.
37
tory comments of Gordon Horwitz that “genocide cannot happen without a
majority of passive bystanders” and of Jean Baudrillard that “forgetting the
extermination is part of the extermination itself.”33
In his analysis of national collective memory, Paul Connerton argues that
forgetting encompasses several different functional processes. I adapted his
analysis to explore how the processes might seek to erase collective memory
of the Aboriginal past: the powerful master narratives that extolled white
progress and denied Aboriginal humanity; the ruthless practices to force Abo-
riginal people to forget their own histories of activism; the pressures to forget
injustices that challenged the nation’s history and identity; the public’s overt
concern and then desire to forget injustices that seemed to be distant and yet
their responsibility; and their turning away so that the issue remained forever
unresolved.34 It was, however, Nancy Tuana’s discussion of the social signifi-
cance of ignorance and Charles Mills’ analysis of the racial contract that made
the link for me between forgetting, ignorance, racism and behaviour. Tuana
argues that ignorance is not a simple matter of failure or omission, an ab-
sence that we will overcome as we push out the boundaries of research and
experience. Rather, it is “often constructed, maintained, and disseminated and
is linked to issues of cognitive authority, doubt, trust, silencing, and uncer-
tainty.”35 To our analyses of why we know we should add epistemologies of
ignorance to account for our lack of knowledge about particular phenomena.
Looking at the Stolen Generations I could see that forgetting and ignorance
are never benign: they both do things.36 Ignorance breeds in a forgetful climate
of not knowing by bestowing value on misinformation and failing to question
its truthfulness. In a world of separation and suspicion of the other, hearsay
and imaginings can easily become fact. Repeated by government and the me-
dia, misinformation assumes an aura of authority and authenticity. Specific
groups can be defined and stereotyped on the basis of these misinformed at-
tributes, which can then be used to rationalise and normalise discriminatory
treatment of members of the group. There is an easy slippage between a mind-
set that promotes the distancing and dehumanising of racial groups, and the
acceptance and normalising of their unequal treatment. In the process, dis-
criminatory practices become normalised to the extent that they are rendered
unremarkable and virtually invisible to the wider society, even as they may as-
33 Ibid., 73.
34 Anna Haebich, “Forgetting Indigenous Histories: Cases from the History of Australia’s Stolen Genera-




sume increasingly harsh forms. Large numbers of people can tacitly support
these processes without fully acknowledging the meaning of what they are do-
ing. This is not peripheral but is an integral part of the oppression of others
to which they contribute directly or indirectly. This state is powerful and ob-
stinate, persisting in the face of circulating knowledge, observable evidence,
personal encounters and even public protests that might emerge. Mills argues
that these steps lead to the “ironic outcome” where the perpetrators of prej-
udice and discrimination “fail to recognise or understand the conditions that
their racism has helped to produce.”37 Tatz provides an astute link from this
analysis back to racism in Australia:
In South Africa I studied “native policy.” On arrival here in 1961, I studied
“ Aboriginal policy.” People who know of my dual interest still ask me,
“Is it true to say that Apartheid was a malevolent instrument of racial op-
pression, whereas racism in Australia was a form of ignorant innocence,
or innocent ignorance, an inability to understand or respect indigenous cul-
ture and values, albeit with some nasty consequences?” Comparisons aside,
how does one categorise Australia’s race relations? Much of that inter-
racial history I call genocide.38
Removals keep on happening
The emotional upheaval, shock, grief, guilt and outrage about the Stolen Gen-
erations might now be part of national history, but in public memory it is
once again slipping into the morass of forgetting and ignorance. For many
politicians and bureaucrats the 54 recommendations of the Bringing Them
Home Report are but a dim memory. Tragically, the breaking up of families
keeps on happening. Despite ongoing activism to reclaim the children and
re-indigenise child and family care, removals and placements outside of Abo-
riginal and Torres Strait Islander families are accelerating. The Aboriginal
Child Care Placement Principle is increasingly sidelined in care arrangements.
Placements such as forced adoption, rejected in the 1980s, are being recon-
sidered. A central Aboriginal family childcare arrangement of grandmothers
caring for grandchildren is once again under scrutiny, prompting the forma-
tion of the protest group Grandmothers Against Removals (GRMAR). In a
further cruelty, some newborn babies are taken from mothers who test drug
37 Cited in Haebich, “Forgetting Indigenous,” 1036.
38 Colin Tatz, Genocide in Australia, Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Studies, Research Discussion Paper Number 8, 1999, 28–32.
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positive, despite care being available within the mothers’ extended family.
Aboriginal mothers are also being imprisoned at unprecedented rates, leav-
ing their children vulnerable to removal from their families. Incarceration of
young people increases along with instances of their abusive treatment. A pub-
lic outcry was raised by shocking images of abusive treatment of Aboriginal
youths at the Don Dale Detention Centre in the Northern Territory in 2016 on
ABC’s Four Corners, now the subject of a Royal Commission into the Protec-
tion and Detention of Children in the Northern Territory. Despite public outcry
about such incidents, the National Sorry Day Committee found in its Bringing
Them Home Scorecard Report 2015 that there is still “insufficient recognition
of the trauma, loss and grief” experienced by members of the Stolen Genera-
tions and the “impacts on health and wellbeing.”39
In her programme for Perth Noongar Radio that won the 2014 Human
Rights Award for Radio, Yamatji radio producer and foster care mother Carol
Dowling cited alarming figures from Western Australia where Aboriginal chil-
dren make up 50.5 per cent of all children in out-of-home care in the state but
are only five per cent of the general population.40 Of these, 34 per cent are with
non-Aboriginal carers. In an example of “bad policy economics” she claimed
that expenditure to keep child protection structures in place was 50 times more
than that spent on Aboriginal family support mechanisms to help keep children
in their families. Dennis Eggington, Director of the Aboriginal Legal Service,
insisted that funding should be relocated to holistic Aboriginal-run services
to provide housing and relieve poverty, causes that lead to removal of Abo-
riginal children. Selena Kickett from the Dumbartung Aboriginal organisation
in Perth spoke of the vital need for healing to relieve the trans-generational
trauma from the ongoing break up of Aboriginal families. An unidentified
mother cries out that taking the children is “killing our future.” Little wonder
then that Dowling named the programme “Another Stolen Generation.”
How can we explain the continuing punitive agendas and policies? We
know of the years of Aboriginal activism and their achievements in David and
Goliath battles against the full force of the settler colonial state. Yet punitive
discourses, policies, legislation and bureaucracies continue to protect and ad-
vance stakeholder interests in Indigenous land and sea, and institutions that
employ thousands of people maintain control over Aboriginal people. The par-
adigm of Aboriginal families as sites of danger and risk for their children
39 John Rule and Elizabeth Rice, Bringing Them Home Scorecard Report 2015 (Canberra: National Sorry
Day Committee, 2015), 8.
40 Carol Dowling, “Another Stolen Generation,” Noongar Radio, September 18, 2014,
https://www.cbaa.org.au/article/another-stolen-generation-noongar-radio-perth.
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continues to be rolled out to endorse ongoing removals and to raise public sup-
port for stricter levels of government intervention and management, ostensibly
to improve health and wellbeing. The Federal Government used allegations
that child sexual abuse was rife in Indigenous communities to validate the
invasive actions of the Northern Territory Intervention. The West Australian
government made similar claims in threatening to close up to 150 communi-
ties. The forced removal of Aboriginal children remains an integral process of
the Australian settler colony.
The shift from principles of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-deter-
mination and pluralism represents yet another iteration of Wolfe’s model of the
settler colony, now fuelled by neoliberal ideologies and practice.41 Events in
today’s neoliberal times represent another return to the status quo, to the famil-
iar scenario of economic and political anxieties, antipathy to the welfare state,
demands for Aboriginal lands and resources, and the use of instruments of
settler colonialism to restore the balance of colonial supremacy and progress.
Terri Libesman points to the accumulated consequences for Aboriginal fami-
lies, of the shifts away from recognition of collective histories and rights to a
more neoliberal focus on individual responsibility and compliance with main-
stream measures of wellbeing.42 This shift has been accompanied by greater
prevalence of populist racist characterisations of neglect and abuse as per-
taining to cultural and individual Indigenous deficits rather than founded in
colonial experiences and systemic disadvantage. There has also been more
anecdotal evidence about a disregard for the rule of law and more overtly dis-
criminatory responses to Indigenous families.
We now live with escalating alarms of global terrorism, climate change,
economic disaster and wars of human annihilation. Fears of so-called problem
populations—Indigenous, ethnic, refugees and asylum seekers—threaten na-
tional security and peace. In this context, there is support for an encompassing
state apparatus of management through surveillance, containment and banish-
ment to institutions and/or forced assimilation into the nation state. Global
terrorism generates dehumanising of “problem populations” and support for
harsh solutions that hark back to carceral institutions for Indigenous popula-
tions in settler colonial states. This is the reality of accelerating incarceration
of Indigenous men, women and children. For Indigenous people, the driving
force of neoliberal capitalist economies for global development engages them
in new struggles against global organisations to maintain their hard-won land
41 The following argument draws on Anna Haebich, “Neoliberalism, Settler Colonialism and the History of
Indigenous Child Removal in Australia,” Australian Indigenous Law Review 19, no. 8 (2015/2016), 21–22.
42 Terri Libesman, email message to author, March 12, 2015.
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security and protect precious resources of water, food, minerals and energy
from fast growing markets and populations. Labelled as problem populations
they once again face threats of being displaced, relocated and forced to transi-
tion culturally by assimilating into the mainstream.
The model of settler colonialism presented in this essay suggests a con-
tinuing draconian settler colonial state with no end to the forced removal of
Aboriginal children. As we have seen, however, there is some hope in the nar-
ratives of activism and strategies for change drawing on Aboriginal values,
knowledge and experience and ways of working together for cultural healing.
Freed from the strictures of government policy and bureaucracy, the Stolen
Generations and their supporters can create movements of people working to-
gether with open hearts and minds to heal the past. In 2015 the National Sorry
Day Committee advised that “the best sources of knowledge and understand-
ing of the backgrounds and needs of the Stolen Generations are the Stolen
Generations themselves.” They are also the people best placed to drive what is
needed now and into the future.
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GENOCIDE BY ANY OTHER NAME
John Maynard
In this essay I step back from contemporary discussions, observations and de-
bates around the history of Australian genocide and reveal: a) the words of
policymakers and officials during the late nineteenth century about the treat-
ment of Aboriginal people; b) the recognition of genocidal acts in newspaper
coverage of the early twentieth century; and c) the assertions of prominent
early Aboriginal activists, including my grandfather Fred Maynard, on the vio-
lence meted out to Aboriginal people. Neither officials nor Aboriginal activists
used the term “genocide” of course, since it had not yet been coined. The ter-
minology they used, however, aligns with a contemporary understanding of
genocide. These witnesses and observers were well aware of the genocidal
practices occurring during their own time.
Settler colonial societies, including Australia, continue to struggle in the
twenty-first century to deal with the crimes of their forebears, crimes that
impacted so devastatingly on Indigenous peoples. For the greater part of the
twentieth century, Aboriginal people simply did not figure in Australia’s cel-
ebratory and triumphalist history. The descent of the curtain of silence during
this period, which prevented government officials or media from reporting on
Australia’s treatment of Aboriginal people, was described by the late anthro-
pologist W.E.H. (Bill) Stanner as the “Great Australian Silence.”1
Yet in the early decades of the twentieth century, Aboriginal activists, de-
spite coming from a marginalised minority, raised their voices and protested
the crimes against their communities. Their outspoken comments, echoed in
the cries of their non-Aboriginal supporters, were not just confined to the
atrocities committed on the frontier. They also recognised that government
policy introduced at the start of the twentieth century would unquestionably
lead to one result—genocide. In this paper, I recall comments made to me by
Dungatti elder, Uncle Reuben Kelly, about those brave Aboriginal activists.
After that first wave of Aboriginal activism, the 1960s and 1970s saw the
re-emergence of grassroots movements and a new generation of young histori-
1 W.E.H. Stanner, “The Boyer Lectures: After the Dreaming,” The Dreaming and Other Essays (Melbourne:
Black Inc. Agenda, 2009), 182–93.
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ans who began to unpack the history of the continent post-1788 and recognise
the destruction wrought upon Aboriginal Australia. Inspired by Stanner and
historian Charles Rowley, others like Henry Reynolds, Noel Loos, Bob Reece,
Raymond Evans and Lyndall Ryan heeded the call and lifted the veil on histor-
ical violence and massacres.2 At the same time, Aboriginal viewpoints seeped
into the public domain, from activists like Kevin Gilbert and Charlie Perkins.
As had happened earlier, this historical reality check was subsequently fol-
lowed and challenged by politicians, journalists and scholars who were more
inclined to support the celebratory national history of the past, one that recog-
nised discoverers, explorers and settlers, and presented the more palatable
view that Australia was peacefully settled. These debates, challenges, argu-
ments and disputes continue to echo across this historical divide even today.
The claim of “genocide” often triggers such debate. In its landmark Bring-
ing Them Home Report, the Australian Human Rights Commission argued that
the forced removals of Aboriginal children over the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries constituted a genocidal policy. Strongly and publicly recognising
Australia’s history of genocide, Colin Tatz has many times applied the terms
of the UN Genocide Convention to Australia, noting that actions taken against
Indigenous peoples were calculated, wanting to destroy and/or to cause serious
physical and mental harm, and that the forcible removal of children conformed
to the acts of genocide defined in the Convention.3 Tatz later reflected that his
disclosures upset many people who “were duly shocked, upset and bewildered
by this portrait of Australia as a genocidal society.”4
The recognised guilt in the records
Before Australia’s Great Silence and subsequent rewriting of history to portray
Australia as having been peacefully settled, many colonial and British gov-
ernment officials, legislators and politicians openly asserted Australia’s role in
the destruction of Aboriginal communities, and newspapers openly reported
it. The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Lord Glenelg, between
2 Noel Loos, “Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland, 1861–1897” (PhD thesis, James Cook
University, 1976); Noel Loos, “Frontier Conflict in the Bowen District, 1861–1874” (PhD thesis, James Cook
University, 1970); Henry Reynolds, The Other Side of the Frontier (Melbourne: Penguin Books, 1982); Ray-
mond Evans, Kay Saunders and Kathryn Cronin, Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in
Colonial Queensland (Sydney: Australia & New Zealand Book Co., 1975); Lyndall Ryan, The Aboriginal Tas-
manians (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996); Robert Reece, Aborigines and Colonists (Sydney: Sydney University
Press, 1974).
3 Colin Tatz, With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide (London: Verso, 2003), 72.
4 Colin Tatz, Human Rights and Human Wrongs: A Life Confronting Racism (Melbourne: Monash University,
2015), 305.
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1835 and 1839 was blunt in his assessment: “Let us not cast upon Heaven a
destruction which is our own, and say the [A]boriginals are doomed by Di-
vine Providence when the guilt lies with ourselves.”5 In official despatches,
Lord John Russell—a powerful government official and twice British Prime
Minister—was also forthright on where the guilt lay for the treatment of the
Aboriginal population: “All too clear is the truth that from first to last the line
of contact of the two races has been a red one, and the strong Caucasian has
trodden the naked nomad like mire into his own soil.”6 In a later despatch,
Russell would add that it was “impossible to contemplate the condition and
the prospects of that unfortunate race without the deepest commiseration.”7
Before the House of Commons Committee in 1838, Lieutenant Richard
Sadlier8 highlighted with alarm the dire situation in the Australian Colonies:
“As a question of humanity nothing can be more dreadful to contemplate, or
more disgraceful to a Christian and civilised nation, than the wholesale de-
struction going on for the last fifty years, and must continue to the end unless
some plan is devised to prevent it.”9 Sadlier recognised Aboriginal people as
sovereign holders of their land and his statements clearly describe colonial ac-
tions as a war of destruction with the aim of usurping the land. Contemporary
scholarship of genocide often focuses on factors such as land expropriation
and “cleansing” of minorities who stand in the way of colonial expansion. Sad-
lier was reported to have written:
It might be presumed that the natives of any land have an incontrovertible
right to their own lands, as it is a plain and sacred right which appears not
to have been understood. Europeans have entered their border uninvited,
and when there have not only acted as if they were the undoubted lords of
the soil, but have punished the natives as aggressors if they have evinced a
disposition to live in their own country. If the Australian [A]borigines have
been found upon their own property, they have been hunted as thieves and
robbers, driven back into the interior as if they were dogs or kangaroos.10
Evidence delivered to the 1838 House of Commons Committee on the Aborig-
inal plight horrified members. Lord Stanley wrote of his dismay: “Outrages of
5 Archibald Meston, “Vanishing Aboriginals,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 25, 1922.
6 Cited in Ibid.
7 Cited in Meston, “Vanishing Aboriginals.”
8 K. J. Cable, “Sadlier, Richard (1794–1889),” Australian Dictionary of Biography (Canberra: National Cen-
tre of Biography, Australian National University, 1967).
9 Cited in Meston, “Vanishing Aboriginals.”
10 Sydney Morning Herald, March 25, 1922.
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the most atrocious description, involving considerable loss of life are spoken
of in these papers with an indifference and lightness which is very shocking.”11
A journalist for the Newcastle Chronicle was adamant that:
We have not only taken possession of the lands of the [A]boriginal tribes
of this colony, and driven them from their territories, but we have also kept
up unrelenting hostility towards them, as if they were not worthy of being
classed with human beings, but simply regarded as inferior to some of the
lower animals of creation.12
There is no mistaking that these individuals witnessed and spoke of a war of
extermination that had been unleashed against the Aboriginal population. This
is only a small sample of material readily available.
Early twentieth century media observations
In the early twentieth century, journalists and commentators were forthright
in their estimation of the treatment of Aboriginal people in Australia’s histor-
ical past. One writer in the Sydney Morning Herald recognised not just the
injustices of the newly federated nation’s past, but also the grim future for
the Aboriginal population: “Most of the white insurpers [sic] of this continent
consider the blackfellow a lingering nuisance, whose inevitable demise should
be hastened rather than retarded.”13 Author T.P. Bellchambers impressed the
crimes of the past upon the nation’s memory:
It has been said that we acquired this country not by an act of war, but
by peaceful occupation. Yes, without so much as “by your leave” we in-
troduced ourselves as supermen and overlords; we took possession of the
[A]borigines, destroyed their game and drove them from their scant water
supplies . . . our “peaceful occupation” has meant many treacherous deeds.
. . . We who have steeped our souls in every known sin, as judged by our
laws that we have made.14
Aboriginal protection societies began in Britain in the nineteenth century,
and similar bodies were established in Australia, gaining some momentum in
11 Sydney Morning Herald, March 25, 1922.
12 Newcastle Chronicle, November 18, 1869, 2.
13 Sydney Morning Herald, 1904.
14 Daylight, May 25, 1922.
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the 1930s. The progress associations, sometimes called welfare leagues, cam-
paigned strongly for the end of discriminatory laws, better living conditions
and the granting of full citizenship rights. They tried hard to gain media space
and attention, but were seldom heard by the press and a public that did not
want to listen. After World War Two, these bodies were dismissed as “do-
gooders” or worse, as Communists.
Early Aboriginal activists and their supporters
The Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA) was formed in
Sydney in 1924 and led by my grandfather, Fred Maynard (1879–1946), a
Worimi Aboriginal man. Fred Maynard was an articulate and inspiring vision-
ary. The AAPA was the first to make a pan-Aboriginal demand for a national
land rights agenda, as well as advocating for self-determination. While the
group itself comprised Aboriginal members, high profile non-Aboriginal peo-
ple like missionary Elizabeth McKenzie-Hatton and newspaper editor John J.
Moloney were active supporters.
In this section I analyse the commentary of Fred Maynard and supporters
to reveal those grassroots Aboriginal movements and their understanding of a
genocide being perpetrated. It is important to realise that early Aboriginal ac-
tivists and their supporters were well aware of the sickening historical reality
of violence perpetrated against Aboriginal populations. Their views consoli-
date the recognition of government officials and the media.
Fred Maynard was scathing in his assessment, not hesitating to label the
British landing at Port Jackson in 1788 as an “invasion.” The British had, in
his estimation, decimated the Aboriginal population through “the arts of war .
. . and diseases.” In an interview I conducted over 20 years ago, Uncle Reuben
Kelly, the respected Dungutti elder, shared his recollections of that time. Kelly
was adamant that Fred Maynard was the first Aboriginal man “to speak out
about the atrocities, the poisoning, the murders, and the penal system.” Kelly
said he revealed “the condoned and silenced massacres of the past.”15 May-
nard saw parallels between the experiences of Aboriginal people in Australia
and the mass killings that had taken place in the Belgian Congo.16 While the
numbers differed substantially, with the Congo witnessing a “death toll of
holocaust dimensions,” Maynard saw a similar genocidal intent in Australian
government policy. In relation to New South Wales government policy that he
15 Reuben Kelly, in discussion with John Maynard, 1996.
16 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Central Africa (Lon-
don: Pan Books, 2006), 3.
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foresaw as having drastic ramifications on local Aboriginal people, he wrote:
“What a horrible conception of so called legislation, Re any civilised laws, I
say deliberately stinks of the Belgian Congo.”17
The language Maynard uses to describe the government’s treatment of
Aboriginal people aligns with the legal definition of genocide. In his esti-
mation, the situation facing Aboriginal peoples and their continuation as a
community, was dire.
Maynard saw the government policy of separating young Aboriginal chil-
dren from their families, especially the girls, as part of a genocidal policy,
stating that this “objectionable practice of segregating the sexes as soon as
they reach a certain age should be abolished for it meant rapid extinction.”18
He viewed the New South Wales Aborigines Protection Board and the Abo-
rigines Act, as well as the Board’s so-called apprenticeship scheme as nothing
more than a thinly disguised “attempt to exterminate the race.”19 Maynard was
not alone in his assessment of this callous treatment with non-Aboriginal com-
mentators also voicing their disapproval. Richard Tomalin, manager of Mount
Leonard cattle station at Windorah in Queensland, wrote to the AAPA leader-
ship and offered his support:
It is not necessary to give my personal experience connected with some ap-
palling extermination methods bar the fact that their [Aboriginal] numbers
were reduced not by the procedure of time, but by drastic unlawful methods
adopted by the white settlers.20
He observed the horror of assaults upon Aboriginal family life:
The drastic and utterly unlawful method of taking away their female chil-
dren would not stand if taken direct to a British Tribunal, as under the law
the freedom of a British subject cannot be taken from him, and I consider
a father just as much justified in using all means he chooses to defend his
children from being forcibly removed from their parental care, more so
even than a banker defending his gold.21
Two prominent and courageous non-Aboriginal supporters of the early Abo-
17 Fred Maynard, private letter, NSW Premiers Department Correspondence Files, A27/915, 1927.
18 Cited in John J. Moloney, “The Aboriginals,” Voice of the North, December 10, 1926.
19 “Aborigines: Agitation by Association,” Northern Star, August 3, 1927.
20 Richard Tomalin, “Australian Aboriginals,” Voice of the North, June 10, 1927, 18.
21 Ibid.
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riginal political movement were the missionary Elizabeth McKenzie Hatton
and John J. Moloney, the Editor of the Newcastle newspaper the Voice of
the North. Decades ahead of their time, their words remain powerful today
in challenging whitewashed Australian history. Former Prime Minister John
Howard argued that, “Australians of the current generation should not be re-
quired to accept blame for past policies over which they had no control.”22 Yet
McKenzie Hatton, writing in the Daylight in 1926, could almost be replying
to Howard across the decades:
We may claim that we are not responsible for the actions of the original
British invaders who violated their homes, shot, poisoned, burned and mu-
tilated the natives, but we cannot claim immunity from the conditions
existing at the present time, and what should not be tolerated for one mo-
ment longer than it will take to rectify matters. The citizens comfortably
situated on the shores of Port Jackson are, in the main, absolutely ignorant
of the conditions under which the natives are existing. The moment this
sore is opened up there will be a rush of apologists from the ranks of
parliamentarians, parsons, priests, pedagogues, pedants, and peripatetic
philosophers, but such belated excuses will be brushed aside, for the fiat
has gone forth—JUSTICE TO THE NATIVES—and the people of Aus-
tralia will not be satisfied until that full measure of compensation has been
accorded to a much injured and sadly wronged people.23
This illustrates how, in the contemporary setting, the failure to accept any
blame or responsibility has continued unabated, notwithstanding Paul Keat-
ing’s 1992 Redfern speech and Kevin Rudd’s apology to the Stolen Gener-
ations. Contemporary scholar Dirk Moses points out that the British “under-
stood the effects of their presence in Australia” but, nevertheless, demon-
strated an inability to take “responsibility for the anticipated disappearance of
the Aboriginal peoples, despite the obvious connection between colonization
and depopulation.”24
22 John Howard, Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2010),
277.
23 Elizabeth McKenzie Hatton, “The Dark Brethren,” Daylight, October 30, 1926, 102.
24 A. Dirk Moses, ed., Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in
Australian History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 6.
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Conclusion
In a letter written in 1927, J.J. Moloney, a fierce Australian nationalist, spoke
out about the treatment of Aboriginal people:
The iniquity of the position maddens me. To see these poor creatures kicked
into the bush—worse than dogs—their homes built by their own hands
confiscated, no compensation, no redress—their children kidnapped by the
Crown and sent to work for Collins Whites at 6d a week, robbed at every
turn, derided by all parties. . . . Every Church equally to blame—Priests,
Bishops, Parsons—all equally guilty . . . if I were in London, I think I would
try and get an audience with the King.25
While many historians, genocide scholars, journalists and politicians continue
to debate and question the validity of whether genocide was committed in
Australia, eyewitnesses had no doubt. Neither did Aboriginal people. I look
back over my own family’s history and that of the Worimi people of the Port
Stephens region of New South Wales and realise that it is a miracle I am here
today. The stark reality is that so many thousands of our people were swept
away with no regard for them as human beings and, even deliberately, with
genocidal intent.
If Australia is willing to accept this history and so educate our children, the
evidence is here, waiting. Those who were alive at the time stated openly what
they witnessed; government officials spoke honest words about the policy goal
of extermination; newspapers wrote about it—the public cannot claim not to
have known. Today we have a body of literature by Aboriginal and non-Abo-
riginal scholars that presents survivor testimony from members of the Stolen
Generations and evidence of massacre and frontier warfare that resulted in
large numbers of Aboriginal deaths. Aboriginal people spent decades with no
legal or civil rights, no sense of belonging in Australia. In the whole menu of
what constitutes “human rights,” we did not have even one item. Moreover,
we experienced and survived a genocide that, while clearly acknowledged at
the time, remains hidden today. It is with the aim of revealing that genocide
that the words of my grandfather, Fred Maynard, resonate still: the government
“insulted and degraded all Aboriginal people, and it aimed to exterminate the
noble and ancient race of sunny Australia.”26
25 J.J. Moloney, letter to A.P. Elkin (private collection, 1927).
26 Fred Maynard, private letter (private collection, 1927).
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TOO NEAR AND TOO FAR: AUSTRALIA’S




Another suspected war criminal found in Australia. In the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) Magistrates Court in late 2014, former Bosnian Croat soldier,
Krunoslav Bonić, was the subject of an extradition hearing to face war crimes
charges in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Apparently he had been living in Can-
berra since 1998, yet an international arrest warrant was issued by Bosnia
only in 2006. This is not surprising. Australia’s record on prosecuting war
crimes, including genocide, is poor indeed. According to a Lowy Institute re-
port, Australia was described in the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s annual status
report on Nazi war crimes investigations and prosecutions as “the only major
Western country of refuge.”2 In January 2015, Bosnia dropped its extradition
request and Bonić was freed. It is unclear why: serious allegations were made
against Bonić by eyewitnesses in at least one case heard at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.3
Australia has an abysmal record in prosecuting genocide and state crime,
perpetrated either here or elsewhere. There is something curious about Aus-
tralia’s reluctance to prosecute this crime. It is either too near (in the case of
Indigenous genocide in Australia) or too far away (in the case of the Holocaust
1 I am grateful to Eleanor Gilbert who allowed me access to the files on the hearings in relation to the
Aboriginal Embassy case, and to Evelyn Rose for her thoughtful research assistance on this chapter. My thanks
to my Honours colleague at Macquarie University, Angela Jones, whose thesis, written in 1991 and supervised
by Colin Tatz, provides an excellent overview of public debates at the time, something that has been lost in
much subsequent analysis. Deep thanks to Colin Tatz, with whom I began this journey.
2 Fergus Hanson, Confronting Reality: Responding to War Criminals in Australia (Sydney: Lowy Institute for
International Policy, 2009), 6.
3 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Kordić & Čerkez IT-95-14/2, case transcript,
September 13, 1999, see 6510. After detailing the involvement of Bonić, together with his father, in the arrest
and detention of the witness, Fuad Zeco, the transcript continues: Q. Thank you. Thank you. This Krunoslav
Bonić who arrested you, did you know whether he was captured by the BH army during the conflict and where
he now lives? A. Yes, he was captured. After the war conflict ceased, he was arrested. I know that he was ar-
rested and that he spent his time in prison in Travnik, and after that, after a certain amount of time spent in
prison, he moved to Australia. That’s what I know.
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in World War Two, or genocide in Rwanda or in the former Yugoslavia). We
ratified its Convention, decried in its defining into international law as an “odi-
ous scourge,”4 yet our political leaders have almost routinely disregarded the
importance of prosecuting genocide. Taskforces have been set up and aban-
doned, downsized, and recommendations ignored. We have failed to name or
hear the crime of genocide perpetrated against Aboriginal Peoples—and it was
only with the hearing of the genocide charges brought by the Aboriginal Tent
Embassy in 1998 that it was made public that, despite signing the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide
Convention”) in 1949, we had not in fact incorporated the crime of genocide
into Australian domestic legislation.
This essay considers our record on addressing genocide and why we are so
reluctant to prosecute. It suggests that in our refusal to acknowledge genocide,
we maintain the charade of a country without history. We are, in many ways, a
land of forgetting. This reluctance to prosecute “the past” is integral to this en-
terprise. That the past informs the present, however, is what is inherently risky
about this apparently entrenched policy approach to an aversion to the naming
and prosecuting of genocide.
Too far away: Australia’s record on prosecuting World War
Two crimes
In the 1980s, Australia introduced legislation to prosecute perpetrators from
the Second World War who were current Australian citizens or residents. This
was the first time that a domestic legislative framework was established to
prosecute World War Two perpetrators who had sought refuge and asylum in
post-war Australia. The Hawke Labor government amended the War Crimes
Act 1945 to allow charges to be brought against suspected war criminals living
in Australia.
The War Crimes Act had been legislated post-war to enable the prosecution
of 807 Japanese defendants, for crimes mostly perpetrated against Australian
soldiers.5 This was, it has been argued, fuelled by deep-seated racist under-
pinnings of Australian attitudes towards the Japanese existing prior to the
Second World War with its “White Australia” policy, and by the witnessing
by the Australian population of Australian prisoners of war returning home
4 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), Preamble.
5 Helen Durham and Michael Carrel, “Lessons from the Past: Australia’s Experience in War Crimes Prosecu-
tion and the Problem of the Applicable Legal Framework,” Asia-Pacific Yearbook of International Humanitar-
ian Law 2 (2006), 135.
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after horrific experiences in Japanese camps.6 Military trials were held in the
Asia-Pacific region and in Australia, with 579 individuals convicted and 137
sentenced to death and executed.7 The War Crimes Act, however, was designed
to prosecute crimes solely against British citizens or subjects. It had no remit
for enabling the broader prosecution of crimes perpetrated in World War Two,
or in other conflicts. The witnessing of POW experiences did not extend to the
experiences suffered by post-war European refugees. That harm was not visi-
ble to the broader Australian population.
There had been little public or political appetite for broader post-war pros-
ecutions. In 1961, the Acting Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Bar-
wick announced––in response to refusing a request from the Soviet Union
for extradition of an alleged war criminal, Ervin Richard Adolf Petrovich
Viks––the end of war crimes prosecutions under Australian legislation. He ar-
gued that whilst there is a sense of “utter abhorrence felt by Australians for
those offences against humanity to which we give the generic name of war
crimes . . . there is the right of this nation, by receiving people into its coun-
try, to enable men to turn their backs on past bitterness and to make a new life
for themselves and for their families in a happier community.”8 Barwick con-
cluded in this vein: “. . . we think the time has come to close the chapter. It is,
truly, the year 1961.”9 This came from someone who three years later was to
become Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia. The policy of forgetting
was entrenched. Even the Japanese war crimes trials had been seen to take too
long. In 1950, with the announcement by the Menzies government to speed up
trials, release those with insufficient evidence, and reserve the right to make
a re-arrest if new material surfaced, then leader of the opposition Mr Chifley,
stated: “I could not see much purpose in continuing investigations aimed at the
tracing of war criminals. That sort of thing could go on for the next 20 years,
and new criminals could be located almost daily.”10
As a result of the investigative work by journalist Mark Aarons, the extent
of the settlement in Australia of suspected war criminals became known.11
6 Michael Carrel, “Australia’s Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals: Stimuli and Constraints,” in The
Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance?, eds. David Blumenthal and Timothy
McCormack (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 240–42; also see Gideon Boas and Pascale Chifflet,
“Suspected War Criminal in Australia: Law and Policy,” Melbourne University Law Review 40 (2016), 48–49.
7 Carrel, Ibid., 246–47.
8 The Hon. Sir Garfield Barwick, Press Statement on Soviet Request for Surrender of E.R.A.P. Viks (Canberra:
Commonwealth of Australia Department of External Affairs, 1961), 7.
9 Ibid.
10 Andrew Menzies, Review of Material Relating to the Entry of Suspected War Criminals Into Australia
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987), 10.
11 Mark Aarons’ five-part documentary series Nazis in Australia was broadcast on ABC Radio National in
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Much of this had begun as anecdotal––Jewish refugees sharing boats to Aus-
tralia with Nazi perpetrators––and had been documented immediately post-
war by the Jewish community, together with Aarons’ own extensive archival
work.12 Later work demonstrated that this was a deliberate policy of excluding
Jewish Displaced Persons and accepting those predominantly from the Baltic
countries.13 Early in 1986, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry had
begun lobbying the Australian government for an enquiry, similar to that un-
dertaken in Canada.14 In June 1986 the Hawke Government appointed a retired
senior public servant, Andrew Menzies, to conduct a review of material relat-
ing to the entry of suspected war criminals into Australia. Menzies found that
it was “more likely than not that a significant number of persons who com-
mitted serious war crimes in World War Two entered Australia and some of
these are now in Australia,” and “that some action needs to be taken.”15 He
recommended a special unit be established to investigate the allegations and
initiate extradition, deportations or prosecutions.16 His first recommendation
to the government was that they “make a clear and positive statement to the
effect that, as regards serious war crimes, it does not regard the Chapter as
closed (contrary to the Barwick statement in 1961) and that it will take ap-
propriate action under the law to bring to justice persons who have committed
serious war crimes found in Australia.”17
The government’s response to that review was tabled in Parliament on Feb-
ruary 24, 1987, by Senator Gareth Evans on behalf of the Attorney-General
Lionel Bowen. It read in part:
The Government accepts the conclusion that some persons, against whom
the most serious allegations have been made, are likely to have entered
Australia after the Second World War, and to be still resident here today.
1986. This was the culmination of earlier documentaries and work that had begun in 1977. He subsequently
published a book detailing the allegations: Mark Aarons, Sanctuary: Nazi Fugitives in Australia (Melbourne:
William Heinemann Australia, 1989).
12 Both Aarons and Suzanne Rutland tell how in the early 1950s, the Federal Immigration Minister, Harold
Holt, threatened Jewish community leaders that if they did not stop their campaign against the migration to Aus-
tralia of known Nazis, the government would block the transfer of money to Israel by the community. See Mark
Aarons, “The Search For Nazi War Criminals in Australia,” Australian Journal of Jewish Studies 26 (2012),
164–65; Suzanne Rutland, Edge of the Diaspora: Two Centuries of Jewish Settlement in Australia (Sydney:
Collins, 1988), 334–35.
13 Leslie Caplan, The Road to the Menzies Inquiry: Suspected War Criminals in Australia (Darlington: Aus-
tralian Jewish Historical Society, 2012), Appendix 3.
14 Ibid.




However, as Mr Menzies has found, their entry was achieved in the circum-
stances of the urgency and intensity of our post-war immigration program.
Given that background, there is no value in continuing to examine the past
with the idea of apportioning blame, or endeavouring to sheet home re-
sponsibility. Instead, our attention must be concentrated on the steps to be
taken to ensure that suspected war criminals involved in serious crimes are
brought to justice.18
Drawing a line under Barwick’s statement, the response continued: “Where
serious War crimes are concerned this Government does not regard the chap-
ter as closed.”19 This enthusiasm was, however, short lived. Public appetite,
and hence political appetite, for war crimes trials continued to be limited.
The Bill took 14 months to pass both the House of Representatives and the
Senate, with the War Crimes Amendment Act eventually becoming law on
December 21, 1988, after divisive political debate.20 The new law was still
contained to World War Two era crimes and the government failed to specif-
ically name genocide. Rather, war crimes were defined to include genocide
as “intent to destroy”:
A serious crime is a war crime if it was: (a) committed: (i) in the course
of political, racial or religious persecution; or (ii) with intent to destroy in
whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such; and
(b) committed in the territory of a country when the country was involved
in a war or when territory of the country was subject to an occupation.21
As a “war crime,” genocide was subsumed under the category of “bad things
happen in wartime” (in Europe), rather than the perpetration of the destruction
of a people and of their common humanity. Like the International Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg, it also continued a curtailed mandate, using September 1,
1939, as the start date, thereby omitting much of the criminal activity perpe-
trated prior to that date.
The War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 led to the establishment of a Special
Investigation Unit within the Department of Public Prosecutions that ex-
amined allegations of war crimes against over 800 individuals resident in
18 Senator Gareth Evans, Government Response to Menzies Review (Canberra: Parliament of Australia Sen-
ate, 1987), 496.
19 Ibid.
20 Irene Nemes, “Punishing War Criminals in Australia: Issues of Law and Morality,” Current Issues in
Criminal Justice 4, no. 2 (1992), 142–43.
21 War Crimes Amendment Act 1988, part 2, sec 6.1.
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Australia. Evidence was found against 400 people who had arrived in Aus-
tralia; of these, 200 were deceased. There was evidence for 40 prosecutable
cases, and four were initially pursued.22 There had been great hope in this new
legislation, as echoed in its preamble:
(a) concern has arisen that a significant number of persons who committed
serious war crimes in Europe during World War II may since have entered
Australia and became Australian citizens or residents;
(b) it is appropriate that persons accused of such war crimes be brought to
trial in the ordinary criminal courts in Australia; and
(c) it is also essential in the interests of justice that persons so accused be
given a fair trial with all the safeguards for accused persons in trials in those
courts, having particular regard to matters such as the gravity of the allega-
tions and the lapse of time since the alleged crimes.23
Yet, due to a combination of ill health and the advancing age of the defendants
and, critically, the compounding difficulties of processing European war
crimes cases in local courts in Adelaide, none were found guilty.
In the first case, Ivan Polyukhovich was charged in January 1990 with the
killing of 24 Ukrainian Jews and involvement in the murder of a further 850
Ukrainian Jews between 1941 and 1943. After an appeal to the High Court
on the basis of the legislation being unconstitutional (that was quashed), he
was committed to trial in the Supreme Court of South Australia and, due to
insufficient witness testimony, the trial ceased.24 The second case was that of
Mikolay Berezowsky. He was charged in 1991 with involvement in the murder
of 102 Jews in Ukraine. Despite the hearing of 22 international witnesses, the
case was dismissed in July 1992 by the magistrate during the committal hear-
ings due to “identification difficulties.”25 In the third case of Heinrich Wagner,
charges were brought in 1992 for the murder of 19 Jewish children and a rail-
way construction worker, and involvement in the murder of 104 Ukrainian
Jews in 1942 and 1943. The magistrate found sufficient evidence to commit to
trial, yet prosecutors discontinued the case due to illness after Wagner suffered
22 War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 (Cth), Preamble.
23 According to Graham Blewitt, Head of the Special Investigations Unit, the extent of the Australian trials
was to be 12. Cited in Angela Jones, More Than a Memory: Australia’s War Crimes Trials (Honours thesis,
Macquarie University, 1991), 75.
24 For further detail, see Gillian Triggs, “Australia’s War Crimes Trials: All Pity Choked,” in The Law of War
Crimes: National and International Approaches, eds. Timothy McCormack and Gerry Simpson (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 1997), 123–49 and, in particular, 130–32.
25 For further detail, see Ibid., 132.
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a heart attack.26 There was a fourth case about to be brought; however, with
the disbanding of the Special Investigation Unit by the Keating Government,
this did not eventuate.
There had been little public interest in these trials. From a high point of
bipartisanship when the legislation was first introduced by the Hawke Labor
government in late 1987, this had deteriorated to the legislation passing in the
Senate a year later by just five votes. The political atmosphere had changed.
There were heated public debates around questions of money, the age of de-
fendants (although as Angela Jones pointed out in her analysis of the trials
at the time, there was no such objection raised when 80-year-old Queens-
land Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen stood trial for perjury in October 199127),
the time that had passed, that the courts would be relying on evidence from
communist countries,28 as well as concern from particular communities who
shared the same national background as the suspects. There was a sense, as
expressed by Labor Senator Bernard Cooney in the Senate debate on the Bill,
that “bygones be bygones.”29 What appeared to be missing, as Jones points
out, was a sense of what these trials were attempting to prosecute: the crimes
of the Holocaust.30
The unit closed in 1992. Since then, there have been only limited resources
put towards the prosecution of Nazi war criminals,31 and no prosecutions have
been brought. One emerging frontier has been that of extraditions sought by
other nations, mainly post-communist, for the trial of war criminals suspected
to be residing in Australia. Australia has been reluctant to take this path: in a
discussion of the extradition proceedings of suspected Hungarian war criminal
Károly Zentai, Ruth Balint has argued that any recognition of war criminals
living in Australia disrupts “the popular imaginary of the post-war period of
immigration [that] has privileged a narrative of rescue of Hitler’s and Stalin’s
victims.”32 Harbouring of perpetrators plays no role here.
It was a case outlining past and present genocide in Australia that brought,
26 For further detail, see Triggs, “Australia’s War Crimes,” 133–34.
27 Angela Jones, More Than a Memory: Australia’s War Crimes Trials (Honours thesis, Macquarie Univer-
sity, 1991), 62.
28 For discussion of this point, see Nemes, “Punishing War Criminals,” 143–45.
29 Hansard Senate War Crimes Amendment Bill 1987, 2nd reading, December 15, 1987, 4254, cited in
Jones, More Than a Memory, 67.
30 Ibid., 56.
31 As Gideon Boas and Pascale Chifflet note, “responsibility for the investigation of such crimes has been
delegated to various departments within the Australian Federal Police,” and “Since the Menzies Review, there
has been no large-scale or commissioned investigation into the entry of suspected war criminals into Australia.”
32 Ruth Balint, “The Ties that Bind: Australia, Hungary and the Case of Károly Zentai,” Patterns of Prejudice
44, no. 3 (2010), 284.
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if not to the public but to the legislature, attention of our failure to prosecute
the crime of genocide in this country.
Too near: the Aboriginal Tent Embassy genocide hearings
In the late 1990s, members of the Aboriginal Embassy tested the ability of
our courts to hear genocide. The Embassy had been established in 1972 as a
land rights protest on the grounds of what is now Old Parliament House, and
has continued to serve as a focal point of protest.33 On July 3, 1998, Wadju-
larbinna Nulyarimma, of Doomadgee Aboriginal Community in Queensland,
lawyer Len Lindon, and Eleanor Gilbert who recorded much of the proceed-
ings, went to the Canberra police station to request that charges of genocide
be brought against current Members of the Australian Parliament. The amend-
ments to the Native Title Act were being debated in the Australian Parliament.
The Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 was the latest iteration of the legisla-
tive regime established in 1993 to regulate Aboriginal land claims. Developed
in the wake of the successful Mabo High Court decision in which the Court
ruled in 1992 that Australia was not terra nullius (“land belonging to no-one”)
on settlement/invasion, it had developed into a restrictive regime of access to
land known as “native title.”
The claim made by the Embassy was that the imminent introduction of the
revised Native Title Act put Aboriginal peoples at even greater risk of destruc-
tion and was part of a long history of genocidal practices.34 In May 1997, then
Prime Minister John Howard had introduced into policy a “10-point plan” in
response to the High Court ruling on the Wik case.35 The High Court in Wik
found that pastoral leases did not automatically extinguish native title. Howard
argued, “The fact is that the Wik decision pushed the pendulum too far in the
33 For more information on the Aboriginal Embassy, see Gary Foley, Andrew Schaap and Edwina Howell,
eds., The Aboriginal Tent Embassy. Sovereignty, Black Power, Land Rights and the State (Abingdon: Routledge,
2014).
34 Damien Short has argued that genocide is a “continuing process in an Australia that has failed to decolonise
and continues to assimilate,” is “predicated on a victim’s understanding of the culturally genocidal dimensions
of settler colonialism and the central importance of land to the survival of many indigenous peoples as peoples.”
See Damien Short, “Australia: A Continuing Genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 2 (2010), 46.
For further relevant discussion, see Colin Tatz, “Genocide in Australia,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no.
3 (1999), 315–52; Colin Tatz, “Confronting Australian Genocide,” Aboriginal History 25, no. 1 (2001), 16–36;
Katherine Bischoping, and Natalie Fingerhut, “Border Lines: Indigenous People in Genocide Studies,” Cana-
dian Review of Sociology 33, no. 4 (1996), 481–506; Larissa Behrendt, “Genocide: The Distance Between Law
and Life,” Aboriginal History 25 (2001), 132–47; Patrick Wolfe, “Nation and Miscegenation: Discursive Con-
tinuity in the Post-Mabo Era,” Social Analysis 36 (1994), 93–131; Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the
Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (2006), 387–409.
35 Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996–187 CLR 1). This was a successful native title claim on land on the Cape
York Peninsula brought by the Wik and Thayorre People.
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Aboriginal direction. The 10-point plan will return the pendulum to the cen-
tre.”36 The subsequent Native Title Amendment Act 1998 had at its core the
extinguishment of native title (as outlined in its originating Bill):
States and Territories would be able to confirm that “exclusive” tenures
such as freehold, residential, commercial and public works in existence on
or before 1 January 1994 extinguish native title. Agricultural leases would
also be covered to the extent that it can reasonably be said that by reason of
the grant or the nature of the permitted use of the land, exclusive possession
must have been intended. Any current or former pastoral lease conferring
exclusive possession would also be included.37
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination was to call this a racially discriminatory piece of legislation on
the basis that, as Damien Short points out, it “detail[s] a host of white prop-
erty interests that would automatically extinguish native title.”38 It was put
to the Court that the native title legislation demonstrated “intent to destroy”
as required by the Genocide Convention that Australia had ratified, although
not implemented. On July 6, 1998, papers and an affidavit by central claimant
Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma were presented to the Registrar of the ACT Mag-
istrate’s Court, asking that John Howard and Tim Fischer (as Prime Minister
and Deputy Prime Minister) be charged with attempt, conspiracy and complic-
ity in genocide (in their formulation of the “10-point plan” and enactment into
legislation), Brian Harradine (Independent Member of the Senate) be charged
with complicity in genocide (in his agreeing to the Native Title Amendment
Bill), and Pauline Hanson (MP and leader of the One Nation party) be charged
with public incitement to commit genocide (that over the past two years she
had deliberately and publicly incited genocide). The Registrar of the ACT
Magistrate’s Court replied to the Embassy claimants: “I have come to the con-
clusion that the offences alleged [genocide, attempted genocide, aid and abet
genocide, conspiracy to commit acts of genocide] in those informations are
unknown to the law of the ACT.”39
The hearing took place over seven days from July to September 1998, in-
cluding one morning “around the fire” at the Embassy where Justice Crispin
36 John Howard, “Amended Wik 10-Point Plan,” media statement, May 8, 1997, http://australianpolitics.com/
1997/05/08/howard-amended-wik-10-point-plan.html.
37 Native Title Amendment Bill 1997 Explanatory Memorandum, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/ bill_em/ntab1997237/memo2.html, chap. 2.2.
38 Short, “Australia,” 55.
39 Letter from PR Thompson, Registrar ACT Magistrates Court, to Mrs W. Nulyarimma, July 7, 1998.
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heard testimony.40 Affidavits were gathered and presented to the court from
communities around Australia. The case was joined by Tom Trevorrow, Irene
Watson, Kevin Buzzacott and Michael Anderson, Alice Hoolihan, Daisy
Brown, Albert Hayes, Alister Thorpe, Yaluritja Clarrie Isaacs and Mingli
Wanjurri Nungala. The claimants spoke to the reality that Australia had not
recognised the genocide perpetrated here. They gave testimony that detailed
their own and their community’s experiences of genocide, both past and con-
tinuing. Wadjularbinna stated in an affidavit:
The applicants’ main concern is that the genocide against our people all
Aboriginal peoples be stopped and prevented. We invoke your criminal law
primarily to get your people to stop the genocide [par. 10]. . . . We see
the Parliamentarians failure to prevent genocide against us by legislation
or otherwise as another act of genocide [par.17]. . . . We have had enough
of this genocide. This is a crisis situation and irreparable damage is being
done [par. 35].41
There was a clear sense in the claims put forward in the case that there was
continuing intent to perpetrate genocide in Australia, illustrated by the failure
to integrate the Genocide Convention into domestic legislation and the use of
law in fact to perpetuate genocide.42 Wadjularbinna testified:
Australia has ratified the Convention but they have not backed it up by
making laws to prevent further genocide . . . speaks volumes . . . there is an
ongoing intent . . . to continue the genocide.43
Justice Crispin did not find for the applicants from the Tent Embassy. He ar-
gued that members of Parliament could not be liable for criminal prosecution
in the carrying out of their duties and in the formulation of policy. He also
argued that he could not find within the common law any recognition of the
offence of genocide, stating that “no offence of genocide is known to the
40 For a detailed discussion of the case, see Jennifer Balint, “Stating Genocide in Law: The Aboriginal Em-
bassy and the ACT Supreme Court,” in The Aboriginal Tent Embassy: Sovereignty, Black Power, Land Rights
and the State, eds. Gary Foley, Andrew Schaap and Edwina Howell (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 235–50.
41 Affidavit of Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma, July 8, 1998.
42 For a broader discussion of the use of law in the perpetration of genocide and how law can make genocide
‘allowable’, see Jennifer Balint, Genocide, State Crime and the Law: In the Name of the State (London:
Routledge-Cavendish, 2012), in particular Chapter Two.
43 Wadjularbinna, Tent Embassy case transcript, 77.
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domestic law of Australia.”44 But he did find that genocide had occurred. Fol-
lowing a discussion of the Genocide Convention, he stated:
There can be little doubt that the shameful chronicle of abuse suffered by
aboriginal peoples in Australia since 1788 included many acts of the kind
described in this definition. Given the passage of time, the paucity of con-
temporary records and the inevitable tendency for people to indulge in self
justification it is not easy to determine whether particular atrocities were
committed with the requisite intent. Nonetheless, the nature, scope and fre-
quency of such acts suggests at least a strong probability that some at least
were so motivated. In 1983 Murphy J referred to the Aboriginal people of
Australia as having been the subject of “attempted genocide.” However,
the concept of genocide contained in Article 2 of the Convention does not
require that the relevant “national, ethnical, racial or religious group” be
destroyed, but only that one or more of the specified acts be committed
with the intention of destroying the group “in whole or in part.” Many of
the atrocities plainly satisfied this description. In 1989 J.H.Wootten QC ex-
pressed the view that assimilation in its crudest forms, and particularly the
removal of aboriginal children, fell within this definition. For present pur-
poses, it is unnecessary for me to determine whether the particular conduct
to which he referred would have been sufficient to sustain charges of geno-
cide if such an offence formed part of the domestic law of Australia. There
is ample evidence to satisfy me that acts of genocide were committed dur-
ing the colonisation of Australia.45
This was a significant statement as it was the first time in Australian law that
genocide against Indigenous Peoples had been so clearly recognised. Further,
the case and its appeal prompted realisation that while Australia had signed
the Genocide Convention, it had failed to integrate it into domestic legislation.
While Australia was amongst the first to sign the Genocide Convention (on the
day it was opened for signature, December 11, 1948), and ratified it in 1949,
it subsequently failed to introduce legislation that would enable its domestic
prosecution. On the one hand, this was not surprising. Those debating the rat-
ification of the Convention in 1949 were convinced that it could never happen
here. As Colin Tatz relates, in some 19 pages of the June 1949 parliamentary
debate on Australia’s ratification of the Convention, Aborigines were not men-
tioned.46 Archie Cameron, Liberal Member for Barker argued in Parliament:
44 Supreme Court of the ACT 1998, no. 457, par. 73.
45 Ibid. (author's italics)
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No one in his right senses believes that the Commonwealth of Australia
will be called before the bar of public opinion, if there is such a thing,
and asked to answer for any of the things which are enumerated in this
convention.47
That Australia and Australians could be capable of genocide, past or present,
was unthinkable. Little has changed, although the academic consensus now
acknowledges that genocide is an apt descriptor for the Australian Aboriginal
experience, and that the “intent to destroy” required to establish the crime of
genocide need not be malevolent—that the effect of destruction remains the
same.48 Yet Australia had failed to introduce legislation to enable genocide to
be prosecuted in Australia.
There had been no space in law previously to hear these claims of genocide.
In his 2008 apology, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd spoke of indignity,
degradation, mistreatment, but not genocide.49 The Bringing Them Home
Report named genocide, but its recommendations, including a national com-
pensation mechanism, failed to be implemented.50 Cases have unsuccessfully
been brought attempting to have genocide put on record—at least indirectly.51
There had been fleeting recognition of genocide earlier, where in Coe v Com-
monwealth 1979 in the Australian High Court, Justice Murphy noted: “the
46 Colin Tatz, With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide (New York: Verso, 2003), 69.
47 Archie Cameron, cited in Ibid., 67.
48 Tatz, With Intent, 98–99.
49 Kevin Rudd, “Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples,” Parliamentary Debates (Canberra: House of
Representatives, Parliament of Australia, 2008), 167–77.
50 See Andrea Durbach, “Repairing the Damage: Achieving Reparations for the Stolen Generations,” Alter-
native Law Journal 27, no. 6 (2002), 262–66.
51 See Chris Cunneen and Julia Grix, The Limitations of Litigation in Stolen Generations Cases (Canberra:
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 2004); also see Ann Curthoys, Ann Gen-
ovese and Alex Reilly, Rights and Redemption: History, Law and Indigenous People (Sydney: University of
New South Wales Press, 2008). Most of the cases have been based on breaches of duty of care, wrongful im-
prisonment, and the consequences of child removal. Where genocide has been put to the courts, it has been on
the whole rejected. For example, in Kruger v The Commonwealth of Australia (1997–190 CLR 1), the judges
expressly noted that the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918, which authorised the removal (between 1925 and 1944)
of the nine children who brought the case, did not authorise acts of “genocide” as defined in the Genocide Con-
vention. As Chris Cunneen and Julia Grix note on page 27: “Government records are likely to paint a picture
in which the removal and subsequent treatment of Indigenous children complied with ‘their best interests’ and
met the standards of the time. Protection laws are characterised as benign in their intent, as ‘beneficial’ laws
– even if discriminatory. Under these circumstances, the likelihood that the forced removal of Indigenous chil-
dren will be considered by the courts as constituting genocide is remote.” One case that has been successful is
that of Bruce Trevorrow, taken from his family at the age of 13 months from hospital by the Aboriginal Pro-
tection Board and placed in a non-Indigenous foster family for the next 10 years. In Trevorrow v State of South
Australia (No. 5) (2007–SASC 285), his removal was found to be unlawful and he was awarded $525,000 in
compensation. South Australia, alongside Tasmania and most recently NSW, has now instituted a Stolen Gener-
ations reparations scheme.
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aborigines did not give up their lands peacefully; they were killed or removed
forcibly from the lands by United Kingdom forces or the European colonists in
what amounted to attempted (and in Tasmania almost complete) genocide.”52
These are rare moments. No justice space has been created of acknowledge-
ment, recognition and redress; rather a policy of “ reconciliation” has been the
policy approach taken by successive governments.
The case and its appeal prompted the bringing of a Private Senator’s Bill,
the Anti-Genocide Bill 1999 (Cth) by Australian Democrat Senator Brian
Greig, who, in his second reading speech “referred to the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide as ‘unfinished business’ of the Common-
wealth Parliament.”53 The Bill was referred by the Senate to the Legal and
Constitutional Affairs References Committee, whose June 2000 report found
that “anti-genocide legislation in Australia was both necessary and timely, and
recommended that the Bill be referred to the Attorney General for considera-
tion of the matters identified by the Committee in respect of its contents.”54
The Bill was overtaken by the ratification of the International Criminal
Court Statute by Australia. In 2002, as a result of pressure from other signato-
ries to the International Criminal Court, Australia introduced the International
Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002. A key principle of the
Statute of the new International Criminal Court, which holds jurisdiction to
hear crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, was that it
would not usurp genuine national attempts to try these crimes. The “principle
of complementarity” means that the Court will only take the case if the state
where the crime was perpetrated is unwilling or genuinely unable to do so.55
This meant that Australia is obliged to implement legislation to enable pros-
ecution even if, as Gillian Triggs has noted, “The existence of such laws by
no means indicates the extent of their enforcement. Indeed, Australian practice
suggests that war crimes prosecutions have ultimately depended upon polit-
ical will.”56 This is reflected in the “Declaration” that Australia included in
its last-minute signature, reinforcing “the primacy of its criminal jurisdiction”
and that the Attorney-General must authorise any arrest or extradition to the
52 Coe v Commonwealth 1979 HCA 68, par. 8.
53 Shirley Scott, “Why Wasn't Genocide a Crime in Australia? Accounting For the Half-century Delay in
Australia Implementing the Genocide Convention,” Australian Journal of Human Rights 10, no. 2 (2004): arti-
cle 22, n.p.
54 Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee 2000 cited in Ibid., n.p.
55 The Preamble notes that “the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be comple-
mentary to national criminal jurisdictions” and this is reiterated in Article 17 of the Rome Statute.
56 Gillian Triggs, “Implementation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court: A Quiet Revo-
lution in Australian Law,” Sydney Law Review 25, no. 4 (2003), 518.
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Court.57 Much of this was for Australian public consumption rather than for
the purposes of operation of the Court.58
The approach taken, as Triggs has outlined, was to amend the Australian
Criminal Code Act 2005 by creating a new Chapter 8—“Offences Against Hu-
manity and Related Offences.”59 In relation to genocide, five new offences
of genocide were added to the Criminal Code, that incorporate the definition
of genocide in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes that had been drafted by the
Preparatory Commission of the Court (and are taken from the Genocide Con-
vention). These are: 268.3 Genocide by killing; 268.4 Genocide by causing
serious bodily or mental harm; 268.5 Genocide by deliberately inflicting con-
ditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction; 268.6 Genocide
by imposing measures intended to prevent births; 268.7 Genocide by forcibly
transferring children.60
Yet while genocide has become a criminal offence in Australia, and is now
prosecutable––and indeed, named––it is up to the Attorney General to bring
prosecutions, with the decision final and no challenges allowed. This has had
the effect of Australia continuing to fail to prosecute genocide.
“Closing the chapter” again?
In his foreword to the Review of Material Relating to the Entry of Suspected
War Criminals into Australia, Andrew Menzies wrote that “In the case of such
crimes, the argument that the culprits, by coming to this country, have turned
their back on such events has, in my view, no validity.”61 Yet in Australian pol-
icy and practice today, we see a selective application of this approach. While
“foreign fighters” legislation gets rushed through, we have no such equivalent
scrutiny of the crimes perpetrated in genocide and other state crime interna-
tionally—or nationally. The provision of the Attorney-General to veto any
prosecutions, means that it is in the hands of the government to determine
prosecution of genocide.
This was evident with the halting of the investigation by the Melbourne
Magistrates’ Court into the indictment filed by Arunachalam Jegatheeswaran,
57 Much of the declaration is concerned with Australia having primary jurisdiction over crimes, which is
reflected in any case in the core principle of the Court of “complementarity.” See https://treaties.un.org/doc/
source/training/regional/2009/13-17October-2009/reservations-declarations-questions.pdf.
58 Alex Bellamy and Marianne Hanson, “Justice Beyond Borders? Australia and the International Criminal
Court,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 3 (2002), 417–33.
59 Triggs, “Implementation,” 520.
60 International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 (Commonwealth of Australia),
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004A00993.
61 Menzies, Review of Material, 12.
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an Australian citizen, against Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaska (who
was about to visit Perth to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting) on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In a media
conference, Jegatheeswaran stated: “He’s [Rajapaksa] the commander-in-
chief and nothing would have happened without his knowledge or his di-
rections, and ultimately, he should be answerable to what was happening.”62
Slated for hearing on November 29, after having been filed late October 2011
under Division 268 of the Criminal Code Act 1995, the then Attorney-General
Robert McClelland refused to support the matter, thus effectively ending the
investigation.
Two years later, then Prime Minister Tony Abbott, in speaking on the issue
of alleged war crimes committed during Sri Lanka’s civil war and on persis-
tent human rights concerns under the Rajapaksa government, stated that while
his government “deplores the use of torture we accept that sometimes in dif-
ficult circumstances difficult things happen.”63 Meanwhile, countries such as
Canada and the Netherlands have routinely been hearing charges of geno-
cide, most recently in relation to the genocide in Rwanda. Yet in Australia,
our response is that we must “move on.” On the appointment of Indone-
sia’s new security minister Wiranto, a former general who was indicted for
crimes against humanity by the United Nations-established Serious Crimes
Unit in Timor-Leste, the Australian Federal Justice Minister Michael Keenan
responded that “we in government need to pursue what is in Australia’s na-
tional interest in 2016.”64 In 1993, with the recognition of at least one former
Khmer Rouge official living in Australia who was identified as responsible
for the torture and killing of Cambodians in “Democratic Kampuchea,” the
Cambodian Advisory Council of Australia requested amendments to the War
Crimes Act so that prosecution could occur here. As Mark Aarons relates,
nothing was done.65
62 Arunachalam Jegatheeswaran, cited in “Rajapaksa Indicated for War Crimes in Australian Court,” Tamil
Guardian, October 23, 2011, http://www.tamilguardian.com/content/rajapaksa-indicted-war-crimes-australian-
court?articleid=3754.
63 Tony Abbott cited in Amanda Hodge, “ ‘Difficult Things Happen’: Tony Abbott Defends Sri Lanka,”
Australian, November 16, 2013, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/difficult-things-happen-tony-
abbott-defends-sri-lanka/news-story/e1bac24a820d0b817bacd250eb18cd73.
64 Michael Keenan cited in Jewel Topsfield, “Alleged Timor War Crimes Forgotten as Ministers Fly in for
Bali Terror Summit,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 10, 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/world/alleged-timor-
war-crimes-forgotten-as-ministers-fly-in-for-bali-terror-summit-20160809-gqokk8.html. Wiranto had been the
Defence Minister and Commander of Indonesian Armed Forces and was charged with “command responsibility
for murder, deportation and persecution committed in the context of a widespread and systematic attack on the
civilian population in East Timor.” See “Timor-Leste Court Issues Warrant for Former Indonesian Defence Min-
ister,” UN News Centre, May 10, 2004, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10677.
65 Mark Aarons, War Criminals Welcome: Australia, A Sanctuary or Fugitive War Criminals since 1945
(Melbourne: Black Inc., 2001), 40.
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Aarons’ investigative work, alongside others, has shown, as he notes, that
“it is a statistical certainty that Australia has war criminals, torturers and mass
killers from almost every major killing field of the past half-century.”66 There
have been allegations made by members of the Chilean, Cambodian, Afghani,
Bosnian, and Rwandan communities, among others, about perpetrators who
now live here.67 Victims have run into perpetrators at community centres, after
years of refuge.68 Most recently, the issue has been raised of returning ISIS
fighters being held responsible for the genocide against the Yazidi people in
Northern Iraq.69
Genocide is not seen as worthy of trial in Australia. We can understand the
three war crimes hearings held in the early 1990s as an anomaly. Barwick's
claims, that Australia must be “history-less,” are a more accurate reflection of
where Australia stands. Tony Barta has argued that as beneficiaries of geno-
cide, Australians cannot address it—as to do so is to acknowledge what we
have gained.70 We can understand this is a form of denial, which Tatz and
Winton Higgins identify as integral to genocide.71 As a “history-less” country
that does not acknowledge its own history, we cannot acknowledge others. In
denying our own history as settler-colonial, based on genocide, we also must
deny others their history––as victims or perpetrators or bystanders––of con-
flicts elsewhere.
Irene Nemes, in her commentary on the closure of the Special Investiga-
tions Unit in the early 1990s, noted that “By abandoning the investigations,
the government is allowing Nazi war criminals to remain complacent and pro-
tected from their past.”72 We could add to this, that Australia remains protected
66 Ibid., 47.
67 Ibid. See chapters One and Two for an account of allegations and sightings of various perpetrators.
68 Ibid., chap. Two.
69 Nikki Marczak, “Comment: Seeking Justice For an Ongoing Genocide,” SBS News, August 22, 2016,
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2016/08/22/comment-seeking-justice-ongoing-genocide.
70 Tony Barta, “After the Holocaust: Consciousness of Genocide in Australia,” Australian Journal of Politics
and History 31, no. 1 (1985), 154-61, see 160. “In Australia, where all of us are the beneficiaries of crimes
against the Aborigines, the question can’t seriously penetrate our ideological defences. Anyone interested in
the continued hegemony of our social values—property acquisition at the very centre of them—has a kind of
functional incredulousness: how could our kind of society be criminal?” Barta continues: “Consciousness of
genocide will have political implications, too. Anyone who knows what took place in this country must surely
know what has to happen now.” While I disagree with Barta’s assessment of Germany’s citizens not having
“gained” from the removal of the Jewish population, his assessment of Australia, and why we have failed to
recognise the genocidal foundations of this society, is spot on. In Colin Tatz and Winton Higgins, The Magni-
tude of Genocide (California: Praeger, 2016), the authors also note how “beneficiaries” can be understood as
integral to the paradigm of genocidal actors, comprising “perpetrators, bystanders, victims, rescuers, and bene-
ficiaries,” and also post-settler- colonial nations as “straightforward beneficiaries of genocide” (see 85 and 194).
71 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, in particular Chapter Nine.
72 Nemes, 156.
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both from its collective past and its current present. In a climate in which Aus-
tralia shows no compassion for those fleeing conflict and seeking better lives
elsewhere, it would seem necessary to demonstrate to the Australian popu-
lation what it is that asylum seekers and refugees flee from. The domestic
prosecution of perpetrators of genocide and other state crime, including war
crimes, would seem to serve this purpose. If a reason is needed beyond that
criminal behaviour will be punished, across the globe, no matter where it was
perpetrated, no matter to whom, and no matter how long ago, then I suggest
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Introduction
The attempted genocide of European Jews perpetrated by the National Social-
ist regime in Germany and its collaborators was a distinctly modern event.
The bureaucratised and industrialised nature of the Nazi plan (the Endlösung
or Final Solution) is generally considered the defining characteristic of the
Holocaust. Prior to the establishment of extermination camps in Poland, the
Nazi regime had perpetrated or fomented both sporadic massacres and a mili-
tarised programme of executions in Eastern Europe, in what has been termed
“Holocaust by bullets.”1 Yet despite the murder of 1.5 million Jews by SS
and police mobile killing squads (Einsatzgruppen), the defining symbol of
the Holocaust was the industrialised killing centre at Auschwitz-Birkenau.
Importantly, the gas chambers of the Reinhard camps (Belzec, Sobibor, and
Treblinka II) and Auschwitz-Birkenau did not appear de novo for the purposes
of killing Europe’s Jews.2 The medical profession, in collusion with Adolf
Hitler’s Chancellery (KdF), had earlier developed and refined a large-scale,
state-financed and well-concealed program of victim selection and mass trans-
portation to dedicated killing centres with effective techniques of gassing and
disposal of victims’ remains. The template for the Endlösung evolved as a
medical procedure, developed primarily by psychiatrists.3
It is argued that the Holocaust may be conceptualised as not a “moment
in history” but rather as the “hidden face” of the culture that persists.4 The
involvement of psychiatrists in this highly organised programme thus raises
questions relevant to the contemporary psychiatric profession. While facile
comparisons of present-day ethical dilemmas in psychiatry with extreme acts
1 Patrick Desbois, The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth Behind the Murder of
1.5 Million Jews (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
2 Henry Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution (Chapel Hill:
University of Noth Carolina Press, 1995).
3 Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance: “Euthanasia” in Germany 1900–1945 (London: Pan, 2002).
4 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
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of certain psychiatrists in the Nazi regime do little to enlighten psychiatric
ethics and likely lead the discourse away from the contemporary significance
of the period, some formulations of the Holocaust have utilised the concept of
“biopower,”5 which along with the notion of a “dual role dilemma,”6 provides
a means to better understand current challenges in psychiatric ethics.
Biopower represents a means of governmental or state control of individual
or population biology and is a modern progression from the coercive power
of the sovereign to control life. The mass sterilisation or destruction of the
sick and disabled under Nazism was a distinct application of biopower. Our
argument is that through this particular programme of persecution of the sick
and disabled, largely executed by the psychiatric profession, the Nazi regime
created a biological “crisis” situated initially in the discourse of eugenics and
later, racial hygiene. The regime used this as a pretext for a large-scale exercise
of biopower over the Volk (population). This raised a specific crisis in psychi-
atric ethics: in the setting of a totalitarian state, the psychiatric profession was
made responsible to the state and the health of the Volk, at the extreme ex-
pense of many individual patients. This, in turn, created a form of the dual-role
dilemma.
The “dual role dilemma” was originally a construct from ethical discourse
in forensic psychiatry, highlighting tension between the conflicting obligations
of the psychiatrist to the patient and a third party, in that instance, the court
system. Many dilemmas in psychiatric ethics can be reduced to manifestations
of the dual role dilemma and, as we will argue, the situation of the psychiatric
profession in the Nazi regime was one of history’s greatest dual role dilemmas
in that it placed the psychiatric profession in a tension between obligations to
patients and to the regime and the Volk.
Most present-day psychiatrists acknowledge the role their profession
played in the Nazi period (1933–1945).7 Much attention in this regard has
been paid to human rights violations perpetrated against people with psychi-
atric, intellectual and physical disabilities. Both these abuses and the broader
history of the German psychiatric profession in the Nazi regime offer many
lessons for contemporary psychiatric ethics. In the first part of this essay, we
provide a broad survey of the main themes in the history of the psychiatric
5 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1978–1979 (New York:
Picador, 2004); Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, “Biopower Today,” BioSocieties 1 (2006), 195–217; Giogio
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford Univeristy Press, 1988).
6 Michael Robertson and Garry Walter, “Many Faces of the Dual-role Dilemma in Psychiatric Ethics,” Aus-
tralian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 42, no. 3 (2008), 228–35.
7 Rael D. Strous, “Psychiatry During the Nazi Era: Ethical Lessons for the Modern Professional,” Annals of
General Psychiatry 6, no. 8 (2007); Michael von-Cranach, “Ethics in Psychiatry: The Lessons We Learn from
Nazi Psychiatry,” Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci 260 (2010), 152–56.
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profession in the Nazi regime. In the second part, we provide a deeper analysis
of the significance of this period for contemporary psychiatric ethics.
Part 1—A historical survey
Psychiatry before National Socialism
Two iconic figures and two divergent views on mental illness characterised
German psychiatry during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The work of Emil Kraepelin and Sigmund Freud left momentous clinical and
cultural legacies to the present day.8 The differences between the two psy-
chiatrists’ projects broadly represented the split in the German psychiatric
profession’s views of mental illness at the time, regarding such illness as
either a biological phenomenon (Somatiker) or a disease of the soul (Psy-
chiker).9 Freud’s ideas were rejected and demonised by both the German
psychiatric profession and Nazi regime as the foundation of the “Jewish Sci-
ence” of psychoanalysis.10 This void enabled Kraepelin’s legacy to profoundly
influence German psychiatry. Kraepelin’s project included, inter alia, classifi-
cation of psychiatric disorders and establishment of the paradigm of biological
psychiatry, culminating in his founding the German Institute for Psychiatric
Research.11 Kraepelin was drawn ultimately to the tenets of Social Darwinism,
eugenics and racial hygiene, and the idea that society had countered natural se-
lection and allowed dysfunctional genetic traits to flourish. He was concerned
about “the number of idiots, epileptics, psychopaths, criminals, prostitutes,
and tramps who descend from alcoholic and syphilitic parents, and who trans-
fer their inferiority to their offspring,” and argued that “our highly developed
social welfare has the sad side-effect that it operates against the natural self-
cleansing of our people.”12 These ideas were developed further by devotees
(including psychiatrist, eugenicist and Nazi, Ernst Rüdin), which ensured this
8 Hannah S. Decker, “How Kraepelinian was Kraepelin? How Kraepelinian are the Neo-Kraepelini-
ans?—From Emil Kraepelin to DSM-III,” History of Psychiatry 18, no. 3 (2007), 337–60.
9 Albrecht Hirschmueller, trans. by Magda Whitrow, “The Development of Psychiatry and Neurology in the
Nineteenth Century,” History of Psychiatry x (1999), 395–423.
10 Geoffrey Cocks, Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985); James Goggin and Eileen Brockman-Goggin, Death of a Jewish Science: Psychoanalysis in the
Third Reich (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001).
11 This institute would later become part of the main German academic body of the twentieth century, the
Kaiser Wilhelm Society.
12 Martin Brüne, “On Human Self-Domestication, Psychiatry, and Eugenics,” Philosophy, Ethics and Hu-
manities in Medicine 2, no. 1 (2007), 21.
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aspect of Kraepelin’s work dominated interwar German psychiatry13 and was
at the service of the National Socialists in their justification for genocide.14
In the early 1900s, a growing anti-psychiatry sentiment in Germany fos-
tered debate over asylum care versus family care for the “insane,”15 although
the systems of asylum (Irrenanstlaten) persisted as the locale of psychiatric
practice.16 Asylums became the focal point of psychiatric clinical practice in
the period leading up to the Nazi regime and consisted of Heilanstalten (sana-
toria) and Pflegeanstalten (nursing homes or care institutions). From 1880
to 1920, the number of asylum inmates in Germany increased by nearly 500
per cent.17 Patients in these asylums had always fared badly—nearly 70,000
German psychiatric patients died of starvation and other consequences of de-
privation during World War One,18 and the high cost of maintaining these
institutions was a constant concern for state treasuries.19
During the same period, psychiatrists began to expand their approaches
to asylum patient care and treatment, including patient engagement in “work
therapy” (Arbeitstherapie), akin to what many would recognise as occupa-
tional therapy today.20 The large numbers of psychiatric casualties from the
1914–1918 war had also prompted German psychiatrists to experiment with
more radical therapies21 such as malaria therapy,22 aversion therapy23 and
insulin coma therapy.24 This enabled a “reform” movement in German psychi-
13 Matthias Weber, “Ernst Rüdin, 1874–1952: A German Psychiatrist and Geneticist,” American Journal of
Medical Genetics 67, no. 4 (1996), 323–31.
14 Eric Engstrom, Matthais Weber and Wolfgang Burgmair, “Emil Wilhelm Magnus Georg Kraepelin
(1856–1926),” American Journal of Psychiatry 163, no. 10 (2006), 1710.
15 Heinz-Peter Schmiedebach, “Zerquälte Ergebnisse einer Dichterseele?–Literarische Kritik, Psychiatrie und
Öffentlichkeit um 1900,” in Moderne Anstaltspsychiatrie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert–Legitimation und Kritik,
eds. Heiner Fangerau and Karen Nolte (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006).
16 Andreas Pernice and N.J.R. Evans, “Family Care and Asylum Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century: The
Controversy in the Allgemeine Zeitschrift fur Psychiatrie Between 1844 and 1902,” History of Psychiatry 6, no.
21 (1995), 55–68.
17 Dirk Blasius, Einfache Seelenstörung: Geschichte der deutschen Psychiatrie 1800–1945 (Frankfurt am
Main: Fischer, 1994).
18 Heinz Faulstich, Hungersterben in der Psychiatrie 1914–1949: mit einer Topographie der NS-Psychiatrie
(Freiburg im Breisgau: Lambertus, 1998).
19 Michael Burleigh, “The Legacy of Nazi Medicine in Context,” in Medicine and Medical Ethics in Nazi
Germany: Origins, Practices, Legacies, eds. Francis Nicosia and Jonathan Huener (New York: Berghahn Books,
2002).
20 Heinz-Peter Schmiedebach and Stefan Priebe, “Social Psychiatry in Germany in the Twentieth Century:
Ideas and Models,” Medical History 48 (2004), 449–72.
21 Heinz-Peter Schmiedebach, “Psychiatry in Germany in the early 20th Century,” Neurology, Psychiatry and
Brain Research 22, no. 2 (2016), 29–3.
22 Cynthia Tsay, “Julius Wagner-Jauregg and the Legacy of Malarial Therapy for the Treatment of General
Paresis of the Insane,” Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 86, no. 2 (2013), 245–54.
23 F. Kaufmann, “Die planmäβige Heilung komplizierter psychogener Bewegungsstörungen bei Soldaten in
einer Sitzung,” Feldärtz Beilage Münch Med Wochenschr 63 (1916), 802ff.
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atric asylums.25 Despite the introduction of such treatments, there remained a
group of patients whose illness and disability proved intractable. This group’s
failure to respond to new treatment methods strengthened views about the fi-
nancial costs and the perceived futility of their lives.
The psychiatric profession and the Nazi regime
After the National Socialists took power, the professions were subject to a
process of alignment to the values of the Nazi regime.26 The Gleichschaltung
(alignment) of the medical profession was positioned around notions of public
health and hygiene.27 As part of the Gleichschaltung, Jewish physicians were
subjected to restrictions to their medical practice, were forced out of their uni-
versity posts or imprisoned. Around 50 per cent of German physicians joined
either the Nazi party or associated bodies,28 and psychiatrists were enthusiastic
participants in the regime. Motivations for participation in the NSDAP were
variably political or ideological, or inspired by opportunism and institutional
loyalty.29 The transcripts of criminal trials in West Germany of perpetrators of
the Nazi “euthanasia” programme provide some insight into such motivations
for participation in the murder of patients, including ideological affinity with
Nazi doctrine, vanity and ambition, a distorted sense of obedience, “inertia” of
the will, careerism and personality vulnerability.30 Other justifications include
seemingly self-serving variations of the concept of empathy in that many of
the killers sought to reframe the murder of the sick and disabled patients as
24 I. Murray Rossman and William B. Cline “The Pharmacological ‘Shock’ Treatment of Chronic Schizo-
phrenia,” American Journal of Psychiatry 94, no. 6 (1938), 1323–36.
25 Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New York:
Wiley, 1997).
26 Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (Cambridge, Mass: Bellknap, 2003).
27 Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic
Books, 2000).
28 Omar Haque, Julian De Freitas, Ivana Viani, Bradley Niederschulte and Harold Bursztajn, “Why Did So
Many German Doctors Join the Nazi Party Early?” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 35, no. 5–6
(2012), 473–79.
29 Henry Friedlander, “Physicians as Killers in Nazi Germany: Hadamar, Treblinka, and Auschwitz,” in Med-
icine and Medical Ethics in Nazi Germany: Origins, Practices, Legacies, eds. Francis Nicosia and Jonathan
Huener (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002); Michael Dudley and Fran Gale, “Psychiatrists As a Moral Com-
munity? Psychiatry Under the Nazis and its Contemporary Relevance,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Psychiatry 36, no. 5 (2002), 585–94.
30 Michael Bryant, Confronting the “Good Death”: Nazi Euthanasia on Trial, 1945–1953 (Boulder: Univer-
sity Press of Colorado, 2005).
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acts of mercy or benevolence.31 Some authors, however, define the motivation
purely in terms of economic necessity.32
The primary theoretical underpinning of the Gleichschaltung in the case of
German psychiatry was eugenics.33 The term “eugenics” usually refers to the
improvement of the health of a population by the promotion of desirable her-
itable characteristics through the elimination of “inferior” genetic stock from
the breeding pool. Although the concept dates to Plato, the modern term is
attributed to British polymath Francis Galton.34 Despite its clear link to Krae-
pelin’s ideas, eugenics was by no means solely a German phenomenon. In
the early twentieth century, eugenic societies existed in numerous countries
and grew in popularity in the face of the massive social change that followed
World War One.35 This legitimated racist immigration policy, particularly in
the US and Australia in the 1930s.36 Well before it was used for genocidal
purposes, the conflation of genetics and race offered by eugenics enabled the
Nazi regime to sanction its programme of social exclusion through “medical
science” and establish a collaborative relationship with the German medical
profession. Many influential psychiatrists were enthusiastic eugenicists, in-
cluding the co-founder of the German Society for Racial Hygiene, Kraepelin’s
acolyte Ernst Rüdin.37
Krankenmorde and the Holocaust
Psychiatrists were not only keen advocates of the principles of eugenics; they
also put these principles into action—and, indeed, extended them—by taking
a central role in the Nazi regime’s so-called “euthanasia program.”38 Contem-
porary memorial sites in Germany and Austria now refer to this part of the
Holocaust as “Krankenmorde” (the murder of the sick). Like eugenics, “eu-
thanasia” of the mentally ill was publicly debated in the US at the same time
31 David Deutsch, “Immer mit Liebe: Empathic Violence in Nazi Euthanasia,” Holocaust Studies: A Journal
of Culture and History 22, no. 1 (2016), 1–20.
32 Gerrit Hohendorf, Der Tod als Erlösung vom Leiden: Geschichte und Ethik der Sterbehilfe seit dem Ende
des 19. Jarhunderts in Deustchland (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013).
33 Friedlander, The Origins.
34 Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry Into Its Laws and Consequences (London: Macmillan,
1869).
35 Burleigh, Death and Deliverance.
36 Robert Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1990).
37 Lifton, The Nazi Doctors.
38 Ernst Klee, “Euthanasie” im NS-Staat: Die “Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens” (Frankfurt-am-Main:
Fischer, 1983); Friedlander, The Origins.
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as it rose in popularity in Germany, with prominent US neurologist Foster
Kennedy39 arguing that the “feeble minded” should be killed.40 In July 1933,
the German Reichstag passed the “Law for Prevention of Hereditary Diseased
Offspring” following which “Hereditary Health Courts” mandated sterilisa-
tion of several hundred thousand adults of child-rearing age deemed by their
doctors as having hereditary diseases. There followed the sporadic murder
of disabled children by deliberate overdoses of barbiturates, or combinations
of morphine and scopolamine. Following successful experiments with car-
bon monoxide gas chambers, a centralised process of mass murder of those
deemed “life unworthy of life” was organised from Tiergartenstraβe 4 in
Berlin. The secret operation—Aktion T4—coordinated the identification of
victims in institutions in Germany and Austria, their mass transportation to six
dedicated killing centres equipped with gas chambers, the disposal of remains,
and a process of deception about the manner of death of the victims. Jewish
patients were among the first to be killed, regardless of their clinical status or
work capacity.41 By late summer 1941, growing community awareness of the
programme led to public protest, prompting Hitler to order the gassings to halt.
Undeterred, many German psychiatrists continued to murder patients—mostly
by deliberate overdose or starvation—in a process termed Wilde Euthanasie
(decentralised euthanasia).42 Many senior psychiatrists participated in Aktion
T4, with a number of doctors later participating in coordinated killing of sick
prisoners in the concentration camp system under Aktion14f13.43 Accounting
for the sporadic murders of asylum patients in Nazi occupied Europe, around
300,000 disabled people were killed in the period 1933–1945.44 It is notewor-
thy that after the T4 programme was disbanded, more than 90 per cent of those
who worked in it later participated in the extermination camps of Aktion Rein-
hard, the process of eliminating Poland’s Jewish population.45
Psychotherapy in the Nazi regime
The immediate effect of National Socialism on the practice of psychotherapy
39 Foster Kennedy, “The Problem of Social Control of the Congenital Defective: Education, Sterilization, Eu-
thanasia,” American Journal of Psychiatry 99, no. 1 (1942), 13–16.
40 Jay Joseph, “The 1942 ‘Euthanasia’ Debate in the American Journal of Psychiatry,” History of Psychiatry
16, no. 2 (2005), 171–79.
41 Rael Strous, “Extermination of the Jewish Mentally-ill During the Nazi Era—The ‘Doubly Cursed,’ ” Is-
rael Journal of Psychiatry Related Sciences 45, no. 4 (2008), 247–56.
42 Gerhard Schmidt, Selektion in der Heilanstalt, 1939–1945 (Berlin: Springer, 2011).
43 Friedlander, “Physicians as Killers.”
44 This estimate is provided by the official memorial to the victims of Nazi euthanasia in Berlin.
45 Klee, “Euthanasie” im NS-Staat.
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was evident in the expulsion of Jewish therapists from practice as part of the
Gleichschaltung. The Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute existed within the tradi-
tion of Freud and many of its esteemed alumni were Jews. The changes to
psychotherapy in the Nazi regime have been documented.46 Central to these
accounts is the establishment of the so-called Göring Institutes. The exclusion
of Jewish therapists and the denouncement of the “Jewish science” of psycho-
analysis created an opportunity for Mathias Göring (first cousin of Hermann
Göring) to establish a series of psychotherapeutic institutes that practised brief
and focal therapies (Kleintherapie), including biofeedback, behavioural mod-
ification and some forms of family therapy. In keeping with the instrumental
goals of the Nazi regime, the critical shift in psychotherapy was away from
the patient growth and introspection sought by psychoanalysis, toward the im-
provement and enhancement of the health and function of the population.
Psychiatrists in the military
German psychiatrists were well integrated into the armed forces, particularly
the Wehrmacht. The main concern of psychiatrists working in the military un-
der the Nazi regime was war neurosis (Kriegsneurosen), or what would be
now considered post-traumatic stress disorder. Each army district had an ad-
visory psychiatrist (Beratender Psychiater) who provided data to the central
authorities, including the incidence of different forms of psychological distur-
bance and problematic behaviours such as self-inflicted wounds, desertion and
insubordination. Most psychiatrists working in the Wehrmacht refused to ac-
knowledge Kriegsneurosen as a legitimate clinical concern.47 The commonly
held assumption was that such problems did not occur in the Wehrmacht due
its superior command structure and morale, and successful recruitment and re-
placement policies.48 As part of recruitment processes, psychiatrists advised
the Wehrmacht how to exclude unsuitable recruits.49 The likelihood is that the
comparatively low reported rate of war neurosis was attributable to the success
of the Wehrmacht in the first years of the war.50 After 1942 and the failures of
campaigns in North Africa and the Soviet Union, the rates of psychiatric casu-
alties increased exponentially.
46 Cocks, Psychotherapy; Goggin and Brockman-Goggin, Death of a Jewish.
47 Robert Schneider, “Stress Breakdown in the Wehrmacht: Implications for Today’s Army,” in Contempo-
rary Studies in Combat Psychiatry, ed. Gregory Belenky (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1987), 87–101.
48 R. Valentin, Kankenbatallione (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1981).
49 Peter Reidesser and Axel Verderber, Maschinengewehre hinter der Front. Zur Geschichte der deutschen
Militärpsychiatrie (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1996).
50 Schneider, “Stress Breakdown.”
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Some personnel with war neurosis were diagnosed with organic conditions
such as encephalitis and treated in military hospitals as medically ill. Others
were either deemed “psychopaths” or malingerers and subject to hard labour
in specific units or, in some circumstances, imprisoned or sent to concentration
camps.51 In cases where a diagnosis of war neurosis was accepted, manage-
ment derived from the approach of “forward treatment” (immediacy, proxim-
ity, expectancy, simplicity, and centrality) developed by American psychiatrist
Thomas W. Salmon during World War One. An additional carryover of the
treatment of “shell shock” from World War One was the use of the so-called
“Kaufmann cure” that involved the administration of electric shocks to trau-
matised soldiers in order to facilitate a desire to return to the front.52 In
the Nazi regime, this approach became the specialty of psychiatrist Fred-
erich Panse at the Ensen Hospital near Weimar—the treatment was renamed
Pansen.53 Panse had a long-standing interest in military psychiatry and had
published on themes of compensation neurosis and malingering in soldiers.54
Pansen was initially opposed by many in the Wehrmacht and in the health bu-
reaucracy; however, with the escalation of psychiatric casualties in the latter
part of the war, this resistance softened.
Part 2—Lessons learnt, ignored and forgotten
The meaning and understanding of “Holocaust”
In order to understand the lessons of psychiatry in the Nazi period, it is nec-
essary to consider not only psychiatrists’ participation in the Nazi regime, but
also the fact that they played a critical role in the “Holocaust.” Our approach to
the Holocaust as “the seminal ethical event of modernity”55 or the “paradigm
of genocide” necessitating a “new categorical imperative”56 and contemporary
reflection, extends from the analysis of Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman argues that
the Holocaust represents both a central moment in Jewish history and the “hid-
51 Ibid.
52 Kaufmann, “Die planmäβige Heilung.”
53 Ralf Forsbach, “Friedrich Panse—Etabliert in Allen Systemen: Psychiater in der Weimarer Republik, im
‘Dritten Reich’ und in der Bundesrepublik,” Nervenarzt 83 (2012), 329–36.
54 Friedrich Panse, “Das Schicksal von Renten—und Kriegsneurotikern nach Erlangung ihrer Ansprüche,”
Archiv fűr Psychiatrie 77 (1926), 61–92.
55 Shmuel Reis and Tomi Chelouche, “Medicine and the Holocaust—Lessons For Present and Future Physi-
cians,” Medicine and Law: The World Association for Medical Law 27, no. 4 (2008), 787–804; Colin Tatz and
Winton Higgins, The Magnitude of Genocide (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016).
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den face” of modernity.57 Key features of Bauman’s definition of modernity
are the removal of unknowns and uncertainties through control over biology,
creation of bureaucracy, enforced rules and regulations, and control and cat-
egorisation of individuals leading to a process of exclusion.58 The latter is
significant in that the origins of the Holocaust exist within the culture—in
this case, one characterised by modernist beliefs and values—and therefore
can recur under similar cultural circumstances. Along similar lines, Colin Tatz
and Winton Higgins describe the Holocaust as the coalescence of the different
components of the modern state—infrastructure, bureaucratic hierarchies, and
a culture of scientism that legitimated the process.59
Bureaucracy in the Holocaust
Of the various features of modernity, bureaucratisation seems to have been
particular important. Max Weber’s formulation of the modern bureaucracy in
the most recognised. Weberian bureaucracy is characterised by a hierarchical
organisation, with delineated lines of authority and fixed areas of activity.60 In
a bureaucracy, action is taken by neutral officials or functionaries working un-
der specific rules within a hierarchic structure.61
For Bauman, one of the critical preconditions of the Holocaust was bu-
reaucratic and industrialised organisation.62 This meant that antisemitism and
modernity, while necessary, were not sufficient conditions in themselves for
the Holocaust. What was needed beyond political will was a rational bureau-
cracy, as rationalisation was the critical process in enacting genocide. Indeed,
the organisational aspects of the Holocaust for Bauman were its defining
characteristic. It is evident that the organisational aspects of the Holocaust
flourished in the Nazi regime’s “euthanasia” programme. Aktion T4 provided
the definitive template of the Holocaust—a centrally controlled bureaucratic
process of identification, exclusion and collection of victims, mass transporta-
57 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust.
58 This is Bauman’s concept of “solid modernity,” as against his subsequent development of “late” or “liquid”
modernity.
59 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude.
60 For Weber, the bureaucratisation of government and society is characterised by a process of “rationalisa-
tion” in which traditional values, such as filial or community bonds, are replaced by “outcomes” such as markers
of efficiency or economy. Weber did not demonise bureaucracy; indeed, he saw it as an inevitable part of large
government. He did, however, describe how it created “technically ordered, rigid, dehumanized society,” with
profound influences on self-concept and community relationships. For Weber, the modern world was shaped by
bureaucratic rationalisation, which creates what he famously proclaimed as the Stahlhartes Gehäuse (iron cage).
See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905; London; Penguin, 2002).
61 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1922).
62 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust.
78
tion to dedicated industrialised killing centres arranged in a network, efficient
killing and disposal methods, and elaborate deception. The association of
bureaucracy and the Holocaust is also at the core of Hannah Arendt’s formula-
tion of the criminality of Adolf Eichmann, the prototypic “Schriebtischtäter”
(desk criminal).63 Arendt’s observation was that Eichmann’s involvement in
the programme of genocide emerged through him operating thoughtlessly and
following orders efficiently (even proclaiming his Kantian ethics),64 without
consideration of the victims.65
German medicine and bureaucracy
It is argued that German modernity, including its relationship to Nazism, was
characterised by the persistence of aristocratic power structures and under-de-
veloped liberal democratic institutions.66 The series of revolutions in Europe
in 1848, in which liberalism became a political reality, failed in Germany. This
meant that the authoritarianism of aristocracy and Prussian militarism were
preserved, and that modern German social institutions and professions evolved
with a particular relationship to the authority of the state. Most notably, loyalty
to the state was placed above all else in any professional ethics. Kühne ar-
gued that the Nazi state had achieved an even more material manifestation of
the Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community) through exclusion of non-Aryans
(and genetic inferiors) and that this enabled such ethical inversions in the pro-
fessions as well as the community.67
The 1946–1947 Doctors’ Trial in Nuremberg,68 and a number of later
prosecutions in West Germany, provide some insight into the individual and
collective motivations of the German medical profession and its relationship
63 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Faber & Faber, 1963).
64 In Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, she notes his justifications for devotion to duty by his stating he had
been schooled in Kant’s categorical imperative.
65 Not everyone accepts this portrait of Eichmann, which is challenged by the account of Benjamin Murmel-
stein, an elder of the Jewish leadership (Judenrat) in the Theresienstadt concentration camp, who claimed he
witnessed Eichmann’s extreme antisemitism during Kristallnacht in Vienna in November 1938, proclaiming to
filmmaker Claude Lanzmann: “Eichmann was not banal, he was a demon.” Later analysis of Eichmann’s cor-
respondence while in Argentina, and in particular his scheming and his endorsement of his crimes to fellow
émigré Nazis in South America, also challenge Arendt’s argument. See Bettina Stangneth, Eichmann Before
Jerusalem (New York: Vintage, 2011). Stangneth does not reject specifically Arendt’s concept of the banality of
evil—she argues that Eichmann was not a good example of it. His particular evil was anything but banal.
66 Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of
the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
67 Thomas Kühne, Belonging and Genocide: Hitler’s Community, 1918–1945 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2010).
68 Nuremberg Military Tribunal 1: USA v Karl Brandt et al. (the trial of 23 alleged perpetrators of uncon-
sented and cruel experiments and the “euthanasia” programme).
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to the Nazi regime and its genocidal programme. The special advisor to the
Nuremberg Tribunal, Austrian-born émigré psychiatrist Leo Alexander, re-
flected later on his observations of the trial, arguing that there were two critical
moral failings underlying the crimes of the “Nazi doctors.”69 First, the process
began with the subtle shift of attitudes of physicians about a relative value of
life. Second, Alexander argued that the physicians working in the Nazi regime
drifted from an approach of an “essentially maternal and religious idea” of
care, to an assumption of responsibility for cure or restoration of function.
This, in turn, emerged as a shift in emphasis of medical practice from serving
the individual to serving the state. This was the ultimately malignant influence
of bureaucracy and Bauman’s modernity on the medical profession.
In the German medical profession, there existed two traditions of Sorge
(care). Fürsorge was the clinical care of the individual, as against Vorsorge,
meaning public health and preventive care. Under Gleichschaltung, the focus
of German medicine aligned with the bio-political aims of the Nazi regime and
a duty of Vorsorge became the moral obligation of the profession.70 In keep-
ing with Lifton’s notion of National Socialism as a form of “applied biology,”
the medical profession was tasked with the health of the Volk (the homoge-
nous Aryan population). Under National Socialism, illness and health became
a critical part of the Volkskörper metaphor (the body of the German people),
considered “a bodily metaphor or an expression of the organic creed charac-
teristic of fascist ideology.”71 Health and illness became a “focal point for the
myriad larger social, economic, and psychological concerns of the era.”72 Such
metaphors enabled racist and other exclusionary discourses to flourish. This
legitimated the Nazi regime’s later programmes of persecution of the weak or
undesirable, and the eliminative genocide of the Holocaust. The emphasis on
the metaphors of health and illness allowed Jewish people to be defined as
“cancer” or “bacillus” and their elimination as a form of medical cure. This
process also placed the medical profession and its bureaucratic structures as a
critical actor in the Nazi regime’s programmes of persecution and genocide.
The transition in German medicine from Fürsorge to Vorsorge began dur-
ing the chancellorship of Bismarck (1871–1890). Medicine gradually became
a state-controlled and state-sponsored enterprise. Oncologist Erwin Leik de-
69 Leo Alexander, “Medical Science Under Dictatorship,” New England Journal of Medicine 241, no. 2
(1949), 39–47.
70 Warren T. Reich, “The Care-Based Ethic of Nazi Medicine and the Moral Importance of What We Care
About,” American Journal of Bioethics 1, no. 1 (2001), 74–84.
71 Boaz Neumann, “The Phenomenology of the German People’s Body (Volkskörper) and the Extermination
of the Jewish Body,” New German Critique 36, no. 1 (2009), 149–81.
72 Geoffrey Cocks, The State of Health: Illness in Nazi Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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spaired of the advent of socialised medicine in Germany, supervised by the
state and also by the market, believing that it had compromised individual care
and created a generation of Kässenartze (cashier doctors).73 He described how
doctors were compelled by social insurance systems into a mechanised and
overly scientifically focused practice that endorsed cost constraint and com-
munity and economic perspectives at the expense of patient care.74 Under the
Nazi regime, the German medical profession was enjoined in a social and eco-
nomic transformation of the population through the valorisation of Vorsorge
and the privileging of medical science in public policy-making.75 In the first
instance, this manifested in the persecution of the weak through involuntary
sterilisation and later Krankenmorde, although, as the groundbreaking work of
Robert Proctor demonstrates, this also involved revolutionary change in pub-
lic health.76 Beyond the metaphoric surgical excision of Jews, the disabled and
other “undesirables,” the Nazi regime sought to eliminate cancer in the pop-
ulation through a raft of initiatives aimed at reducing smoking, alcohol and
environmental pollutants, and encouraging healthier plant-based diets. Proc-
tor sees this as a historical first; the implementation at the individual level
of initiatives aimed at enhancing the productivity and, ultimately, war-making
capacity of the Volk. This form of modern public health was not “in spite of
fascism, but in consequence of fascism.”77
This focus on the care of the population represented a particular version of
“German modernity”—one that was at odds with the liberal prioritisation of
the individual self, and instead linked the entitlement to health care to the ca-
pacity for productivity in service of the greater German people’s community
or Volksgemeinschaft.78
None of this is to suggest that individual motivations were irrelevant in
driving the actions of psychiatrists under the Nazi regime. As mentioned
previously, participation in the regime was driven by myriad factors includ-
ing ideology, obedience, ambition, fear and opprobrium. However, German
modernity—with its particular form of bureaucracy—clearly played an im-
portant role.
73 Mary Seeman, “Psychiatry in the Nazi Era,” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 50, no. 4 (2005), 218–25.
74 Ibid.
75 Jennifer Leaning, “War Crimes and Medical Science,” British Medical Journal 313 (1996), 1413–15.
76 Robert N. Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
77 Ibid., 249.
78 Cocks, The State.
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“Biopower” and the State
As we noted earlier, one component of modernity for Bauman was control
over nature and biology. This recruits biological and biomedical disciplines as
executors of, or at least part of, modernity. Our thesis is that the significance
of the Holocaust to contemporary medical ethics, and in particular psychiatric
ethics, is usefully framed through the concept of “biopower”—a concept that,
for reasons we will explain later, is particularly salient in forms of modernity
that are characterised by the bureaucratisation of medicine.
The term “biopouvoir” (biopower) appeared initially in Michel Foucault’s
work, History of Sexuality (1976), and was later developed in a series of lec-
tures he gave at the College de France. The core idea in Foucault's construct of
biopower is the integration of sovereign power with biological science and the
reformulation of politics as, ultimately, control over life. Foucault introduced
the term “governmentality” to provide a critique and modification of the pre-
modern notion of power being the exercise of coercion by a sovereign power
or ruling class and, in particular, the means by which this power is exercised.
In essence, governmentality through biopower seeks to either “make live” or
“let die”—an inversion of the ancient legal apparatus of Roman law of Pa-
ter familias that would be “let live and make die.”79 Related to this, Foucault
described a shift from “sovereign” power to “discursive” power—in this for-
mulation power is generated by a particular discourse (evident in a “discursive
formation”) in the absence of a particular “ruling class.”80 Foucault considered
a “discourse” as an institutionalised way of speaking or writing about reality
that defines what can be intelligibly thought and said about the world and what
cannot. A discourse creates a form of truth, rather than discovering it as it is.
Within modernist societies, bureaucracies create contexts that are partic-
ularly ripe for the exercise of biopower because a critical component of
modernity is the control of biology, inevitably co-opted into a bureaucratised
medical profession. According to Foucault, biopolitical power emerges with
particular force and efficiency in the context of the modern capitalist nation
state where it is exercised in, for example, interventions to effect control over
fertility, vaccination, screening and treatment of disease, diet or pharmaceu-
tical manipulation. Biopolitical power is exercised at both the level of the
79 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction (London: Penguin, 1981), 137.
80 This is a manifestation of Foucault’s formulation of the indistinguishability of power from knowledge.
Foucault considers knowledge is always an exercise of power and power always a function of knowledge. See
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books,
1969).
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individual and the population (what he terms the “massification” of individu-
als into a population).
The modern state’s scientifically inspired “disciplinary institutions” re-
placed the pre-modern power of the sovereign over both the individual and
groups in the population, through a technologically driven process of be-
haviour control.81 The dissonant observations of the Nazi “war on cancer,”82
juxtaposed with the persecution of the disabled, can be reconciled within the
framework of biopower. In both instances, the medical profession acts as the
executive in the process aimed to improve the economic situation (or in the
case of the Nazi regime, the war-making capacity) of the population.
It has been argued that Foucault’s notion of Dispositif (loosely translated as
an “urgent need”) provides a pretext to the exercise of biopower by the state.83
Dispositif can be conceptualised as a network of different discourses, insti-
tutional responses or laws in response to a defined or perceived crisis.84 An
obvious example includes quarantine or regional isolation in the case of infec-
tious disease. In a contemporary example of biopower and the Dispositif, the
problem of the obesity “epidemic” arises from construction of ideal biologi-
cal parameters consistent with a notion of “health,” as defined in this case by
weight, adiposity or other biochemical markers.85 The application of biopower
by the state facilitates urgent interventions in public and individual health, ar-
guably targeting the financial burden posed by the phenomenon and its threat
to the state’s finances. Our argument is that the 1930s’ constructs of racial
hygiene or eugenics represent equally apposite examples of Dispositif—the
perceived threat to the population posed by purportedly inferior racial and
genetic stock initiated a state-directed programme of registration, exclusion,
sterilisation and mass murder, unprecedented in terms of scale and technolog-
ical sophistication. The Nazi regime utilised eugenics and racial hygiene to
legitimate its use of extreme forms of biopower through its “euthanasia” pro-
gramme and subsequent racially based eliminative genocides in Europe.86
81 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977–1978 (New
York: Palgrave, 2007).
82 Proctor, The Nazi War, 249.
83 Christopher Mayes, The Biopolitics of Lifestyle: Foucault, Ethics and Healthy Choices (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2016).
84 Ibid.
85 Mayes, The Biopolitics.
86 The concept of “biopower” as a means of formulating the behaviour of nurses in the T4 programme has
been explored by Thomas Foth, whose work also situates “Dispositif” in the asylum setting. See Thomas Foth,
“Analyzing Nursing as a Dispositif Healing and Devastation in the Name of Biopower.” PhD thesis, University
of Ottawa, 2011; Thomas Foth, “Understanding ‘Caring’ Through Biopolitics: The Case of Nurses Under the
Nazi Regime,” Nursing Philosophy 14, no. 4 (2013), 284–94.
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As stated earlier, eugenics had a long history in Germany and other de-
mocratic societies. It was popular across the political spectrum in the Weimar
parliament in Germany (1919–1933). There was also enthusiasm for eugenic
ideas in the middle and professional classes, part of a so-called “techno-bu-
reaucratic intelligentsia.”87 Eugenic societies were influential in numerous
other countries, most conspicuously the USA. The state of Indiana had passed
the first compulsory sterilisation law in 1907. Until the 1960s, 29 other US
states enacted similar laws. German and American eugenic institutions col-
laborated closely until the outbreak of the war. American eugenicists were
profoundly influential in the formulation of the 1924 US federal Immigration
Act.88 Prominent American physicians advocated the “euthanasia” of “feeble-
minded” patients,89 and it was only when the mass murder of the disabled
under Nazism became apparent that German and other western eugenic move-
ments parted company.90 The attempted “psychiatric genocide” of people with
schizophrenia in Germany during the Nazi period failed: the prevalence of the
disorder actually increased after the war.
Eugenic notions have served as the basis of state policy in a number of
countries in the post-war era and represent continuations of this form of
biopower. In China, for example, the 1995 Maternal and Infant Health Law
forbade people carrying heritable mental or physical disorders from marrying,
and promoted mass prenatal ultrasound testing for birth defects. Then Chi-
nese Premier, Deng Xiao Ping, also encouraged social and economic policies
to ensure educated and successful young Chinese would meet and procreate.
The since revised “one child policy” was another manifestation of the process.
In Singapore, the Family Planning and Population Board (FPPB) advocated
population control. In the 1970s, Singaporean social and economic policies
sought to increase the reproduction rate of educated and successful women
and reduce that of low-paid, uneducated women. In most post-industrial lib-
eral democratic societies, tacit forms of eugenic-based biopower are found in
state-funded and professionally-endorsed routine prenatal screening for foetal
abnormality. As a result of these programmes, for example, numerous stud-
ies indicate that the vast majority of pregnancies with Down Syndrome are
terminated at the point of pre-natal diagnosis.91 It has also been averred that
87 Burleigh, “The Legacy.”
88 Adam Cohen, Imbeciles: The Supreme Court, American Eugenics, and the Sterilization of Carrie Buck
(New York: Penguin, 2016).
89 M. Louis Offen, “Dealing With ‘Defectives’: Foster Kennedy and William Lennox On Eugenics,” Histor-
ical Neurology 61, no. 5 (2003), 668–73.
90 Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race (New
York: Basic Books, 2003).
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legitimating termination of pregnancies on the basis of specific evaluative
“criteria” enables discrimination against those who live with Down Syndrome
or other disabilities.92
“Thanatopolitics”
As shown in the Nazi regime, in extreme authoritarian settings biopower be-
comes the literal question of life and death. This is what Foucault and later
writers termed “Thanatopolitics.” Foucault considered genocide as the logical
extension of biopower through the revisitation of the right of the sovereign to
kill, an exercise of coercive power at the level of life, species, race and popu-
lation.93 Foucault saw that genocide was the ultimate expression of this.
Despite the traditional definition of genocide interrogating the deliberate
elimination of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, many in the field
of disability studies have argued that “disability” is as much a social category
as race.94 Moreover, any reading of the history of the first part of the twentieth
century in the United States or Europe sees the categories of “disability” and
“race” as manifestations of biological inferiority and therefore the pretext for
exclusion and ultimately annihilation. The firm nexus between eugenics and
racism in the United States and Europe in the first part of the twentieth cen-
tury is a core premise of what has been dubbed the “eugenic Atlantic.”95 The
genetic and racially inferior fall into the same category and so therefore does
their elimination. The Krankenmorde is therefore arguably as much a genoci-
dal act as the Shoah. It is important to recognise that of the German victims
of the Nazi regime, the more than 200,000 people with disabilities who were
murdered represent the group with the highest mortality.96
Thanatopolitics is at the core of the work of philosopher Giorgio Agamben.
Agamben defined the threshold of biological modernity as the point where the
species and the individual as living bodies becomes the focus of politics—the
state and, by extension, the focus of the state bureaucracy, becomes a “bio-
mass” of population, or, as in the case of the Nazi regime, the Volk. Agamben
91 Brian Skotko, “With New Prenatal Testing, Will Babies With Down Syndrome Slowly Disappear?”
Archives of Disease in Childhood 94, no. 11 (2009), 823–26.
92 Alicia Ouellette, “Selection Against Disability: Abortion, ART, and Access,” Journal of Law, Medicine
and Ethics 43, no. 2 (2015), 211–23.
93 Foucault, The History.
94 Catherine Kudlick, “Disability History: Why We Need Another Other,” American Historical Review 108,
no. 3 (2003), 763–93.
95 David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder. “The Eugenic Atlantic: Race, Disability, and the Making of an Inter-
national Eugenic Science, 1800–1945,” Disability and Society 18, no. 7 (2003), 843–64.
96 According to the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, the death toll for German Jews was around 180,000.
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makes use of the ancient figure of “Homo Sacer”97 as a metaphor for those
excluded from society and its protections: living within the law but not pro-
tected by law. This creates a situation redolent of the ancient concept of “bare
life”—life without the privileges or rights of citizenship.98
For Agamben, the Holocaust was the fullest realisation of biopower and
the concentration camp its ultimate manifestation. Agamben argued that when
the state shifts into an authoritarian mode, in circumstances of perceived or
manufactured threat, it creates what he terms “states of exception.”99 This is
a state of virtual war on certain parts of the population and a means of elimi-
nation—social exclusion and starvation were forms of biopower used against
“undesirables” and enemies of the Nazi regime. The particular obsession of
the Nazi regime with food, and the use of starvation as a means of control
and murder, demonstrates a particular manifestation of a form of biopower
expressed through thanatopolitics.100 The Musselmänner of the concentration
camps, the diseased and starved figures of the Polish ghettos, or the inmates
of starvation houses in “de-centralised euthanasia” centres are reduced to bare
life in a biologically-driven state of exception. Agamben sees this phenome-
non in the present day in Guantanamo Bay or the refugee camps and detention
centres of Europe (and, we would argue, the Pacific).
The psychiatric profession and the state
To eschew a Hippocratic tradition and then be enjoined in an exercise of
biopower, the medical profession and its specialties must realise a form of
professional ethic. The complex relationship between the psychiatric pro-
fession in Germany and the Nazi regime has been analysed from multiple
perspectives.101 A critical dimension to the analysis of this period is that of
professional ethics in psychiatry.102 “Professional ethics,” as contrasted with
particular normative theories of ethics such as utilitarianism or virtue ethics,
situates the psychiatrist as moral agent within the context of a complex net-
work of relationships, laws and obligations with the community.
97 Agamben’s use of Homo Sacer (or the “sacred man”) refers to the status of being outside protection of the
law or excluded from society. It is a complex concept with multiple examples throughout history.
98 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
99 Ibid.
100 Gesine Gerhard, Nazi Hunger Politics: A History of Food in the Third Reich (New York: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2015).
101 Lifton, The Nazi Doctors; Klee, “Euthanasie” im NS-Staat.
102 Michael Robertson and Garry Walter, “Overview of Psychiatric Ethics I: Professional Ethics and Psychi-
atry,” Australasian Psychiatry 15, no. 3 (2007), 201–06.
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A “profession” is a group possessed of a certain expertise, knowledge
and set of skills that applies these in service of the “greater good,” usually
of the community.103 In exchange, the professional group is afforded status,
material reward and autonomy. This arrangement is a form of “social
contract” that, through laws, negotiated binding arrangements or policy ap-
plications, effectively trumps other approaches to moral deliberation and
action by the professional group.104 It is in the nature of such arrangements
to privilege the interests of the community over the individual, which fre-
quently places the professional’s obligations to the individual patient in
conflict with obligations to the community under the professional social con-
tract. In such a situation, the Hippocratic injunction to do no harm may need
to be abandoned.105
This creates a situation of a “dual role dilemma.”106 The concept of dual
role dilemma originates from the perceived conflict of obligations forensic
psychiatrists have to both impartiality to the court and the Hippocratic oblig-
ations to the individual patient.107 It can be argued that most dilemmas in
psychiatric ethics may be framed as variants of the dual role dilemma, many
of which arise from conflicting obligations between the psychiatrist’s obliga-
tions under the professional social contract and duties towards the individual
patient.
Leo Alexander highlighted in his analysis of the Doctor’s Trial in Nurem-
berg 1946–1947 that the critical step in the pathway to the crimes perpetrated
by psychiatrists under the Nazi regime was a shift from individual care to
that of productive capacity or economic utility.108 The “useless eaters” des-
tined for death in the T4 programme were thus defined by the cost of their
existence, rather than their individual value as human beings. Karl Brandt,
Hitler’s physician, coordinator of the T4 programme and lead defendant in the
doctor’s trial, highlighted this dual role dilemma in the seemingly conflicted
statements he made in his defence. On the one hand he proclaimed: “Any per-
103 “Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter,” Annals of Internal Medicine
136, no. 3 (2002), 243–46.
104 Robertson and Walter, “Overview of Psychiatric.”
105 Allen R. Dyer, Ethics and Psychiatry: Toward Professional Definition (New York: American Psychi-
atric Press, 1987).
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George Ikkos (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), 221–39.
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sonal code of ethics must give way to the total character of the war.”109 On
the other, he provided rationalisations about his actions being motivated by
the relief of suffering:
Would you believe that it was a pleasure to me to receive the order to start
euthanasia? For fifteen years I had labored at the sick-bed and every patient
was to me like a brother, every sick child I worried about as if it had been
my own. . . . And thus I affirmed euthanasia. I realize the problem is as old
as man, but it is not a crime against man nor against humanity. Here I can-
not believe like a clergyman or think as a Jurist. I am a doctor and I see the
law of nature as being the law of reason. For that grew in my heart the love
of man and it stands before my conscience.110
Conclusion
Throughout this essay, we have reflected upon how the German psychiatric
profession was enrolled in an enterprise on behalf of the state and the health of
the Volk, in exchange for unprecedented power and status in the Nazi regime.
As an instance of professional ethics, the obligation to the collective (as we
have argued, a malignant application of biopower in the origin of genocide)
creates a situation of doctors becoming “healer killers” and instruments of
genocide.111 A similar dual role dilemma born of professional ethics emerged
in the Soviet Union several decades later through the persecution of political
dissidents by psychiatric diagnosis and restraint,112 and subsequently in China
through the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in forensic psychiatric
hospitals.113 In all three instances, the obligations of the profession to the com-
munity, represented by an authoritarian or totalitarian state, creates a diabolical
dual role dilemma.
The moral analysis of the history of the Nazi regime needs to move beyond
normative comparisons with an “outlier” period in the history of psychiatry,
that is, “what the Nazis did.” The conceptualisation of the Holocaust as an
enduring possibility in Western culture is an important precondition of any ex-
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graphs, Volume One (San Jose: James Bender Publishing, 1984).
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don: Gollancz, 1983).
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ploration of the period. As Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose have argued, the
Holocaust is not “an exceptional moment of throwback to a singular barbarian-
ism, but an enduring possibility intrinsic to the very project of civilization and
the law.”114 If we accept that the culture that produced the Holocaust remains
the context of the practice of psychiatry, then the contemporary significance of
the period requires deeper analysis. Eugenics and euthanasia must be recon-
ceptualised and, in our analysis, the prism of biopower and thanatopolitics are
among the most valid ways to do so. The proclamations of international med-
ical groups and the public atonement of those professionals implicated in these
crimes are important historical events, but on their own do not enlighten fully
the true significance of this period to psychiatry. If one accepts that what hap-
pened under the Nazi regime was an extreme form of dual role dilemma—for
example, the application of a highly malignant process of the exercise of
biopower—then current dilemmas in psychiatric ethics need to be constructed
along similar lines. Whether this concerns debates around mental health pol-
icy, medicalisation of problems of life, or contemporary biologically based
conceptualisations of disability and mental illness, the dual role dilemma re-
mains a function of the empowerment of the psychiatric profession by the
community and the expectations that arise from it. If the key participants of
this exceptional period in history remain framed as evil doers, indifferent by-
standers and heroic resisters, such lessons are lost, forgotten or unlearnt.
114 Rabinow and Rose, “Biopower Today.”
89
FIRST DO HARM! A MEDICAL EXPERIMENT ON
AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE
CAREER OF A MILITARY PHYSICIAN
Konrad Kwiet and George Weisz
Introduction
On May 20, 1941, the Wehrmacht launched Operation Merkur—the large-
scale airborne invasion of the Greek island of Crete.1 It was the first of its
kind in the history of warfare. The fierce battle between German parachutists
and glider-borne infantry, and the Allied “Creforce,” lasted 12 days, each
side suffering severe losses. Thousands of soldiers were killed, injured or
went missing in action: Germans and Austrians, Britons, Australians and New
Zealanders, Greeks and Cypriots, Palestinians and Indians. More than 16,000
Empire troops were taken prisoner, among them 3,109 Australians, almost half
the Australians deployed on Crete,2 and more than one-third of those captured
by the Axis powers in Europe during World War Two.3 The defeat at Crete
was Australia’s “largest single catastrophe of the war, surpassed only by the
fall of Singapore in February 1942.”4 Despite extensive research on the mili-
tary campaign, one incident on the sidelines has, to date, evaded notice: five
Australian prisoners of war (POWs) on Crete who were exposed in the sum-
mer of 1941 to a hepatitis experiment,5 presumably the first recorded case in
1 Peter Monteath, P.O.W.: Australian Prisoners of War in Hitler’s Reich (Sydney: Pan Macmillan Australia,
2001), 75.
2 Ibid., 78.
3 Australian War Memorial Encyclopedia, https://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/pow/ww2.
4 Joan Beaumont, “Introduction,” in Australia’s War 1939–1945, ed. Joan Beaumont (Sydney: Allen & Un-
win, 1996), 12.
5 George Weisz was the first to access and evaluate the personal open files of the Australian POWs housed
at the National Archives of Australia. He published his findings in a short article, George Weisz, “Nazi Medical
Experiments on Australian Prisoners of War: Commentary on the Testimony of an Australian Soldier,” Journal
of Law and Medicine 23, no. 2 (2015), 457–59. The article attracted considerable media attention in Australia
and abroad. Konrad Kwiet joined the project, searching for records in German archival depositories on the ca-
reer of the military physician who conducted the medical experiment. Weisz, a surgeon, dealt with the medical
dimension. Kwiet, a historian, constructed the historical narrative. We would like to sincerely thank friends and
colleagues who assisted us in researching this case study: Clement Boughton, Klaus Toyka, Paul J. Weindling,
Giles Bennett, Astrid Ley, Rüdiger Overmans, Jürgen Förster, Sarah Haid, Joachim Schneeweiss, Beate Winzer
and Jane Sydenham-Kwiet.
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Australian history. They belong to the forgotten victims and survivors of mur-
derous Nazi medicine.6
At the core of this contribution stands a review of the life history of
Friedrich Meythaler, and a critical assessment of a hepatitis experiment he
conducted during the Second World War. Meythaler was an eminent physician
whose career illustrates the easy transition, indeed the continuity, from Nazi
medicine to medicine in post-war Germany.
Our research is ongoing as there are still many gaps in the known history
to be filled. One key question that remains is whether Meythaler’s medical ex-
perimentation had long-term effects on the health of the POWs who served
as his test subjects. Privacy regulations restrict access to patient records that
may be held at hospitals, insurance companies and clinics. In addition, more
research needs to be conducted to shed light on the medical and institutional
networks of the Nazi regimes within which Meythaler was operating.7 Further-
more, there is evidence to suggest that Meythaler’s experiment represents only
the tip of the iceberg. Many more POWs from Australia and other Allied coun-
tries, held in custody of the German Wehrmacht, might have been selected for
human experiments conducted by Nazi doctors.
For the Cretan population, Nazi rule and terror commenced in May 1941.
From the outset, the occupying military authorities implemented examples of
their extermination policies. Instructed by Hermann Göring, Commander-in-
Chief of the Luftwaffe, General Kurt Student, commander of the XI Fliegerko-
rps, issued an order to his men to “annihilate” civilians in retaliation for local
resistance––immediately and without any judicial proceedings.8 On June 2,
parachutists arrived in Kondomari to slaughter 50 men. The following day a
firing squad perpetrated another horrific war crime known as the “ Holocaust
of Kandano.” 180 civilians were massacred and all buildings were dynamited
or torched and the village razed to the ground. The murder site was declared a
“dead zone.” War crimes committed by the Wehrmacht continued unabated in
the course of “pacifying” the conquered island.9 The fate of the small, ancient
6 Paul J. Weindling, Victims and Survivors of Human Experiments: Science and Suffering in the Holocaust
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).
7 Beate Winzer’s PhD explores the history of the Luftmedizinische Forschungsinstitut der Luftwaffe,
1934–1945, to be submitted at the University Berlin Charitě. We thank her for bringing this military research
centre to our attention, and providing us with details of the military and medical networks.
8 Detlef Vogel, “Das Eingreifen Deutschlands auf dem Balkan,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite
Weltkrieg, Bd.3 Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungamt (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984), 508.
9 Norman Paech, “Wehrmachtsverbrechen in Griechenland,” Kritische Justiz 3 (1999), 380–97; Christian
Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, Ulrike Jureit, Jan Philipp Reemtsma and Horst Möller, Verbrechen der Wehrmacht:
Bilanz einer Debatte (München: C.H. Beck, 2005).
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Jewish community of Crete was sealed three years later. On May 29, 1944,
about 300 Jews were rounded up, destined for Auschwitz. They were trans-
ported under appalling conditions to the port city of Heraklion and forced to
embark the ill-fated Tanais, together with 400 Greek hostages and 800 Italian
POWs. The boat was torpedoed by a British submarine and sank within min-
utes. There were no survivors. Accused of war crimes, General Student was
sentenced in 1947 to five years in prison. One year later he was set free. Mem-
bers of the killing units were never tried.
Friedrich Meythaler also escaped criminal prosecution after the war. He
held the rank of Oberstabsarzt (Surgeon Major) and headed a sanitation com-
pany. He also served as consulting physician to the 12th German army that
operated in the Balkans; such positions were reserved for Germany and Aus-
tria’s medical elite. Much has been written about the crimes perpetrated by
Nazi doctors in concentration camps, about the forced sterilisation of more
than 400,000 people and of the murder of more than 300,000 psychiatric in-
mates in mental institutions as part of the so-called “ Euthanasia” programme,
code-named Aktion T4.
Little is known about the recruitment and activities of consulting physi-
cians.10 With the beginning of the Second World War, university professors,
Privatdozenten (post-doctoral university fellows) and other specialists were
called up for military service. Recruitment and deployment, arrangements
and monitoring were in hands of the Berlin-based Army Medical Inspec-
torate, its affiliated Military Medical Academy, and the Research Institute
of the Airforce for Aviation Medicine, set up in Göring’s Reich Ministry of
Aviation.11 Consulting physicians were not only deployed at home in the mil-
itary districts but were also assigned to army groups, offering their services
in all war-relevant areas of medicine. Later, they examined the ever-increas-
ing cases of shell shock, bedwetting, self-harm and suicide attempts among
soldiers, and referred patients to the brutal military justice systems.12 They
continued medical research behind front lines, prescribed cures and treat-
10 Karl Philipp Behrendt, Die Kriegschirurgie von 1939–1945 aus der Sicht der Behandelnden Chirugen
des Heeres im Zweiten Weltkrieg (PhD thesis, Albert-Ludwig University, Freiburg, 2003). See also Jürgen
Förster, “Ideological Warfare in Germany, 1919 to 1949,” in Germany and the Second World War: Volume IX/
I: German Wartime Society 1939–1945: Politicization, Disintegration, and the Struggle for Survival (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 487–88.
11 See Alexander Neumann, Arzttum ist immer Kämpfertum: Die Heeressanitätsinspektion und das Amt
“Chef des Wehrmachtssanitätswesen” im Zweiten Weltkrtieg (1939–1945) (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005). See
also Wolfgang Uwe Eckart, and Alexander Neumann Eckhart, eds., Medizin im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Mil-
itärmedizinische Praxis und medizinische Wissenschaft im “Totalen Krieg” (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006).
12 See Gine Elsner and Gerhard Stuby, Wehrmachtsmedizin und Militärjustiz, Sachverständige im Zweiten
Weltkrieg: Beratende Ärzte und Gutachter für die Kriegsgerichte der Wehrmacht (Hamburg: VSA, 2012).
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ments, and presented their findings at conferences. Medical experiments, in
particular human experiments, were an integral part of their role. A directive
for consulting physicians authorised the experiments: “In time of war unique
opportunities for medical research present themselves. These opportunities
must not be missed.”13
Upon his arrival on Crete, Meythaler selected five healthy Australian
POWs in the port city of Rethymno, located on the central north coast of the
island, for a hepatitis experiment. Declared “sick,” they were admitted to the
local hospital where they were examined and x-rayed. Blood and urine tests
were performed. They were then injected with the blood of highly suspected
hepatitis-affected German soldiers, some with, others without jaundice. This
non-consensual human-to-human blood injection for diagnostic purposes did
not only constitute a war crime but a clear violation of the 1907 Hague and
the 1929 Geneva Conventions on the treatment of POWs. It also contravened
the spirit of the ancient Hippocratic Oath that imposes on doctors the duty,
to use the popular phrase, “First do no harm!” or also described as: “Practice
two things in your dealings with disease: either help or do not harm the pa-
tient!”14 Meythaler’s experiment was harmful and painful. It was, of course,
totally unacceptable, both professionally and ethically. Australian records, re-
cently digitised in the National Archives, identify the Australian POWs and
trace their military service. The personal dossiers comprising the Service and
Casualty Forms, the Attestation Sheets, letters and reports, POW files and the
Proceedings of Discharge provided the biographical data.
The victims were young, born between 1907 and 1920. They came from
Sydney, Melbourne and Hobart, and grew up in a lower socio-economic envi-
ronment, earning their living as labourers, a cook and grocery assistant. One
was a Catholic, the others Anglicans. Two were married. They enlisted after
the outbreak of the war and joined in the ranks of the 2nd and 5th Australian
Infantry Battalions that fought with the 16th Brigade Composite Battalion on
Crete. After being discharged from the Rethymno hospital, they returned to
military captivity. One of them managed to escape––like so many Allied sol-
diers––and sought refuge in the Cretan hills sheltered by locals. The others had
to wait some time before they were shipped to Thessaloniki and incarcerated
13 Behrendt, Die Kriegschirurgie, 19.
14 Geoffrey Lloyd, ed., Hippocratic Writings (London: Penguin Books, 1989), 94.
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in a transit camp.15 From there they embarked on a long and harrowing jour-
ney to Germany.
In March 1942, they arrived in the small city of Lamsdorf to be incarcerated
in nearby Stalag VIII B, one of the largest POW camps that administered
more than 100,000 prisoners of Allied nationalities. Subjected to harsh forced
labour in mining, factories and railway construction, they were transferred to
Arbeitskommandos, labour detachments, living and working outside the main
camp. One test subject, WJL, belonged to the 242 Australian POWs who did
not survive Hitler’s Reich.16 The Germans informed the Australian military
of his death on May 30, 1942, and dispatched his German POW card. It was
marked with the red death symbol and the handwritten entry: “Auf der Flucht
erschossen” (“shot while attempting to escape”). It was the standard phrase
to disguise murder. WJL was buried by the Germans in the Krakow military
cemetery––Row 8, Grave 13––and posthumously awarded with an Australian
war service medal. The other three POWs returned to Australia and were dis-
charged in 1945–1946 “on compassionate grounds.” None of them informed
the authorities about their treatment at the Rethymno hospital, nor lodged a
claim for compensation for long-term damages caused by the experiment. The
grocery assistant applied in the early 1950s to the POW Memorial Trust for
a grant on the basis of his “nervous disabilities” and “suffering from nervous
strain.”17
It was left to the Australian POW who had managed to escape from Crete
in November 1941 to inform the Australian military about the medical ex-
periments and the damage these had caused. Arriving in Melbourne in early
August 1942, he experienced several symptom-free weeks, alternating with
one or two weeks of fever. The attacks gradually became less frequent, but
were accompanied by muscle pain and lower back pain. In September 1942
he was admitted to a military hospital in Melbourne and examined by mili-
tary physicians. They were unable to confirm the initial suspected diagnosis
of “typhus,” “malaria” and “pyrexia of unknown origin,” but several doctors
commented on the back pain and blood test results found abnormalities.18 Af-
ter several examinations and interrogations, the classified findings and clinical
15 The OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) did not raise any objections to transporting British,
Australian and New Zealand POWs to Germany. However, the OKW did not favour transporting Jews to Ger-
many, instead suggesting that “they could remain on the Balkans and perhaps be deployed in war relevant
work.” R 40.741. Letter OKW to Foreign Affairs, June 11, 1941.
16 Monteath, P.O.W., 414.
17 Research has yet to be conducted as to whether the test subjects applied in 1986 for compensation for harsh
treatment in German camps. The scheme was set up by the Australian government in the wake of Nazi war
crimes investigations and public debates.
18 A high reading of 10% Eosinophilia (normal 1-3%).
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notes were submitted to higher military authorities. A Colonel of the Aus-
tralian Military Forces who saw the report stated: “If true, and there seems
no reasons to doubt the veracity, (the case) is one which merits any protest
which can be lodged by Dep. Prisoner War.”19 No protest was lodged. Instead,
the Australian Army staff in London were instructed to take up “the matter
. . . with the United Kingdom authorities.”20 A report was dispatched; how-
ever, no record of any British response has yet been found.21 In Australia, the
case was closed. Appearing before a Medical Board, the psychiatric examiner
concluded: “Apart from the fact that he was rather underweight and mildly
anxious about himself, he did not appear to be permanently invalidated by his
alleged experiences.”22 Discharged on “mild psychiatric grounds” the patient
left behind a lengthy testimony of the events in Crete.23 Having lost a lot of
weight, he described the hunger rations as minimal, one meal per day of “a
handful of cooked beans and one slice of Greek bread” and a pint of water
twice a day. He remembered in detail the arrival of a doctor who “approached
me and turned up my upper eyelid.” The doctor returned the next day and
conducted an examination, x-ray of the chest, and blood and urine tests. “He
then stated I was sick, conducted me to a ward, in which there were a number
of German patients, and ordered me into one of the five beds that had been
set apart in the ward. . . . The same day the four other Australians . . . were
brought in.”24
He continued with his recollection of the experiment, and his testimony is
worth quoting here at length:
On the following day we were again examined, temperature, pulse, and
blood and urine tests. Later that day the doctor returned and withdrew half a
syringeful of blood . . . from the arm of the German patient in the room and
immediately injected it into a vein of my arm, after first applying a tourni-
quet in my upper arm. The blood went into my arm without clotting. The
other Australians received similar injections, but I do not know from whom
the blood was taken, as I was not paying attention to them at that time. The
following day the doctor returned and after the customary examinations,
temperature, pulse, blood and urine he injected into the vein at the same
19 (G.A.S) Chronological Record of Movements; Medical case sheet, October 19, 1942; Letter AMF-South-
ern Command to DDMS Victoria, April 2, 1943.
20 Ibid., Department of the Army, minute paper, April 14, 1943.
21 Ibid., letter to Australian Army Staff in London, May 5, 1943.
22 (G.A.S), letter AMF-Southern Command to DDMS Victoria, April 2, 1943.
23 Ibid., statement, April 10, 1943.
24 Ibid.
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place in my arm a clear fluid. The others were similarly treated. Following
this injection we all became, within the space of 24 hours, feverish with
high pulses, and felt very sick. We were not provided with any medicine as
relief, but every morning thereafter until the 10th day the doctor examined
us—eyes, temperature, pulse, blood, urine, and prodded us and tested us for
pains in various parts of our bodies. It seemed to me that he appeared to
be disappointed on observing the colour of my urine. By the 10th day the
fever and body pains had gradually subsided, and we were given a second
injection of blood, on this occasion in the buttocks. . . . Two hours later we
were all very ill, suffering all the discomfiture of the first attack, but to a
greater degree. . . . On the 11th day a clear fluid was injected into each of us
and thereafter until the 18th day the procedure was the same . . . except that
several of my friends had a tube inserted into their stomach through their
throats.25
Importantly, he also stated that the Germans from whom the blood had been
taken were all very sick and receiving medical treatment: “Several of them had
a very yellow complexion, and one particularly was yellow in the eyes.”
After three weeks the Australians started to recover. They knew they had
been “used for experimental purposes.” They protested their treatment both in
hospital and to the military authorities upon their return to the POW camp.
The escaped POW suffered for months with high fevers and pains, especially
in the back, and cramps in the legs.
German records, accessed in several archival depositories,26 and the lit-
erature consulted, shed light on the career of Friedrich Meythaler.27 They
document his deployment in Crete, the human experimentation, and support
the validity and plausibility of the Australian POW’s testimonial accounts. The
clinical notes taken during the examinations and experiments have not come
to light as yet. The findings, however, were made public in a lecture presented
25 (G.A.S), letter AMF-Southern Command to DDMS Victoria, April 10, 1943.
26 The archival studies were conducted in the Freiburg-based Military Archives of the Federal Archives, the
Federal Archives in Berlin, the Political Archives of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, and in the State Archives Nurem-
berg.
27 Michael Buddrus and Sigrid Fritzlar, eds., Die Professoren der Universität Rostok im Dritten Reich: Ein
biographishes Lexikon (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 277; Paul J. Weindling, Nazi Medicine and the Nurem-
berg Trials: From Medical War Crimes to Informed Consent (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 38; Paul
J. Weindling, Victims and Survivors, 64–66; Brigitte Leyendecker and Burghard F. Klapp, “Deutsche Hepati-
tisforschung im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Der Wert des Menschen: Medizin in Deutschland 1918–1945, eds.
Christian Pross and Götz Aly (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1989), 261–93; also Brigitte Leyendecker and Burghard
F. Klapp, “Hepatitis-Humanexperimente im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Hygiene 35, no. 12
(1989), 756–60.
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at a conference of military physicians,28 and in an article published in a med-
ical journal in 1942.
Friedrich Meythaler came from a well-established middle-class family in
which Christian values were cultivated. Born in 1898 in Offenburg, he at-
tended high school at a Gymnasium in the final years of the Wilhelmine Em-
pire. He then joined the army in World War One, fighting at the Western Front
as a platoon leader. Decorated and discharged as Lieutenant in early 1919,
he undertook his studies in medicine at the top universities of Heidelberg
and Munich, graduating in record time in 1923 with distinction. His doctoral
dissertation explored a special case of bleeding of the kidney. Meythaler em-
barked on a career within the university hospital’s system, treating patients,
teaching and researching, gradually climbing the hierarchical ladder from in-
tern to registrar, station doctor to senior doctor, and finally to chief physician
and medical superintendent. Specialising in internal medicine, he attained a
post-doctoral qualification in 1933. Three years later he was awarded a special
teaching assignment to lecture in the field of aviation medicine. This teaching
position secured his integration into Göring’s Research Institute for Aviation
Medicine, paving the way for his later deployment to Crete and recruitment
as consultant physician. Moreover, the Medical Faculty of Rostok University
had emerged as one of the key centres for liver research. In 1939, on the eve
of World War Two, Meythaler was awarded a professorial title.
Since the National Socialist seizure of power, Meythaler had witnessed the
systematic expulsion of Jewish doctors, first from universities and hospitals,
then from private practices.29 About 8,000 lost their positions; many found
refuge in exile, but those who remained trapped in Nazi Germany fell victim to
the programme of the “Final Solution.” Non-Jewish physicians profited from
the removal of Jewish doctors. After the war, facing a denazification tribunal,
Meythaler recalled the names of Jewish doctors under whose guidance he had
worked in the years of the Weimar Republic.
His affiliation with National Socialism was determined less by ideological
convictions than by professional interests; joining Nazi organisations assisted
him in cementing and enhancing his academic career. In November 1933 he
joined the SA, Hitler’s Stormtroopers, offering his services within the SA
28 Frederick Taylor, Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany (London: Blooms-
bury, 2011); Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die NS-Ver-
gangenheit (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2012).
29 Avraham Barkai, From Boycott to Annihilation: The Economic Struggle of German Jews 1933–1939
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1989); Marianne Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish
Life in Nazi Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 26; Günter Plum, “Wirtschaft und Erwerb-
sleben,” in Die Juden in Deutschland 1933–1945, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1983), 268–313.
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Medical Corps. He then joined other organisations affiliated with the Nazi
Party but it was only in May 1937 that he joined the NSDAP. The high party
number (4,403,603) allocated to him attests to his late entry. Unlike the infa-
mous SS doctors engaged in barbaric medical experiments, he saw no need to
apply for membership in Heinrich Himmler’s SS.
On the eve of World War Two, Meythaler was called up for military ser-
vice. As Internist of a Feldlazarett (Field Hospital) he participated in the
German conquest of Poland. He might have been aware of the atrocities and
murderous campaigns unleashed by SS and police units alongside ethnic Ger-
mans against Jews and “saboteurs,” politicians, intellectuals and priests. By
the end of 1939, the death toll amounted to more than 60,000.30 In May 1940
the Wehrmacht launched its Blitzkrieg (Lightning War) against countries in
Western Europe. Meythaler took up a position at the Field Hospital of a newly
established Waffen-SS Division—the infamous 3rd Panzer Division Totenkopf
(Death’s Head).
By the time Meythaler was selected to go to Crete he had developed a repu-
tation as an authoritative figure in the fields of liver dysfunction and infectious
diseases. He could point to an impressive list of 66 publications; at the end of
the war the number had risen to 73, documenting ongoing research on hepati-
tis and diabetes and his new pioneering studies on malaria. The supervision
of 25 doctoral dissertations and papers, submitted by his students and interns
in the pre-war years, was equally remarkable.31 Undoubtedly, these academic
credentials led to the assignment in Greece, where “Hepatitis sine Icterus,”
that is, hepatitis without but mostly in conjunction with jaundice, was ram-
pant. German and Allied soldiers alike were severely affected by jaundice. On
Crete they were admitted to field and local hospitals. Meythaler hastened to
carry out research on the differential diagnosis of the Mediterranean diseases
amongst the German soldiers, and their causes and prevention.
The findings were submitted to the Berlin-based Army Medical Inspec-
torate,32 along with all the other reports from consulting physicians. As the
hepatitis epidemic spread across Europe, causing a major problem for the
army, at many places efforts were undertaken to identify the agent of the
infectious hepatitis via animal trials and person-to-person experiments. Kurt
30 Jürgen Matthäus, Jochen Böhler and Klaus-Michael Mallmann, eds., War, Pacification and Mass Murder,
1939: The Einsatzgruppen in Poland (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2014); Jochen Böhler, Auftakt zum
Vernichtungskrieg: Die Wehrmacht in Poland 1939 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2006); Alexander B. Rossino,
Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology and Atrocity (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003).
31 Friedrich Meythaler, “Die wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten von Prof. Dr. Meythaler und Liste der wissen-
schaftlichen Arbeiten der Assistenten und Liste der Dissertationen,” compiled on January 14, 1944.
32 Neumann, Arzttum ist Kämpfertum.
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Gutzeit played a vital role in this research. A member of the SS since 1933,
he served as Consultant Internist at the Army Medical Inspectorate and ran
a department of internal medicine at the Military Medical Academy. Initially
he conducted an experiment on himself. Two assistants carried out non-con-
sensual experiments. Hans Voigt infected psychiatric patients from a mental
hospital in Breslau. Arnold Dohmen had permission from Heinrich Himmler
to select 11 Jewish juveniles from Auschwitz and to expose them to a barbaric
hepatitis experiment in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp.33
This hepatitis research illustrates that university-based Nazi doctors often
took the initiative and determined the scope of the experiments. They com-
peted against each other to be the first to discover the infectious nature of
the rampant disease. They used all available sites for their experiments: POW
camps and field hospitals, universities and research institutions, psychiatric
wards and concentration camps. The International Committee of the Red
Cross, entrusted with the task of monitoring experiments in POW camps and
concentrations camps, “was a catastrophic failure” in this regard.34
Meythaler’s findings were quickly published. In August 1942 his article
appeared in the medical journal Klinische Wochenschrift.35 The timing and
scope of the research were mentioned: “In summer and autumn of 1941 I
had the opportunity to personally see on the Balkan, in Greece and Africa,
a large number––around 2,500––cases of hepatitis infectiosa and to observe
the course of the disease.”36 Outlining the results of his examinations, he then
admitted the blood injection from hepatitis-infected soldiers. The central sen-
tence reads in English as follows:
As the causative agent is unknown, I carried out on Crete transmission ex-
periments through transfer of blood from person to person in a pre-ikterian
condition. The result in three of the test persons was an elevation of the
sedimentation, a decreased body reaction with initial increase in the body
temperature and a distinct liver enlargement over an observation period of
8 days, but no appearance of jaundice.37
Meythaler repeated this statement when he gave the keynote address at a sci-
33 Astrid Ley and Günther Morsch, eds., Medical Care and Crime: The Infirmary at the Sachsenhausen Con-
centration Camp, 1936-45 (Berlin: Metropol, 2008).
34 Weindling, Victims and Survivors, 65.
35 Friedrich Meythaler, “Zur Pathophysolologie des Ikterus,” Klinische Wochenschrift 21, no. 32 (1942),
701–06.
36 Ibid., 701.
37 Meythaler, “Zur Pathophysolologie,” 703.
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entific symposium in Athens on October 28, 1942.38 A newly established
research centre was entrusted with the task of carrying out clinical exami-
nations and medical experiments to combat the hepatitis epidemic. Research
teams were sent from the Army Medical Inspectorate in Berlin, recruited by
its consulting internist, Professor Gutzeit. Meythaler reiterated his findings:
There exists also a contagious infectious syndrome, a hepatitis infectiosa
sine iktero. It can be assumed that it (hepatitis) is transmittable from human
to human as well via experiments on animals. All hypotheses from clinical
or experimental research point to a virus infection, whose agent has not
been identified.
Meythaler’s experiment can be evaluated as follows: he observed a febrile
condition in a geographic region with numerous bacterial and parasitic infec-
tions. The illness appeared to result from a blood inoculation taken from sick
German soldiers. Without documented blood group analyses in donors and
recipients, the consequent illness could be either a transfusion reaction with
blood group incompatibility or a rapid infection by a pathological agent. The
rather short interval between blood transfer and the reactions of the recipients
would imply an infectious illness with virtually no incubation period. This
would be very unlikely with a viral infection like hepatitis A. The time inter-
val would rather favour the interpretation of a transfusion reaction as indicated
by hepatomegaly without jaundice. This led Meythaler to suggest blood-borne
transmissibility of infectious hepatitis. That result had not yet been confirmed
in laboratory tests. Other endemic infections ought to be taken into account:
a) The most likely alternative diagnosis was thought to be Malta Fever
caused by the bacterium brucella mellitensis, which causes undulant fever
attacks, lasting 10–14 days, of decreasing frequency and with persistent
low-grade lumbar and muscular pain, corresponding to spondylitis (osteo-
chondritis of the lumbar spine).
b) Malaria was excluded a year later in the Heidelberg Military Hospital.
c) Jaundice from either a viral infection, leptospirosis or spirochaetosis was
not observed.
The five Australian POWs were seemingly used in a non-consensual, enforced
experiment, probably in an ad hoc, ill-prepared attempt to diagnose the Ger-
38 Friedrich Meythaler, “Zur Pathogenese und Klinik der Hepatitis infektiosa (epidemica contagiosa).”
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man soldiers’ infection. The experiments were unscientific and inconclusive,
a surprisingly poor quality experiment for an academic physician.
In December 1942 Meythaler returned to Germany to take up a profes-
sorship in internal medicine and a directorship of the outpatient clinic at the
University of Erlangen, located in close proximity to Nuremberg. A link with
the military was maintained. He was assigned to a sanitation unit and held in
great esteem. In July 1944 the Medical Faculty of the University Halle ranked
him first in line for a professorship. The Dean praised his academic credentials
and emphasised his achievements as a military physician, saying “he excelled
in this position, above all in the fight against malaria.”39
Professorial candidates required the approval of the Nazi Party. Wolfgang
Wagner, in charge of the political surveillance of the academic staff, did not
raise any objections against his Party colleague.40 Meythaler remained in Er-
langen. At the end of his Nazi career he was again called up as consulting
physician against the background of the drastic shortage of doctors to look
after female patients from Poland. They were incarcerated in a small forced
labour camp at the outskirts of Erlangen, presumably providing slave labour
for a Siemens plant.41 On April 16, 1945, Erlangen was liberated by Ameri-
can troops.
Like most Germans, Meythaler experienced the liberation as the “German
Catastrophe.” The downfall of the National Socialist state meant for him im-
mediate dismissal from the University, decreed by the American Military
Government. Banned from teaching, researching and practicing medicine, fac-
ing the loss of a professorial salary and status, he was offered a job in a toy
factory as an unskilled labourer.
While struggling with his dismissal, he learnt about the International Mil-
itary Tribunal convened to hold captured Nazi leaders accountable for their
crimes. Conducted in the Nuremberg Palace of Justice, 21 top officials were
tried and sentenced on charges of “crimes against peace,” “war crimes” and
“crimes against humanity,” legal codes regarded as milestones in the history
of International Law. The Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial followed.42 Twenty-three
defendants were accused of “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity”
perpetrated in concentration camps, research institutions and mental hos-
pitals. Seven death sentences were handed down, five life imprisonments,
39 Friedrich Meythaler, letter to Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Popular Education, July 7, 1944.
40 Ibid., letter Wolfgang Wagner to Eckart Moebius, August 7, 1944.
41 The files only contain a brief reference to this forced labour camp. Our research is ongoing to trace
archival material.
42 Angela Ebbinghaus and Klaus Dörner, eds., Der Nürnberger Ärzteprozess und seine Folgen (Berlin, Auf-
bau, 2001).
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four long-term imprisonments and seven acquittals. The hepatitis experi-
ments, including Meythaler’s research, were discussed at the Doctors’ Trial.43
Moreover, the defence lawyer for Karl Brandt, Adolf Hitler’s “escort” physi-
cian and Reich Commissioner for Sanitation and Health, considered calling
Meythaler as an expert witness to testify that hepatitis experiments were nei-
ther painful nor lethal. Meythaler declined to appear citing medical reasons.44
In addition, he was caught up in his own judicial procedure; that is, with the
process of denazification.
The ambitious denazification programme was designed by the Allied pow-
ers to remove the vast army of over 8 million National Socialists from office
and to impose sanctions upon those inculcated in Nazi beliefs. A series of
Allied directives was issued to initiate and secure the path to a stable and
peaceable democracy.45 Hugely unpopular, the different Allied strategies, and
the rapid emergence of the Cold War, limited and finally aborted the efforts.
From early 1946 civilian tribunals were set up in each zone of occupation
and in each major town, commissioned with the task of examining the com-
prehensive, often ridiculed Fragebögen (questionnaires) completed by the
accused and the documentary evidence submitted. A verdict was then handed
down, classifying the status of the accused. They ranged from “Exonerated”
and “Followers” to “Lesser Offenders” and then to “Offenders” and “Major
Offenders.”
Meythaler’s denazification in Erlangen lasted several months. Maintaining
ignorance and innocence he declared, as did so many Germans after the war,
that he was neither an antisemite nor a participant in the persecution of the
Jews. Self-defence and lies followed the pattern of an entire generation: “I was
shocked to hear of the annihilation of the Jews and the horrific crimes perpe-
trated in concentration camps after the Allies marched in.”46 He admitted that
he knew of the killing of mental patients, adding immediately that as a devout
Christian and member of the Catholic Church he had rejected the “ euthanasia”
programme. As far as his medical services were concerned, he saw no reason
to reveal the experiments conducted on the Australian POWs on Crete. Instead
he proclaimed, “Wherever my services as a doctor were required, I was only
concerned with medical considerations. I never allowed myself to be dictated
by Party or State authorities.”47
43 Nürnberg Dokument NO 922, 42.
44 Nürnberg Dokument NO 922, 2.2137.
45 Frederick Taylor, Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany (London: Blooms-
bury, 2011); Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die
NS-Vergangenheit (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2012).
46 Letter Meythaler to Spruchkammer, January 25, 1947.
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Several statements and affidavits were submitted praising the character and
credentials of the accused. Most fell into the category of Persil-Scheine. This
term was borrowed from the advertisement of the well-known laundry product
Persil, propagating its whiteness and cleanliness. All denazification tribunals
were flooded with such whitewashing certificates. Meythaler could rely on
this classic example:
In his professional capacity as doctor, Meythaler always took pains to
show tolerance and to follow the letter of the human principles of the
Geneva Convention. His deep Christian convictions were manifest in his
care for sick prisoners of war, regardless of nationality. A thousand times
over, Meythaler demonstrated his unflinching professional ethics as a
physician.48
On June 26, 1947, the tribunal handed down its verdict. Referring only to his
membership of the NSDAP and other Nazi organisations, Meythaler was clas-
sified as “Follower,” a mere “Mitläufer” of National Socialism. “Exonerated”
persons and “Followers” represented the bulk of the denazified Germans.
They were the first granted the privilege of resuming their positions. The rapid
reintegration of doctors and lawyers, judges and academics, teachers and po-
licemen, artists and industrialists in the western zones of occupation secured
the continuity of the social conservative elites. It provided a decisive impulse
for the restoration process that characterised the emergence of the Federal Re-
public of Germany.
Meythaler’s case is a classic example of the ease of transition from murder-
ous Nazi medicine to post-war medicine in Germany. He was not among the
ranks of the most brutal and infamous Nazi doctors who, with the permission
of Heinrich Himmler, selected inmates in concentration camps and prisons.
The victims of such doctors were subjected to terrible experiments without
restraint and most were eventually murdered. Those who survived remained
traumatised, suffering from lifelong symptoms. Rather, Meythaler typifies the
“ordinary” Nazi doctor. He was one of a vast army of physicians who used
the circumstances prevailing in Nazi Germany to further their research and
careers. Nazi doctrines, policies and warfare escalated into a “Total War” in
which legal barriers, medical constraints and moral concerns were abandoned.
In this context, doctors were encouraged and instructed to select test subjects
from POW camps and other institutions. Nazi doctors, especially the elite of
47 Ibid.
48 Spruchkammer Erlangen-Stadt, January 1, 1947, Affidavit K.E.S.
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the medical profession, grasped the opportunity to continue and intensify their
research, without being held accountable for the suffering they inflicted or the
crimes they committed.
After his denazification in 1947 Meythaler was appointed Director at the
Second Medical Clinic of the city hospital in Nuremberg. One year later he
was re-installed as Professor for Internal Medicine at the University of Erlan-
gen. Over the next two decades he distinguished himself again as physician,
teacher and researcher, leaving behind a plethora of books, book chapters,
edited and co-edited volumes, journal articles and papers.49 After pioneering
wartime research on malaria,50 he moved into a new field—cancer research.51
In the early 1950s he founded the Scientific Doctors’ Conference, which
emerged as a key centre of medical training and education. Later he joined,
again as devout Catholic, the chorus of German physicians protesting against
the distribution of the “Anti-Baby Pill.” He loved and cared for his children,
some of whom followed in the footsteps of their father, embarking on medical
careers. Aged 69, Friedrich Meythaler died in 1967 in Erlangen. Obituaries
paid homage to his life and achievements without mentioning the experi-
ment on Crete or his links to National Socialism. One oration—“In Memo-
riam Friedrich Meythaler”—published in the medical journal Bayerisches
Ärzteblatt, summed up his personality in this way:
It would be difficult to characterize his personality in a few words. He was
a man of contradictions. Outwardly he appeared to be a tough guy (“harter
Typ”) with fast but sound judgement; his inward response was one of help
and care, whenever the sick were in need.52
49 To name a few of Meythaler’s publications, several of which were co-authored: The Viruspneunomie des
Menschen (1952); Prophylaxe. Früherkennung und vorbeugende Therapie innerer Erkrankungen (1950); Die
Erkrankungen der Leber-und Gallenwege: Ein Grundriss für Ärzte und Studierende (1957); Die Indikation zur
Splenektomie. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der splenomegalen Leberzirrhose (1960).
50 Friedrich Meythaler, Differentialdiagnose und Therapie der Malariagruppe im Kriege (Stuttgart: Hip-
pocrates, 1944).
51 Friedrich Meythaler and H. Truckenbrodt, “Körpereigene Abwehr und Krebs,” Ärztliche Praxis 1, no.
2 (1963); Friedrich Meythaler, E. Holder and R. du Mesnil de Rochemont, eds., Therapie maligner Tumore,
Hämoblastome and Hämoblastosen, Bd.1: Die operative Behandlung der Geschwülste. Bd.2: Pathologie and
Chemotherapie (Stuttgart: Enke, 1968).
52 Bayerisches Ärzteblatt 23, no. 1 (1968), 16.
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100 YEAR COMMEMORATION OF THE ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE, APRIL 24, 2015 - SYDNEY TOWN HALL
SPEECH
Geoffrey Robertson QC
On August 22, 1939, Adolf Hitler summoned his generals to a villa in Salzburg
and in a shockingly brutal speech, urged them to show no mercy towards local
women and children when invading Poland—there would be no retribution,
because, he said, “after all, who now remembers the annihilation of the Ar-
menians?” The blitzkrieg crimes and the annihilation of Jews and Roma, and
other minorities, were committed by Nazis who believed they would have the
same impunity that 20 years before had been granted those who oversaw the
extermination of over half the Armenian population. In 1915, Armenians were
rounded up and community leaders killed; the perpetrators executed able-bod-
ied men and then sent women, children and old men on marches into the
Syrian desert, knowing that hundreds of thousands would die. The Ottoman
Turks may not have used gas ovens, but they used death squads, starvation, ty-
phus, and concentration camps in places we have only heard of today because
they are now being overrun by ISIS. Their intention was to destroy Armeni-
ans as a Christian people, killing them to cries of “Allah Akbar” whilst passing
laws to seize their homes, lands and churches, because they were not coming
back to those homes and lands and churches, which have never been restored
to them.
Historically, there is an interesting link between the Armenian Genocide
and Australia that has gone largely unnoticed. It began, as genocides often do,
with the arrest and murder of the intelligentsia: Armenian scholars, writers and
community leaders, rounded up in Constantinople (now Istanbul) on April 24,
1915, the night before the dawn landing at Gallipoli. That was no coincidence.
As the Turkish army prepared to repulse the Gallipoli landing, the Young Turk
Government took the opportunity to begin the physical extermination of those
it termed “the enemy within.” This was a people of 2 million who had lived
there since before the birth of Christ, and were the first to convert to Christian-
ity in 301 AD, a century before it became the religion of the Roman Empire.
They had lived on in the Ottoman Empire under the Muslim caliphate of the
Sultan, but as a despised minority, and the Gallipoli landing was used as an
excuse to begin a genocide that took over a million civilian lives.
What now do we owe to those lives, people butchered and starved as
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the result of internal state planning during a world war that the Ottomans
had opportunistically entered on the side of Germany? The Armenians were
not killed in war, they were killed under the cover of war. I compare their
deaths with that of my own grand-uncle on the beach at Gallipoli on 24
April. William Robertson, or “Piper Bill” as he was known (he played the
bagpipes in the Leichhardt Town Band), pretty quickly copped a load of bul-
lets in “Sniper’s Alley.” He had volunteered to fight and was killed, lawfully,
by Turkish soldiers defending their own land. Piper Bill is owed no special
mourning a century on, other than sadness at the futility of this war, and anger
perhaps at the stiff-necked and stupid political leaders who took their nations
to war and refused, for over four years, to contemplate a peace agreement.
The million or so Armenians who died because of massacres and deportations
were, by contrast, victims of a crime against humanity. Should they be remem-
bered a century on, merely as victims of war, like Piper Bill? I believe they
have a special claim on our memory, and on our thinking about how to avoid
such atrocities now and in the future.
There is, of course, an international debate about whether Armenian mas-
sacres and deportations amount to genocide. Turkey denies it and insists that
all Armenian deaths following the decrees of the Young Turk government
were justified. Most democracies in Europe, however, have recognised this
as genocide, and some have even made it a crime to deny it. The debate
even touched Australia when the speaker of the Turkish parliament threatened
politicians from New South Wales with exclusion from ANZAC Day cere-
monies at Gallipoli because in 2013 they had voted to recognise the genocide.
Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott followed in the footsteps of Barack
Obama, who proclaimed during his first presidential campaign in 2008 that,
“The Armenian genocide is a widely documented fact supported by an over-
whelming body of historical evidence. The facts are undeniable—as President,
I will recognise the Armenian genocide.” But Obama reneged and dropped any
use of the g-word, preferring instead Meds Yeghern, an Armenian word that
means nothing to Americans. Obama does call it “one of the worst atrocities of
the 20th century” in which, he says, 1.5 million Armenians were brutally mas-
sacred. He goes on to say elliptically, “I’ve already said what my opinion is on
what happened in 1915. It has not changed.” If you want his opinion on what
happened to the Armenians you have to Google his 2008 speech to find that
he believes it was genocide. It is a word he does not utter for fear of Turkish
reprisals: the closing of spy bases or airfields currently used to pummel ISIS.
The truth is too inconvenient to utter. Turkey is simply too important to
NATO for governments to speak the truth. 43 state legislatures in America
have recognised the genocide, but not the US. In Britain, where Scottish and
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Welsh parliaments have recognised the crime, the UK government will say
anything to avoid expressing the inconvenient truth. It disingenuously claimed
that the evidence for genocide is “not sufficiently unequivocal.” The reason
for this I discovered in some secret memoranda obtained under the Freedom
of Information Act—Turkey is “neuralgic” on the subject. “We are unethical,”
the Foreign Office secretly admitted, “but given the importance of our politi-
cal, strategic and commercial relations with Turkey, UK equivocation was the
only convenient option.”
Because of all this genocide equivocation, I have attempted to settle the
issue in my book, An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Ar-
menians? by applying the law to the facts agreed upon by historians. My
conclusion, beyond any doubt, is that the Armenian people were victims of
genocide as defined by the Genocide Convention and by the Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court. I will not weary you with the evidence, and I will
not describe in detail the massacres, the Euphrates River so swollen with dead
bodies that it changed its course, the beheading of boys and the selling into
sexual slavery of girls, the forced conversions to Islam, and so on.
The Armenian minority in the Ottoman Empire had always been denied
civil rights and been allocated the title of an inferior status. In 1894–1896,
the period of the first massacres, 200,000 were killed, which was warning
enough to the Young Turk Government that took power in 1909, of underlying
racial and religious tensions. That government increased these tensions by a
“Turkification” programme that stressed racial superiority and demeaned the
Armenians, referring to them as tubercular microbes on the body politic. The
government even changed the names of streets and towns, from Christian to
Muslim. They banned the use of the name “Armenian” from companies and
associations, and refused to teach the Armenian language in schools. At the
outset of the war, their tame Imam declared a Jihad against Christians, al-
though he had to, somewhat embarrassingly, exempt Germans as they were
Ottoman allies.
In April 1915 came the roundup of the intellectuals, the call-up of Armen-
ian men to be placed in army labour battalions and then massacred, and the
deportation law that required all Armenians without exception to be deported.
This meant relocation to the Syrian desert where most died either from star-
vation on the long march, or from typhus and dysentery in camps beyond
Aleppo. Then came the laws that expropriated their property as “abandoned,”
a euphemism for confiscation. It is interesting to compare the euphemisms
used to cover up genocide: Adolf Eichmann’s Wannsee Conference minutes
talk of “evacuation” of Jews to the east, because of wartime necessity. The
Young Turk Government similarly spoke of “relocating” the Armenians be-
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cause of wartime necessity. Both governments knew they were transporting
people (the Armenians mainly on foot) to their deaths.
Evidence of the Ottoman Turkish government’s genocidal intentions comes
from many sources, most compellingly from their allies, the Germans, whose
consuls reported to Berlin that the Turks were bent on extinguishing the Ar-
menians as a group. They were very worried that Germany would be held
complicit in what the British, French and Russians denounced as “a crime
against humanity,” and they urged Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Holl-
weg, and the Kaiser, to take action. They refused. “It’s unheard of to criticise
your ally in the middle of a war,” replied the Chancellor. The American diplo-
mats, neutrals at this stage, were appalled by the destruction. Talaat Pasha, the
Turkish Interior Minister, made no bones about his determination to destroy
the community: “We are solving the Armenian question by eliminating the
Armenians,” he told Henry Morgenthau, the US ambassador. There is telling
evidence from German and American missionaries, from Austrian and Ital-
ian diplomats, from captured Australian diggers (themselves treated decently
enough by the Turks), who reported with some horror how their captors would
massacre Armenians and send them off to starve. At the end of the war, an ex-
tensive enquiry led by American General James Harbord described this as “the
most colossal crime of all the ages . . . this wholesale attempt on a race.”
Well, that is genocide in my book and by definition of Raphael Lemkin, the
brilliant Polish law professor who coined the word and the concept. Lemkin
was bothered by the fact that there was no international criminal law that
would punish the perpetrators of state-sponsored racist massacres outside of
their own country. The British had rounded up 68 of the main Turkish officials,
taken them for trial in Malta, but discovered they had no jurisdiction to try po-
litical or military leaders for killing their own people. In 1919, there was no
international criminal law. The main perpetrators were given refuge by Ger-
many, and in 1922 Talaat Pasha was assassinated by a vigilante whose family
had died in the deportations. The jury heard defence evidence from German
generals and missionaries, and acquitted the assassin.
Lemkin thought you could not leave genocide to the justice of the vigilante.
It was a peculiar and horrific event that should be made an international crime,
with the states of the world obliged to punish it. He examined its history, from
the destruction of Carthage to the latest twentieth century example that he
gave as the destruction of the Armenians. It was this event that inspired his
campaign throughout the 1930s, and it gained momentum with the Nazi geno-
cide. Lemkin lobbied all the embassies of the war. He was a pain in the neck
and the Canadians, to get rid of him, palmed him off on the Australian, Dr
Herbert Evatt, who could also be a pain in the neck. These two legal geniuses
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hit it off and Evatt was the statesman who supported Lemkin and who intro-
duced the Genocide Convention at the UN in 1948 as President of the General
Assembly.
So the whole concept of an international law against genocide was inspired
by the Armenian experience, which was not, as the Australian Government
now says, a tragedy. It was a crime, and is now the worst crime of all, with a
Convention that obliges the world to act against its perpetrators.
It is important to understand that genocide does not mean that the target
group is extinguished. It is sufficient if part of the group is intended for de-
struction. There was genocide, the International Court of Justice has ruled,
in Srebrenica, when 7,000 Muslim men and boys were killed, and 18,000
women deported. Nor does it mean killing or injuring. Genocide includes, by
Convention definition: “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part.” There can
be no doubt, therefore, that what happened to the Armenians in 1915 was
genocide. It is true that no court has yet held this to be the case, and all books
about it have been written by historians. Mine is the first, I think, by an inter-
national lawyer.
But the evidence is overwhelming. Why, then, does Turkey dispute it? First,
it states that there were only 1.1 million Armenians in the country at the time,
so 1.5 million could not have died. It estimates the death toll at “only” 600,000
and I put “only” in inverted commas, because 600,000 is over half of 1.1
million. In any event, the Armenian Church records, far more likely to be ac-
curate, count 2.1 million. So “only 600,000” is hardly a sensible objection.
Then the Turkish Government says that the “relocations,” as they put them,
were for “military necessity.” That does not excuse the massacres, which they
put down to a few “unruly officials.” “Unruly” is another of genocide’s eu-
phemisms, intended to cloak barbarism ordered by the government. As for the
“relocations,” what was the military necessity in killing children, women and
old men? Necessity in war can never justify the deliberate murder of civilians:
if suspected of treason or loyalty to the enemy they may be detained or in-
terned or prosecuted, but not sent on death marches from which they are not
expected to return.
This Turkish argument, promoted by a massive propaganda exercise in the
run-up to the genocide’s centenary, is very dangerous. Deliberately killing
civilians can never be justifiable in order to gain a military advantage. There
were, admittedly, dangers on the Russian front, and there were some Arme-
nians who defected to the Russian army, and there were some outbreaks of
violence from Armenians, generally in self-defence. Only in one town, Van,
did they succeed in driving out the Turkish army and then only for two months.
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The danger of giving legal credence to the Turkish argument is that it would
apply to all genocides where there is civil resistance. It would justify Ra-
japaksa in Sri Lanka, killing up to 70,000 civilians in order to eliminate the
Tamil Tigers. It could be used by the Pakistani army to justify the killing of
3 million Bengalis back in 1971, because they harboured a small number of
freedom fighters. It is during war that the law of genocide is most necessary
to protect minority groups, and it is ironic that the Turkish government denies
genocide of the Armenians on the pretext that they were “the enemy within”
during a war, the very circumstances in which special obligations on a state to
protect racial or religious groups are essential.
That is why genocide trials continue today in The Hague for those per-
petrators of Srebrenica: five Bosnian Serb generals have been convicted, and
it is only a matter of time before General Mladić joins them. Srebrenica, a
Muslim enclave surrounded by a predominantly Serb-populated countryside,
in the racially jumbled geography of Bosnia, was attacked by Bosnian Serb
commanders who did not, merely by taking the town, commit genocide.
That happened shortly afterwards when Mladić ordered the deportation of
all Muslim women, children and old men, whilst at the same time about
7,000 able-bodied men and boys were separated and detained, ostensibly to
“screen” them for war crimes, but in fact to be carted off, killed and buried
in mass graves that later yielded corpses with hands tied behind backs, shot
from behind. Remember the incriminating footage that came from a private
camcorder, with grainy images of Muslim men and boys huddled in fields,
surrounded by soldiers who wait impatiently to be blessed by Serb Orthodox
priests so they can, with easy consciences, shoot their prisoners before night-
fall. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and the International Court of Justice have concluded that the operations—the
deportations and the massacre—prove that, “the Bosnian Serb forces not only
knew that the combination of the killings of the men with the forcible trans-
fer of the women, children and elderly would inevitably result in the physical
disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica, but clearly in-
tended through those acts to physically destroy this group.” That is what the
Ottoman leaders clearly intended to do to the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia
in 1915.
So what are we to make of the massively-funded Turkish government de-
nialism of crimes committed by their predecessors in 1915? It goes beyond
denialism. Under S.301 of the Turkish Criminal Code, citizens can be, and
are, prosecuted for asserting that there was a genocide. Hrant Dink, a coura-
geous newspaper editor, was assassinated and the government did nothing to
bring his assassins to justice. Schoolchildren are taught to write essays refut-
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ing the genocide. The press restrictions are such that Turkey is rated 154th in
league tables of press freedom, largely because of its ban on criticism of Ot-
toman behaviour.
Of course, it was a long time ago, but 100 years is still within living mem-
ory. Several elderly women who were small children when carried by their
mothers across the burning sands, were invited to tea with President Obama
in 2015, along with the world’s most famous Armenian, Kim Kardashian.
And, of course, the mental scars, the psychological trauma on their children
and grandchildren, continues throughout the diaspora, and will continue until
Turkey makes some acknowledgement of the crime, and some reparation.
International law may provide some assistance, as it has with art looted
by the Nazis: there are assets expropriated in 1915 that can still be traced.
Over 1,000 seized churches could be given back. One church, at Lake Van,
was restored and returned a few years ago, which gives some hope of resolu-
tion. Armenians want their historic lands restored, but that is probably asking
too much. I have suggested that the majestic and mysterious Mount Ararat
that overlooks the capital, Yerevan, could be restored to Armenians as an act
of reconciliation. What Armenians most want is an acknowledgement of the
dreadful crime that was committed, and if Turkey chokes on an admission of
genocide, it should at least admit that its Ottoman predecessor committed a
crime against humanity—there can be no conceivable legal argument that the
massacres and deportations did not amount to that.
Turkey, outrageously, claims that if the 1915 events did not amount to
genocide, they amounted to nothing at all: “c’est la guerre,” as if “military ne-
cessity” in war can justify the marching of hundreds of thousands of civilians
to their death. That this is a war crime of utmost gravity was confirmed by the
American and Australian military courts that convicted Japanese generals for
the death marches in the Philippines and at Sandakan. Their victims were sol-
diers who were prisoners of war: to subject civilians to the same treatment is
a crime that “military necessity” can never justify, any more than it could jus-
tify General Mladić’s destruction of Muslims in Srebrenica on the ground of
strategic advantage for his army and his cause.
Genocide, because it is the worst crime against humanity, calls for a special
study of its causes and for special precautions against its recurrence. There are
lessons to be learned from the way in which a new and seemingly progressive
“Young Turk” government decided to solidify its support behind the banner
of racial superiority, and how this in turn led its intellectual theorists to de-
monise and dehumanise the Armenian minority. Genocide scholarship serves
a valuable purpose of identifying patterns that recur in the build-up to behav-
iour in which formerly happy neighbours are incited to hack each other to
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death, renouncing the very notion of “neighbourhood” as a living space that
human beings of different creeds or colours can amicably occupy. Within liv-
ing memory, murderous hatred has been inflicted on Hindus and Bengalis of
Bangladesh, on Tutsis in Rwanda, Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tamils of
Sri Lanka, Chechens in Russia, Mayans in Guatemala, Chinese in Indonesia,
Darfurians in Sudan, and on other victim groups; currently on Christians and
Yazidis by ISIS. The list is long and it will lengthen unless the world remem-
bers the Armenians and rejects the claim that their killing was no more than
cruel necessity or, as polite genocide deniers always say, like the Australian
Government, “It was a tragedy.” It was not a tragedy. It was a crime.
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Just over 100 years ago, Armenian women and girls across Anatolia and
beyond were witnessing their teachers and community leaders being exe-
cuted, mourning their murdered husbands and sons, hiding weapons from
gendarmes, taking food to arrested male relatives, negotiating with au-
thorities, and comforting distressed children.2 Amid the chaos of the First
World War, the Ottoman authorities launched a coordinated and systematic
genocide against the Armenian population. The narrative of the Armenian
Genocide commonly begins with attacks on the Armenian elite followed
by massacres of “battle-aged” men. Stories of women during the early days
of the genocide have largely been omitted or positioned as peripheral to
the “main event.” Yet their experiences are revealing in a number of ways,
not least in their exposure of perpetrator intent and brutality. Marion Ka-
plan wrote in 1982 that including women’s voices in historical study can
“sharpen our understanding of a past that has been interpreted without any
reference to women at all,”3 an assertion that underlies this essay. In view-
ing the early phases of the Armenian Genocide from the perspectives of
women, a richer and fuller history of victim experiences and perpetrator
tactics emerges.
Here I integrate women’s stories into the following stages of the Armenian
Genocide narrative: early persecution; disarming of the community; targeting
1 In April 2015, I was honoured to give the keynote address in Melbourne for the 100 Year Commemoration
of the Armenian Genocide. The community connected deeply to the stories of Armenian women highlighted
during my talk, to their losses and suffering and their survival and resilience. It was the profound response from
Melbourne’s Armenian community to the stories of women—the sense that they somehow captured an essence
of Armenian identity—that compelled me to undertake further research.
2 Although women’s experiences were not homogeneous (there were distinctions based on age and
socio-economic position, as well as regional variation), patterns do emerge in practices employed by
authorities and in women’s responses.
3 Marion A. Kaplan, “Tradition and Transition: The Acculturation, Assimilation and Integration of Jews
in Imperial Germany: A Gender Analysis,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 27, no. 1 (1982), 7.
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of community leaders and intellectuals (eliticide);4 and the arrest, torture and
killing of large numbers of men, although it should be noted that these did not
necessarily happen in the same order in every region, and many aspects of the
genocide overlapped, occurred concurrently or in close succession.
In genocide historiography, the concept of the male norm,5 or the assump-
tion that men’s experience is the universal human experience, has created a
dichotomy by which women’s stories are seen as divergent or particular.6 As
Paula Hyman suggests, history has been written in a way that spoke “explic-
itly of men but implied that women were included in the category of man”7 or,
alternatively, presented women’s experiences as so distinct and separate from
men’s that they are not included in the core narrative of the genocide. Further,
as Pascale Bos argues, “when one introduces gender as an analytic tool, cul-
turally dominant and male ways of categorizing what is historically important
and what is not are challenged.”8
In fact, nuances contained in the experiences of Armenian women illustrate
a number of important dimensions of the genocidal process, including deliber-
ate attacks on the family unit as the symbol of the group’s continuity.9 Further,
examining events from women’s points of view helps to crystallise perpetra-
tors’ intent to destroy the social and cultural fabric of the group, a crucial
dimension of Raphael Lemkin’s concept of genocide. The destruction of fam-
ily, community and cultural life has unique effects on women. Perpetrators
attacked women in ways that aimed to break down Armenian society and al-
though women were not generally targeted with mass murder until later in
the genocidal process, their treatment while male relatives were arrested and
killed was a clear harbinger of increasing brutality.
A notable exception to the majority of male-centric historiography is the pi-
oneering study “Women and Children of the Armenian Genocide” by Donald
E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller. They develop the concept of “tragic moral
choices” to describe how “women were placed in untenable situations where
4 “Eliticide refers to the killing of the leadership, the educated, and the clergy of a group.” See Samuel Totten
and Paul R. Bartrop, Dictionary of Genocide (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2008), 1:129.
5 “Since men lay claim to representing ‘humanity’ in all its universality, both in theory and in everyday life, it
is women who have to be singled out for closer specification.” Maria Wendt Höjer and Cecilia Åse, The Para-
doxes of Politics: An Introduction to Feminist Political Theory (Stockholm: Academia Adacta, 1999), 17.
6 For more detail, see Pascale Rachel Bos, “Women and the Holocaust: Analyzing Gender Difference,” in Ex-
perience and Expression: Women, the Nazis, and the Holocaust, eds. Elizabeth R. Baer and Myrna Goldenberg
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2003).
7 Cited in Ibid., 24.
8 Ibid., 24.
9 For more on targeting of the family unit, see Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, “The Devil in the Details: ‘Life Force
Atrocities’ and the Assault on the Family in Times of Conflict,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Interna-
tional Journal 5 no. 1 (2010), 1–19.
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no uncompromised moral decision could be made; only tragic moral choices
existed as options.”10 Unthinkable decisions women faced, often alone, in-
cluded whether to leave children with Turkish families in the hope they might
be saved, or to kill themselves and their children to avoid deportation, abduc-
tion or sexual violence. This concept contains echoes of Lawrence Langer’s
“choiceless choices,”11 those decisions made by victims of the Holocaust that
may be considered problematic in other circumstances, such as stealing, smug-
gling or suicide. In the moral grey zone of genocide, such dilemmas were
additional tortures that cannot be judged retrospectively, nor perhaps even
fully comprehended.12
The pain and victimhood embedded in these situations is clear. What is
less overt, but equally important, is the concept of agency. In order to build
on Miller and Miller’s “tragic moral choices,” I attempt to introduce an addi-
tional dimension of analysis to Armenian women’s experiences by recognising
and highlighting agency and resilience. Not only does the process of uncov-
ering women’s roles and responses serve to counterbalance the pervasive,
one-dimensional image of the “female victim,” it also tells much about how
targeted communities respond to genocide, how individuals assert their dig-
nity and humanity even within a prison of oppression. Such responses also
entail gendered aspects. Survivor accounts often depict how women main-
tained their domestic roles such as comforting children in times of great stress,
while also noting women’s “resourcefulness” in attempting to rescue their
male relatives or negotiate with authorities. Although I am conscious of the
risk of glorifying women’s actions,13 testimonial literature does frequently in-
clude reference to women’s adaptability to changing and ever more perilous
situations. Their daily struggle to survive and their adaptation to changing cir-
cumstances and extraordinary challenges should not be relegated to the sphere
of “unimportant” women’s domestic issues but rather, understood as central to
the genocide experience.
10 Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, “Women and Children of the Armenian Genocide,” in The
Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St Martin’s, 1992), 168.
See also Miller and Miller’s comprehensive testimonial collection and analysis, Survivors: An Oral History of
the Armenian Genocide (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).
11 Lawrence Langer, Versions of Survival: The Holocaust and the Human Spirit (Albany, NY: Suny Press,
1982).
12 “Grey zone” describes moral ambiguity in the concentration camps during the Holocaust. See Primo Levi,
The Drowned and the Saved (London: Sphere Books, 1989).
13 Early gender analysis of the Holocaust tended to identify “special vulnerabilities” and to idealise women’s
“special abilities” (coping skills, resourcefulness and sisterhood). See Bos, “Women and the Holocaust.”
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Theoretical approach
In 2005 Katharine Derderian wrote that “further scholarly examination of
gender-specific experience in the [Armenian] Genocide would aid in the un-
derstanding of the Genocide as a whole and provide a crucial basis for com-
parative work with other genocides.”14 While my aim is not a comprehensive
comparative analysis, the theoretical approach in this essay has been influ-
enced by analyses of Jewish women’s lives during the early stages of the
Holocaust, especially Kaplan’s contribution to Dalia Ofer and Lenore Weitz-
man’s Women in the Holocaust.15
In The Magnitude of Genocide, Colin Tatz and Winton Higgins note the
“comprehensive analytical toolbox” provided by Holocaust Studies, asserting
that it provides useful frameworks and lenses for examination of other cases.16
In line with their view, I argue that gender analysis within Holocaust Studies,
as an area of research that has developed over several decades, provides us
with a reliable framework for application to the Armenian case.
This essay explores how women were often at the forefront as victims of vi-
olence and intimidation, and forced to deal directly with Turkish authorities. It
investigates the ramifications of the disappearance of community leaders and
intellectuals on women and girls, including long-term effects of disruption to
their education. I also show how Armenian women managed the multiple re-
sponsibilities of their daily lives and, in addition, took on traditionally male
responsibilities like representing the family in political or social affairs.
Over recent years an increasing body of scholarship has emerged on the use
of sexual violence as a genocidal strategy against Armenian women and girls.
During the genocide, sexual violence, abduction, and forced marriage and con-
version were ubiquitous and enshrined in government policy.17 It would be a
mistake, however, to restrict the study of women’s experiences to these crimes.
Women were affected during every stage of the genocide and their distinct
14 Katharine Derderian, “Common Fate, Different Experience: Gender-Specific Aspects of the Armenian
Genocide, 1915–1917,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 19, no. 1 (2005), 5.
15 Marion Kaplan, “Keeping Calm and Weathering the Storm: Jewish Women’s Responses to Daily Life in
Nazi Germany, 1933–1939,” in Women in the Holocaust, eds. Dalia Ofer and Lenore J. Weitzman (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1998).
16 Colin Tatz and Winton Higgins, The Magnitude of Genocide (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016), xii.
17 In addition to Derderian, see Matthias Bjørnlund, “A Fate Worse Than Dying: Sexual Violence during the Ar-
menian Genocide,” in Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe’s Twentieth Century, ed. Dagmar Herzog
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Ara Sarafian, “The Absorption of Armenian Women and Children into Mus-
lim Households as a Structural Component of the Armenian Genocide,” in In God’s Name: Genocide and Religion
in the Twentieth Century, eds. Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001); Anthonie Hol-
slag, “Exposed Bodies: A Conceptual Approach to Sexual Violence during the Armenian Genocide,” in Gender
and Genocide in the Twentieth Century: A Comparative Survey, ed. Amy E. Randall (London: Bloomsbury Acad-
emic, 2015); and various texts by Lerna Ekmekcioglu.
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experiences spanned every facet of life—sexual, social, familial, economic,
physical, intellectual and more. In fact, there is a danger in defining women’s
experiences exclusively by sexual violence and trafficking, in that it can obscure
or further sideline women’s experiences of genocide. As Ofer and Weitzman ar-
gue, “While it is important to stress the distinctiveness of gendered experiences
during the Holocaust, it is essential that women’s experiences not be discussed
exclusively in terms of motherhood or sexuality. To do so marginalizes women
and, ironically, reinforces the male experience as the ‘master narrative.’ ”18
The very beginning
The arrest and execution of Armenian community leaders and intellectuals
marks the official start of the Armenian Genocide in the academic narrative
and collective memory, partly because the roundups represented a sudden and
significant escalation in violence against the Armenian population. Arguably,
this has also been the result of an overwhelming attention in the genocide
studies field on overt, physical tactics of genocide, most obviously mass mur-
der. Survivors often began their testimonies with the arrests of community
leaders or male relatives, not necessarily because this was the first episode of
violence experienced, but possibly because they (and interviewers) assumed
this was where the genocide story should commence. This starting point has
the experiences of men as its foundation.19
Yet, prior or simultaneous to the roundups, both men and women were
intensely affected by escalating persecution, rumours of violence in other re-
gions, and the anxiety of anticipating what was to come. I have therefore
chosen to begin not with the eliticide but with “early persecution,” a category
intended to capture the tense atmosphere before the arrests and murders. For
instance, child survivor Ermance Rejebian said that before her father was ar-
rested, she knew “something was afoot, because we would speak in whispers
in our home.”20 Another survivor explicitly distinguished between the early
reactions of men and women: “I could see and sense the men of our town gath-
ering in groups, talking and looking very sad. The women used to sigh.”21
18 Ofer and Weitzman, Women in the Holocaust, 16.
19 Only one woman was included on the list of Armenians to be deported or killed on April 24, 1915,
writer Zabel Yesayan. See “Zabel Yessayan, Leading Female Writer of Armenian Awakening Period,” 100
Lives (blog), https://auroraprize.com/en/armenia/detail/10160/zabel-yessayan-leading-female-writer-armenian-
awakening-period.
20 Testimony of Ermance Rejebian, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive, http://vhaonline.usc.edu/
viewingPage?testimonyID=56718&returnIndex=0.
21 Testimony of Takouhi Levonian, cited in Miller and Miller, “Women and Children,” 158.
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In the months, even years leading up to April 1915, there was an inherent
danger for Armenian girls walking alone. Mothers would warn their daugh-
ters: “Horrific dangers are lurking around every corner. . . . So many young
girls just disappear, even when they’re just popping out to visit their neigh-
bors.”22 The fear of sexual violence, which had been widespread during the
1909 Adana massacres, was palpable. Women and girls faced public taunts
and a general sense of fear for their safety. As Derderian identified, “sexual
intimidation created an environment of rumor and alarm.”23 The necessity of
going out of the home on errands increased as men began to disappear or,
fearing arrest, stayed hidden. Disguising one’s “Armenianness” in public be-
came imperative for girls and women. One survivor explained that a teenage
girl “could not go out with her face uncovered fearing the Turks,”24 and the
risk intensified as public insults and humiliation came to be condoned among
the Turkish population. Peter Balakian described one such attack on a cousin
in his memoir, Black Dog of Fate. In an increasingly ominous atmosphere in
Diarbekir, rumours of arrest, murder and deportation in other towns spread
through the local community. Gendarmes began searching for weapons in
houses and individuals started to disappear, including young women return-
ing home from the bathhouse. The episode below conveys the gendered use
of genocidal language and the growing acceptability of violence against civil-
ians, both of which were used to instil fear in the Armenian community:
I dressed fast and put on my charshaff, because if you look Muslim they
might ignore you . . . in the distance I could hear women’s voices screaming
. . . and I was walking faster now when a group of Turkish men came out
of a side street and began to throw stones at me. “Armenian. Whore. Gi-
aur [infidel].” They chanted it, and they ripped my charshaff off and began
spitting at me . . . throwing stones at me.25
Despite women’s heightened sense of fear for their own safety and for their
children, they continued to perform their accepted roles and daily tasks as
caregivers for immediate and extended family members. Further, they drew
on traditional knowledge and skills to respond to unusual and violent situa-
tions. Kaplan has described how Jewish women kept their households running
22 Astrid Katcharyan, Affinity with Night Skies: Astra Sabondjian’s Story (London: Taderon Press, 2003), 20.
23 Derderian, “Common Fate,” 5.
24 Testimony of Anna Boghossian, Armenian Assembly Oral History Project, Center for Armenian Research,
University of Michigan-Dearborn, 1981, http://umdearborn.edu/casl/686475.
25 Peter Balakian, Black Dog of Fate (1999; New York: Basic Books, 2009), 220–21.
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and comforted their children as persecution intensified before the Holocaust:
“At the center of Jewish family life, holding it together and attempting to keep
the effects of Nazism at bay, women’s stories provide a history not of mere
victims but of active people attempting to sustain their families and commu-
nity, to fend off increasingly nightmarish dilemmas.”26 There are significant
parallels in the Armenian case. Balakian describes his cousin’s mother crying,
wishing she were blind so she would not see her daughter hurt. Yet he empha-
sises her pragmatism and use of traditional cultural knowledge, soothing her
daughter’s wounds with beeswax and gauze soaked in milk, and a cloth dipped
in egg yolk.27
Indeed, the role of women as caregivers and mothers permeates survivor
testimony. Many child survivors retain vivid memories of how their suffering
was tempered, mediated, by their mothers’ efforts to reassure them, offer wise
words or simple gestures like holding their hands. This is what Kaplan refers
to as “the psychological work necessary to raise their family’s spirits and tide
the family over until better times.”28
It is clear that even prior to the disarming of the Armenian population
and elimination of the Armenian leadership, intimidation of women was im-
bued with genocidal intent, aiming to weaken the fortitude of the community.
Women tried to keep their families’ spirits up; ever more so once fathers, hus-
bands and brothers began to disappear. The shattering of the family unit meant
that women were suddenly launched into unfamiliar roles, such as negotiating
with authorities, while also grieving for loved ones and apprehensive of the
fate awaiting them.
Disarming the population
The disarming of the Armenian community had distinct impacts on women.
First, women were often at the frontline of the violence, since they were likely
to be in the home when searches were conducted. Second, with the home tra-
ditionally a female domain, women were deeply affected by the trauma of
having their domestic spaces invaded and treasured items destroyed. Finally,
they were often responsible for either hiding weapons or retrieving those hid-
den earlier. In order to terrorise the community, gendarmes would conduct
26 Marion A. Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 3.
27 Balakian, Black Dog, 221.
28 Kaplan, “Keeping Calm,” 43.
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searches at all hours of the day and night and did so with excessive force.29 In
her unpublished autobiography written in 1922, Vartuhi Boyajian wrote:
They dug the floors and the walls of the houses in search of guns and when
they found any they would torture the people of that household to extort
information about other houses or sources where guns were hidden. The
torturing was so bad that Armenians would go secretly and buy guns to give
it to them to escape torture. . . . The women who had guns for self defence
would wrap them up into towels then carry them secretly to the elders of
the Armenian Church who would turn them in to the Turkish government,
to be in good standing citizens. But all was to no avail.30
Armenian homes were often decorated with items handmade by the women
and girls of the household and after the violent attacks, women were left not
only with physical damage to their belongings, but also with a sense that any
semblance of sanctuary had been obliterated. Theft or breakage of items cre-
ated by the women using skills passed down over centuries was particularly
distressing; a symbolic representation of the destruction of Armenian culture
and identity. In addition, often the searches were simply an excuse to steal
valuables from Armenian houses.31
Women’s descriptions of chaos and terror during Turkish searches bring to
mind Kaplan’s portrayal of Jewish women’s experiences of Kristallnacht, so
named because of the “shards of shattered glass that lined German streets in
the wake of the pogrom . . . from the windows of synagogues, homes, and
Jewish-owned businesses plundered and destroyed during the violence.”32 Yet
“the night of broken glass” was experienced by many women as the destruc-
tion of their domestic spaces and intimate belongings, particularly bedding
and pillows: “This image of feathers flying, of a domestic scene gravely dis-
turbed, represents women’s primary experience of the pogrom.”33 As Bos has
29 US Consul to Harput, Leslie Davis, U.S. State Department Record Group 59, 867.00/803,
http://www.armenocide.de/armenocide/armgende.nsf/.
30 Vartuhi Boyajian, My Autobiography–Written in Constantinople 1922: This is the Story of the Black Days
of My Life, unpublished testimony, Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Archives, Yerevan.
31 “The Turkish soldiers, and also civilians, were going through Armenian homes, ostensibly searching for
firearms and weapons and evidences of rebellion against the government, but really they were robbing of us
whatever they wished to take.” See Serpouhi Tavoukdjian, Exiled: Story of an Armenian Girl (Washington DC:
Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1933), 25.
32 Holocaust Encyclopedia, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/ar-
ticle.php?ModuleId=10005201
33 Kaplan, “Keeping Calm,” 46.
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asserted, men and women not only experience but also remember and recount
the same events in different and gendered ways.
Women’s actions in times of intense stress can illuminate forgotten aspects
of victim responses. In order to protect their families, and often at great risk to
themselves, women attempted to hide or dispose of any items that might have
led to arrest.34 Echoing stories of Jewish families who burned book collec-
tions and documents in an attempt to avoid arrest by the Nazis, survivor Alice
Muggerditchian Shipley recalled how she and her mother buried weapons
along with her father’s books and valuables under the basement floor. She was
also responsible for burning her father’s letters containing war and political
information in the stove, while her mother cooked stuffed cabbages—an en-
lightening juxtaposition of traditional tasks and exceptional challenges. Alice
had been so engaged with putting papers in the stove that she did not notice
the cabbage burning; they ate it regardless.35
Hiding or handing over weapons did not necessarily prevent violence.
One survivor remembered digging up a hidden weapon and placing it in the
box for the gendarmes, only to have a senior official beat her mother with a
cane: “I spread myself on mother so the blow would fall on me.”36 Gendarmes
saw the searches as an opportunity to sexually assault Armenian women, the
trauma of which was compounded if family members were present.37 Such
episodes elucidate genocidal intent, as the symbolism of attacking women in
front of male relatives is an assault on the woman herself as well as a way
to desecrate the sanctity of the family.38 In addition to searches for weapons,
Turkish soldiers would demand to know the whereabouts of men of the house-
hold. Vartuhi Boyajian recalled her neighbour’s experience:
It was Winter and the family was doing their laundry. The soldiers threw
their laundry out in the mud outside and beat them up violently in order to
make them confess where was the husband hiding. Then they threw them
out of their home into the cold and took over their house leaving the poor
34 For instance, by throwing weapons into the river in the middle of the night. See the testimony of Massis
Nikoghos Kodjoyan, in Verjine Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewitness Survivors
(Yerevan: Gitoutyoun Publishing, House of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia,
2011), 203.
35 Alice Muggerditchian Shipley, We Walked Then Ran, privately published, 1983, 55.
36 Testimony of Paydsar Yerkat, in Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide, 366.
37 For example, survivor George Vetzigian said the Turks would invade Armenian houses, steal items and
abuse young women in front of their relatives. See Carol Bedrosian and Laura Boghosian, “Survivors For All
time: Stories of the Armenian Genocide,” Spirit of Change, December 1, 2009, http://www.spiritofchange.org/
Winter-2009/Survivors-For-All-Time-Stories-of-the-Armenian-Genocide.
38 von Joeden-Forgey, “The Devil in the Details.”
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woman with her kids outside on the frozen ice for days. They would beat
her up three times each day, throwing out and destroying all her belong-
ings and furniture, torturing her and her children until the day her husband
would return and surrender. They assumed that the wife knew of his where-
abouts. Several times they even put the house on fire but the helpless family
did not have a clue where he was.39
When searches were carried out simultaneously with the arrests of men of the
household, many women immediately took action to rescue their husbands.
Here lies another parallel with the circumstances of Jewish women in Ger-
many, who “summoned the courage to overcome gender stereotypes of pas-
sivity in order to find any means to have husbands and fathers released from
camps.”40 Armenian women were suddenly responsible for liaising with au-
thorities. When Astra Sabondjian’s husband was arrested:
she jumped into hostile territory to secure releases not only for her husband,
but also for his closest friends, all high-ranking members of the Dashnag
party. She argued with reason, pleaded with passion, threatened with cau-
tion, bargained with cunning, and they listened. She strode fearlessly into
the Ministry of Interior demanding to be heard as though it was her right,
she settled ransom payments at the Ministry of Finance, throwing money
at them like confetti and persuaded every known newspaper contact of
the international press propaganda machine to tell his story to the outside
world.41
Not all women had such success, and their lack of political experience proved,
in many cases, a ready target for officials. Shipley remembered how the
women were tricked into handing over weapons with the promise that their im-
prisoned husbands would be released, only to have the authorities murder their
husbands, and then the women too.42 Gender analyses of the Holocaust often
stress the common experience of women creating social networks in order to
survive. Armenian survivor testimonies frequently describe women acting col-
lectively in appealing for their husbands to be released or delivering food to
their imprisoned relatives, as in the case of a group of women who gathered at
39 Boyajian, My Autobiography.
40 Kaplan, “Keeping Calm,” 46.
41 Katcharyan, Night Skies, 72.
42 Testimony of Alice Muggerditchian Shipley, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive,
http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingPage.aspx?testimonyID=56527&returnIndex=0.
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the prison where their male relatives were crowded into small cells, and were
suffocating: “Some of the prisoners’ wives protested to the Ittihad execution-
ers; Atan bey had said with an ironic smile: ‘Don’t worry, we’ll soon transfer
your prisoners,’ meaning, transfer them to the slaughterhouse.”43
Women also took on the task of communicating horrific news to one an-
other. Survivor Sarah Attarian accompanied her neighbour to the prison, only
to discover inadvertently that the men had already been killed. Her neighbour
collected some of the blood that had soaked into the dirt outside the prison to
show the other women in the village. Their screams and cries upon being told
of the murder of their relatives remained engraved in Sarah’s memory.44
Eliticide
Men constituted the religious and intellectual leadership of the Armenian
community. Their torture and murder was a structural component of the
genocide, leaving the community with little capacity for social or political
organisation and thus more vulnerable to further attacks. As scholars Samuel
Totten and Paul R. Bartrop have written, “Eliticide is often committed at
the outset of a genocide, and is perpetrated in order to deny a group those
individuals who may be most capable of leading a resistance effort against
the perpetrators. Concomitantly, it is used to instill fear in the citizenry of
the targeted group and to engender an immense sense of loss.”45 This strat-
egy too is one experienced in gendered ways, and the impact on women is,
rather than a side effect of the genocidal process, central to it. Women of-
ten endured intimidation and brutality that accompanied the murder of their
leaders. Girls’ opportunities were diminished because of the destruction of
educational infrastructure, and as the traditional transmitters of culture across
generations, many women experienced the targeting of religious leaders and
teachers as well as the desecration of sacred buildings as an attack on their
identity.
Many Armenian women recalled with sadness the closure of their schools
and arrest of beloved teachers. Survivor Perouze Ipekjian from Constantinople
was in her graduation year when all her teachers disappeared.46 Another sur-
vivor described her school uniform displaying one stripe to represent first
43 Hakob Manouk Holobikian, in Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide, 262.
44 Testimony of Sarah Attarian, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive, http://vhaonline.usc.edu/
viewingPage.aspx?testimonyID=56633&returnIndex=0.
45 Totten and Bartrop, Dictionary of Genocide, 129.
46 Testimony of Perouze Ipekjian, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive, http://vhaonline.usc.edu/
viewingPage?testimonyID=56592&returnIndex=0.
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grade, and then sadly, “I would’ve had two stripes the following year.”47 Mari
Vardanyan from Malatya recalled her education with pride—her school books,
the opportunity to read aloud—and then the brutal end:
I was always a good student, because my mother would teach me at home
before sending me off to school. I liked school a lot. But then a paper was
issued which said that whoever taught in an Armenian church institution
would have to leave the country. And if they didn’t leave the country in
three days, their blood would be drunk out of a bowl. . . . I went to school,
but the door was closed. I looked through the keyhole in the door and saw
the priest praying inside. Our school never reopened.48
While both boys and girls had their schooling disrupted, there was a lifelong
impact on girls. By the time the deportations ended, surviving girls were
usually unable to resume their education as it was considered of little impor-
tance in the wake of genocide. Some were living in poverty, with returning
to school an impossible option. Most had matured to “marriageable age” and
with their primary role seen as repopulating the shattered community, en-
gagements were arranged quickly. Education for girls and young women was
limited to domestic skills and older family members refused the opportuni-
ties some yearned for: “I desperately wanted to finish my education. But my
grandmother and my uncle both said it wasn’t necessary; I had all the school-
ing I would ever need.”49
Women related to community leaders were targeted with severe violence
or forced to witness their family members tortured in a symbolic intersection
of violence against women and men.50 Authorities tormented women in the
wake of their relatives’ murders, as in the case of a woman sent the eyeballs of
her professor husband.51 These atrocities are indicative of a broader genocidal
intent—one that used the initial murders of the community elite to terrorise re-
maining community members into submission. In this frightening atmosphere,
women were faced with the challenge of caring for those men who had been
tortured and then released. One professor was sent home in severe psycho-
47 Dirouhi Avedian, Defying Fate: The Memoirs of Aram and Dirouhi Avedian (California: H and K Man-
jikian Publications, 2014), 11.
48 Testimony of Mari Vardanyan, in Nazik Armenakian, Survivors (Yerevan: 4 Plus Documentary Photogra-
phy Center, 2015), 133.
49 Dirouhi Kouymjian Highgas, Refugee Girl (Massachusetts: Baikar Publishing, 1985), 111.
50 For example, survivor Anaguel reported that her uncle had been a member of the Dashnag political party
and that his wife was tortured so she would hand over his documents. See Miller and Miller, Survivors, 105.
51 Testimony of Alice Muggerditchian Shipley.
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logical distress, frequently running outside naked and screaming of what the
authorities had done to him. The women would run after him covering his
body with bedsheets and returning him to the house.52
Finally, women were witness to their revered priests degraded, humiliated
and brutally slain,53 not only desecrating the sanctity of the church and
removing any hope of a safe haven, but destroying a central element of
women’s spiritual and social life. The desecration of sacred spaces that were
used by women for gathering and prayer, and the subversion of comforting
rituals into signals of terror, such as the ringing of church bells to round
up Armenian men, were often emphasised in survivor testimony. As Paydsar
Yerkat recalled:
I was woken up from a deep sleep by the ringing of the twin bells. I was
surprised to hear them. From the window of my room could be seen the al-
ley to the local church, St Karapet. I saw the men hurrying to the church
silently and thoughtfully. The church was filled up, the doors closed. The
private meeting lasted until midnight. No one was allowed to come out.
The women took food to the prisoners in the church, moaning and crying.
. . . The Armenian men came out from there covered in blood, with beaten
mouths and noses.54
As the community leaders disappeared, some women maintained their reli-
gious and cultural traditions as a way to manage the intense grief and to
distract their children. Shipley recalled hearing women crying from their
homes as the prominent men were handcuffed and taken away, and that her
mother “pulled us away from the windows and read many encouraging verses
from the Bible and gave us more verses to memorize.”55
Forced army recruitment, imprisonment, murder and
massacre
Over time, Armenian women lost husbands, fathers, sons and brothers to ar-
rest, imprisonment, conscription and murder. Saying goodbye to fathers was
a trauma that survivors never forgot, and those who were children frequently
52 Ibid.
53 For instance, Veronika Gaspar Berberian described how her grandfather, a priest, was decapitated as he
knelt, praying, and his head used as a football by the Turkish soldiers. See Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide,
360.
54 Testimony of Paydsar Yerkat in Ibid., 366.
55 Shipley, We Walked, 53.
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highlight the immediate impact on their mothers. Serpouhi Tavoukdjian re-
membered the heartbreak of her father’s last night at home; as he gathered
them for one last prayer, her mother was “ill from grief.”56 Nvart Assaturian
described the night when the men in Bitlis, including her father, were ar-
rested: “We waited and waited, and he was not coming . . . the Turks began
knocking on the door, and my mother was sitting in the bed, and crying and
praying . . . since then I cannot forget that night, and my mother’s crying and
praying.”57
Occasionally, arrested men were returned to their families, but in a horrific
state, and women immediately resumed their role as the men’s carers. This
included nursing their wounds, as in the case of a woman who bathed her hus-
band’s skin that had turned black from daily beatings.58 Publicising the torture
was even used as a strategy of intimidation to show the remaining popula-
tion what the authorities were capable of. Some women were sent the bloodied
clothes of their beaten relatives, while Balakian writes of his cousin’s father
being tortured and crucified, his mutilated body left on the doorstep (and his
decapitated head at the edge of the street) for his wife to find.59
Women’s roles were profoundly affected by the loss of male relatives. The
structure of the Armenian household had been determined by gender and age,
with young married couples moving into the husband’s parents’ house, of-
ten with uncles and aunts living under the same roof.60 Relationships between
family members were ordered according to generational protocols, with older
women holding authority over young women and some new brides forbid-
den from speaking to their elders until the birth of their first child, or until
grandparents had passed away.61 Young mothers, usually teenagers, had tra-
ditionally relied on older women to help them with new babies. As Dirouhi
Kouymjian Highgas writes, “My major upbringing was gladly undertaken by
my grandmother. Older women in the household often took over the care of
babies born to such young girls.”62
Men’s absence had serious repercussions on gender roles and intergenera-
tional relationships, an aspect of the genocide that has so far been neglected
56 Tavoukdjian, Exiled, 24.
57 Testimony of Nvart Assaturian, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive,
http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingPage.aspx?testimonyID=56720&returnIndex=0.
58 Testimony of Mikayel Mkrtich Chilingarian, in Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide, 268.
59 Balakian, Black Dog, 222–23.
60 For example, see the testimony of Zarouhi Ayanian, Center for Armenian Research, University of
Michigan-Dearborn, http://umdearborn.edu/casl/686475.
61 Miller and Miller, Survivors, 55.
62 Highgas, Refugee Girl, 14.
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in academic research. Existing rules of relationships and communication were
broken, as young women had to become “the head of the family”63 or the sole
protectors of sons and younger brothers,64 positions historically occupied by
fathers. Further, while the eldest man had been responsible for dealing with
“social and political interactions,”65 women both young and old now took on
the unfamiliar tasks of liaising with authorities, as well as daily activities that
had previously been the province of men, including shopping for food.66 There
were also financial consequences. Just as some Jewish women sought employ-
ment when their husbands were arrested, Armenian women took on paid jobs
to support their children in the absence of an income, overturning traditional
gender roles and, for those who had occupied a high socio-economic position,
class status as well. Some even had to manage the moral dilemma of taking
jobs washing or sewing uniforms for Turkish soldiers.67
Women began to straddle multiple roles. Without abandoning their tradi-
tional responsibilities, they quickly learnt how to advocate to authorities or
use illegal means to rescue male relatives or protect their families, including
bribery. Kaplan notes that actions by Jewish women “not only broke gender
barriers but also bypassed normal standards of legality,”68 and likewise, Ar-
menian women took huge risks in stepping out of gender constraints and
engaging in common but illegal methods of survival. Vergine Rouben Nad-
jarian recalled how her mother hid, negotiated and bribed to save their lives
at every opportunity, including trading jewellery for shelter in Turkish homes.
Yet she continued to conform to traditional gender expectations of self-sacri-
fice, telling her mother, “If you die, I’ll die with you.”69 Another woman took
a handful of gold pieces to a senior official in exchange for the release of her
husband, and when he returned home, she dressed him in cotton for a month to
protect his wounds.70 The dual persona that women came to embody is exem-
plified by Astra Sabondjian, who, in addition to negotiating on behalf of her
husband and collecting information for his illicit newspaper, visited her hus-
63 Testimony of Garegin Touroudjikian, in Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide, 522.
64 Eliz Sanasarian, “Gender Distinction in the Genocidal Process: A Preliminary Study of the Armenian
Case,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 4, no. 4 (1989), 452.
65 Miller and Miller, Survivors, 55.
66 Several testimonies refer to shopping having been a male duty. For instance, Zarouhi Ayanian, Center for
Armenian Research, University of Michigan-Dearborn.
67 Testimony of Haiganoush Bedrosian, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive,
http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingPage.aspx?testimonyID=56699&returnIndex=0.
68 Kaplan, “Keeping Calm,” 44.
69 Testimony of Vergine Rouben Nadjarian, in Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide, 284–85.
70 Miller and Miller, Survivors, 66.
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band in prison every week and brought him fresh bandages and ointment for
his wounds.
Significantly, women were forced to make life-changing and tragic deci-
sions without the support of husbands, brothers or fathers. Rubina Peroomian
writes:
In almost every household, with the men of the family murdered or impris-
oned, it was now up to the women to assume responsibility and make the
difficult decisions, first, to accept the loss of the murdered or imprisoned
husband or son . . . [and deciding] whether or not to entrust a young child
to the care of a volunteering neighbor—with the hope of returning and re-
claiming the child.71
As in the case of Jewish women sending their children out of Germany in the
hope they might survive, some Armenian women had to decide whether to
accept offers from non-Armenian families to take in their children. Knowing
they would never see their children again, and that they would be converted
and assimilated into Muslim Turkish society, these decisions encompassed the
sorrow of losing loved ones and further, the pain that accompanies loss of cul-
ture and tradition. Many implored their children not to forget their heritage.
The grief of mothers is recorded in their own testimonies and remembered by
the children, with a survivor describing being sent to a Turkish official’s house
and the absence of a goodbye kiss from his mother, which he attributed to her
inability to bear the sadness of bidding him farewell.72
Survivor Bertha Nakshian Ketchian recalled daily searches by officials and
pressure from a Turkish captain to give her away. Her story is pertinent in
multiple ways, illustrating the predicaments women faced and their changed
roles, and demonstrating that authorities knew in advance the atrocities await-
ing deportees: “Grandmother Mariam, now the head of the household, would
slowly open the door . . . the brutal presence of angry soldiers was terrifying .
. . the captain concentrated on staring only at me.” When Mariam continually
refused to give Bertha away, he responded: “You’ll be sorry. . . . You are all
going on a long, troublesome journey. She is very little and will not survive it,
or she will be taken by the Arabs.”73
71 Rubina Peroomian, “Women and the Armenian Genocide: The Victim, the Living Martyr” in Plight and
Fate of Women During and Following Genocide, ed. Samuel Totten (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
2009), 9.
72 Testimony of Sarkis Agojian, quoted in Rouben P. Adalian, “The Armenian Genocide,” in Century of
Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, eds. Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons and Israel W.
Charny (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997), 70.
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The concepts of tragic moral decisions and choiceless choices are perhaps
most explicitly revealed in acts of suicide or family murder.74 Suicide and
acts such as drowning or abandoning children were common on the deporta-
tion marches (usually to avoid violence, abduction or sexual abuse) but even
at this early stage, some saw suicide and the killing of their children as their
only option. After the murder of her father, Nektar Hovnan Gasparian’s mother
decided to end the remaining relatives’ lives. Nektar herself survived, but re-
membered: “She had arsenic with her; she gave it to a few girls of the village;
she drank it and made me and my sister Anoush drink it.”75
Such actions demonstrate both the lack of genuine options for Armenian
women as well as the spectrum of responses. Decisions to choose death over
deportation or abduction, or excruciating acts of sacrifice in giving away
children in order to potentially save their lives, contained elements of vic-
timhood but paradoxically also agency and resilience. Decision-making by
women involved complex gendered dimensions in that the role of mothers and
“appropriate female behaviour” was highly prescribed. Sometimes women’s
responses aligned with gender expectations; in other situations, they chose to
act outside of their traditional roles. Cases also occurred where moral dilem-
mas had adverse consequences for women’s intergenerational relationships,
such as when grandmothers had a different view from mothers as to whether
or not children should be given away.
Concluding thoughts
Forgotten elements of the complex crime of genocide, or those historically
viewed as marginal, surface in women’s stories. Scholars of the Holocaust
who pioneered gender analysis uncovered significant and meaningful details,
and by applying aspects of their theories and frameworks to the Armenian
case, gendered experiences of the early days of the genocide are brought out
of the shadows. The rounding up of community leaders, long known as the of-
ficial start of the genocide, tells the story with men as the central characters.
But the genocidal process relied on tactics that targeted both men and women
in distinct, yet intersecting ways. The challenges faced by women are as vital
to the history of the genocide as the executions and massacres of men. Begin-
ning the analysis with early persecution, for instance by including escalating
73 Bertha Nakshian Ketchian, In the Shadow of the Fortress: The Genocide Remembered (Massachusetts: Zo-
ryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research and Documentation, 1988), 13.
74 Suicide among Jews in the early Nazi period was also common, see Konrad Kwiet, “The Ultimate Refuge:
Suicide in the Jewish Community under the Nazis,” Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 29, no. 1 (1984), 135–67.
75 Testimony of Nektar Hovnan Gasparian, in Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide, 198.
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public attacks and insults against both women and men, sexual intimidation of
women, and pressure to cover their faces, may help formulate a more gender-
inclusive narrative.
What emerges clearly by viewing the events from women’s points of
view is the intent to annihilate the family unit and prevent the continuity of
the community. Women’s experiences highlight the unique essence, the real
tragedy of genocide—the social, cultural, physical and biological destruction
of the group. This is seen in the shattering of community structures, tradi-
tional ways of life, established familial roles, and the capacity for cultural
transmission to new generations. Yet within the constraints imposed, many Ar-
menian women responded in ways that asserted their resilience. Their actions
and decisions straddled traditional gender expectations and attempts to take
on new and challenging tasks. While this essay focuses on the beginning of
the genocide, their fortitude continued to manifest during the next phases of
torment—deportation marches under horrific conditions, systematic sexual vi-
olence, massacres, starvation, and eventually unimaginable suffering in desert
concentration camps.
Testimonies describing the treatment of women expose their persecution,
but also their strength. These were women who watched as their homes were
invaded and torn apart, who tried to soothe crying children and tend to the
wounds of tortured husbands. Women who read Bible stories as their relatives
were shot in or outside the church, supported each other in groups to appeal to
authorities, and bribed officials to release husbands and protect their children.
Women who used every skill and every ounce of tenacity they had to survive.
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FINDING A WAY: WOMEN’S STORIES OF DAILY
SURVIVAL AFTER THE 1965 KILLINGS IN
INDONESIA
Annie Pohlman
Introduction: the 1965–1966 massacres in Indonesia
In this essay I explore the experiences of women who lived through the mass
killings of 1965–1966 and the strategies they developed to survive in the after-
math of that violence. Mass violence swept across Indonesia in the months and
years following a military coup in Jakarta on 1 October 1965, and it had a pro-
found impact on the lives of millions. In its wake, the Indonesian Army carried
out a propaganda campaign to incite violence against its main political rival,
the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or the PKI) and its
supporters. With the willing participation of numerous civilian militia groups,
the Army orchestrated the eradication of the Left in Indonesia. Approximately
half a million people were killed and a further 1 million were rounded up dur-
ing anti-Communist purges and held in political detention. Many died during
torture or from hunger, disease, forced labour or a lack of medical care.1 Al-
though political groups are excluded from the 1948 United Nations Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1965–1966
mass killings were genocidal in intent.2 As several scholars argue, these killings
were intended to wipe out the political Left from the Indonesian polity.3 The
leading scholar on the Indonesian case notes that the violence of 1965–1966
was “a successful exercise in national obliteration.”4
1 Robert Cribb, “Genocide in Indonesia, 1965–1966,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 2 (2001), 219–39;
Douglas Kammen and Katharine McGregor, eds., The Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia, 1965–68 (Singa-
pore: NUS Press and NIAS Press, 2012).
2 See Beth van Schaack, “The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot,”
Yale Law Journal 106, no. 7 (1997), 2259–91; Anton Weiss-Wendt, “Hostage to Politics: Raphael Lemkin on ‘So-
viet Genocide,’ ” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (2005), 551–59.
3 See Cribb, “Genocide in Indonesia,” 219–25; Helen Fein, “Revolutionary and Antirevolutionary Genocides: A
Comparison of State Murders in Democratic Kampuchea, 1965 to 1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966,” Compar-
ative Studies in Society and History 35, no. 4 (1993), 796–823; Jess Melvin, “Mechanics of Mass Murder: How the
Indonesian Military Initiated and Implemented the Indonesian Genocide” (PhD thesis, University of Melbourne,
2014); Annie Pohlman, “Incitement to Genocide against a Political Group: The Anti-Communist Killings in In-
donesia,” Portal: Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 11, no. 1 (2014), 1–22.
4 Cribb, “Genocide in Indonesia,” 237.
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During this period of mass killings and arrests—that continued apace until
March 1966—the Indonesian Army under Major General Suharto took govern-
ment. What followed was three decades of authoritarian, military-backed rule,
under a regime that named itself the “New Order” (1966–1998). Throughout
this military regime, those with any connection to the former PKI experienced
a range of repressive measures, and these were carried out not only against for-
mer members of the PKI but also former members of any of the organisations
associated with the party, such as the women’s organisation Gerwani (Gerakan
Wanita Indonesia, the Indonesian Women’s Movement), the trade union feder-
ation, SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), and the farmers’
and peasants’ association, the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia). Measures were also
taken against anyone imprisoned during the arrests that followed the coup, re-
gardless of whether they had connections to the PKI.5 Prior to 1965, Communist
supporters made up nearly one-quarter of Indonesia’s then estimated 100 mil-
lion population.6 Under the new military rule, Leftist associations were banned
and therefore affiliation with such organisations was denied by many for fear of
persecution. Anti-communism was a core pillar of the New Order, which main-
tained a vigilant and militant stance against Leftist politics over its 33-year rule.7
Repression against former prisoners and associates of the PKI took many
forms. Particularly for those politically detained following the coup—some of
whom remained incarcerated for a decade or more—the New Order govern-
ment imposed a range of restrictions designed to impede their reintegration
into society.8 Those known as ex-tapol (an abbreviation of “tahanan politik”
or “political prisoner”) were targeted upon release from prison with restraints
on employment, movement, speech, residence and political participation. Fur-
thermore, the family members of ex-tapol and those killed during the mas-
sacres, faced similar restrictions, all of which the New Order implemented
without legal process and in the name of social inoculation against the alleged
danger of a communist revival.9 By the 1980s, these restrictions had developed
5 Amnesty International, Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report (London: Amnesty International, 1977);
Greg Fealy, The Release of Indonesia’s Political Prisoners: Domestic Versus Foreign Policy, 1975–1979 (Clayton,
Victoria: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1995).
6 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959–1965 (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1974), 366.
7 Robert Goodfellow, Api dalam Sekam: The New Order and the Ideology of Anti-Communism (Clayton, Victoria:
Monash Asia Institute, 1995); Ariel Heryanto, State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging
(London: Routledge, 2006); Katharine E. McGregor, History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of
Indonesia’s Past (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007).
8 Asia Watch, Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1988), 5–6.
9 Asia Watch, Human Rights, 6; Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda, and
Terror (London: Zed Press, 1983), 75–80.
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into the more formal “clean self” and “clean environment” restrictions—to be
“clean” meant that one had no familial or other ties with persons killed or
arrested following the coup. Those found to be “unclean” were barred from
various forms of employment, citizenship, expression and movement.10
Aside from these formal restrictions, those seen to have former Leftist con-
nections also experienced a range of social stigmas and economic difficulties.
People identified as ex-tapol, and their families by association, were targeted
by military and government officials through various forms of heightened sur-
veillance.11 Former political prisoners had their identity cards stamped with
the initials “E/T” (ex-tapol), becoming easily identifiable to officials.12 Forms
of monitoring and restriction of movement were further reinforced by social
surveillance by distrustful neighbours and community members; many former
prisoners have spoken of how neighbours conducted monitoring on “unclean”
former Communists in their midst.13 Barred from a wide range of educational
and employment opportunities, many former prisoners, their children, grand-
children and other family members suffered significant financial difficulties.
While the worst of these repressive measures were lifted following the
end of the New Order regime in 1998, the stigma of association with former
Communists and political prisoners remains to this day.14 To date, the Indone-
sian government has delayed or blocked attempts to investigate or redress
the violence of 1965; there has been no official apology or reparations made
to survivors or victims’ families.15 Given the impunity for historical cases
of gross human rights violations in Indonesia, survivors and their advocates
speak out about their experiences at some risk; those who choose to take part
in truth-telling about past abuses do so under threat of reprisal from security
services and hard-line groups within their communities.16
10 See Justus van der Kroef, “Indonesia’s Political Prisoners,” Pacific Affairs 49, no. 1 (1976), 34–60; Annie
Pohlman, “A Fragment of a Story: Gerwani and Tapol Experiences,” Intersections: Gender, History and Culture
in the Asian Context 10 (2004), http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue10/pohlman.html.
11 See Asia Watch, Human Rights, 65–73; Fealy, The Release.
12 Tapol, “All Forms of Discrimination Must End,” Tapol Bulletin 130 (1995), 5–7.
13 Carmel Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag: A Western Woman Tells Her Story (London: Cassell,
1996), 103–10; Tapol, “All Forms of Discrimination,” 5–7.
14 Steven Miller, “Zombie Anti-Communism? Democratisation and the Demons of Suharto Era Politics in
Contemporary Indonesia,” in After 1965: Causes, Responses and Memories of the Indonesian Genocide, eds.
Katharine McGregor, Annie Pohlman and Jess Melvin (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).
15 International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Commission for Disappeared Persons and Vic-
tims of Violence (KontraS), Derailed: Transitional Justice in Indonesia Since the Fall of Soeharto (Jakarta:
ICTJ & KontraS, 2011); Kimura Ehito, “The Struggle for Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Suharto Indonesia,”
Southeast Asian Studies 4, no. 1 (2015), 73–93.
16 Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem, “Seducing for Truth and Justice: Civil Society Initiatives for the 1965 Mass
Violence in Indonesia,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 32, no. 3 (2013), 115–42; Annie Pohlman,
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Since the end of the New Order, however, many survivors have indeed
chosen to speak about their experiences. Survivors’ testimonies have revealed
how those killed and imprisoned during the mass violence of 1965–1966 ex-
perienced egregious violence, many suffering inhumane and dehumanising
treatment.17 Those left behind when loved ones were rounded up also ex-
perienced violence and severe forms of hardship. Yet such stories are rarely
examined in detail and are often treated as peripheral to narratives about those
who experienced violence first-hand.18
In this essay, I examine the stories of two women who lost husbands, Ibu
Arum and Ibu Moeliek,19 and the impact this had upon them and their fami-
lies. I explore the suffering and resilience of these women and pay particular
attention to their experiences in terms of financial hardship and the strategies
they developed and deployed to survive. I also highlight the experiences of
women in finding ways to persevere in the wake of genocidal violence, en-
suring the survival of their children and other family members in the face of
extreme violence, marginalisation and poverty.
Women speaking of survival after the violence
The topic of survival underpins many of the testimonies of women survivors,
the term having multiple meanings for individual women. In some women’s
testimonies, survival meant immediate safety from direct threats of attack and
imminent danger. When describing the weeks and months after the 1965 coup,
women talked about having to hide or flee when soldiers and mobs of youth
militias came to their homes in the night, sometimes taking members of their
family or attacking entire households, looting and killing, even setting fire to
the house. These stories convey the nightmare and panic of having to grab
“A Year of Truth and the Possibilities for Reconciliation in Indonesia,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An
International Journal 10, no. 1 (2016), 60–78.
17 Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia, 112–18; Kammen and McGregor, The Contours.
18 For exceptions, see Anton Lucas, trans., “Survival: Bu Yeti’s Story,” in The Indonesian Killings
1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies,
Monash University, 1990), 227–39; Yayan Wiludiharto, “Penantian Panjang di Jalan Penuh Batas: Kisah Kelu-
arga Korban,” in Tahun yang tak Pernah Berakhir: Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65, Esai-esai Sejarah
Lisan, eds. John Roosa, Ayu Ratih and Hilmar Farid (Jakarta: ELSAM, TRuK and ISSI, 2004), 61–85; Kom-
nas Perempuan, Gender-Based Crimes Against Humanity: Listening to the Voices of Women Survivors of 1965
(Jakarta: Komnas Perempuan, 2007); Budiawan, “Living with the Spectre of the Past: Traumatic Experiences
among Wives of Former Political Prisoners of the ‘1965 Event’ in Indonesia,” in Contestations of Memory in
Southeast Asia, eds. Roxana Waterson and Kwok Kian-Woon (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 270–91.
19 “Ibu” is a term that means both “wife” and “mother.” All names given in this essay are pseudonyms,
except when initials are employed in the source document. For example, see Komnas Perempuan, Gender-Based
Crimes, 128.
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children and meagre possessions and flee, uncertain whether they would find
safety.20
For other women, “survival” referred to the daily effort, over years and
decades, to secure necessities for themselves and their families. The way this
topic circulated through women’s testimonies differed. First, it related to find-
ing shelter and sufficient food. In many cases, necessities included discussions
about their children’s access to schooling and other opportunities. Stories of
survival were also relayed in descriptions individual women gave of their
work or the belongings they sold or sometimes stole. Furthermore, the topic of
survival was evident in stories centred on making difficult decisions and sacri-
fices. Many spoke of extreme poverty and marginal living that involved daily
struggles to provide food, shelter and other immediate needs for themselves,
their children and other family members.
Many women had been income earners prior to the upheaval but, with
the loss of a husband, the family’s income dramatically reduced in most
cases. In the first few months after a husband was arrested or killed, women
often resorted to selling household goods and furniture and later perhaps
even the family home. As one woman, “AR”—part of whose testimony is
recorded in a report by the Indonesian National Commission on Violence
against Women—recounted:
We had all been selling things for a long time, that was how I took care
of my three children who had such bloated stomachs [from starvation] that
kept on getting bigger. We sold the cupboard, the bed, [I] kept selling until
. . . we ended up sleeping on the floor. Luckily I had foster parents there
[and] they often gave me rice. I didn’t have anything there, not even any
jewellery. I didn’t think of myself at that time, I never thought I would be
stuck in such a hole. Once I tried to sell things behind the school, but it was
hard to sell anything because I was the wife of a PKI member. Only one
or two people bought from me, I was broke again, [but I] kept going so I
could feed the children. Everywhere I went I was ridiculed by people, that
was how it was for me.21
20 This chapter draws on selected interviews with women survivors conducted by the author between 2002
and 2012, and on transcripts of interviews held by two Indonesian non-government organisations, the Lontar
Foundation and the Indonesian Institute for Social History (Institut Sejarah Sosial Indonesia). Partial interview
transcripts are also taken from the Komnas Perempuan (Indonesian National Commission on Violence Against
Women) report (Gender-Based Crimes). The author conducted approximately 150 interviews with women sur-
vivors of the 1965–1966 mass killings as part of a large oral historiographical study into women’s experiences
during this period in various parts of Sumatra and Java, Indonesia. For a description of these interviews, see Annie
Pohlman, Women, Sexual Violence and the Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966 (London: Routledge, 2015), 21n1.
21 Cited in Komnas Perempuan, Gender-Based Crimes, 128.
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This section of AR’s testimony contains experiences that were common to
many women after the death or detention of husbands. The loss of income,
compounded by the social marginalisation and stigma faced by those associ-
ated with “Communist sympathisers,” almost always meant direct and often
severe economic hardship for family members.22 Whether the process hap-
pened over mere weeks or over years, families lost incomes, possessions,
homes and land. In the testimonies of many women, this process is described
as a relentless and distressing erosion of not only the family’s sources of in-
come and wealth but of their position within communities.
Research into the experiences of women who live through periods of con-
flict tends to focus on the gendered and gendering effects of that violence.
Quite rightly, such research has revealed the broad range of gendered violence,
particularly sexualised forms of violence, perpetrated frequently as part of
conflict, crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.23 Where more re-
search is needed is into women’s lives in the aftermath of conflict; that is,
into the years and decades of survival and rebuilding. As Tristan Borer argues,
“[a]lthough it is clear that war is gendered, less recognised are the ways in
which the post-war period is equally gendered.”24 As recent research into the
lives of women in post- genocide situations has shown, more work is required
to understand the social, economic and varying institutional constraints and
opportunities faced by women in the immediate and long-term periods follow-
ing mass violence.25
Ibu Arum
By her own account, Ibu Arum had a hard life, one in which she “worked
every day to survive.”26 Born in the late 1930s in a poor area of southern
22 See Budiawan, “Living with the Spectre,” 270–72; Wenhsien Huang, “Women and Political Detention in
Indonesia,” Amnesty International, April 7, 1975, ASA 21/WH/CF.
23 For example, see Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London: Sage, 1997); Binaifer Nowrojee, Shat-
tered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights
Watch, 1996); Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide of Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croa-
tia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
24 Tristan Anne Borer, “Gendered War and Gendered Peace: Truth Commissions and Postconflict Gender Vi-
olence: Lessons from South Africa,” Violence Against Women 15, no. 10 (2009), 1170.
25 Catherine Ruth Finnoff, “Gendered Vulnerabilities after Genocide: Three Essays on Post-Conflict
Rwanda” (PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts, 2010); Jennie E. Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us: Women,
Memory, and Silence in Rwanda (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012); Judy Ledgerwood, “Death,
Shattered Families, and Living as Widows in Cambodia,” in Plight and Fate of Women During and Following
Genocide, ed. Samuel Totten (New Brunswick and London: Transaction, 2009), 67–82.
26 The transcript for the oral testimony by Ibu Arum (a pseudonym) is taken from the testimonial archives of
the Indonesian Institute for Social History (ISSI), used with permission.
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Sumatra, she was orphaned during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) by
the time she was five. Raised by an uncle who worked in a rubber factory,
she never attended school and married when she was 15. She and her husband
worked as day labourers on local plantations and cut and sold firewood from
the nearby forest. Together they worked to accumulate a marginal income that
paid for a small house and fed their three children.
As with many poor men in the area, in the mid-1950s her husband became
involved in the Indonesian Communist Party’s organisation for farmers and
peasants, the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia), as well as another local labourers’
union.27 During the 1950s and early 1960s, the BTI’s membership grew sub-
stantially throughout many regions of Indonesia, particularly among landless
peasants whose labour was critical to farming and forestry in Java and Suma-
tra.28 Attracted by the PKI’s strong stance on land reform, as well as numerous
programmes aimed at supporting the mostly landless agrarian labourers, the
BTI, like other PKI-affiliated bodies, grew into an organisation with millions
of members.29
In her testimony, Ibu Arum noted that in her area following the coup, a
wave of killings and arrests occurred that lasted until early 1966. As in other
parts of Sumatra, plantation workers in their region, many of whom had been
members of the BTI and other unions, became targets during the massacres
because of their affiliations with the PKI.30 Ibu Arum recalled that at night
she could hear people being shot in the plantation near their home: “But peo-
ple didn’t talk about, they’d [refer to these events] only in code. Codes like,
‘there’s an operation going on in there,’ things like that.” As she explained,
she and all the other villagers who lived near the plantation knew what was
happening and were frightened:
We were all terrified, when everything exploded and they were looking for
people, they were rounding them up, and it went on for some time, the
rounding up of people. . . . They were all the people accused of being in the
PKI, or that they must have been in Gerwani (the PKI-affiliated women’s
27 See Karl J. Pelzer, “The Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra,” Pacific Affairs 30, no. 2 (1957), 151–59.
28 See Rex Mortimer, “Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian Communism,” Indonesia 8 (1969), 1–20; Ernst
Utrecht, “Land Reform in Indonesia,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 5, no. 3 (1969), 71–88.
29 See Ernst Utrecht, “Land Reform and Bimas in Indonesia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 3, no. 2
(1973), 149–64.
30 Joshua Oppenheimer and Michael Uwemedimo, “Show of Force: A Cinema-Séance of Power and Violence
in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt,” Critical Quarterly 51, no. 1 (2009), 84–110; Hilmar Farid, “Indonesia’s Original
Sin: Mass Killings and Capitalist Expansion, 1965–66,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6, no. 1 (2005), 3–16; Ann
Laura Stoler, Capitalism and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870–1979 (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1985).
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organisation), that’s what they said. Then they’d be taken, then taken away.
And then they disappeared . . . in the forest.
In this initial wave of killings and arrests, Ibu Arum and her family were
left alone. It was a few months later, when the military were carrying out a
“clean-up” operation that her husband was arrested. These clean-up operations
went on in some parts of Indonesia until approximately 1970. The Indone-
sian Army worked with local governments and other civilians to identify and
detain remaining PKI supporters (often called “PKI malam” or “night PKI”),
particularly in rural areas.31 Aimed at rounding up PKI supporters who had
escaped initial purges, these clean-up operations also targeted those seen to
be closely aligned with the “Old Order”—the retrospective name given to
President Sukarno’s government by the Suharto regime to distinguish it from
the “New Order” post-1966.32 Throughout the late 1960s, government depart-
ments, various branches of the military and a wide range of formal labour
sectors were also cleansed of suspected “PKI elements”; those removed were
then sent to one of the many detention camps established for the purpose of
holding hundreds of thousands of political prisoners.33
Ibu Arum recalled how soldiers led the clean-up operation amongst the
plantation workers and how local members of their community also partici-
pated: “One of our neighbours, he was the one who got involved in this, that’s
what he did.” As Ibu Arum explained, “The [soldiers] would come out at night
and take people. And he was the one who wrote down each of their names. . . .
Our neighbour, he wrote down names on a list of people from around here, all
of them. . . . I’m not sure why he did it, but they [the soldiers] told him to do
it, and they paid him to do it too, that’s what happened.” Ibu Arum’s husband
was one of those whose name was added to the list of unionists and other al-
leged PKI supporters given by their neighbour to the soldiers.
One evening, they came for him. His name was on the list. He was out in
the plantation still, getting firewood to sell along with my uncle, and they
took him from there, in the forest. . . . It was only about one kilometre from
our home. They [a group of soldiers] followed him into the middle of the
31 See Justus van der Kroef, “Indonesian Communism Since the 1965 Coup,” Pacific Affairs 43, no. 1
(1970), 34–60.
32 See HD. Haryo Sasongko and Melanie Budianta, eds., Menembus Tirai Asap: Kesaksian Tahanan Politik
1965 (Jakarta: Lontar Foundation, 2003).
33 See van der Kroef, “Indonesia’s Political Prisoners,” 34–38; van der Kroef, “Indonesian Communism,”
34–40.
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plantation and arrested him there. Then they took him to the local military
command post [Kodim].
Ibu Arum’s uncle was not arrested, and came back to tell her that armed sol-
diers had taken her husband. Ibu Arum was terrified about what might happen
to her husband at the command post. “We knew what was happening there.
People said that at the command post, people were being beaten and tortured.
They said they were tying people up, beating them. . . . I was scared to go to
the command post, but I was also scared for [my husband].” The command
post was located in the nearby town and she and a few other women whose
husbands had been kidnapped made the three-hour journey on foot.
When they arrived, the soldiers harassed them and ate the food they had
brought for their husbands. Ibu Arum recalled how she and another woman
were slapped across the face for asking to see their husbands, and both told
to wait in a side-room of the command post. “So we went into the room, and
there were people getting electric shocks [in the next room], crying, we could
hear them doing it. . . . I could hear them being beaten, thrashed.” After wait-
ing for a few hours, the women were told to go home without seeing their
husbands.
Thus began a new and more “terrible way of living,” as Ibu Arum described
it, for herself and for the other women from the plantation whose husbands
had been arrested. “Once a week, we would walk there [to the command post],
we would leave at 5a.m. and get there by 8a.m., we would take food in for the
men, because they had none. . . . There would be four, maybe five of us at a
time, whoever could go, but someone would stay at home with the children.”
As in many of the detention camps across Indonesia during the late 1960s, the
political detainees held at the command post were starving.34 Ibu Arum’s hus-
band, along with others, received almost no food rations from their jailors and
relied on what little food family members were able to bring. However, the
food that she and the other women brought was almost always taken by the
soldiers and only some of it passed on to detainees.
As Ibu Arum explained, sustenance for the women themselves and their
children was also a constant struggle. Over the three years Ibu Arum’s husband
and the other men from the planation were detained, Ibu Arum and her small
circle of friends cooperated to keep themselves, their husbands and their chil-
dren fed as best they could. Without this cooperation, Ibu Arum insisted, none
of them would have survived:
34 See Carmel Budiardjo, “Political Imprisonment in Indonesia,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 6, no.
2 (1974), 20–23.
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We all had children, most of them small children, all of us wives. The chil-
dren were little, some of them just babies. I myself had three little ones . . .
one was eight, the second one was five, and the third one was just two. . . .
All of our men had been put inside, and we all really struggled. So we went
to work and we worked together. I went to work back in the plantation. The
rubber plantation was nearby, just behind where our houses were. I got out
and worked hard. I also went to the forest to collect firewood, to sell. My
friends did this too. . . . One of us would stay with the children, the [others]
would go work, so that we would have food.
This small group of women took turns working at the plantation or scavenging
for firewood to sell at the market. One woman would always stay with the chil-
dren and, as some of the older children grew up, they too went to work hunting
for firewood or looked after the younger ones. The children would also make
the weekly journey to the command post to deliver what little food they could
spare for the imprisoned men. Cooperation between the women “kept us all
alive, thanks be to God. Without [it], we would be dead. Starved.”
After three years, Ibu Arum’s husband and the other men were gradually
released. Each of the men was forced to “report back” to the command post
once a week (wajib lapor); each time they had to pay the soldiers 1000 Rupiah
(roughly the cost of feeding an extended family for at least a few weeks) to
stay out of detention and they were often forced to perform free labour. The
mandatory bribes and additional forced labour meant that Ibu Arum’s family,
as with other families from the plantation, struggled for subsistence. Yet, as
Ibu Arum explained, “we were blessed . . . we were together.” As she also
made clear, they had been “blessed” because none of their husbands had been
murdered or starved to death while in detention: “they all came home, and not
many did.”
Ibu Moeliek
Ibu Moeliek was born in the early 1930s in West Sumatra.35 Though inter-
rupted by the Second World War and the Japanese occupation (1942–1945),
followed by the struggle for independence from the Dutch (1945–1949), Ibu
Moeliek received a primary education and was married in her mid-twenties
to a high-ranking local member of government. Her husband, Pak “A,” was
a supporter of the PKI and became a leader within the BTI, and Ibu Moeliek
35 Interview, recorded with permission, with Ibu Moeliek and Ibu Jusufa, together with Narny Yenny, Sep-
tember 2005, West Sumatra.
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herself became quite heavily involved in running one of the Taman Melati
(Melati Gardens) kindergartens in their city. These crèches were set up by
Gerwani—the popular women’s organisation closely aligned with the PKI—to
help women in communities across Indonesia.36 Aside from her work with
the Taman Melati, Ibu Moeliek became increasingly involved with organising
other activities through the city’s Gerwani branch.
Shortly after the coup, anti-PKI violence broke out in the city and surround-
ing villages. Ibu Moeliek’s husband, Pak A, as a public official with close
links to the PKI, knew that he would become a target. After an angry mob
came looking for him at his office in town, Pak A told his wife that he had
to flee, saying that she and their four young children would be alright. “But
we weren’t. And [he] left, ran into the forest.” In that part of Sumatra, the city
lies on the coast and the hills behind are covered with dense rainforest. Dur-
ing the anti-Communist purges that started in the region mid-October 1965
and continued for some months, many members of the PKI and affiliated or-
ganisations went on the run, attempting to hide in the forest. Another woman
from this area explained that soldiers and groups of civilian militias would
go “pig hunting.” She described how, when the mob caught someone, “they’d
slaughter them near the mountain top. They’d be pulled along by their feet .
. . suspended by their feet, by their hands . . . like they were carrying a pig.
After they cut [the victim’s throat], blood would spill out everywhere. They’d
all come down together, [calling], ‘We’ve got one! We’ve got a pig!’ ”37
After Pak A had fled to the forest, Ibu Moeliek explained how people came
looking for him. “I was still at home with the children. [Shortly after] Pak A
left, for three nights the police came looking for him. They came at one in the
morning, 2 a.m., sometimes 3 a.m.. Yelling, harassing us.” This went on for
some time while Pak A was on the run and she recalled how the harassment by
policemen, soldiers and mob members frightened her and her young children.
“We were all terrified [every] time they came. Our youngest wasn’t even four
years old yet, the next one was in kindergarten, the third one was in Year Two
at school and the oldest one well, he was suffering. I had to find food for all
five of us.”
After five months of hiding in the forest, Ibu Moeliek’s husband was cap-
tured by a mob of civilian militias and soldiers. Dragged out of the forest along
with other PKI members who had been hiding, Pak A was taken to the city’s
main police station. Ibu Moeliek found out from friends that he had been cap-
tured and went to the police station to see him when she could:
36 See Saskia E. Wieringa, Sexual Politics in Indonesia (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 240–41.
37 Interview, recorded with permission, with Ibu Eny and Narny Yenny, September 2005, West Sumatra.
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I had the chance to go see him there. I went to see him with the children.
. . . He was detained there for five months, but after one time [after I had
gone to see him], two days later I found out that he’d been shot. They said
it happened when they [the detainees] were taken out and taken across the
road near the [town] market. He was shot there near the police station, in
front of that market. Another man was shot too, with [my husband]. They
were shot from behind by a policeman, in the back of the head . . .
For the five months Pak A was detained at the police station, Ibu Moeliek took
their children to see him whenever able, bringing food with her. As similarly
described by Ibu Arum, detainees held at the city’s police station were starv-
ing. Ibu Moeliek was never able to find out the exact details of her husband’s
death but believed her husband and the other victim had been taken from the
police station and executed. She believed the public nature of his execution
was due to his “position within the PKI” and that he was made an example of
because of the public office he had held within the government.
In Ibu Moeliek’s testimony, she emphasised that from the time her husband
fled into the forest, she and her children suffered a great deal. She explained
that without her husband’s income they were starving. “There was nothing I
could do. At first, I just kept crying with my children because how would I be
able to feed them? We had nothing anymore . . . and then, after what happened
at the police station, when my husband was no more, then we really suffered.”
During those first few months, Ibu Moeliek gradually sold household items to
pay for food and then she sold “whatever else I could find.” Eventually, she
had sold everything in their house:
By then, we had nothing to eat. My children had no father to get food for
them. So I worked. So then I went out and cleaned, I cleaned peoples’
clothes . . . I would work for whoever would let me, I would clean their
clothes and get a little bit of money. Then my oldest girl, she was still little,
but then she started helping me to clean clothes too.
Ibu Moeliek explained that, for a time, they managed to survive on the money
brought in by herself and her oldest daughter (the second child). She received
no help from family or friends who had all “turned away” from her, but she
added that, “Not everyone was bad to us. Some people felt sorry for us. They
saw a mother with four hungry children and felt sorry for us . . . but many peo-
ple, they cursed us, rejected us. . . . [They] cursed the children and called them
‘PKI children’ and things like that.” The term “anak PKI” or “PKI child” be-
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came a common epithet used against the children of those who were murdered
or detained following the 1965 coup.38
Her own parents were very old and were only able to help on occasion. The
only time Ibu Moeliek was able to get help from her husband’s family was just
before her oldest child died. As she explained during our interview:
I went many times [in the beginning]. I went back and asked them again
for rice for my child when he was dying. I came home that day with half
a small bag of rice and they told me never to come again. They would not
give us anymore, not again. That’s what my parents-in-law said to me. . . .
[T]hey were rich. But they wouldn’t help us.
Ibu Moeliek explained that her parents-in-law were angry with their son for
his involvement in the PKI and blamed him for being killed. They cut all ties
with their son’s children.
Ibu Moeliek described a sequence of events she called “the most devastat-
ing” of her life. Shortly after going to see her parents-in-law to beg for food,
her oldest child, a son, died. He had been sick for a while and Ibu Moeliek
blamed the lack of food that would have “kept him strong.” Shortly after, she
was arrested and taken to the police station:
I was kept inside for a month. The three [remaining] children were left all
by themselves, to find food for themselves, even the little one. The old-
est one [her second child, a daughter] sold off the rest of our possessions,
everything. That’s how they were able to get food. They came to see me
when I was in detention, and they were starving. . . . It broke my heart. My
children were starving, I wasn’t there to get them food. I was devastated,
and terrified about what would happen to them.
Ibu Moeliek did not speak much about her treatment during detention at the
police station; as she explained, her focus was on getting out as fast as she
could to take care of her children. At the end of the month she was released
along with some other women; only a small number of women had been de-
tained at the police station, whereas “hundreds of men were being kept there,”
all of them “packed tightly into rooms, like animals, starving.” As with most
former political prisoners, Ibu Moeliek was required to make “reports” to lo-
cal authorities for many years.
38 See Andrew Conroe, “Generating History: Violence and the Risks of Remembering for Families of Former
Political Prisoners in Post-New Order Indonesia” (PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 2012).
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After her release from detention, Ibu Moeliek needed to find a “better-paid
job”; cleaning clothes did not bring in enough money. She found work as a
housemaid for a family in another part of the city and the income was suf-
ficient to feed her children. A year or so later she found another job as a
housemaid for a different family who let her and her children live in the back
section of their house. She stayed for nearly 10 years and had enough money
to feed her children and, eventually, to send them to school. Once she and her
children had moved in with this second family, Ibu Moeliek reflected, their
“lives got better, not everything was hard all the time. I was happy. We had
food, the children were able to go to school, and they [the family she worked
for] were good to us.” After 10 years, and with her children mostly grown up,
she married a man who had also been a political prisoner. After his death in
the early 2000s, Ibu Moeliek went to live with one of her daughters and her
grandchildren.
Finding a way
Ibu Arum’s and Ibu Moeliek’s experiences during and after the mass killings
and arrests of 1965–1966 share many similarities. Like so many women,
they faced a range of increasingly demanding and dangerous circumstances
and choices, including attacks by soldiers, police or civilian militias. The nu-
merous deprivations imposed by the loss of income and connections had to
be negotiated and new social relations managed. As their testimonies high-
light, the immediate priorities of finding food and safety became the main
focus.
In her testimony, Ibu Arum focused on the difficulties that she and her
young children endured during the three years of her husband’s detention. For
her, the only way she was able to survive this period was due to the mutual
help and cooperation between herself and a small group of like-situated wives.
As she outlined, by working together to secure income for food, as well as
sharing the childcare, they survived. Ibu Moeliek, by comparison, was cut off
by relatives and from other support mechanisms. She and her family were on
the verge of starvation and her oldest child, already ill, perished from lack of
food. Ibu Arum’s husband survived detention, whereas Ibu Moeliek’s husband
was taken from detention and publicly executed. Both endured and both sur-
vived, but like so many other women affected by the mass violence of 1965,
they lost loved ones as well.
Both testimonies give witness to women’s daily acts of survival in the face
of violence, severe economic stress and social marginalisation. Their stories
reveal some of the ways in which women negotiated these circumstances and
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the choices they made in order to survive. Moreover, the testimonies of Ibu
Arum and Ibu Moeliek reveal the social, economic and other constraints faced
by women in the immediate and long-term periods after mass violence, which
are so often neglected in the histories of this period.
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NORTH KOREA: GENOCIDE OR NOT?1
The Honourable Michael Kirby AC CMG
On March 21, 2013, the UN Human Rights Council established the Com-
mission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (“North Korea”). I was asked to chair the Commission, which was
required “to investigate the systematic, widespread and grave violations of
human rights in North Korea, with a view to ensuring full accountability, in
particular for violations that may amount to crimes against humanity.”2 One
of the thornier issues those of us on the Commission had to wrestle with was
whether the human rights violations in question, which indeed claimed many
lives, constituted genocide. We found ourselves in highly contested territory:
how was genocide to be defined? Did the available evidence of the North Ko-
rean authorities’ human rights abuses fall within the accepted definition?
My colleagues and I thus had to confront the complexities of the concept
of genocide and its legal status before we could make a finding, one way or
another, about its attribution to the transgressions we were examining. In what
follows I sketch the historical background to this conundrum, and the actions
of the North Korean government as revealed in the evidence before us. On that
basis I go on to explain why we came to the conclusion we did.
The (very) late arrival of the genocide concept
The world had not heard of “genocide” before 1944. Yet the world has known
the phenomenon of genocide all too well since time immemorial—as Steven
Pinker graphically reminds us in his historical overview of human violence.3
We can read many accounts of what we now call genocides in the Old Tes-
tament, Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, Polybius’ account of
the sacking of Carthage in the Third Punic War, and in countless other an-
1 This paper’s origins are a presentation to the Department of Statistics and Mathematics at Queen’s Univer-
sity of Ontario, Canada, June 8, 2015.
2 “Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” UN Human
Rights: Office of the High Commission, accessed October 28, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/
CoIDPRK/Pages/AboutCoI.aspx.
3 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (London: Allen Lane, 2011).
146
cient sources, as well as in the work of today’s forensic anthropologists and
archaeologists. That is before we come to the more premeditated medieval
genocides such as the Crusades, and the modern ones associated with slave
trade, colonialism, ethnic nation building and regime maintenance, right up to
the Holocaust itself and beyond.
At its most basic, genocide refers to the deliberate destruction of a recog-
nisable group of people, eliminated because of who they are rather than what
they have done or might do. “Killing-by-category,” Pinker calls it.4 Why did it
take humanity until 1944 to find a word for such a horrific and ubiquitous phe-
nomenon? Perhaps because it was such a banal accompaniment of the almost
ceaseless warfare in human affairs. A war occurs between tribes A and B; A
wins a decisive victory, massacres all the B men to preclude a counterattack,
opportunistically enslaves the B women and children, and seizes B’s territory.
Tribe B is then effectively obliterated. Until the twentieth century, the A lead-
ers had no need to account for their actions because there were no authoritative
witnesses, and certainly none with cameras, or telegraphic or wireless links to
a foreign press. Above all, there was no rule of law as such to bring leaders to
account.
This situation changed with the genocide orchestrated from April 1915 by
Turkish authorities against Armenians and other Christian minorities in Asia
Minor. Now the witnesses included foreign diplomats and consular staff, and
correspondents equipped with cameras, telegraph and shortwave radio. Re-
ports of the atrocities found their way into Western newspapers and sparked
mass mobilisation of groups supporting Armenian survivors, including in
far-off Australia.5 The governments of Britain, France and Russia issued a de-
claration condemning the outrage. Yet the outrage itself still lacked a name, let
alone any legal sanction against it.
Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish jurist, became obsessed about this prob-
lem in the interwar period, all the while focusing on the Armenian killings.
What was this crime, and what should we call it? In 1944 he came up with
an answer in a very long, forbidding book published in the USA,6 by which
time his own people (including family members) had fallen victim to the self-
same crime at the hands of the German occupiers of his country.7 The missing
4 Ibid., 386.
5 Peter Stanley and Vicken Babkenian, Armenia, Australia and the Great War (Sydney: NewSouth, 2016).
6 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals
for Redress (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).
7 The fascinating story of Lemkin’s mission, in apparent opposition to his compatriot and colleague Hersch
Lauterpacht’s project to found post-war human rights development on a more individualistic basis, has re-
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name was “genocide” and he laboured for many years to see it stand for a
justiciable crime.
Thanks largely to Lemkin, the still newly created United Nations Organ-
isation adopted in 1948 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (“the Genocide Convention”). Until then, geno-
cide had rated just one official mention—in the indictment of October 1945
served on the defendants in the first Nuremberg trial of major Nazi offi-
cials. In consequence of the new convention, “genocide” found its way into
indictments before ad hoc international tribunals dealing with atrocities in
Cambodia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Today it constitutes part of
the jurisdiction that the 1998 Rome Statute confers on the International Crim-
inal Court (ICC).
Unfortunately, Lemkin’s achievement was incomplete. Countries whose
authorities had committed historic wrongs connived to attenuate the definition
of genocide in the convention, lest they be accused of the crime themselves.
I will return to the problems of definition below.8 Suffice to say that the defi-
nition in the Genocide Convention, with all its shortcomings, became the one
and only authoritative definition for both analytical and legal purposes, and
is reproduced in the crimes schedule of the Rome Statute that constitutes the
ICC.9 Above all, the definition insists on the “intent to destroy [a group] in
whole or in part,” and political or class groups are not mentioned as recognis-
able victims of genocide, which has proved problematic in a number of cases,
including Cambodia and, indeed, North Korea.
Of course, most thoughtful people today probably consider that they know,
with a fair degree of accuracy, what genocide means. The same could be said
for lexicographers. The Macquarie Dictionary defines it as “extermination
of a national or racial group as a planned move.” The Shorter Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary gives an even briefer definition: “annihilation of a race.” The
Chambers English Dictionary uses the same definition but adds the adjective
“deliberate”: “the deliberate extermination of a race or other group.” This may
be an unnecessary elaboration as it is difficult to imagine that a whole race
(or part thereof) could be exterminated except by deliberate conduct, even if it
remains true to the Genocide Convention’s insistence on intent. Of itself, the
cently been told by international lawyer Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016).
8 For a more detailed critique of the definition, see Colin Tatz and Winton Higgins, The Magnitude of Geno-
cide (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016), 17–32.
9 See UN General Assembly Resolution 260, “United Nations Genocide Convention,” Article II, December 9,
1948, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf; and the crimes
schedule of the “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” Article 6 and 25(e), July 1, 2002,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf.
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connotation of “race” is too large to permit chance, accidental or unthinking
extermination of so many human beings.
On the basis of their general knowledge or reading, most people would
probably sense that the Khmer Rouge regime’s systematic destruction of be-
tween 1.5 and 1.7 million people in Cambodia constituted genocide.10 When it
comes to international law, though, such matters are not decided by intuition,
feelings or common assumptions. Nor can they fall into the widespread (often
rhetorical) tendency to equate any large-scale heinous crime with genocide.
The specificity of this crime needs to be respected.
To decide whether conduct of indisputably oppressive regimes that disre-
gard fundamental human rights amounts to genocide requires the decision-
maker to be more precise. He or she must look exactly at what constitutes
genocide in international law. This obligation takes the decision-maker to an
examination of the origins of the notion of genocide in international law.
Considering genocide in North Korea
My role in the UN Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Abuses in North
Korea obliged me to embark upon that journey. The purpose of this essay is to
explain where the journey took me, where it ended up, and the controversies
surrounding the destination I reached together with my colleagues.11 The In-
quiry found convincing evidence of many human rights violations and crimes
against humanity. Was there proof of genocide though? On the evidence before
us, we answered that question in the negative. Some readers of the report and
some scholars have found that conclusion surprising.
Our inquiry followed many years of disturbing reports about North Korea.
Although a member of the United Nations since 1993, its authorities had not
cooperated with the UN human rights machinery. They had not permitted
successive special rapporteurs—appointed by the Human Rights Commission
(and then Council, abbreviated to HRC)—to visit their territory, nor had they
invited the High Commissioner for Human Rights. North Korea had essen-
tially closed its borders, allowing only a trickle of tourists who were kept
under close watch and restricted in their movements and contacts. For these
reasons, North Korea came to be known as a “hermit kingdom.”
Accessing up-to-date, accurate and representative evidence to respond to
10 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 106.
11 UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in the De-
mocratic People’s Republic of Korea,” February 7, 2014, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G14/108/66/PDF/G141866.pdf?Open Element.
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the nine-point mandate for our inquiry was bound to be extremely difficult.12
As expected, the North Korean government, through its mission in Geneva,
effectively ignored our requests to permit Commission members and staff to
visit the country. It maintained this stance throughout the inquiry. In the end,
a copy of our draft report was emailed through North Korea’s Geneva em-
bassy to the country’s Supreme Leader (Kim Jong-un), with a warning that
he might himself be personally accountable for the crimes against humanity
found in the report under the “command principle.”13 This too was ignored.
The North Korean authorities, however, were aware of the inquiry. They reg-
ularly denounced it and its members. When they criticised the inquiry and its
procedures, the Commission’s members and other UN representatives offered
to come to Pyongyang to explain their mandate, to report and answer ques-
tions. This offer was also ignored.14
Faced with such intransigence, the Commission was reminded of the im-
portance of the compulsory procedure of subpoena (literally “under the
power”), developed in national legal systems to ensure that parties, witnesses
and records relevant to a proceeding are bought before judicial officers
charged with making findings about transgressive conduct. While the HRC
strongly and repeatedly urged the North Korean government to cooperate with
the inquiry, its pleas were also ignored. Yet obviously, this want of cooperation
could not be allowed to obstruct the Inquiry in the discharge of its mandate,
any more than a national court or inquiry would simply surrender in the face
of non-cooperation.
The three members of our Commission of Inquiry came from differing cul-
tural and legal traditions. Two (Marzuki Darusman from Indonesia, and Sonja
Biserko from Serbia) came from countries that follow civil law traditions, ul-
timately traced back to France and Germany. My own experience had been in
the common law tradition derived from England as applied in Australia. Most
UN inquiries are carried out by professors and public officials from civilian
countries. Ours gave a great deal of attention at the outset to the methodology
we should adopt to overcome, as far as possible, the hostility and non-cooper-
ation of the subject country.15
The Commission was not itself a court or tribunal. It was not authorised
to prosecute, still less to arraign and to determine North Korea’s guilt, or that
12 “Report of the Commission,” 6–7.
13 Ibid., 25.
14 Ibid., 23–25.
15 Ibid., 10–15; Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey, The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2016), 25, 69, 89.
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of any named officials. The object of UN commissions in the area of human
rights is to be “effective tools to draw out facts necessary for wider account-
ability efforts.”16 Self-evidently, all such inquiries must themselves conform
with UN human rights law. This means that they must accord natural justice
(due process) to those who are the subject of inquiry, and protection to those
who give or produce testimony, and may for that reason be at risk. Our Com-
mission took these obligations seriously. The methodology adopted included:
1. Advertisement to invite witnesses to identify complaints and offer tes-
timony;
2. Conduct of public hearings to receive such testimony as could be
safely procured in public (with other evidence being received in pri-
vate);
3. Film recording of such public testimony and placing it online, accom-
panied by written transcripts in relevant languages;
4. Inviting national and international media to attend and cover the testi-
mony and draw it to global attention;
5. Production of a report written in simple, accessible language;
6. Indicating clearly in the report of the findings made by the Commis-
sion and the evidence upon which such findings are based;
7. Provision of a draft of the report to the nations and individuals most
closely concerned, with an invitation to offer suggested corrections or
comment on factual or legal conclusions;
8. Publication with the report of any such comments (that were received
and published from China);17and
9. Engaging with media in all forms to promote knowledge of—and to
secure support for—the conclusions and recommendations.18
The Commission was aware that false testimony from witnesses could po-
tentially damage the credibility of its findings. It therefore took care to limit
the witnesses to those who, on preliminary interview by the Commission’s
Secretariat, appeared to be honest and trustworthy. It also secured an unusual
16 UNSC, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies,” August
23, 2004, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/2004%20report.pdf; UNHRC, “Impunity: Report of the Secretary-
General,” February 15, 2006, http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/258488. See also Geoffrey Palmer, “Reform
of UN Inquiries,” For the Sake of Future Generations: Essays on International Law, Crime Justice in Honour
of Roger S. Clark, eds. Suzannah Linton, Gerry Simpson and William A. Schabas (Leiden: Brill-Nijhoff, 2015),
597–616.
17 “Report of the Commission,” 27–36.
18 Michael Kirby, “The UN Report on North Korea: How the United Nations Met the Common Law,” Judi-
cial Officers Bulletin 27, no. 8 (2015), 72–73.
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agreement with the government of South Korea, to allow North Korea to send
representatives or advocates, or to engage lawyers, who could make submis-
sions and (with the Commission’s leave) ask questions of witnesses. This offer
was communicated to the North Korean government, which ignored it. In giv-
ing testimony, witnesses before the Commission were examined in a manner
appropriate to “examination in chief,” that is, with non-leading questions. This
course permitted them to give their testimony in a generally chronological
order, in their own language, and in a way they felt comfortable. The Com-
mission did not cross-examine witnesses unless it found it essential to clarify
apparent inconsistencies, or to address particular doubts that the evidence had
raised in the minds of Commission members. The non-leading mode of most
of the examination allowed witnesses to speak for themselves.
The Commission substantially organised the mass of testimony it procured
under the headings of the nine-point mandate it had received from the HRC.
In each case, analysis of the issues and the overall effect of the testimony were
supplemented by short extracts from the transcripts. These passages add light
and colour to the report, which third person chronicles commonly lack. Part
of the power of the Commission’s report derives from the care devoted by the
members and the Secretariat to providing a readable text. The purpose was to
ensure that the findings, conclusions and recommendations grew naturally out
of the preceding passages of testimony, evidentiary extracts, recommendations
and analysis.
The North Korean government criticised the report on the basis of the
alleged “self-selecting” character of the witnesses, among other points. The
Commission repeatedly responded with appeals to permit its members to visit
the country and to conduct a transparent investigation among a wider pool
of witnesses. This offer was also ignored. Moreover, the testimony of more
than 80 witnesses (taken and recorded in Seoul, Tokyo, London and Washing-
ton DC) was placed online and is still available there. This means that people
everywhere throughout the world (except in North Korea) can view the wit-
nesses and their testimony for themselves and reach their own conclusions as
to their truthfulness, balance and representativeness.
North Korea’s objections, and alternating “charm offensive” and bullying
tactics following publication of the report, are recorded online. Sharp (but re-
spectful) exchanges between the country’s ambassadors at the UN in Geneva
and New York and myself as the Commission’s Chair, are also available on
the internet. These allow both the political actors and the general international
public to evaluate the Commission’s report. Certainly, in the first instance, the
political actors in the organs of the UN indicated their strong support for the
inquiry through overwhelming votes endorsing the report in the HRC, the UN
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General Assembly and the Security Council. In the latter, the human rights
situation in North Korea was added to the agenda of the Security Council fol-
lowing a procedural vote, not subject to the veto, by a two-thirds majority (11
for, two abstentions, two against).
Two permanent members of the Security Council (China and the Russian
Federation) voted against the procedural resolution that added the report to
the Council’s agenda. One substantive matter on which the concurring deci-
sion of the permanent members would be essential concerns the Commission’s
recommendation that the case of North Korea be referred to the ICC. If that
occurred, prosecutorial decisions might be considered and, if so decided, trials
would be conducted to render those arguably guilty of grave crimes account-
able both before the people of North Korea and the international community.19
So far, that substantive resolution has not been proposed, still less voted on.
In December 2015, the Commission’s report returned to the Security Coun-
cil. By a further procedural motion, the Council affirmed that the topic was
within its agenda. Again, China and the Russian Federation disagreed, but
their negative votes again did not count as a veto, since the resolution was
procedural. No so-called “double veto” was invoked to challenge the assertion
that the resolution was procedural. The Chinese ambassador asserted that
North Korea presented no danger to the peace and security of its neighbours.
Notwithstanding this argument, the Security Council adopted the resolution.
By its own actions, North Korea itself quickly demonstrated the serious error
of the Chinese characterisation of its dangers: in January 2016 it conducted a
fourth nuclear weapons test and, a month later, tested an intercontinental mis-
sile. Ostensibly, it carried out the latter test to place a satellite in space. Yet no
observer was misled into thinking that its objectives were purely peaceful. In
September 2016 it undertook a fifth and larger nuclear test.
As noted above, the Commission recommended that North Korea’s human
rights violations should be referred to the ICC.20 Under the Rome Statute that
established the court, in exceptional cases the Security Council can confer
jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the country concerned is not itself
a party to the statute. Although the Council has not so far invoked this ex-
ceptional jurisdiction in North Korea’s case, following the country’s fourth
nuclear test on January 6, 2016 and a new missile launch, the Council adopted
a strong resolution imposing new and severe sanctions on the country.21
19 “Report of the Commission,” 361, 370.
20 “Rome Statute,” Article 13(b).
21 Richard Roth, Holly Yan and Ralph Ellis, “UN Security Council Approves Tough Sanctions on North Ko-
rea,” CNN, March 3, 2016, http://www.onn.com/2016/03/02/world/un-north-korea-sanction-vote-index/html.
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The Commission’s findings of crimes against humanity referred to the de-
finition of such crimes under international law. It found ample evidence in
the testimony of such crimes in the conduct of political prison camps; in the
ordinary prison system; in the way the regime targeted religious believers
and others considered subversive influences; in the victimisation of people
who attempt to flee the country; and in the targeting of other countries’ cit-
izens as victims, in particular through a deliberate campaign of abduction of
foreigners.22
As well, the failure to address the state’s obligations to feed its population
on top of natural disasters (floods and droughts) was found to have resulted
in a major famine in the mid-1990s.23 It caused death by starvation of up to 2
million people,24 and severe stunting of infants, deprived of essential nourish-
ment. Famine crimes (including the North Korean case) have been examined
in depth by international lawyer, David Marcus,25 who proposes four grades of
negligence or recklessness, the top two to be considered criminal: the least de-
liberate (incompetent government that cannot manage a food crisis); the next
level (an indifferent government that does not act even though it has the capac-
ity to); second worst (when governments develop policies that create famine
and although they are aware of the consequences, persist in implementing
them); and, finally, the first-degree famine crime where governments inten-
tionally use starvation as a tool of annihilation.26 Marcus argues that the first
and second-degree cases are distinguished by the intent (or dolus specialis).
He also argues that famine crimes of this extent, used to eliminate a particular
group, may align with the Genocide Convention.
Genocide scholar Adam Jones explains that as a tyrannical regime fol-
lowing in the footsteps of Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin, the North Korean
government has added to political persecution a strong element of racism with
its philosophy that Koreans constitute the world’s purest or cleanest race. Af-
ter the fall of the Soviet Union and China’s withdrawal of foreign aid, 1994
saw a major famine, while international humanitarian aid was diverted from
local populations to the leadership who sold it on the black market for profit.
22 “Report on the Commission,” 319, 323, 330, 333, 335, 345.
23 Ibid., 144.
24 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 68. The Com-
mission found “the death of at the very least hundreds of thousands of human beings.” Report, 208. Although
it is true that some observers have estimated millions of deaths in the 1995 famine in DPRK, more recent es-
timates have suggested that the number of deaths was substantially lower, no more than 800,000 and probably
less.
25 David Marcus, “Famine Crimes in International Law,” American Journal of International Law 97 (2003),
245–81.
26 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 30.
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Forced requisitions of crops and food for the army exacerbated the situation,
and any protesting civilians were labelled political enemies and punished with
exile to Gulags for slave labour or execution.27
All of this is true. Yet in the context of the Commission of Inquiry’s terms
of reference, and with the Genocide Convention providing the international le-
gal definition, was there evidence of genocide? This was the question that the
Commission addressed in a special section of its report.
The definition of genocide
Although the Commission’s mandate from the HRC did not expressly raise the
issue of genocide (as distinct from human rights violations and crimes against
humanity), some of the submissions it received urged that a case of genocide
had been established. This was particularly so in relation to the starvation of
the general population (but especially the prison and detention camp popu-
lation),28 and the drastic reduction in the population of Christian and other
religious believers in North Korea.29 Here too there is a parallel with the Cam-
bodian case, which can be said to align with the international legal definition
of genocide in its targeting of Buddhist monks, Muslim Cham communities,
and ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese, but not in relation to its killing of Cam-
bodian citizens who were viewed as political or class enemies.
In the North Korean case, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a civil society
organisation representing Christians, appeared before the Commission in Lon-
don and offered a well-prepared and persuasive submission that the evidence
of genocide against religious groups (especially Christians) was sufficiently
established. This related particularly to the 1950s and 1960s when, even ac-
cording to North Korea’s national census and other official materials, the
Christian population in the country declined rapidly and substantially.
Unsurprisingly, at the partition of the Korean Peninsula in 1945, the pro-
portion of the Christian population of North Korea approximated that of South
Korea. Before the end of the Second World War in August 1945, during the
years that Korea was a unified kingdom and empire—even as a colony of
Japan (1911–1945)—it had been a unified country, with a common language
and culture, including religious culture.30 According to the statistics issued by
the North Korean census authorities, the percentage of the population identi-
27 Jones, Genocide, 216.




fying as Christian in 1945 was 24 per cent. This was roughly the same as in
the south. It is roughly the same proportion as exists in South Korea today.
In North Korea, however, the percentage identifying in the census as Chris-
tians plunged rapidly, so that today it stands at less than one per cent. Chris-
tians, Chondoists and Buddhists dropped from 24 per cent in 1950 to 0.016 per
cent in 2002.31 The Commission was invited to accept the inference that this
reduction was the result of the regime’s hostile attitudes and actions towards
faith communities, and Christians in particular. Such hostility would have been
consistent with a large amount of evidence before the Commission proving
the regime’s suppression of any challenge to the ideology propounded by its
successive Supreme Leaders. So was there sufficient evidence to justify a con-
clusion of genocide in that case? Was the evidence supported by the testimony
relating to the suffering of the people (especially children) of North Korea dur-
ing the famine in the mid-1990s? That period was labelled by the regime (with
its attraction to traditional Marxist slogans) as “the arduous march.”
Before the Commission reached a conclusion on this subject, it consulted
a number of experts on the international law of genocide. These experts in-
cluded Professor William Schabas and Sir Geoffrey Nice QC. The former had
written extensively on the legal aspects of genocide.32 The latter had extensive
trial experience before the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
dealing with allegations (and the proof) of the international crime of genocide.
Each of these experts cautioned the Commission that it should not feel under
any obligation to find the “gold standard” international crime of genocide. As
noted earlier in this essay, in law, genocide has unique features. It has speci-
ficities that have to be applied in formal decision-making. It is not a general
offence arising from any mass death toll due to serious human rights offences.
The components of genocide in international law
In dealing with this issue, the Commission collated the testimony that might
arguably fall within the crime of genocide:
According to the Commission’s findings, hundreds of thousands of inmates
have been exterminated in political prison camps and other places over a
span of more than five decades. In conformity with the intent to eliminate
class enemies and factionalists over the course of three generations, entire
31 Ibid., 351.
32 William Schabas, Unspeakable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 106.
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groups of people, including families with their children, have perished in
the prison camps because of who they were and not for what they had
personally done. This raises the question of whether genocide or an inter-
national crime akin to it has been committed.33
Having reflected on those findings, the Commission addressed the definition
of genocide in international law, which specifies the groups covered as na-
tional, ethnic, racial or religious in character.
The Commission concluded that the North Korean government’s clearly
deliberate conduct, that had destroyed human life en masse, had been “based
principally on imputed political opinion and state assigned social class,” and
that “such grounds are not included in the contemporary definition of genocide
under international law.”34
Because the number and horror of the crimes revealed in the Commission’s
report demanded still closer analysis, it went on to consider how the acts of
murder and extermination might be classified:
Such crimes might be described as a “politicide.” However, in a non-tech-
nical sense, some observers would question why the conduct detailed above
was not also, by analogy, genocide. The Commission is sympathetic to the
possible expansion of the current understanding of genocide. However, in
light of finding many instances of crimes against humanity, the Commis-
sion does not find it necessary to explore these theoretical possibilities here.
The Commission emphasises that crimes against humanity, in their own
right, are crimes of such gravity that they not only trigger the responsibil-
ity of the state concerned, but demand a firm response by the international
community as a whole to ensure that no further crimes are committed and
the perpetrators are held accountable.35
The Commission acknowledged that the category of possible elimination that
might come closest to the definition of genocide in the present international
law would be that relating to religion:
In its testimony before the Commission, Christian Solidarity Worldwide
submitted that there were indications of genocide against religious groups,
specifically Christians, in particular in the 1950s and the 1960s. The Com-




mission established, based on the [North Korean government’s] own fig-
ures that the proportion of religious adherence [had greatly declined]. The
Commission also received information about purges targeting religious be-
lievers in the 1950s and the 1960s. However, the Commission was not
in a position to gather enough information to make a determination as to
whether the authorities at that time sought to repress organised religion
by extremely violent means or whether they were driven by the intent to
physically annihilate the followers of particular religions as a group. This
is a subject that would require thorough historical research that is difficult
or impossible to undertake without access to the relevant [North Korean]
archives.36
In this way the Commission came to its conclusion that genocide, as it is cur-
rently defined in international law, was not made out on thetestimony. The
reasons for extermination were fundamentally political and ideological. That
is not currently a ground for the establishment of genocide in international law.
Nonetheless, the evidence of many acts amounting to crimes against humanity
was overwhelming. Such acts were enough to invoke the duty of the inter-
national community to respond. It would have pushed the boundaries of the
Commission’s report needlessly to have reached a finding of genocide.
Conclusion
Genocide is a special crime of the greatest horror. That is why UN inquiries,
scholars, historians and even politicians have to be careful in the use of the
word. Throwing around the term “genocide” and drawing analogies to hor-
rible events that do not fit the treaty definition of genocide, is dangerous.
It tends to downgrade the unique and particular elements of the crime as
presently defined.
One could certainly argue that genocide in international law should extend
to crimes of extermination based upon actual or perceived political convic-
tion or belief. So much was proposed during the elaboration of the Genocide
Convention by the representative of Cuba. The USA’s representative opposed
the suggestion. In the end, the “political ground” was not adopted. This was
another reason, based on the travaux préparatoires, for the Commission to
hold back.
Time may establish that, in this respect, the Commission was excessively
cautious. Evidence might appear that the extermination of religious believers
36 “Report on the Commission, 351.
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that occurred in North Korea was motivated by their religious beliefs. If
that were so, it would be enough to constitute genocide, accountable in in-
ternational law as it stands today. Time might eventually also see the en-
largement of the definition of genocide to include extermination on political
grounds. Any such elaboration would operate in law prospectively only, even
if—analytically speaking—it might apply to North Korea’s actions in the
1950s, 1960s, or even up to the present day, based on the continuation of the
relevant acts of deadly violence based on racial or religious grounds.
If we are to build international law and tribunals that are respected as a true
regime of law, we must do so on a foundation of authentic components. Those
components will include establishing the preexistence of the norm invoked.
In the immediate instance, that is the norm of the definition of genocide con-
tained in present international law.
On each occasion when alleged victims and civil society organisations
urged the Commission to push the envelope of international law and practice
into problematic areas, it held back. It observed the principle of due process
and natural justice. It took care to warn the North Korean government and
its Supreme Leader of their own potential personal liability for international
crimes. When it came to considering the international crime of genocide, it
accepted the orthodox, current definition. On the basis of that definition it de-
clined to record a finding of genocide.
Whilst this conclusion may strike some as surprising, even needlessly cau-
tious and disrespectful to the victims in North Korea, it was the conclusion
that the rule of law appeared to demand on the evidence adduced. One of the
essential ingredients for preventing, combatting and responding to genocide is
the existence of international law. In that sense, the Commission’s approach
contributes to a world in which genocide is no longer just a morally repugnant
affliction of humanity, but constitutes an international crime for which perpe-




REALITIES, SURREALITIES AND THE MEMBRANE OF
INNOCENCE
Tony Barta
A funny thing happened to me on the way to Genocide Studies: I was called a
surrealist. I was not so sure it was a compliment when I first heard it 30 years
ago. And I only heard it through Colin Tatz, who then told the world about it. I
had delivered my very first paper on genocide, at a conference called “On Be-
ing a German- Jewish Refugee in Australia.” The problem was that I wanted to
discuss how the genocide in everyone’s minds, the Holocaust, inhibited con-
sciousness of the violent past that had enabled us to meet on ground named
after the colonial secretary, Lord Sydney. The question was equally suppressed
where I had settled with my family, the city named after Lord Melbourne.
The conference went well. The trouble came when I attempted to explain
to a Jewish audience at the Hakoah Club that these cities might be named
after civilised gentlemen, but they were founded on genocide. That did not fit
with the consciousness of many in the audience. I caused unease, then out-
rage. Konrad Kwiet, behind me, urged, “Mention your mother, mention your
mother.” She was sitting in the front row. It did not come to that. I was thrown
from the platform by a young Zionist who went on to become an important
lawyer. When it came to publishing the papers, the editors, John Moses and
Kwiet, decided to include mine, though according to Tatz, they asked him
whether my “surrealistic” vision belonged there.1
Generally, when we talk about the surreal we mean something strange, out-
side everyday reality, disconcerting. For me, the word had a quite different
resonance. I recalled a debate in the seventies about how knowledge is socially
constructed and made culturally meaningful. Objective historical knowledge
in the present is only achieved with a sense of how subjectivity constructs
the past. Philosopher Robert Solomon’s book The Passions argued for a more
extensive and intensive embrace of subjectivity. His chapter devoted to the in-
dividual nature of all perspectives was titled “Surrealism.”2
1 Tony Barta, “After the Holocaust: Consciousness of Genocide in Australia,” Australian Journal of Politics
and History 31, no. 1 (1985), 154–61; Colin Tatz, “Confronting Australian Genocide,” Aboriginal History 25
(2001), 16–36; the recollection is reprinted in Colin Tatz, With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide (Lon-
don: Verso, 2003), 102–03.
2 Robert C. Solomon, The Passions (New York: Anchor Doubleday, 1976), chap. 3; see also, Clifford Geertz,
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Solomon wished to distinguish his position from one that says individual
perspectives create reality. He believed, as do I, that in a comprehensive sense,
there is only one reality but any person can only comprehend that reality in
part, and from an individual perspective:
Surreality is Reality from a point of view, limited by our personal expe-
rience and edited for brevity and manageability as well as for dramatic
considerations. Objective reality is all here now, all at once. Subjective sur-
reality, on the other hand, can handle only a small piece of Reality at any
one time.
That definition takes us straight to the problem I encountered at the Hakoah
Club. Anyone interested in the multiplicity of perspectives, paradigms and in-
terpretations that jostle within genocide studies, needs to ponder surreality. My
own perspective on genocide, and genocide studies, would be to highlight this
interplay between historically constructed expectations, blind spots, prejudices
and decisions, the context that produced them—and subsequent outcomes.
Solomon gives a special place to “values”; the source of values, he says, is the
passions. I would never exclude emotion or indeed physiological drives and
pathologies. Yet, because I am especially interested in intentions, interests and
unintended consequences, I look to the limitations of knowledge or feeling in
a potentially disastrous situation. In Solomon’s example:
The psychologist Kurt Lewin compares the “lifeworlds” of two men cross-
ing dangerously thin ice in a carriage; one knows the danger, the other does
not. The “facts” (the Reality) are the same for both of them; their surreali-
ties could not be more different.
The thin ice in genocide studies is a complex of historical realities very few
actors are likely to know. Many of us assume people in Nazi Germany knew
where things were headed. Mostly they did not. Such psychological realism
is crucial in the key question of intent. Intent looks readily demonstrable if
searching the documents yields a smoking gun. But reading documents often
means reading actions. By their actions we must know them.
My argument has always been that the intentions of a settler “taking up”
land outside Melbourne can seem to him (and to us) genuinely innocent of
The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books 1973); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The So-
cial Construction of Reality (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Alfred Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social
Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
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genocidal intent. A genocidal outcome nevertheless results. Only by constru-
ing the actions within a broader complex of culture and societal and individual
interests, can we begin to understand the larger factors in play. Some reasons
will have been personal (to impress a parent or a fiancée), some as impersonal
as a worldwide colonial project. It seems obvious that a history will benefit
more from a sense of different surrealities when it has information specific to
an individual. Culture and interests are not, however, only personal, any more
than a consciousness of history is. The ways these matters are construed, at the
time and later, depends on our conceptual framework, most importantly on the
way we conceive of relations. How are the thoughts and actions of an indi-
vidual to be understood in relation to the larger contexts of economy, coercive
power, society, culture, ideology?
Layers of surreality
It does not take much theorising to agree that people acting in the past (that
is, their present) acted within a history we are now able to conceptualise into
different factors and contexts. The question is how to represent their realities
and surrealities to enhance our understanding. Too often we simply resort to
our old friend “common sense.” This is both vital and hazardous in genocide
studies. Vital because it reminds us to check our reference base, and hazardous
because it leads to false assumptions about empathy and equivalence.
Our common sense assumption is that the most direct access to a surreality
in the past is through the memory of a person who experienced the situation.
Common sense also tells us there are complications in the ways people re-
member and represent their own experience. Remembering Genocide, edited
by Nigel Eltringham and Pam Maclean, reminds us that memory is not a pas-
sive storage system, not an image bank of the past, but an active, dynamic,
shaping force. The editors quote Raphael Samuel’s warning that it is “histori-
cally conditioned to the emergencies of the moment. . . . Like history, memory
is inherently revisionist and never more chameleon when it appears to remain
the same.”3 That said, memory is unparalleled and indispensable in the access
it gives us to the past.
Each of us can think of memorable instances even as we remember the
caveats about memory and retelling. Often we listen with a special considera-
tion of a general kind, assuming a further surreality of trauma, which involves
3 Pam Maclean, “To be Hunted like Animals: Samuel and Joseph Chanesman Remember Their Survival in the
Polish Countryside during the Holocaust” in Remembering Genocide, eds. Nigel Eltringham and Pam Maclean
(New York: Routledge, 2014). The quote from Raphael Samuel is from Theatres of Memory (London and New
York: Verso, 1994), 1.x. See also works by Zoe Waxman and Pascale Bos on gender and memory.
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the protection of self and others, the effects of repeated recounting, and con-
fidence or doubt about creating conviction in the listener. Nevertheless, the
stories told do carry weight. This is especially so in the case of the Holocaust
where we rely on the accounts of survivors—and a small number who did not
survive—to convey the surreality of victimisation. Because the imagery of the
slaughter is so hellish, with its herding, gassing and burning of bodies, it is
also the most surreal in a more conventional sense, but that is not what I mean
here. What I am trying to chase down is our access to the experience and the
larger realities recognised or unrecognised in that particular experience.
Our sense of victim experience is by far the most powerful and pervading
due to the extensive testimonies of survivors. Testimony and memoir are also
by far the most common source for reconstructing the surreality of perpe-
trators. We have the accounts of Franz Stangl, Rudolf Höss and a few other
officers, and we have the trial records. If the most damning testimony in tri-
als was that of victims it was because the self-exculpating testimony of the
accused was not considered to give the court access to the all-important mens
rea, the incriminating state of mind at the time of the offence. No amount
of badgering could elicit from Adolf Eichmann a confession of murderous
intent. It had to be proven by inferences from deliberately euphemistic docu-
ments, the testimony of his victims—and from his actions.4
Because action (or inaction) is so challenging to construe, “bystanders”
are always problematical in their links to a genocide. Sometimes they are lit-
erally bystanders at an episode of discrimination or violence, yet more often
they are far from the scene and very often genuinely innocent—in which case,
they may be better described in Tatz’s conceptualisation, as “beneficiaries.”
In the case of the Nazi genocide of Europe’s Jews, we have been almost as
much fascinated by the surrealities of “ordinary Germans” as we are with
the “ordinary men” who became killers. Those far from the scene aroused
more interest in earlier decades, when collective guilt became a legacy of
post-war preoccupations. Books like Milton Mayer’s They Thought They Were
Free and William Sheridan Allen’s The Nazi Seizure of Power were staples of
teaching in the 1970s. In biographies of ordinary Nazis or “The Experience
of a Single German Town,” we found access to the lives of Germans before
the worst atrocities were perpetrated.
4 Essential documents remain in several versions including Heinrich Himmler’s speeches to his officers,
especially the address at Poznan: http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/h/himmler-heinrich/posen/oct-04-43/
ausrottung-transl-nizkor.html. See also Rudolf Höss, Death Dealer: The Memoirs of the SS Kommandant at
Auschwitz, ed. Steven Paskuly, trans. Andrew Pollinger (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1996); Gitta Sereny, Into That
Darkness: An Examination of Conscience (New York: Vintage, 1974); Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle
with Truth (New York: Vintage, 1996); Bettina Stangneth, Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life
of a Mass Murderer (New York: Knopf, 2014).
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Such access has been one basic ambition of modern history over the past
two centuries. Where traditional accounts were more concerned with making
a meaningful narrative, we have more recently wanted to know “how it ac-
tually was.” For some historians that still means the formation of policy, for
others an account of large events that swept up individuals. The experiences of
individuals have now achieved a dominating popularity, with biography a sta-
ple of historical bestsellers. What is known as “ethnographic history” attempts
to read the actualities of individual perspectives—surrealities—by interpreting
historical episodes within an understanding of cultures. History must situate
both culture and individual experience within economic, societal and politi-
cal contexts, and these contexts are also needed to understand any episode of
genocide.
Genocide Studies in the academy are scarcely 30 years old; ethnographic
history is about a decade older. How many genuinely ethnographic accounts
of genocide have we produced in that time? The studies of specific Nazi atroc-
ities by Christopher Browning, Jan Gross and Claude Lanzmann take us very
close to the action—of ordinary men committing massacres or filling a lorry
with Jews for gassing. Gross follows neighbours in a Polish village doing
their part. Konrad Kwiet’s “From the Diary of a Killing Unit” shows how the
mentality of bicycle policemen transforms once they are far from the familiar
streets of Vienna.5
The notion that individual actions need to be read very carefully, alongside
maximum historical information and theoretical assistance, has become stan-
dard in ethnography. Here, as Inga Clendinnen reminds us, neither common
sense nor its bedfellow, intuition, are much help. Engaging in open discussion
of interpretive options “reduces the role of untestable ‘intuition’ by making
the business of interpreting actions a public affair: it inhibits the casual of-
floading of our own expectations onto unlike others.”6 The interpretation
of cultures, as Clifford Geertz argued, can only proceed by a hermeneutic
process that goes beyond attentive observation. Understanding and creating
understanding is something elaborate, educated and subtle. To illuminate an
action, we need to consider what will be most effective from the plethora of
theories and methods our libraries hold.
In studies of Australian genocide, the groundwork of ethnographic history
5 Konrad Kwiet, “From the Diary of a Killing Unit” in Why Germany?: National Socialist Anti-Semitism and
the European Context, ed. John Milfull (Oxford: Berg, 1993), 75–90; Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men:
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Jan T. Gross
Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001).
6 Inga Clendinnen, Reading the Holocaust (Melbourne: Text, 1998), 138.
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began quite early, before the term was invented. More recently, records, mem-
ories and local studies have not produced many analyses in terms of colonial
settler culture.7 Explicating genocidal realities in the USA has been similarly
fitful.8 Perhaps because we have a stronger ethnographic tradition in studying
peoples further from home, the accounts of genocide in Cambodia, Rwanda
and Central America are more culturally engaged. They have given us some of
the best examples of where an anthropologically curious and ethnographically
persistent kind of genocide study can take us.
Alexander Hinton has reflected on some of the challenges. He has spoken
of his early interest in Buddhism, in folk psychology, emotion, stories. How
could Cambodians do this? The cover of his book Why Did They Kill? has
an apt summary: “Hinton considers this violence in light of a number of dy-
namics, including the ways in which difference is manufactured, how identity
and meaning are constructed, and how emotionally resonant forms of cultural
knowledge are incorporated into genocidal ideologies.” The foreword to an-
other of his books, Annihilating Difference, asks:
What combination of hatred and fear leads people to see their neighbours
not as fellow human beings entitled to lead their own lives but as an in-
tolerable presence that must be isolated and eliminated? Human rights
activists seek to monitor, curb, and punish such atrocities. They identify
proximate causes or individuals who bear special responsibility. But in a
fundamental sense they do not really explain these abuses. For a deeper
explanation, they must turn to other disciplines. In this quest, anthropology
has much to offer.9
7 Some sources are indicated in Tony Barta, “ ‘They appear actually to vanish from the face of the earth.’ Abo-
rigines and the European Project in Australia Felix,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 4 (2008), 519–39.
Judith Wright, The Cry for the Dead (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1981) stands out among memoirs
that also try to indicate the genocidal realties and surrealities of settler culture. On Wright, and Clendinnen, see
Tom Griffiths, The Art of Time Travel: Historians and Their Craft (Melbourne: Text, 2016).
8 Some of the most illuminating histories do not have genocide in their vocabulary. Ned Blackhawk, Violence
over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
2006) refers to “genocidal” events, also plainly addressed in Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonial-
ism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Stephen Howe,
“Native America and the Study of Colonialism, Part 1: Contested Histories,” Settler Colonial Studies 3, no. 1
(2013), 102–26, and “Native America and the Study of Colonialism, Part 2: Colonial Presents,” Settler Colonial
Studies 4, no. 1 (2014), 105–19. Not to be missed: Ken Burns and Stephen Ives, The West (New York: Insignia
Films, 1996), DVD.
9 Alexander Laban Hinton, ed., Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2002), 1–6. Nancy Scheper-Hughes adds, “Public anthropology [is about] making
things public that are private. Making invisible things into public issues, making visible secrets that empower
some and disempower others who are not privy to the information.” Located in Aleksandra Bartoszko,
“Being Radical without Being a Leftist: Interview with Nancy Scheper-Hughes,” antropologi.info (blog),
http://www.antropologi.info/blog/anthropology/2011/nancy-scheper-hughes.
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Not all historians value the help of other disciplines, and we certainly do not
want to erase the differences. Individual proclivities—and surrealities—will
shape the ways we seek to create understanding.
Surrealities of writers and readers
Writing history is not easier than other forms of writing. Our own personal dis-
positions are crucial to the perspectives we adopt. We will all conventionally
acknowledge a rather formulaic subjectivity, derived from our own historical
context and life experience. We are inclined to be reticent, perhaps mercifully,
about our own surrealities, the interplay of intimate, emotional and societal
factors that are probably crucial to the kind of history we write and read. Even
such an obvious personal constriction as the languages we know and do not
know, something that is just as obviously linked to the largest dynamics of
world history, rarely rates a mention. In Australian history our language limi-
tations are manifest—and almost always passed over in silence. To recognise
how many hundreds of languages have disappeared would be to implicate our
everyday selves in genocide. The Great Australian Silence was upheld by the
writers and the readers of the history they complacently shared.
If every historian writes from a unique personal experience and a shared
historical encounter, there is also a more institutional factor in the shaping of
historical consciousness. Greg Dening once memorably compared the mind-
sets of academic disciplines to an old horse ploughing its furrow and we all
know examples (ourselves included) that fit. The strictness of our blinkers, the
matters we choose for attention, the assumptions we bring to the interpretive
venture, the paradigms we apply—all these are brewed in the surreality we in-
habit. To the extent the surreality inhabits us, it commands our focus and our
scope. How much is nature and how much nurture is interesting to pursue; all
of us have our own mix.10
Where does this matter in genocide studies? Almost everywhere. What we
give attention to, when and how persistently we examine a question of geno-
cide, indeed whether we even see a question of genocide: every impulse of
our enquiry is provoked, vetted, or encouraged by our individual surreality.
As we shall see again, when we turn to our audience, each surreality is of
course a construct of history, society, culture and ideology. These are the very
large contexts that control something as fundamental as the definition of geno-
cide we adhere to, or which elements of the standard definitions (Lemkin’s
10 The draught horse Eustace makes a repeat appearance in Greg Dening, Performances (Melbourne: Mel-
bourne University Publishing, 1996). See also Griffiths, The Art, chap. 6.
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1944 chapter, or the clauses of the UN Convention) we deploy. When we
add the more intimate contexts—family, friends, academic environment, those
we wish to win approval from—we can see that the whole field of genocide
studies is likely to be skewed by dominating, but not usually acknowledged,
surrealities.
The influence of such factors is over and above (sur) or underneath (sous)
our choice of which reality we focus on and how we go about it. To concen-
trate on legal questions, as William Schabas does, or on massacres, as Lyndall
Ryan and Benjamin Madley do, means breadth and depth in our understanding
of genocide. There is no reason to promote one expertise over another. Nor can
inclinations towards empirical or theoretical pursuits claim any superiority. I
will end up arguing that all treatments of genocide are not created equal be-
cause I believe all writers should attend to the surrealities of their subjects and
attempt to follow them through to their historical contexts—social, cultural,
political, economic. I have an open bias towards intellectual constructs, util-
ising what Geertz called “made in the academy concepts” to interpret events.
But I also have a bias towards less explicit representations, the kind that leaves
much implicit, that relies more on artistic flair to give us access to the worlds
of others. Writers (and filmmakers) with such talents have usually had them
nurtured outside of the academy. We all have examples of true stories or made
up ones that have the power to transport us into the experiences of others. Fic-
tion relies on this power but memoirs can have it, too. (I once had the nerve
to suggest to Raimond Gaita that he write no more books because he had
achieved close to perfection in Romulus, My Father.) If we want the feeling of
taking part in an atrocity, or surviving one, we will turn to a writer who knows
the art of recreating a surreality.
Imagination is the heart of the matter. Each interpretive enterprise relies
on the talent of the writer that will enable the reader to inhabit something
of another’s reality. Fiction has the most immersive potential and its poetics
can sometimes cultivate, rather than smother, our critical faculties. A more
prosaic kind of explication might foreground the analytical capacity of writer
and reader, but the surrealities in play will only come through if the more
imaginative arts allow them to. For access to individual cases we still rely
mainly on memoir, fiction and encounters through film. The art of novelists
(Lion Feuchtwanger to Jonathan Franzen) and filmmakers (Leni Riefenstahl to
Edgar Reitz) have given us more insight into Nazi allegiance on the one hand
and the ideology of innocence on the other. The closer we get to the realities
of Nazi Germany, and the surrealities of German people, the less we will see
these characterisations as alternatives.11
Strategies of meaning-creation implicitly have a target audience. For acad-
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emic work it is other academics. Within that audience we will have in mind a
more circumscribed set we may or may not be part of, and certain individuals
whose opinion we value. We may hope to strengthen ties within professional
networks or at least not alienate colleagues. For whom, with what intellectual
interests and prejudices, am I writing? What qualities am I searching for in a
wider circle of possible readers? With which elements of their surrealities am
I seeking to make a connection?
The perspectives of our audience are not really the end-point of our work.
They are the primary ones. Their surrealities govern the reception of the ac-
counts we give. I learned about their power the hard way in that first encounter
at the conference in Sydney. Recently, at the other end of my career, I stopped
to check with a large lecture hall that my reference to Clifford Geertz had some
resonance. It did not. The great ethnographer had not been dead 10 years and
for this audience of genocide scholars he was scarcely a whisper. We can as-
sume very little, even in a specialist audience, about a shared set of references,
understandings, responses. As with all representations—visual, written, musi-
cal—we cannot assume that our surreality evokes a similar reverberation in
someone else’s.
All historians strive to make past understandings real to their readers.
Where we rely on translation, as in so much writing on the Holocaust, we need
to be aware that almost any word or set of words can skew the meaning of
the original. We can build up crippling scruples about tone and nuance. Be-
yond the hideous distortions in the language of the Nazis (memorialised by
Viktor Klemperer) are the historical, cultural and intimately personal specifics
faced by all translators. Anyone bilingual knows the pull of one language or
the other for just the right, often untranslatable word. For the difference a word
makes in conveying a meaning—and with it a surreality—see the attention
J.M. Coetzee pays to Franz Kafka and his translators. He needs a page to show
how one sentence of interior experience can be wrong, word after word.12 The
experience examined is making love. Should we have less care with the expe-
rience of separating children from mothers for killing?
Film has a special place in the representation of surrealities because it de-
ploys, and employs, powers that are the most deeply learned and practised in
human communication. To read the face and voice and demeanour of another,
11 Tony Barta, “Recognizing the Third Reich: Heimat and the Ideology of Innocence,” in History on/and/
in Film, eds. Tom O’Regan and Brian Shoesmith (Perth, 1985), 131–39. For earlier examples, see Tony Barta,
Screening the Past: Film and the Representation of History (Westport: Praeger, 1998), chap. 8, and chap. 9, a
discussion of television and history with Pierre Sorlin. Also Tony Barta, “Consuming the Holocaust: Memory
Production and Popular Film,” Contention 5, no. 2 (1996), 161–75, and the 2014 film Labyrinth of Lies.
12 J.M. Coetzee, “Translating Kafka,” Stranger Shores, Essays 1986–1999 (London: Vintage, 2002), 88–103.
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a skill that predates literacy by millennia, is acquired in the first months of life.
Even as we watch for signs of deception we build our confidence in our abil-
ity to access another’s experience by watching and listening. This encounter is
the basis of “documentary” interviews with survivors, and sometimes perpe-
trators, of genocide. There is almost always a degree of acting in such accounts
and the acting in fictional films also depends on our suspension of disbe-
lief. Once we become critically aware of how film manipulates our senses to
supposedly give access to the inner reality of another person, suspicions can
multiply. Some of the most successful art makes us aware of artifice even as
it inducts us into an extreme rendering of a past horror. Think of Lanzmann’s
stolid persistence in Shoah, the little girl with the red coat in Steven Spiel-
berg’s monochrome Schindler’s List, and the old-format framing throughout
Son of Saul. All attempt to heighten the simultaneous awareness of surrealities
as historical reality.
Surreality as reality: interests and ideology, intent and
innocence
We have thousands of attempts to link the prejudices and political choices of
Germans to the Holocaust. In Germany, the question resides less in media rep-
resentations than in quite personal connections to the broad-brush verdicts of
collective guilt (you must have known) or collective innocence—how could
we have known? Historical judgement between these opposed surrealities has
tended to come to questions of historically formed culture and ideology. Un-
surprisingly, most Germans have responded negatively to accusations and
analyses they see as lacking realism and subtlety.13
Raphael Lemkin opened himself to this criticism even as he brought an im-
portant aspect of collective responsibility to light. He was a lawyer before he
was an historian and his interest in subjectivity did not, so I thought, go much
beyond the crucial mens rea. But there turns out to be another Latin tag on
which he also placed weight in his judgement of intent. In the preface to Axis
Rule he quotes three words followed by a translation: facit cui prodest—he
in whose interest it was, did it.14 Lemkin insisted that the crimes carried out
13 Dirk Moses has made many contributions to the understanding of post-war surrealities in Germany. Of
special relevance here is his discussion of Jürgen Habermas and Martin Walser in “The Non-German German
and the German German: Dilemmas of Identity after the Holocaust,” New German Critique 101 (2007), 45–49.
14 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals
for Redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), xiv. Subsequent quotations are
also from the Preface; Tony Barta, “ ‘He in Whose Interest It Was, Did It’: Lemkin’s Lost Law of Genocide,”
Global Dialogue 15, no. 1 (2013), 12–23 .
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far from hearth and home could not be separated from “important political
and moral considerations based upon the responsibility of the German people
treated as an entirety”:
All important classes and groups of the population have voluntarily assisted
Hitler in the scheme of world domination: the military, by training the
reserves and working out plans for conquest; the businessmen, by penetrat-
ing and disrupting foreign economies through cartels, patent devices, and
clearing agreements; the propagandists, by organizing Germans abroad and
preparing fifth columns in countries to be occupied; the scientists, by elabo-
rating doctrines for German hegemony; the educators, by arming spiritually
the German youth.
Germany’s Nazi elite was crammed into the dock but in his “Proposals for Re-
dress” he makes plain that the larger societal involvement implies something
very close to collective guilt regardless of the subjective sense of individuals.
The surrealities massaged by ideology are trumped by the objective realities
of interest:
Indeed, all groups of the German nation had their share in the spoils of
occupied Europe. The German Hausfrau used for her family the food of
all occupied countries, Polish geese, Yugoslav pigs, French wine, Danish
butter, Greek olives, Norwegian fish; the German industrialist used French
and Polish coal, Russian lumber; the German employer in agriculture and
industry used for his greater profit imported conscript labor; the German
business man bought up foreign interests and properties, taking advantage
of the debasement of non-German currencies; the importer benefited
through low prices and compulsory credits; and by Hitler’s decree of July
28, 1942, the access to women in occupied countries was facilitated for
German manhood by fiat of law.
In their first essay on genocide, Ann Curthoys and John Docker highlighted
the benefits Lemkin listed, and his insistence that all groups who shared the
spoils of occupied Europe shared responsibility for the atrocities. Their con-
cern was less Germany than the consciousness of genocide in Australia.15
Unlike Lemkin, they were not arguing for guilt, but for a recognition of the
suppressed reality of colonisation: genocide.
15 Ann Curthoys and John Docker, “Introduction: Genocide: Definitions, Questions, Settler-colonies,” Abo-
riginal History 25 (2001), 1–15.
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Robert Manne insisted many years ago that the black armband/white blind-
fold controversy was not about guilt. It was shame we should feel.16 Suppres-
sion and repression of the shameful remains the reality/surreality interface in
Australian history. There are notable signs of consciousness changing. The
weasel word “ Reconciliation” is giving way to “Recognition” and “truth-
telling.” Even “Treaty” has reappeared. “Genocide” is still too confronting
for older Australians and is not pushed to the fore by Aboriginal spokespeo-
ple.17 There are incremental gains to be achieved. There may be generational
change under way that may even allow the idea of a treaty onto the agenda.
The changes in historical consciousness are due more to Indigenous initiative
and public presence than to the labours of historians. Musicians, actors in film
and television have made more difference than politicians, with footballers in
the front line.
Only a few historians even by the 1990s would attach something as uni-
versal as sport and as searingly individual as suicide to a whole history of
colonisation. For Colin Tatz, the crisis in Aboriginal communities was not
only a matter of alcohol and family violence. “It is a legacy of past violations
by a hostile and even genocidal society.” Men who did not kill themselves still
had a low chance of surviving past 50. Their surreality was closer to football
than colonisation but Tatz makes the connection. The Ceduna Rovers won the
Far West premiership in South Australia in 1958. “By 1987, less than 30 years
later, all but one of the 18 young men were dead.”18
Colin Tatz gave his collection of powerful essays a powerful title: With In-
tent to Destroy. The provenance of the phrase could not be more impressive.
Since my first failed attempt to indicate elements of shared responsibility dif-
ferent from explicit genocidal intent, my aim has been to broaden the readings
of ultimately genocidal interests and actions. How individual surrealities, fo-
cussed on the innocent pursuit of interests, help create a reality in which a
genocide is produced, is part of the problem. The other part, determinedly re-
pressing what might surface as intent, is the membrane of innocence.
There was a prologue to my disaster at the Hakoah Club, and an epilogue.
In the days before the conference an old friend of my parents asked what had
16 Robert Manne, “Sorry Business: The Road to the Apology,” Monthly, March, 2008, 22–31; Tony Barta,
“Sorry, and Not Sorry, in Australia: How the Apology to the Stolen Generations Buried a History of Genocide,”
Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 2 (2008), 201–14.
17 Some Indigenous leaders, most eminently Marcia Langton and Noel Pearson, have on occasion used the
word genocide, and it has recently been revived in public discourse by Stan Grant, Talking to My Country (Syd-
ney: HarperCollins, 2016).
18 Colin Tatz, Aboriginal Suicide is Different: A Portrait of Life and Self-destruction (Canberra: Aboriginal
Studies Press, 2001), 5. On March 31, 2017, ABC news reported that Indigenous youth are 17 times more likely
to be in judicial detention.
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brought me to Sydney. Quick as a flash came the perfect response to my men-
tion of Aboriginal genocide. “That wasn’t us,” he said. “That was the poms.”19
The day after the debacle I returned to the Club to pick up the jumper I had
shed before my talk. The woman in the office had not been present but she had
heard. It was a pity, she said, that I was not there the previous week. Charlie
Perkins had come to address the same audience. He had said how much he
could feel their suffering. “You could have heard a pin drop,” she said. “He
held them in the palm of his hand.”
Perkins knew about surrealities. He had lived them and studied them and
negotiated them all his life. He knew the strength of the membrane. I came
to see he was right. Most Australians still respond to any association with
genocide in ways that preclude negotiation. The Perkins’ principle is to allow
recognition of a reality in the only way possible, within someone’s surreality.
To recognise that there were many Indigenous peoples and that the many
means employed to destroy their unique identities must be classed as genocide
may still be a bridge too far.20 Yet the 30 years of bridge building must, we
hope, make eventual recognition more certain.
Tatz coined a memorable and pertinent phrase when he wrote of breaking
through “the membrane that locked or blocked out the unthinkable notion of
genocide having occurred in this moral country.” It was a membrane of in-
nocence, impervious to a word evoking a distant horror. Tatz lists the many
writers who had tried to get Australians to face the facts, some detailing atroc-
ities against Aboriginal peoples, but none connecting massacres and other
brutalities of European Australia with the foreign concept, “Genocide”:
No one was reading the Polish international jurist, Raphael Lemkin, who
coined the word for the destruction of the genus of a people in 1944. No
scholar was looking at the fine print, or at the fact that the United Nations
had created an international law which equated physical killing with such
acts as imposing birth control measures and forcibly transferring children.
We were all steeped in Auschwitz, Treblinka, Sobibor and Belzec, in mon-
19 A British historian has also returned the weight of responsibility to the colonial power. Tom Lawson, The
Last Man: A British Genocide in Tasmania (London: I.B. Taurus, 2014). See also John Docker, “A Plethora of
Intentions: Genocide, Settler Colonialism and Historical Consciousness in Australia and Britain,” International
Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 1 (2015), 74–89. For a contrary view of the effect in historical consciousness,
see Rebe Taylor, “Genocide, Extinction and Aboriginal Self-determination in Tasmanian Historiography,” His-
tory Compass 11, no. 6 (2013), 405–41.
20 Another Aboriginal language has been buried with Tommy George, the last fluent speaker of Awu Laya
on Cape York. He fought a billionaire miner and won but could not save a basic element of his culture. Perhaps
because it was a double funeral with his son, there was a report with headline and pictures in the Weekend Aus-
tralian, August 13–14, 2016.
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strous SS men, in Himmlers, Heydrichs and Hoesses. Who needed to look
further than these men and their doings for an understanding of genocide?
Who could look any further?21
Tatz was one who did look further. His attack on the membrane of ignorance
and innocence was sustained and effective. Work on Australian genocide by
other scholars combined with Indigenous activism began to bring interna-
tional attention to bear on our history. I believe the most cited and defining
intervention was Tatz’s 1999 paper “Genocide in Australia,” supported by his
path-breaking work on racism. He succeeded in installing genocide studies as
an academic discipline with institutional support and founding Genocide Per-
spectives to stimulate Australian scholarship in an environment of ignorance,
ideology and interests resistant to any association with genocide.
Directly confronting the resistance remains something very few Australian
historians do. Despite the landmark interventions of two Prime Minis-
ters—Paul Keating’s Redfern speech should be the credo taught to every
generation of schoolchildren—the key recognition of Australia as a nation
founded on genocide scarcely surfaces in our histories. They keep reinforcing
the membrane anchored in the ideology of the society at large. But a smaller
group of our academic colleagues have recognised something we should be
proud of: that genocide, from its invention, is an activist concept as well as a
hermeneutic one. Like Raphael Lemkin, we want it to have an effect in chang-
ing the world.22
21 Tatz, “Confronting Australian Genocide,” 18–19.
22 Donna-Lee Frieze, ed. Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2013); Tony Barta, “Liberating Genocide: An Activist Concept and Historical Understanding,”
Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 2 (2015), 103–19.
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THROUGH GERMAN EYES: AMATEUR PHOTOS AND




In a trunk in my garage I have a sizable collection of photos gathered over a
span of years. They are black and white images taken during Hitler’s reign and
each contains some reference to the Third Reich. Often they show uniformed
men lounging with friends. Others reveal youth in Hitler Youth uniform, or a
group of soldiers on military parade, and some contain little to no evidence of
the Nazi party, with possibly just a flag in the background or a framed picture
of Adolf Hitler on a wall. Others portray European Jews in their homes, in a
shtetl, or in the camps, and a few have been taken by Allied soldiers as they
moved across Europe from late-1944 to mid-1945. Similar in their production,
each has been taken with a personal, hand-held camera. There are no press
photos in the collection, no propaganda cigarette cards then common in Nazi
Germany: the images are amateurish and often blurred, off-kilter, sometimes
over-exposed, and the majority are mundane. They show (mostly) men and
some women carrying out banal institutional and vocational activities: butch-
ers, mechanics, cooks, soldiers, couriers, doctors, nurses and ditch diggers, to
name just some. Their setting is slightly more adventurous, revealing a host of
European regions—French beaches, the outskirts of Moscow, the very north-
ern tip of Finland. I began collecting these images many years back when, on
a five-month cycling trip through Europe, I kept coming across markets where
stallholders sold individual photos, sometimes albums. I have since continued
buying from online sources, as well as from the odd antique shop.
As mentioned, the majority of photos glimpse the day-to-day workings
of the Reich from various working class perspectives. Contrastingly, though
fewer in number, some images are at a remove from everyday settings. Not
pictures of Hitler and his high-ranking entourage, but images whose innocuous
look belies their more disturbing truth (although this might be true of any
photos of the Third Reich). In this essay I look at two particular photos to in-
terrogate photography as a memorialising link to the Holocaust, and by doing
so discuss literal and representational modes of interacting with this past. The
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photos I explore represent particular types of German images. The first has
been taken by a German and reveals individuals who are clearly victims of the
regime. The second photo is an image taken by a member of the SS, show-
ing his comrades enacting a similar role to that of the photographer. The gaze
is similar, since both are from the viewpoint of perpetrators, yet the subject
matter varies. Given their agenda and content, each is fraught with ethical and
historiographical complexity. Individually and collectively, amateur German
images are a problematic means of remembering the Holocaust, and the act
of reinstating such images as insight into this history adds to the complexity.
In questioning these photos’ legitimacy, I explore Marianne Hirsch’s idea of
postmemory—inherited memories passed down the generations through, for
example, the medium of the photo (to name one narrative form)—alongside
Roland Barthes’ discussion of the photo’s punctum, those moments that arrest
a viewer’s gaze and reconfigure initial readings. I then discuss trans-genera-




The first image depicts three Jewish males who appear reluctant to have their
photo taken. Behind them are parked German military vehicles. Their faces
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show a mixture of irritation and confusion, and not one of the men looks
pleased. Handwritten on the back in German is “Krakow, 1939.” This photo-
graph reminds me—not only in its subject matter and mode of production and
gaze, but in the feeling it generates—of images found in the SS Auschwitz
album, in which imprisoned women and men are forced to look into the lens
of a camera held by an SS officer. Similarly, there is a resemblance to that
iconic image of the boy with raised arms whose family is being evicted from
the Warsaw Ghetto, a photo discussed at length by, among others, Hirsch and
Susan Sontag. The photo is also reminiscent of Walter Genewien’s collection
of images that he took as a “tourist” of the Warsaw Ghetto while a member
of Germany’s Wehrmacht. In these types of photos a sense of resigned reluc-
tance pervades, sometimes mixed with a streak of anger and often disbelief (or
annoyance), notable in facial expressions or body language. In all cases, the
subjects are required—it would seem—to look into the camera and not into the
distance, or elsewhere. Alternatively, they are viewed from a distance as one
might look at zoo animals, people captured both literally and figuratively for
the pleasure of the photographer. They are, as Hirsch signals, photos of people
shot on camera not long before being shot with bullets.1
The second photograph shows eight members of the SS Totenkopf—the SS
branch that worked in the camps—at Mauthausen concentration camp. The
men who committed crimes such as the gassings are having their picture taken
by another perpetrator, or with a timer, or by an inmate. Such images are
rare; there are limited records showing the men who were not high up in the
SS hierarchy, but who carried out the crimes. A plethora of photos exists of
Heinrich Himmler and Rudolf Hess for example, a small number of Josef
Mengele, but very few of SS minions directly operating the killing machine.
Here we witness men who are physical and masculine in some ways, yet verge
on the bland, even the ugly. They are middle-aged and of middling weight.
Their uniforms are loose, hair unkempt, their postures relaxed. In this depic-
tion of uniformed mundanity, it is possible to infer the presence of families,
the routine of work, and an aura of camaraderie. Somewhat ironically, while
their physicality (or lack thereof) provides an antithetical redressing of SS
mythology, these men are literally the overseers of life and death. These are
the men responsible for keeping order in Germany’s concentration camps in
both a bureaucratic and physical sense, overseeing underling Trawniki guards,
administering punishment, helping with selections, and carrying out gassings,
shootings and hangings.
1 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 13.
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SS Totenkopf Guards, 1940s
Both photos either explicitly show, or allude to, the Holocaust, displaying lit-
eral and/or connotative connections to aspects of that past. “Literal” in that
each photo, as John Frohmayer suggests, presents the viewer with evidence of
the Holocaust, the irrefutable acknowledgement that such events took place.2
Photos such as these remove “doubt . . . they affirm ‘having-been-there’ of
the victim and the victimizer, of the horror.”3 Each photo, therefore, becomes
a small piece of a larger historical narrative. Similarly, there is a semiotic
connection to this past, each photo symbolic of a wider narrative, and each
contains multiple signifiers to substantiate this broader history, though such
readings are somewhat dependent upon prior knowledge. For example, in
photo two, the men stand around a table and a bench carved from stone taken
from the quarry at Mauthausen; the photo confirms the presence of the quarry
and its infamous “stairs of death,” a long stairway prisoners climbed while car-
rying heavy stone blocks. The table and chair come to represent the oppression
of the Nazi slave labour camp system.
The photographers were most likely members of the SS who have taken
2 Cited in Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Massachusetts: Har-
vard University Press, 1997), 24.
3 Hirsch, Family Frames, 24.
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these as mementos, capturing moments of comradeship and the subjugation of
others. The gaze (the photographer’s viewpoint) is purposefully informative.
Each has a certain wish, an ideology embedded within it; the Totenkopf men
evidently wish to “put their hearts on their sleeve” for an ideology is marked
literally on their uniforms, in the patches on their collars, their belt buckles,
the caps, and the iconic death’s head emblem. This and the way they hold
themselves, and their lack of a smile, show a group of men intent on fulfill-
ing political and gendered roles that, given the signs inscribed in the photo,
require a balance of seriousness and mateship. In the photo of the Jewish men,
it is the ideologue’s viewpoint that positions their victims. German politics be-
comes evident for there is a clear divide, an “us” versus “them” distinction.
This photo, taken by a Nazi, captures the captured (and makes evident the
societal position of slave as compared to victor). Claude Lanzmann believes
images like these deprive the viewer of anything outside of the Nazi gaze and
are therefore problematic, as the perpetrator’s intentions guide the onlooker.4
Similarly, Ulrich Baer suggests that Nazi images rob their Jewish subject mat-
ter “of any interior life and self-directed means of expression, while the Nazi
photographer is endowed by historians with motives, feelings, and a rationale
for his actions.”5 These photos record “nothing but the ‘ruination’ and death of
the Jews . . . while they reveal a complex ‘mental’ stance and even the overall
‘existential attitude’ of the German behind the camera.”6 Agency becomes the
privilege of the German, not the victim, and a viewer’s reaction might be em-
pathic to the victimised yet more understanding of the subjugator; action might
be more easily conceptualised and understood than subordination. In the photo
of the Totenkopf group, the image may negate this appropriation of agency, for
the men are too average, too normal to determine people’s fate, an ordinariness
suggesting these men are not the masters of their own fate; they are merely the
ciphers of a hierarchical ideology.
In both cases, the images convey a distinct message, one that privileges
the German over the victim. The Germans as conquerors wanted to record
their success. Those persecuted had little desire to remember the humiliation,
other than to document atrocities for future generations. As losers in this bat-
tle, those imprisoned in the German photos are often positioned to feel like
oddities, and their expressions reveal as much. To add to this visual bias, the
Germans had affordable technology and many owned a small camera, so the





bulk of amateur photos of the period situate the victim politically and ideolog-
ically as the “Other.” A contemporary viewer, therefore, imagines 1930s and
1940s Europe from the viewpoint of the Germans, or the Germans’ accom-
plices, and it is only once the Russians begin incursions into former occupied
Europe in 1943, followed by the Americans and British in late 1944, that the
tone of the amateur photo differs. German photos are bestowed a sense of au-
thority, and yet these images are unjust and unethical: mass-produced death,
either literally or through association, is documented with some glee and ad-
miration or, at best, with a level of curiosity.
Historical veracity
When discussing photos as individual snapshots of a time and place, the au-
dience glimpses the past through a small and specific window that does speak
to a larger narrative, but homes in on the specificities of the photo itself. The
abundance of amateur photos, however, suggests a collective means of seeing
this past, a cohort of images building a common remembrance. In both cases
the contemporary viewer is, in the words of Gary Weissman, a “non-witness,”
as we have no first-hand knowledge of events.7 We are at an historic, cultural
and temporal remove, and our role in these photos is more voyeur than partic-
ipant. We are the non-witness to another’s victimisation and torment. Sontag
notes that “torment, a canonical subject in art . . . is often represented . . . as
a spectacle, something being watched (or ignored) by other people. The im-
plication here is: no, it cannot be stopped—and the mingling of inattentive
with attentive onlookers underscores this.”8 The nature of the amateur German
photo suggests we remain voyeurs, watching from an advantaged dislocation,
peering at images that are (consciously or not), boastful. Unlike photos that
might catch a unique situation, a “one-off” occurrence, the prevalence of Ger-
man amateur photos reiterates the fact that a victim’s torment is not halted
post-photo; rather, it continues, and we as spectators become witness to a pho-
tographer’s ongoing political and ideological habits. We see his world the way
he wishes us to see it. We see the world the way Germany, at that point in his-
tory, wished us to see it.
Amateur photography was a very much accepted and encouraged practice
throughout the Reich. Rolf Sachsse notes in his study of Nazi photography
that “[t]he power of the state rested not so much on the contribution of grand
7 Gary Weissman, Fantasies of Witnessing: Postwar Efforts to Experience the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2004), 18.
8 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 38.
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visual images provided by professionals, artists and photo-journalists, as on
the simple praxis of shooting photos by anybody who could hold a camera
in his or her hand.”9 The everyday photographer, invited by the state, con-
tributed to the nation’s collective identity, and the every-persons’ photo acted
as propaganda. Aleida Assmann writes that, “the new decentralized medium
of photography, which was put into the hands of the citizens to coproduce
and maintain a shared collective memory, was central here.”10 She continues:
“The project of the NS State . . . was to transform, as far as possible, external
propaganda into personal practice, choice and habit. Together with the mass
distribution of new private cameras, a visual regime was constructed and im-
planted into the minds of the citizens who then collectively practiced, shared
and consolidated the iconic photos of the NS state themselves.”11 Nazi am-
ateur photos have an agenda embedded in them, not solely contrived by the
individual, but sponsored by the government. They build a certain type of Ger-
many akin to propaganda posters or Nazi movies. Individual photos become
political messages, and while such images contain the normal and banal of the
everyday—alongside battle scenes and comrades in arms—the collective ef-
fect intends to support and uphold Nazi ideology.
This becomes problematic when generations removed peer proudly
through family albums, or when amateur German photos gain status as his-
torical records. The emphasis shifts from the Holocaust per se, to the Reich
more generally, possibly dissipating the importance of the Holocaust. Sim-
ilarly, amateur photos present alternatives to those known as iconic of, and
synonymous with, the Holocaust—images brutal in their content, such as the
Jewish man kneeling on the edge of a pit awaiting execution. Iconic im-
ages, while often horrific, have become, some contend, too commonplace.
Their presence on book covers, for example, at museums, or on television
shows, dissipates their authority and their shock value. Caroline Dean, in
her examination on empathy after the Holocaust, notes that, “assertions that
we are numb and indifferent to suffering, that exposure to narratives and
images of suffering has generated new and dramatic forms of emotional dis-
tance . . . are by now commonplace in both the United States and western
Europe.”12 Alternative records such as amateur photos, therefore, might re-
place the iconic and over-used. Regardless of an interred bias, they offer a
9 Rolf Sachsse, Die Erziehung zum Wegsehen: Fotografie im NS-Staat (Dresden: Philo Fine Arts, 2003), 133.
10 Aleida Assmann, “Look Away in Nazi Germany,” in Empathy and its Limits, eds. Aleida Assmann and Ines
Detmers (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 132–33.
11 Ibid., 133.
12 Caroline Dean, The Fragility of Empathy After the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004),
2.
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new perspective, no matter how mundane, for each photo is authentic and
documents a specific moment in time, attesting to what Roland Barthes ob-
served in Camera Lucida, that photos adhere to the embedded referent and
“can never deny the thing has been there [documenting] . . . absolutely,
irrefutable [the] present.”13 In their discussion of street scene photos of Eu-
ropean Jewish populations, Hirsch and Leo Spitzer note that images of the
period hold documentary value.14 Such photos—including those featured in
this essay—contain historical veracity, and are first-hand evidence of what
occurred. The photos discussed by Hirsch and Spitzer, for example, con-
struct “an authoritative historical archive while also hoping to reactivate and
re-embody it as memory.”15 These are images of a Jewish population taken
by street photographers. Therefore, their use to reactivate or invigorate a
past needs certain considerations, but different considerations to those arising
when dealing with the German gaze. Especially when, as noted, this gaze was
purposeful propaganda attempting to build a National Socialist Europe.
The return of the German gaze
When Hirsch discusses the notion of postmemory, she is suggesting on the one
hand that “memory can be transmitted to those who were not actually there to
live an event,” specifically children whose parents survived the Holocaust.16
She is also discussing intergenerational transference of memory through “the
aesthetics of remembrance in the aftermath of catastrophe.”17 Hirsch writes
that “postmemory’s connection to the past is not actually mediated by recall
but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation,”18 which is, when
considering victim narratives and perspectives, an approach to this past that
might have its concerns, yet remains morally tenacious if viewed from the
vantage point of the victim. What if this production of memory, individually
and more widely generated, derived from photos akin to those shown here?
How might individuals or communities inherit these images if they become
accessible historical documents? Similarly, how might a museum curate such
images? Susan Crane contends that, “the normalcy of understanding, facili-
13 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill
and Wang/The Noonday Press, 1981), 76–77.
14 Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer, “Incongruous Images: ‘Before, During, and After’ the Holocaust,”
History and Theory: Studies in the History of Philosophy 48 (2009), 9.
15 Ibid., 14.




tated through communication, as well as collective memory, is threatened by
atrocity images. The ‘universal language’ theory would hold that any human
eye will register the same content in any image, and thus replicate the inten-
tion of the photographer.”19 According to Crane, therefore, images taken by
perpetrators hold a certain power, and by their very vantage point, viewers are
imbued with the photographer’s perspective.
One way of negating the potency of such photos lies in the importance
placed on them as historical records. Similarly, the importance attached to
them as cultural artefact—deny the photos moral legitimacy through education
and negate the risk of them becoming normalised and accepted viewpoints.
There is also the assumption of knowledge a viewer brings to these images,
realising something of this past and positioning these images accordingly,
thereby neutering their potency as Nazi propaganda. In their exploration of
Jewish photos of the past, Hirsch and Spitzer write:
Not only may these viewers be able to contextualize the images historically,
inserting them within the broader tapestry of cultural/collective or personal/
familial resemblance, but they also bring to them an awareness of future
history—of events-yet-to-come that could not have been known to the sub-
jects of the photographs of their photographers at the time when the photos
were taken.20
While aspects of this statement might not relate to the photos examined
here—in that events-yet-to-come were seemingly known or predicted by the
Nazi photographer, for the Germans would win!, would be victorious!—the
idea that contemporary audiences contextualise images with this history in
mind remains applicable. Audience knowledge, the building of such knowl-
edge, and curatorial positioning that adds to knowledge, are important tools
in the negotiation of amateur German photos. In the case of the two photos
here, however, pragmatic suggestions present their own concerns, presuppos-
ing as they do that the viewer has sufficient knowledge of the Holocaust, and
that curatorial practices ensure Holocaust narratives are not pushed aside by
alternate stories that question the historicity of the Holocaust. These presup-
positions have proved less than dependable on occasions.
Alternatively, as Crane suggests in her paper “Choosing Not to Look: Rep-
resentation, Repatriation, and Holocaust Atrocity Photography,” these photos
19 Susan Crane, “Choosing Not to Look: Representation, Repatriation, and Holocaust Atrocity Photography,”
History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History 47, no. 3 (2008), 311.
20 Hirsch and Spitzer, “Incongruous Images,” 15.
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are possibly best removed from the public and “should perhaps fall under the
same category as Nazi medical experiments: they have been rendered inad-
missible because they are ethically compromised materials, made without the
participants’ consent.”21 Whilst this idea is appealing at first blush, the vast
number of German images circulating between private collectors on internet
sites such as eBay and Gumtree undercut the proposal. Amateur German pho-
tos are accessible in bulk, taking up viewership on sites such as Instagram
and Facebook. “Collection of wartime atrocity images and gruesome war tro-
phies by combatants and civilians alike,” noted Crane in 2008, “has become
not typical, but also not unusual . . . [and] have dramatically increased with
the advent of the Internet.”22 Eight years has lapsed since Crane’s observation,
and technology has only heightened the accessibility of such German images.
Instagram account “die_soldaten,” for example, posts glorified images of the
Wehrmacht and the SS and has almost 18 thousand followers. “germanmili-
tarypower” boasts over 30 thousand followers, and “the_ wehrmacht_and_ss”
over 10 thousand, and these sites, and many others, upload amateur and press
photos taken from the German perspective on a daily basis. We return, there-
fore, to the overarching debate: how to deal with photos whose Nazi gaze
proudly shows trauma inflicted on others, or makes banal and dull (or glori-
fies) the perpetrators and, by association, their crimes.
More theoretically, though not separate from educative and curatorial con-
siderations, amateur German images invert what Barthes calls the punctum
of the photo. In Mythologies, Barthes suggests the political photo “has the
power to convert” and goes into some detail revealing how politicians assem-
ble images to sell themselves, to convince an audience of aptness and show
credentials.23 Photos examined here might be less overt than politicians’ pro-
paganda, yet work in similar fashion. We see the world as the photographer
wishes us to see it: we look at a world through a specific set of German eyes
that reveal a time and a place. In the case of both photos—and of photos of the
genre more generally—the viewer projects into them what the photographer
expects (or hopes); in this way the photo has a function, “to inform, to surprise,
to cause to signify, to provoke desire.”24 The onlooker is educated by the photo
and gets to know something about the educator. A triadic symbiotic relation-
ship arises: the viewer learns about the subject matter, and, in doing so, comes
to understand, in some measure, the photographer. In this case, the German
21 Crane, “Choosing Not to Look,” 309.
22 Ibid., 320.
23 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (London: Vintage Classics, 2000), 91–93.
24 Ibid., 28.
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gaze seeks to show the power relationship between Germans and the victim; in
the process, without even seeing the person behind the camera, we gain insight
into the photographer. We learn something about their gender, race, mindset,
politics, hobbies and interests, profession, family life, their dress, what they
eat and drink, and their dislikes.
Knowledge is literal and connotative: we can see these things and we can
read into these images. Barthes goes on to highlight aspects of the photograph
that he calls the studium by introducing the notion of the punctum, those mo-
ments in the photo that “shoot out of it like an arrow, and pierces me. . . .
A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises
me, is poignant to me).”25 When Hirsch and Spritzer discuss photos taken of
a Jewish population walking in pairs or in small groups down a street in an
Eastern European city, the punctum is that moment that arrests your gaze and
your imagination. In these photos of European Jewry, this moment might be
the yellow star pinned to the clothing. The viewer is “pierced” by a small de-
tail that “annihilates the rest of the image”26: the abnormal in an otherwise
normal scene. The punctum, writes Barthes, “changes my reading, that I am
looking at a new photograph, marked in my eyes with a higher value.”27 The
street photo conveys, on an initial viewing, two or three people from a certain
period enjoying a day out. At that moment of piercing, when we spy the yel-
low star, the photo invokes another narrative, one that undermines and revises
initial readings.
If we look to the two photos in this study, there are moments in either that
indicate this punctum, such as the SS uniform, and yet the punctum is not what
is shown, but what is not shown. The photos’ secondary narrative, their en-
coded meaning, destroys the innocence or normalcy of the images. The photo
tells, without literally showing, that death awaits the Jewish men, or that these
SS men are the killers. Such images invert Barthes’ concept of the punctum
for they reveal the photos’ hidden intentions; agendas pushed just out of view
of the audience. For an onlooker to decipher these encoded messages, the
punctum needs to be there, somewhere. To the unfamiliar, the men in uniform
are just men in uniform in an old photo, and while some may gawp over the
fact that these individuals are part of the infamous SS, there is little to sig-
nal their actual roles. Similarly, while the photo of the Jewish men reveals the
Holocaust, the true situation lies just beyond the frame of the photo itself. So
there is a need to negate the image as seen at face value, otherwise misread-




ing occurs. The punctum needs to deflate the nefarious gaze that privileges
the German. Similarly, a certain embedded pathos is present in these photos,
one not necessarily accentuated by the visible content. Sympathy should be
extracted rather than nationalistic pride, but this is not so easy without that
punctum. Crane argues that, “with atrocity images, we have tended toward
preservation as if by moral imperative, but if that choice means retention of,
and indeed conservation of, the Nazi gaze, we should consider the alterna-
tives.”28 The inclusion of the punctum allows for a more nuanced and ethical
positioning, less binary in its approach to Nazi images than noted in Crane’s
suggestion, and provides a more general audience, those without the schol-
arly background, the encoded knowledge that bruises, internally ruptures, and
pierces. The alternative to this punctum, Crane argues, is to “choose not to
look” or to choose on behalf of onlookers the photos they should or should not
view,29 an idea undermined by the multitudinous amateur Nazi photos already
present in the public domain.
The insertion of a punctum, a moment of acknowledgement that annihilates
what comes before, serves two purposes. First, it draws an audience to the
image, since surface level readings only attract a certain degree of interest.
Second, the photo is contextualised, made to fit within the wider context of
the Holocaust, thus providing a modern audience with an “honest” reading.
Deny the photos their place in the Holocaust and take them solely to show
Jewish men or men in uniform, and the true atrocity of what they represent
stays hidden. This attempt to quash a viewer’s initial experience would there-
fore negate some of the Nazi gaze when this gaze does not show the atrocity
first-hand. What, though, of those many hundreds of thousands of photos not
directly tied to the horrors, to the atrocities of the Nazi regime, yet are part
of this “everyday” propaganda machine? What about those vernacular photos
that show Nazi life?
Cultural memory and sympathy
The risk in providing amateur German photos currency as historical docu-
mentation is that they legitimate the Nazi perspective. “Legitimate” in that
the emphasis currently placed on the Holocaust becomes sidelined, not con-
sciously (though conscious decisions still antagonise in the form of Holocaust
denial, for example), but because of an ulterior narrative. In the more banal
photos of Nazi life, day-to-day existence is pleasurable and seemingly whole-
28 Crane, “Choosing Not to Look,” 322.
29 Ibid.
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some. There is, as mentioned before, nothing innocuous about these narratives,
aside from their place in time and history as seen retrospectively. Revisionist
narratives about the Holocaust have already emerged in other artistic and aes-
thetic endeavours, such as the genre of fiction, in book form, including The
Hand that Signed the Paper.30 In Helen Demidenko/Darville’s novel, Ukrain-
ian history is rewritten to privilege a Ukrainian family who work in, or marry
members of, the SS. Originally touted as semi-biographical and told from the
perspective of the Australian/Ukrainian granddaughter of these former SS, the
writer eventually revealed she was British in heritage with no connection to
this past whatsoever. By then the book had won two prestigious Australian
literary awards and had sold multitudes of copies. With amateur photos, we
could be seeing a similar movement in the popularity of internet realms that
privilege a German gaze. Given the numerous amateur German photos for sale
on the internet or in antique shops—due, possibly, to the death of family mem-
bers whose possessions are not wanted—the social and cultural repercussions
are multifaceted and complex. For example, what were once private photos
are now in the public domain, which sanitises the true story behind the photo,
while those who bore witness to the atrocities, whether victim or perpetrator,
are no longer alive to provide context. Generational memory is shifting, and
with it cultural and societal attitudes.
Associated with this trans-generational transmission is an assumption,
writes Sontag, that the photo, in contrast to the painting or the novel (for
example), intends to show and not evoke, suggesting objectivity. Photos are
believed to be real-life moments that bear witness and are therefore “true.”
The audience might react with interest, but with a limited ability to decipher
bias and subjectivity.31 We have inured within us the belief that photos are
factual representations of life moments that tend to contain fewer, if any, in-
sinuations, especially if images are at a remove from politics and the press.
Vernacular photos such as family holiday snaps, individual portraits, school
mementos, photos of picnics and weddings are seemingly no place for pol-
itics. This attitude is coupled with the problem of temporal distance. We
therefore, supposedly, do not question a photograph’s intentions. Similarly,
the distance between now and the event itself further lessens a photo’s impact
on contemporary psyches. And there has been, interestingly, mixed reaction
from scholars regarding the potency of amateur Nazi images on a contempo-
rary audience.
Exploring the divide between present and past in her discussion of post-
30 Helen Darville, The Hand that Signed the Paper (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994).
31 Sontag, Regarding, 42.
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Holocaust empathy, Dean suggests that distance might lead “to insufficient or
disingenuous sympathy” by later generations.32 Both Dean and Dominik La-
Capra, among others, explore the notion of empathy post- Auschwitz and find
the notion tenuous, yet for differing reasons. LaCapra writes that “empathy it-
self, as an imaginative component not only of the historian’s craft but of any
responsive approach to the past or the other, raises knotty perplexities, for it
is difficult to see how one may be empathetic without intrusively arrogating
to oneself the victim’s experience or undergoing (whether consciously or un-
consciously) surrogate victimage.”33 Here LaCapra suggests Nazi photos do
privilege the victim, and yet the audience may adopt a position of “surrogate”
victimisation, a somewhat nihilistic approach to another’s suffering. Assmann
notes a divergent stance in some approaches to Nazi images, suggesting pho-
tos of victims—including the trains and the camps—initially tokens of Nazi
superiority, now evoke an antithetical and appropriate emotional response.
She contends that “the same photos that had been taken in a state of utter lack
of empathy with the victims [pre-1945] were suddenly charged [post-1945]
with enormous empathy with the victims.”34 New generations who look at
iconic Nazi photos or artwork in which Nazi images are incorporated, and see
victimisation over perpetration, often reinvigorate sympathy for the victim,
Assmann notes.
Conversely, Caroline Dean questions the role of Nazi photos and our
modern-day social conscience, and though she looks specifically at photos of
atrocity, one of the questions raised is pertinent when discussing “banal” Nazi
images: do Nazi photos excite or numb us?35 In answering this question, Dean
looks to a gap identified by a group of “heterogeneous scholars” that sepa-
rates “representation from responsibility . . . between emotional allegiance to
empathy and a sense that this term [empathy] can no longer capture modern
historical experience.”36 Dean examines three terms she believes question the
legitimacy of empathy in contemporary Western society, and all three are
products of post-Holocaust generations. She suggests that “expectancy, excite-
ment, voyeurism . . . violate the dignity of memory by taking the historical
event out of context, by appropriating it for our own pleasure and render-
ing meaningful empathy impossible.”37 While Dean looks at contemporary
32 Dean, Fragility, 3.
33 Dominik LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 182.
34 Assmann, “Look Away,” 136.




artwork as a case study, and refers to processes of historiography more gen-
erally, these three ingredients are potentially implicit in the photos featured
here. To collect these images and to post them on social media is an exam-
ple of appropriation, for in either case there is some degree of nihilism and
self-pleasure. There is something politically wilful in the reappropriation of
amateur Nazi photos, and this approach mimics, to a degree, the initial inten-
tions of the photographer. Furthermore, collecting Nazi photos can become a
hobby that seemingly ignores peoples’ fates. If fate were a consideration, some
reference to the Holocaust, rather than none, might accompany amateur Ger-
man photos found on numerous Instagram accounts. It might also be the case
that, as we play a voyeuristic role, and knowing something of the Holocaust
more generally, there remains a certain expectation placed on these photos: a
contemporary audience expects a certain type of narrative rather than the his-
torical narrative. These images, for example, excite by emphasising uniform
over civilian or machinery over humanity, the battle rather than the casual-
ties. Similarly, they highlight the “Germanic type” who dominates “Others.”
Expectancy, excitement and a voyeuristic element are not the products of a
less than sympathetic contemporary audience, but the products of modern so-
ciety more generally. James Dawes, in his publication Evil Men, argues that
“empathy and the altruism effect . . . can be contingent on social constructs,
artefacts of a particular society’s way of socializing its subjects into collab-
orative prosocial behaviour, and they can nonetheless still feel as implacable
as biology in shaping the lives of those subjects.”38 Empathy, according to
Dawes, does not come naturally, and social conditioning establishes the pre-
conditions for sympathetic outcomes or reactions.
Originally taken as a somewhat less blatant form of propaganda, Nazi am-
ateur photos become historical artefacts in a global society where empathy
is forced or false, and sympathy for those victimised might already be under
stress. This poses a danger to the collective memory of the Holocaust or, at
the very least, a problematic combination. Sontag believes that “remember-
ing is an ethical act, has ethical value in and of itself. Memory is, achingly,
the only relation we can have with the dead.”39 Similarly, Assmann writes that
blocked empathy leads to blocked memory.40 Given the photo’s original inten-
tion, sympathy remains stalled and empathy becomes something of a hollow
reaction, as the photographer’s prerogative was neither. If sympathy/empathy
were unintended, then the memorialisation of the victims might be altogether
38 James Dawes, Evil Men (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), 197.
39 Sontag, Regarding, 103.
40 Assmann, “Look Away,” 144.
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negated. It could be difficult to inspire sympathy, much less empathy, when
a contemporary reading of such images defers to the original gaze. Amateur
German photos are not going to evoke large-scale emotional reaction that priv-
ileges the victim, as this was never their intention. Their pathos accentuates
the victor: jubilation rather than humiliation, and so forth. What such images
might do in their quantity and gaze is to remove an emotional reaction for the
victim, and instead fascinate over the perpetrator. As Hirsch and Spitzer note,
the incongruity of retrospectively adopting old photographs, “tell[s] us more
about what we want and need from the past, than the past itself.”41 Here we
might be witness to the onset of a new generation of memorialisation, helped
by the Nazi photo that adds to current knowledge, but from a perspective with
a dubious moral and ethical content. Oddly, the very thing these photos meant
to do some years ago, might now be acting out.
Conclusion
While the normalising of the Nazi gaze seems a bleak forecast, amateur photos
of the Reich do offer some alternate readings of this past, allowing further in-
sight and investigation. They do show the history in a broader context and in
highlighting atrocity there is always a victim: there cannot be one without the
other. Amateur German images, therefore, are not without their reference to
those victimised even if they never intended these photos to signal victimi-
sation. The two photos used as case studies are, I believe, apt but somewhat
extreme examples of the types of photography the Germans took with their
small cameras. They show the murdered and the murderers, whereas most
photos are content with day-to-day generalities. Vernacular showings of life in
the Reich, though, are most potent when normalising the German viewpoint.
The Holocaust is no longer a central feature, neither is war nor the carnage of
battle. These amateur photos lack the punctum, and even locating them within
the historical narrative of the time does little to provide the moment that “an-
nihilates” the image. The two photos cited literally and figuratively refer to the
Holocaust, and alongside those found in the Auschwitz album for example,
they have a kinship to iconic images used to evoke post-Holocaust empathy.
Ironically, the more macabre and telling of disaster, or the more iconic an im-
age becomes—the more powerful the punctum—the more sympathy might be
extracted from post-generations. Countless other photos, used as Nazi pro-
paganda, though relatively boring in their content, show life under National
Socialism to be convivial, healthy, productive and, even in times of war, rela-
41 Hirsch and Spitzer, “Incongruous Images,” 23.
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tively pleasant. These images are the more acceptable, for in them death is not
apparent, nor is killing. They build an overall oeuvre that privileges normalcy
over the macabre or iconic, but they do not call on an individual’s imagination.
They are possibly too dull for the modern audience, too normal for them to
be of interest. And possibly this normality becomes their undoing as historical
reference; cultural reappropriation and trans-generational shifts are less likely
the outcome of the mundane. Similarly, though somewhat contradictory to this
lack of excitement, amateur German photos fit within what Inga Clendinnen
calls a strange opposition in relation to the Holocaust, a continuum “which be-
gins with the familiar and extends to the profoundly strange.”42 This disparity
is particularly true of images revealing everyday machinations of the Reich.
Because, by their very historicity, their setting and subject matter (their Third
Reich vernacularity), these photos are beyond a contemporary viewer’s com-
prehension. That may be, among other factors, the strongest antidote to their
potency. And yet while they show day-to-day life of the Third Reich, this in
itself reveals a lack of normalcy, for life under Hitler’s reign must have been
anything but normal.





“And then one day, God replaced the light with the darkness.”1 In this way,
Miriam Katin begins her account of surviving the Holocaust, presented in
graphic novel format. For graphic novelists depicting genocide, like Katin,
theological questions can be a pressing issue. Characters—and their au-
thors—grapple with the seeming chasm between the existence of a benevolent
deity and the occurrence of this most terrible of crimes. Where was God as
genocide unfolded? Is it possible to have faith in its aftermath? This essay will
examine how three graphic novels explore these complex and challenging is-
sues. In many respects the graphic novels are very different: We Are On Our
Own is a Holocaust memoir; Smile Through the Tears a non-fiction account
of the fate of a Tutsi family during the Rwandan genocide; and Deogratias
a fictional account of a perpetrator of the Rwandan genocide. Yet each pose
searing questions about the role of God, and the role of organised religion, dur-
ing genocide.
This analysis begins by briefly examining broader theological responses
to genocide in the post-Holocaust period. It then explores the graphic novel
as a space in which to depict and grapple with genocide. After introducing
the reader to each of the graphic novels under discussion, the essay examines
how each uses text and images to pose challenging questions about the role
of God, and of organised religion, during genocide. It examines the anger and
feelings of abandonment experienced by the protagonists as their prayers go
unanswered. I explore their sense of betrayal as religious leaders prove corrupt
and complicit with the genocidaires. My analysis shows how each grapples
with deep theological questions about God’s existence, nature and role dur-
ing genocide. Finally, I reflect on how the three graphic novels each come to
vividly contrasting conclusions.
1 Miriam Katin, We Are On Our Own: A Memoir (Montreal: Drawn and Quarterly, 2006), 5.
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Theology after genocide
Theological debate about the role of God in the world, and particularly Jewish
theological debate, was profoundly challenged by the Holocaust. Traditional
Judeo- Christian conceptions of God as omniscient, omnipotent and om-
nibenevolent have always conflicted with a world in which pain and suffering
exists, but for many this conflict became intolerable in the wake of the Holo-
caust. Survivors expressed their anguish in memoirs, none more famously than
Elie Wiesel in Night:
Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp [Auschwitz], which
has turned my life into one long night, seven times cursed and seven times
sealed.
Never shall I forget that smoke.
Never shall I forget the little faces of the children, whose bodies I saw
turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky.
Never shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever.
Never shall I forget that nocturnal silence which deprived me, for all eter-
nity, of the desire to live.
Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my soul
and turned my dreams to dust.
Never shall I forget these things, even if I am condemned to live as long as
God Himself. Never.2
Wiesel’s anguished testimony reflects an unresolved inner turmoil about God
in light of the Holocaust; a turmoil common to many survivor accounts. Sur-
vivors and religious scholars—Jewish and non-Jewish—have attempted to
resolve this conflict in multiple ways. Some have proposed the death of God,
or posited that God never existed at all.3 Others, such as Richard Rubenstein,
have suggested that the only logical response is to reject a God that has not
protected His people.4 Rabbi and theologian Eliezer Berkovits asserted that
humankind’s free will was dependent upon God remaining hidden; were God
2 Elie Wiesel, Night (1960; London: Fontana, 1972), 45.
3 Gabriel Vahanian, The Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-Christian Era (1961; Oregon: Wipf & Stock,
2009).
4 Richard L. Rubenstein, After Auschwitz: History, Theology and Contemporary Judaism (Baltimore: John
Hopkins Press, 1992).
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to intervene to curb humankind’s capacity for evil, it would nullify free will.5
Harold Kushner and others have taken that concept further, identifying a God
that is not omnipotent and thus unable to intervene.6 Explanations of the Holo-
caust as a punishment for sin have been proposed but widely rejected. Yet
there has been no satisfactory resolution to this theological conundrum; no ex-
planation has proven acceptable to a majority.
Ultimately, religious leaders have recognised that perhaps resolution is im-
possible. Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the former leader of the
Chabad Lubavitch branch of Judaism, stated that there “is no rational explana-
tion” and that religious texts could provide no elucidation for the devastation of
the Holocaust.7 Pope Benedict XVI, when visiting Auschwitz, reflected: “In a
place like this, words fail; in the end, there can only be a dread silence—a silence
which is itself a heartfelt cry to God: Why, Lord, did you remain silent? How
could you tolerate all this?”8 For survivors of genocide, this remains an urgent
question, a question without resolution but one that must be explored. It is this
question that the graphic novels discussed in this chapter address.
Graphic novels and genocide
Graphic novels are a relatively new genre. Will Eisner’s A Contract With God,
published in 1978, is often regarded as the first graphic novel. Eisner sought to
take the medium of comics and imbue it with literary content. Interestingly, the
eponymous story in this collection of four shorter stories is one in which the
protagonist grapples with theological anguish after the premature death of his
adopted daughter. The genre is a diverse one, but is typically characterised by
“juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to con-
vey information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer.”9 That
is, the narrative of graphic novels unfolds through both text and images, rather
than exclusively through text. In doing so, graphic novels “generate narra-
tive effects not available to non-pictorial novels.”10 For example, they provide
unique spaces to pictorially represent the unspeakable; to portray contradic-
5 Eliezer Berkovits, Faith after the Holocaust (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1973).
6 Harold S. Kushner, When Bad Things Happen to Good People (1981; New York: Schocken Books, 1989).
7 Menachem Mendel Schneerson, Sefer HaSihot 5751, vol. 1 (Brooklyn: Kehot, 1992), 233–34.
8 Pope Benedict XVI, “Pastoral Visit of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI in Poland: Address by the Holy Father:
Visit to the Auschwitz Camp,” May 28, 2006, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/=speeches/2006/may/
documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060528_auschwitz-birkenau.html.
9 Scott McCloud, Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 9.
10 Liam Kruger, “Panels and Faces: Segmented Metaphors and Reconstituted Time in Art Spiegelman’s
Maus,” Critical Arts 29, no. 3 (2015), 358.
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tion and conflict through disagreement between the words and texts in a panel;
and to provide the reader with insight into the thoughts and feelings of charac-
ters through the literal depiction of “thought bubbles.” Like other new genres,
however, graphic novels have struggled for legitimacy and literary recogni-
tion, particularly when grappling with serious topics such as trauma.
The publication of Art Spiegelman’s groundbreaking Holocaust graphic
novels, Maus I, A Survivor’s Tale: My Father Bleeds History (1986) and Maus
II, A Survivor’s Tale: And Here My Troubles Began (1991) accorded a new
space and legitimacy to graphic novels about genocide. Maus, recounting the
tale of Spiegelman’s father’s experiences in Auschwitz, yet unsettling the
reader through its illustration of its characters as mice, cats and pigs, won the
Pulitzer Prize and identified the graphic novel as a new medium for the ex-
ploration of extreme violence. Like Maus, graphic novels about genocide have
typically adopted a creative, rather than journalistic style, and that is true of
those examined herein. Maus, however, almost completely refrained from the-
ological reflection on the Holocaust. Only in one small scene, in Auschwitz, is
there arguably a theological component. In this scene, the character Mandel-
baum prays: “My God. Please God . . . help me find a piece of string and a
shoe that fits.”11 In a caption at the bottom of the cell, Spiegelman informs us
matter-of-factly: “But here God didn’t come. We were all on our own.”12 The
narrative continues briskly, leaving little opportunity to reflect as to whether
this was just a mechanism to inform the reader that Mandelbaum had to strug-
gle on without string or a shoe that fits, or whether Spiegelman was offering a
broader theological statement.
Since the publication of Maus, there has been a very small yet growing
number of graphic novels depicting genocide. Despite this, graphic novels
attempting to portray the experience of genocide remain marginalised and
viewed as a somewhat experimental format.13 The subject matter is one often
perceived as at the limits of representation, that is, one in which there are seri-
ous challenges to compellingly describing or representing such horrific events
within the limits of expression. The unconventional format can be perceived
as provocative in overlaying an additional challenge to mainstream notions of
historical representation. Moreover, graphic novels are rarely the subject of
critical analysis.14 Interrogations of the limits of portrayal, of the relationship
11 Art Spiegelman, The Complete Maus (London: Penguin, 2003), 189.
12 Ibid.
13 Deborah Mayersen, “One Hundred Days of Horror: Portraying Genocide in Rwanda,” Rethinking History
19, no. 3 (2015), 359.
14 Hugo Frey and Benjamin Noys, “Editorial: History in the Graphic Novel,” Rethinking History: The Jour-
nal of Theory and Practice 6, no. 3 (2002), 255.
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between literary representation and truth, and of that between meaning and
history, have typically focused on the functions of language and text, not im-
ages.15 Traditional historiographical notions of representations of history have
been challenged in recent decades, but the privileging of text over images “has
remained relatively unquestioned.”16 Images have been regarded as too am-
biguous, too emotive, too distant from their subject matter.17 In the graphic
novel in particular, they compress the elements of a sequence of events within
frozen panels, distorting time and space.18
Yet there are also opportunities for alternative conceptualisations of the
graphic novel that embrace the strengths of the format.19 The emotive nature
of graphic novel depictions of genocide, for example, can be perceived as pro-
moting reader engagement rather than detracting from parochial notions of
the primacy of “objectivity.” Images can tell a tale of their own, depicting a
complex and multilayered scene with a richness that text alone cannot. More-
over, the experimental nature of graphic novels makes them “good sites for
‘thinking’ about history and memory in a creative fashion.”20 I suggest they
also offer valuable sites for exploring the raw and emotional issue of faith
after genocide. The sparse text facilitates a directness in communication that
quickly informs the reader of the theological anguish of protagonists. Speech
bubbles enable the reader to literally “read the mind” of characters as they
beseech or berate their God. The reader is thus privileged to access the in-
nermost thoughts of protagonists in a way unlikely to be expressed through
external communication. Biblical imagery, and images of churches, priests and
prayer books provide context for the reader far more efficiently than could be
achieved solely through text. Moreover, the inherently fragmented and incom-
plete nature of depiction within a graphic novel provides an almost ideal space
for the sometimes conflicting, confused and unresolved nature of attempts to
theologically grapple with genocide. In some ways the graphic novel also has
a unique capacity to resist the impetus of purely written forms to reach a neat
resolution in the concluding chapters.
15 Frank Ankersmit, Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2012), 117, 124.
16 Jan Baetens, “History Against the Grain? On the Relationship Between Visual Aesthetics and Historical
Interpretation in the Contemporary Spanish Graphic Novel,” Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and
Practice 6, no. 3 (2002), 346.
17 Ibid., 345–56.
18 Jonathan Walker, “Pistols! Murder! Treason!” Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 7,
no. 2 (2003), 146.
19 Baetens, “History Against the Grain?” 346.
20 Hugo Frey, “History and Memory in Franco-Belgian Bande Dessinée (BD),” Rethinking History: The Jour-
nal of Theory and Practice 6, no. 3 (2002), 302.
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Faith in the aftermath of genocide
This essay explores theological responses to genocide through three very dif-
ferent, yet in some ways surprisingly similar, graphic novels. We Are On Our
Own is a memoir written by accomplished graphic novelist, Miriam Katin.
While it tells her own story of survival during the Holocaust, she remembers
none of the events she depicts. She survived as a toddler, and the tale she
records is her journey with her mother, as her mother recounted it. Within the
narrative she is depicted as Lisa. Lisa and her mother, Esther, became caught
up in the Holocaust as it reached Budapest in 1944. With fake documents, they
went into hiding to avoid deportation. They survived precariously in the coun-
tryside, fleeing on foot from place to place, staying just a few steps ahead of
the German soldiers. Miraculously, Lisa’s father Ka’roly also survived the war
fighting for the Hungarian army. After the war they reunite and rebuild their
lives. Alongside and within the compelling narrative of survival, Katin devotes
substantial space to her exploration of the issue of faith, and the presence or
absence of God during the Holocaust.
Smile Through the Tears is also a non-fictional account of the fate of one
family during genocide. Author Rupert Bazambanza is a survivor of the Rwan-
dan genocide, but it is not his own story that he tells, rather that of close family
friends, the Rwangas. The Rwanga family is a Tutsi family with a long history
of experiencing discrimination and persecution. The graphic novel presents
their story within a narrative that also provides a broader account of Rwandan
history. The Rwangas are a deeply religious Catholic family, but when they are
targeted during the genocide, the Church offers no safe haven, and neither the
UN, nor the international community provide protection. Ultimately only the
mother, Rose, survives the genocide, while her husband and three children are
killed. As the Rwangas experience genocide, the corruption of the Church is
revealed. Yet while their faith is challenged and questioned, it provides ongo-
ing comfort for Rose after losing her family.
Deogratias differs from We Are On Our Own and Smile Through the Tears
in that it is a fictional account of the Rwandan genocide, and was not written
by a survivor. Deogratias tells the eponymous story of a teenage boy and the
community in which he lives. Deogratias is Hutu, and despite liking a Tutsi
girl, becomes a reluctant perpetrator of the genocide. The author oscillates be-
tween scenes before, during and after the genocide, deftly utilising colour and
darkness to alert the reader to these scene changes. In the aftermath of the
genocide, such is Deogratias’ distress that he morphs between human and dog-
like forms as he loses his sanity. Many scenes in the novel are violent and
shocking, and it provokes both horror and a strange compassion for Deogra-
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tias. A major theme within the narrative is the corruption and complicity of the
Catholic Church during the genocide. Yet it also goes beyond critical exami-
nation of the Church, directly questioning the role of God in the genocide.
In many respects, We Are On Our Own and Deogratias can be interpreted
as having been written as theological statements about God and genocide. That
is, a core purpose––if not the core purpose––of each, is to explore the theo-
logical anguish created by the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. This is
immediately evident from the titles of each graphic novel. The title We Are On
Our Own is taken from a scene towards the end of the book, when Lisa’s par-
ents, Esther and Ka’roly, are reunited after the war. Esther joyously proclaims
“Thank God that we are alive and together again,” but for Ka’roly “God has
nothing to do with any of this.”21 He questions, “How can you give thanks to a
deadly sky?”22 While Esther is shocked at Ka’roly’s sacrilege, he insists, “We
are on our own, Esther. That’s all there is,” as a young Lisa looks on.23 The title
Deogratias is similarly explicit in defining the theological focus of the graphic
novel, albeit through irony. Deogratias literally means “thanks be to God,”
and is used as a Catholic given name in the region. There are also additional
layers of depth within this choice. The term Deo Gratias is used during mass,
a liturgical formula repeated after readings from the scriptures, and after com-
munion. Thus, it is repeated after parishioners receive something, becoming a
statement of gratitude in response to a gift. Into the title Deogratias, therefore,
we can perceive an even deeper layer of irony in the aftermath of genocide.
Katin goes even further to immediately locate We Are On Our Own within a
theological framework. The opening panel, a full-page cell in black with only
a small square of text in the centre, begins “In the beginning darkness was
upon the face of the deep”—a condensed version of the opening sentences of
the bible.24 The biblical rendition continues with God creating light. A series
of panels slowly zooms out from the Hebrew text of God’s name to a page of
the Hebrew bible, then to Esther teaching a young Lisa the story of creation as
they sit at the family table together. On the next page, the scene changes seem-
ingly innocuously, to the view of a Budapest street out the apartment window.
Across six panels, however, the pleasant view of buildings and blue sky is ob-
scured by the approaching of a Nazi flag, until in the final image the black of
the swastika blots out the view from the window completely. Text, written be-
tween the panels, states simply “And then one day, God replaced the light with





the darkness.”25 This highly evocative scene, placed even before the reader
meets the protagonists of the graphic novel, identifies the fundamental place of
theological anguish within the memoir. To suggest that “God replaced the light
with the darkness” is effectively to hold God responsible for all that follows in
Katin’s experience of the Holocaust. Yet this is not a clear theme that emerges
consistently. Rather, there is an ongoing tension between an anger at God—as
expressed in this statement of blame—and the assertion that God does not ex-
ist. Underlying this tension are additional themes of abandonment by God and
oblique references to divine malevolence.
In the first half of the graphic novel, themes of anger and abandonment
dominate. For Katin, however, anger cannot be expressed directly. Instead, a
muted fury appears in repeated images of a broken God, an evil God; images
that can only be regarded as blasphemous. The reader is shocked out of the
narrative by these intense scenes. In the first, a young Lisa is delighted to meet
a new “doggie” friend when Esther finds refuge at a vineyard in the Hungar-
ian countryside.26 The dog is starving, but without enough food even for the
people, there is nothing to feed it. Esther gives the contents of a chamber pot
Lisa has just used to the dog. As the dog eagerly eats her waste, Lisa reflects
“I am helping my bestest friend to eat. I am the God of my doggie.”27 Just a
few pages later, Lisa confuses God with a Nazi commander. The commander
arrives at the vineyard in search of good wine, meeting Esther while appropri-
ating a supply. Attracted to her, he soon returns with a box of chocolates and
carnal desires. As Esther is forced to comply, Lisa enjoys the chocolates in a
different room, musing “Mmm. So Good. Such a Nice man. Maybe he is God.
The Chocolate God.”28
As Lisa and Esther struggle to survive the war, these profane scenes con-
tinue. When they seek refuge from bombs in a wine cellar, it is not God that
can provide comfort but the wine. “God’s only truth is inside these barrels.
Give some to the child,” says the vintner, and as Lisa is calmed by the alco-
hol she muses, “God is red. God is in the glass. . . . God lives inside the big
barreeellsss.”29 Later, it is a doll of Saint Anthony that provides comfort in a
storm—a striking blasphemy for a Jewish child.
As We Are On Our Own progresses there is a subtle shift in its theological
focus. Slowly, hesitantly, the author begins to explore the possibility that God
25 Katin, We Are, 5.
26 Ibid., 34. Her previous pet dog had been forcibly confiscated by the Nazis.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 42.
29 Katin, We Are, 50.
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does not exist. As Esther and Lisa flee the vineyard in a storm, they discover
Lisa’s “doggie” friend shot by the approaching Russian soldiers. Lisa, just a
few years old, experiences the loss of a second beloved dog. As she mourns,
her reflection takes us back to the opening scene of the novel: “And then,
somehow she knew that God was not the light and God was not the darkness
and not anybody at all. Maybe, God was not.”30 Several pages later, Katin
returns to this theme in one of the occasional scenes that flash forward to
Lisa’s adulthood. In this scene––depicted in colour rather than the drab greys
of the wartime narrative––Lisa is herself a mother with her toddler son. We
join the family mid-discussion, as the child’s father insists he must go to He-
brew school “to learn the bible and the prayers the way I did.”31 As father and
son go outside to play though, Lisa replies to the empty room “And so did
I. I prayed and I prayed.”32 But in the poignant final panel in the scene the
reader sees a downcast Lisa opening a bottle of wine as she continues “God,
He turned out to be residing in a wine barrel.”33 Lisa’s desire for, yet inabil-
ity to find, comfort in a belief in God, is strikingly portrayed in this redolent
image. In the second half of We Are On Our Own this emerging conclusion
of the non-existence of God comes to dominate. Indeed, in the epilogue Katin
remarks, “I could not give this kind of comfort, a comfort of faith in the ‘exis-
tence of God,’ to my children. I was unable to lie.”34
Smile Through the Tears, like We Are On Our Own, also has moments in
which the faith of the protagonists is severely tested. When Rose’s husband
Charles and two sons Wilson and Degroot are taken away to a certain death
during the genocide, Rose cries out “God! What sin did we commit to warrant
this?”35 Later in the genocide, when Rose’s daughter Hyacinthe is shot in front
of her, she beseeches “God in Heaven! Why have you abandoned me?”36 Yet
in Smile Through the Tears, these questions arise only during times of crisis.
The narrative operates within a framework of faith and prayer, and there are
many references to trust and comfort in God. Even as Rose buries Hyacinthe
after the interahamwe (Hutu militia) leave, she prays “May you be with God,






35 Rupert Bazambanza, Smile Through the Tears: The Story of the Rwandan Genocide (Montreal: Les Édi-
tions Images, 2006), 50.
36 Ibid., 59.
37 Bazambanza, Smile Through, 60.
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children. I returned them to you as I received them. Knowing that I’ve fulfilled
my task and done it well is my sole happiness today.”38 In the closing scene
of the graphic novel, Rose visits a mass gravesite where she has been told her
husband and sons were buried. She finds a child there, calling out to his par-
ents whom he believes were buried alive. She comforts him: “Your parents
suffer no more. Their souls have left this grave and gone somewhere marvel-
lous!”39 For Rose Rwanga, genocide has robbed her of her entire family, but
not the comfort of a loving God.
In Smile Through the Tears, it is not faith in God that is tested and
found wanting, but faith in the Church. The corruption and complicity of the
Catholic Church emerges as a major theme of the narrative. As the genocide
approaches, the reader gets the first hint of the issue. Degroot, in a conver-
sation with his brother about the dangers of the interahamwe, notes that the
Church is unlikely to offer protection.40 Its leadership is associated with the
MRND, the increasingly extremist Hutu political party of Rwandan President
Habyarimana.41 At the outbreak of the genocide, the failure of the Church to
offer protection rapidly becomes clear in a series of scenes that take place
at the Centre d’éducation de langues africaines (CELA), a school run by
the White Fathers, Catholic missionaries. Rose and Hyacinthe seek refuge at
CELA. At first they are warmly welcomed and given assistance so that the
rest of the family can seek refuge there too. Just as they are seemingly safe
under the protection of the White Fathers, the reader learns: “At that moment
inside the CELA, the White Fathers considered their position.”42 Belgian sol-
diers have arrived in Rwanda to evacuate their compatriots, including the
White Fathers. In the following panel, a warm yellow light radiates from
above, signifying the presence of God. As a White Father packs his suitcase,
a voice emanating from the warmth intones: “The good shepherd stays with
his sheep when the wolves come!”43 Nevertheless, the White Father replies:
“Lord! I hear your voice but the flesh is weak. We lack the strength to do as
You wish.”44 The following day, “every last one of the White Fathers left.”45
It is not just the weakness of the White Fathers that is highlighted in the







44 Bazambanza, Smile Through, 43.
45 Ibid.
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thers leave CELA, the Tutsi that had gathered there seeking protection attempt
to defend themselves from the genocidal onslaught. When Tutsi resistance at
CELA is crushed, Rose and Hyacinthe are transferred to the nearby Sainte-
Famille Church. There they are welcomed by Father Munyeshyaka, but it
quickly becomes apparent he is acting in league with the interahamwe.46 Fa-
ther Munyeshyaka offers Hyacinthe “favours” in exchange for sex. When
Hyacinthe refuses, she is targeted by interahamwe but manages to hide. Later,
in a desperate bid to stay alive, Rose and Hyacinthe again seek the protection
of Father Munyeshyaka, this time at his private apartments. When Hyacinthe
continues to refuse his sexual advances, she is cast out and dies shortly there-
after. The complicity of the Church in the deaths of the Rwanga family is clear.
In Deogratias, as in Smile Through the Tears, the malevolence of the
Church is a key theme. Very quickly, the centrality of the Church within the
narrative is established. Images of the church are repeatedly used to signify a
change of scene (for example pages 3, 28, 49–50 and 67). Images of the cross
are everywhere. Yet they are confronting, not comforting images, often juxta-
posed with depravity. In a darkly coloured scene from after the genocide, for
example, a filthy, decrepit Deogratias sits directly under a cross outside his lo-
cal church.47 In the next panel Deogratias––now in a bright, full-colour scene
from before the genocide––is secretly examining a magazine featuring erotica,
his back turned to the church behind him. In school, meanwhile, Deogratias
is taught the racist attitudes that led to the genocide under the image of the
cross.48 In these ways, the reader is continually drawn back to the Church as a
central reference point, but in a manner that can provide no comfort.
Two of the main characters within the narrative are Father Stanislas, a white
priest that has lived in Rwanda for decades, and Brother Philip, a newly ar-
rived Belgian missionary. From the first image of Father Stanislas the reader
is cued to suspicion by his severe expressions and the bottle-end thick glasses
that obscure his eyes. Before the reader even learns his name, they hear of the
rumour of a previous mistress and illegitimate child Apollinaria—now a beau-
tiful young lady.49 Brother Philip is presented as naïve but well-meaning, but
he too acts improperly. Shortly after his arrival he gets terribly drunk on the
local beer, and he is unable to keep himself from ogling Apollinaria.50
It is when the genocide erupts that the reader sees the true depths of the
46 Ibid., 53.






behaviour of these missionaries. At first it seems honourable. At the outbreak
of the genocide, Father Stanislas and Brother Philip are depicted defending
the church from a gang of interahamwe who are armed with guns, machetes
and clubs. Behind them, Tutsi cower in the church for protection.51 In the
next scene, however, the missionaries are fleeing Rwanda in a convoy. Stanis-
las justifies his behaviour: “We did what we could, Brother Philip. We have
to go now. Staying any longer would be suicide.”52 Brother Philip counters:
“We could at least have tried to take Apollinaria.”53 It becomes apparent that
not only has Father Stanislas abandoned the Tutsi seeking the protection of
the Church, but he has made no special effort to protect even his own daugh-
ter.54 The immorality of Stanislas sinks even lower when Apollinaria’s mother,
Venetia, comes across them in the convoy. “Where is Apollinaria? She’s not
with you?” Venetia demands to know.55 Stanislas responds: “We had to leave
her in the church. These . . . people prevented us from taking anyone with
us.”56 For once his glasses are off and eyes clearly visible in a seeming display
of sincerity, but the reader knows this is a complete lie. When Venetia arrives
at the church shortly thereafter, the double doors are ajar. On one side of the
door is the cross, on the other a pool of congealing blood.
Beneath the narrative exploring the culpability of the Church, a further and
more subtle narrative exploring the role of God in the genocide can be dis-
cerned. In the scene described above in which Father Stanislas and Brother
Philip defend the church against the interahamwe, for example, Father Stanis-
las responds to the armed men: “My children, my children, you can’t think
of desecrating the house of God.”57 Yet the reply he receives is “You don’t
understand Father. We’re working with God. God loves justice.”58 The scene
abruptly shifts to the convoy fleeing Rwanda; the reader does not get the
opportunity to hear the missionaries’ reply. Following the genocide, Brother
Philip returns to Rwanda, somehow still naïve to the reality of the violence.
A broken Deogratias cryptically recounts his role in the genocide to him, to




54 Ibid. Throughout the narrative Stanislas neither admits nor denies being Apollinaria’s father, but the ru-
mour of his paternity is presented multiple times. Moreover, in the next scene, Apollinaria’s mother Venetia





58 Stassen, Deogratias, 59.
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tias replies, “I don’t need your forgiveness! Or the mercy of your god! . . . It
wasn’t a confession!”59 Faith is now only relevant to Brother Philip, safely re-
moved from the genocide.
It is the final scene of Deogratias that most powerfully challenges the role of
God in the Rwandan genocide. It is a complex scene that can be interpreted in
multiple ways, depicted through multilayered allusion.60 In a dark climax, De-
ogratias—taking on the form of a dog in his distress—tries to poison Brother
Philip while recounting his role in the genocide. Fortuitously, he is prevented
from doing so when police swoop in and arrest Deogratias for previously poi-
soning a French soldier. As Deogratias is led away, an officer asks the shocked
Brother Philip, “Friend of yours, that madman?” A downcast Brother Philip
replies, almost to himself, “He was a creature of God.”61 The final three word-
less panels slowly zoom out, from the exterior of the hotel, to the beauty of
the setting sun, to a vast image of the stars in a dark night sky. These word-
less images and the opening vista invite the reader to reflect upon this final
statement. Does Brother Philip, secure in his faith, believe Deogratias was “a
creature of God” in that all beings are divine creations, even those who have
somehow gone astray? Or perhaps the reader can ponder a more insidious in-
terpretation. If a creature of God is capable of murder, indeed of genocide, does
the creator himself bear responsibility for this evil? A clue to interpreting this
scene may lie much earlier in the graphic novel. When Brother Philip’s par-
ents visit him in Rwanda before the genocide, Apollinaria joins the family as a
guide for a museum visit. As they explore an exhibit, she explains of traditional
Rwandans: “because they did not yet know our Lord Jesus Christ and the great-
ness of His love, they believed the spirits of the dead filled the underworld,
where they schemed spitefully against the living; and at night they lit up the sky
over Rwanda.”62 According to a traditional Rwandan interpretation, the reader
is thus informed, the stars represent malevolent spirits. As the reader reflects
on the starry night sky, Stassen’s ambiguous conclusion may be suggestive of a
malevolent divinity above.
The conclusion of We Are On Our Own is no less powerful. If, for Stassen,
the God that allowed the Rwandan genocide is evil, for Katin her experience
of the Holocaust is evidence that God does not exist. The final scene of We
Are On Our Own, like that of Deogratias, is complex. The joyous reunion of
Esther with her husband Ka’roly is tempered by Ka’roly’s assertion that God
59 Ibid., 76.
60 This style is reminiscent of Nobel prizewinning author Shmuel Yosef Agnon.
61 Stassen, Deogratias, 78.
62 Ibid., 44.
204
does not exist, only “a deadly sky.”63 As a young Lisa plays at their feet during
this reunion, she re-enacts some of her traumatic experiences and reflects upon
her unanswered prayers for her beloved dog Rexy to return.64 The final panel
refers back to a scene near the opening of the novel. Esther, in preparation for
going into hiding, burns all evidence of their Judaism. While throwing pages
of a Hebrew prayer book onto the fire, however, she is secretly observed by
Lisa, who misinterprets the scene. “You burned him! Yo [sic] burned God! I
saw it! I saw it!” cries Lisa.65 At the time her mother replies “Hush! You can’t
burn God silly. He will be with us everywhere helping us. You will see.”66 In
the final panel of the novel, however, after Lisa reflects on all of her traumatic
experiences, she asks “And what if Mommy burned that God after all?”67
The concluding reflections in Smile Through the Tears contrast starkly with
those of We Are On Our Own and Deogratias, and yet the reader is again
deeply moved. Rose visits the mass grave where her son Wilson is supposed to
be buried, and she is accompanied by Wilson’s girlfriend. Wilson’s girlfriend
reflects: “Before he died, Wilson asked me to embrace life. To live and be
happy! He said this would help him live in Paradise.”68 Rose affirms, “None of
our loved ones who are now dead would wish us to live our lives in mourning.
. . . You young people, your mission is to restore harmony so that your children
never know the meaning of the words ‘racial discrimination.’ ”69 For Rose, it
is not God that is responsible for the Rwandan genocide, “But its own people
[who] have sullied this Eden.”70 What humankind has destroyed, it must at-
tempt to rebuild.
Conclusion
The three graphic novels explored in this chapter, We Are On Our Own, Smile
Through the Tears and Deogratias, are all very different. They span different
genocides, different generations, and they divide between fiction and non-fic-
tion. Yet each has successfully utilised the format of the graphic novel to pose
searing questions about theology and religion during and after genocide. Smile
Through the Tears and Deogratias hold the Catholic Church to account for its









complicity with the genocide in Rwanda. All of the graphic novels hold God to
account. In Deogratias, Stassen questions whether divine malevolence enabled
the genocide; for Katin the tentative explanation is divine absence. Yet Rose
Rwanga is able to retain her faith in Smile Through the Tears, despite losing
her husband and three children. In each case, the reader is taken on a deeply
emotive journey. The graphic novel format provides a compelling medium
and a unique space to explore unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable questions,
concerning the existence and role of God during genocide. The inherently in-
complete and fragmented nature of the medium challenges the reader to reflect
on these unanswered questions. The authors have the space and ability to con-
clude in a manner that invites ongoing theological reflection. As these three
masterful works demonstrate, the graphic novel provides an extraordinarily
powerful medium for exploring the impact of genocide.
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CAN THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE STOP COLLUDING
IN GENOCIDE?
Winton Higgins
Be careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—Genocide
finding could commit [the US government] to actually “do some-
thing”—Office of the US Secretary of Defence, secret discussion paper on
the Rwandan genocide, 1994.
After 9/11, President Bush asked, “Why do they hate us?” From Iran
(1953) to Iraq (2003), the better question would be, “Why would they
not?”— Chalmers Johnson, 2010.
The concept of genocide, and outspoken abhorrence for what it stands for,
have arisen over the last hundred years on the back of Western sensibilities and
legal initiatives. Yet since the end of World War Two, Western countries have
typically failed to take action against actual or impending genocides, in spite
of the growth of explicit legal and moral obligations to do so. Some West-
ern countries have even avoided denouncing genocidal regimes, and failed to
withdraw their economic and diplomatic privileges from them. In some cases
Western countries have colluded with these regimes in ways that go beyond
bystanderism, even if bystanderism remains the most ubiquitous and effective
form of collusion in virtually all historical genocides.
In this essay I probe this gap between pious recoil from genocide in the ab-
stract on the one hand, and passive and active practical collusion in genocide
on the other. I will extend the concept of active collusion to include self-in-
terested (overt and covert) overseas incursions, ones that sow the seeds of
genocide by unleashing mayhem on a grand scale, and subvert the long-term
project of creating an international rule of law, of which the prevention of
genocide forms an integral part. I look at the provenance of the contradiction
between pious recoil and practical collusion, and at the challenge of closing
the gap between sanctimonious self-preening and effective responses to geno-
cide. Genocidaires commonly commit cognate crimes, such as starting wars,
and crimes against humanity like routinised torture. I will treat these crimes
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as contextually significant in this analysis, as they take their place in the cur-
rently intense assault on the international rule of law as a whole.
Few Western countries enjoy the military and economic heft to unilaterally
tackle genocidaires in distant lands. Thus, the main moral responsibility for
Western failure to do so falls on the American alliance, which does possess
ample capability, and claims a leadership role in the Western world (even
though the alliance from time to time also includes non-Western countries).
Membership of what I call “the American alliance” refers to substantial mil-
itary or diplomatic co-ordination with the US, whether under the auspices of
formal alliances such as NATO and ANZUS1; ongoing intimate military, intel-
ligence and economic ties, such as those that bind Saudi Arabia, the Persian
Gulf emirates, and Pakistan to the US; or ad hoc co-belligerencies such as the
US, British and Australian invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The core members of the alliance, however, are the US, Britain and Aus-
tralia—the latter two having played follow-my-leader in virtually all matters
of diplomatic and military significance that relate to creating the preconditions
for genocide, and subsequent inertia towards it. The focus of this inquiry falls
on America itself, which sets the agenda for the alliance that bears its name.
This focus in no way exonerates the other members of the alliance for their
collusion in “the crime of crimes.”
To ensure coherence and keep the essay within reasonable limits, I take
this investigation through three stages, each represented by a major analyst. In
the first stage, Samantha Power’s monumental “A Problem from Hell”: Amer-
ica and the Age of Genocide accounts for the manoeuvres whereby American
decision-makers have almost always evaded their moral and treaty responsi-
bilities to confront genocide.2 (Power’s analysis has added force given that she
was the US ambassador to the UN between 2013 and 2017.)
As a prelude to the second and third stages, I briefly introduce Steven
Pinker’s hypothesis that links the suppression of violence (including genocide)
to the consolidation of democratic governance.3 Since the American alliance
has convincingly bucked this trend to suppress violence, I ask whether its de-
mocratic pretensions are now just as hollow as its commitment to “prevent and
punish” the crime of genocide under the terms of the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“the Genocide Conven-
tion”), which the US and all its allies have either ratified or acceded to. Thus,
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty.
2 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books,
2007).
3 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes (London:
Allen Lane, 2011), 194.
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in the second stage of the investigation, I place these sins of omission in the
wider context of America’s robust real-world foreign relations, and the nature
of its domestic polity today. Our preliminary guide here is the late Chalmers
Johnson in his so-called “blowback trilogy” and its sequel.4
In the third stage, I invoke Colin Crouch’s “post-democracy” thesis. It
highlights currently profound but less obvious democratic deficits in the core
members of the American alliance—deficits that obstruct the emergence of a
political will to meet moral and legal obligations in the face of today’s genoci-
dal threats.5
The US and genocide since World War Two
During the years from 1941 to 1949, the US proved itself on the world
stage, not just as a military leader in the struggle against tyranny, but also
as a moral and jurisprudential pioneer of a new international order based
on the rule of law—one with the criminalising of aggressive war, foreshad-
owed in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, as its centrepiece.6 These years saw
the development (in the Pentagon, under the auspices of the US Depart-
ment of War) of the jurisprudence that underpinned the Nuremberg trials of
1945–1949—themselves American initiatives that essentially created modern
international criminal law.7
Raphael Lemkin coined the word “genocide” as a refugee in the US in
1944. It gained its first official airing in the indictment of October 1945 that
triggered the first Nuremberg trial of Nazi leaders, which began in the fol-
lowing month under international auspices. This trial established the crime
of aggressive war and crimes against humanity in international law. It set a
precedent that stripped state perpetrators and their underlings of the automatic
impunity that the institution of national sovereignty had previously afforded
them. The erstwhile “prophets unarmed” of human rights now held a poten-
tial weapon in their hands: offences against these rights were now justiciable
4 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2nd ed. (New York: Holt
Paperbacks, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Re-
public (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American
Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007); Chalmers Johnson, Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last
Best Hope (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).
5 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
6 In paragraph eight of the charter, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill de-
clared that “all nations of the world . . . must come to the abandonment of the use of force.” See Philippe
Sands, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (London: Penguin, 2006), 8–9. As he points out,
the charter inspired the emergence of the nascent “united nations” on the Allied side during the war.
7 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (London: Bloomsbury, 1993), 21–42; Colin Tatz and
Winton Higgins, The Magnitude of Genocide (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016), 174–77.
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and punishable. Twelve follow-on trials in Nuremberg, under purely Ameri-
can auspices, cemented the precedent. The UN General Assembly affirmed the
status of the “Nuremberg principles” in 1947 as part of international law, and
tasked the International Law Commission to formulate them in precise legal
terms, which the latter published in 1950.8
In May 1945, the US hosted the founding congress of the United Nations
in San Francisco. Its charter’s opening words declare the intention to save
future generations from “the scourge of war” and to defend human rights.
In the years immediately following, Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the fledg-
ling UN Human Rights Commission and presided over the drafting of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on the shores of Lake Suc-
cess, New York.9 It was duly adopted by the UN in 1948, together with the
Genocide Convention, the first signatory of which was the US itself. The
UDHR created rights that inhered in all human beings without exception,
not as “gifts” that could be withdrawn by political authorities.10
Taken together, these American-led innovations laid the basis for an inter-
national rule of law that set its face against warmongering, genocide, and a
host of other human rights abuses. For America itself, the 1940s set a bench-
mark in its contribution to a safer, more orderly world. This project brought
together existing legal concepts that stretched back as far as the 1215 Magna
Carta, which proscribed arbitrary imprisonment and prescribed access to fair
courts of justice and the liberty of the subject (habeas corpus). The pre-ex-
isting elements also included international humanitarian law to be applied in
wartime, such as the Hague Conventions that emerged from 1899.
In the years following the late 1940s, under UN auspices, new conventions
and treaties kept up this momentum towards an international rule of law
focused on universal human rights. “Universal” meant what it said: no in-
dividuals fell outside their ambit, and the rights themselves constrained the
actions of states even beyond their sovereign territories.11 The new provisions
included the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights (in force from 1976), the 1977 Geneva Protocol
I, and the 1984 Convention against Torture. The elements of the new interna-
tional rule of law spelled out the special rights of women, children, prisoners
of war, refugees, and people with disabilities, as well as criminalising tor-
8 The text of the seven Nuremberg principles appears at http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-nurem.htm.
9 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (New York: Random House, 2001).
10 Sands, Lawless World, 152.
11 Ibid., Lawless World, 150-53.
210
ture.12 The strengthening of this overall international legal framework seemed
(and still seems) to offer the best hope of suppressing genocide.
From this vantage point, the US’s subsequent relentless subversion of its
own civilising project, the international rule of law, appears all the more
startling. From 1949, American foreign relations began accelerating in the op-
posite direction, as if the Nuremberg trials, their jurisprudential achievements
and later ramifications, had never seen the light of day (least of all in the Pen-
tagon itself, where the Nuremberg principles were generated). I will have more
to say on this about-face in the second section of this essay.
Having been the first country to sign the Genocide Convention, it took
the US 40 years to ratify it. Even then it hedged its ratification with so
many “RUDs” (reservations, understandings and declarations) that even the
UK—along with 21 other Western countries—formally opposed them.13 The
RUDs rendered the Convention a dead letter in American law and policy for-
mation from the start. But as we shall see, US abhorrence towards genocide
was strictly rhetorical up to ratification, and remained so afterwards, with no
echo in the practice of American foreign relations. Of the 18 subsequent in-
ternational human rights conventions and protocols, the US has ratified or
acceded to just five.14
The successful resistance from within the US to the accumulating inter-
national human rights provisions (including the Genocide Convention) has
rested on a vociferous defence of national sovereignty, which its own Nurem-
berg legacy had subordinated to the international rule of law. As we shall see,
the thrust of US foreign policy during and after the Cold War has been to assert
US sovereignty at the expense of the international rule of law and the national
sovereignty of other countries. It is the only Western country to spurn the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC—the successor to the International Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945–1946). In its first years, the GW Bush Ad-
ministration vilified the ICC, even legislated to criminalise co-operation with
the court’s investigations, and empowered the President to take military action
against the court if any US official is ever brought before it.15
12 Ibid., 146-53. Sands summarises the historical development of the relevant international law. As he points
out on page 152, the Fifth Amendment (guaranteeing due process) to the US Constitution provided key terms in
which the new rights were expressed, starting with articles 10 and 11 of the UDHR.
13 Power, “A Problem,” 163–69. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain and Sweden also lodged formal objections to the RUDs attached to the US ratification.
14 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at http://indicators.ohchr.org. For instance, the US
is the only member of the UN that has not ratified or acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (in
force since 1990).
15 The American Service-members’ Protection Act, 2002, informally known as “The Hague Invasion Act.”
See Sands, Lawless World, 62–63; Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 187. Power, “A Problem,” 491, gives pro-
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American policy-makers’ nonchalance towards what came to be known as
genocide goes back a century, to 1915 when the Armenian Genocide began.
The US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau, kept his
government well informed of the genocide’s progress, yet the US refused
to sign the joint British, French and Russian protest of May 1915 against
“these crimes against humanity and civilisation.” Under the doctrine of na-
tional sovereignty, US policy-makers reasoned, the Turks’ slaughter of their
own Armenian compatriots was no concern of other states, not least ones like
the US that enjoyed good trading relations with the perpetrator state.
“America’s nonresponse to the Turkish horrors established patterns that
would be repeated,” Power writes. “Time and again the U.S. government
would be reluctant to cast aside its neutrality and formally denounce a fellow
state for its atrocities.”16 Thus US backsliding from the 1950s constituted a re-
turn to the status quo ante (although, as we will see in the next section, there
was more to it than that). However, the standard excuses did not apply during
the Holocaust, when the US and Britain failed, in spite of vociferous lobby-
ing, to bomb the death factory in Auschwitz- Birkenau and the railway leading
thereto.17
Samantha Power presents us with the history of a protracted non-
event—the US’s and its allies’ failure ever to “put boots on the ground” to
stymie highly publicised and enormously destructive genocides in the second
half of the twentieth century. Two of them—targeting non-Serbs in the for-
mer Yugoslavia, and Tutsis in Rwanda—occurred after the Cold War ended,
when the US was the world’s sole superpower facing no appreciable threats
elsewhere. The bystander policy persisted despite the fact that the Indian army
(in East Pakistan in 1971), the Vietnamese army (in Cambodia in 1979), and
a Tutsi rebel militia, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (in 1994), had demonstrated
how limited military action can stop major genocidaires in their tracks.18
US inertia is all the more astonishing when we consider the enormous rel-
ative size of the country’s military establishment, which it has maintained
since the Cold War began. Today America’s military spending accounts for
39 per cent of global military expenditure. At 596 billion USD, annual US
military expenditure exceeds the aggregated military expenditure of the seven
next-largest military powers. Its armed forces (excluding reservists and the
tectiveness of national sovereignty as the reason for US refusal to join the ICC, but given the circumstances
reviewed in the second part of this essay, a far stronger motive is the one that the 2002 Act indicates: (well-
grounded) fear of US officials being indicted for gross infringements of international criminal law.
16 Power, “A Problem,” 13.
17 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 147–49.
18 Ibid., 100–02; Power, “A Problem,” 141.
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“civilian” CIA) comprise over 1.3 million personnel, 666 overseas bases (just
part of its 103,270 overseas “assets” that encircle the world).19 Yet during the
1994 Rwandan genocide, this colossus even turned down a desperate request
to use its technical capability to jam Radio Mille Collines, which was the main
means used to incite and co-ordinate the genocide. US policy-makers saw this
request as involving an unwarranted diversion of American resources.20
The Indian, Vietnamese and domestic Rwandan military actions remain our
only post-war examples of troop deployments to stop genocide, apart from to-
ken UN peacekeeping missions. These aside, NATO (including US) bombers
targeted genocidal Bosnian Serb forces for three weeks in 1995, long after
their predicted and widely publicised atrocities in Srebrenica and other desig-
nated UN safe havens. NATO bombers raided Serbia itself, as well as its forces
in Kosovo in 1999, when that country resumed genocidal attacks, this time
against ethnic Albanians in the province in question.21 These aerial campaigns
exhaust the American alliance’s record of anti-genocidal military actions, and
were not complemented by troop deployments.
As noted above, bystanderism is a powerful—and indeed indispens-
able—form of collusion in genocide, one that emboldens actual and potential
genocidaires. Their ilk has learned from experience in virtually all cases that
they have nothing to fear from the American alliance, whatever the identity
and party affiliation of the sitting US president.
But American collusion has sometimes tipped over into active support for
genocidal regimes. In 1979–1980 the US government continued to provide
the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime with diplomatic legitimation in the UN,
long after its atrocities had become common knowledge, and even after the
Vietnamese had ousted it from Cambodia itself. (Quite apart from the issue
of arch-criminality, under longstanding international law a regime should not
receive diplomatic recognition if it no longer controls the country it claims
to represent.) In the 1980s the American government strenuously defended
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, armed it, and provided it with substantial
economic credits, at the same time as the latter was gassing and massacring its
Kurdish population (as well as using gas and chemical weapons against Iran-
ian troops in the Iran-Iraq war).22
19 Figures taken from the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, and the US Defence Department’s most recently
available Base Structure Report for fiscal year 2012, 7–8. These figures probably grossly underestimate actual
overseas US bases and assets, as they do not, for instance, include the CIA’s secret establishments: see Johnson,
Nemesis, 137. He found 737 US bases on foreign soil in 2006.
20 Power, “A Problem,” 371–72.
21 Ibid., 440, 448.
22 Ibid., 146–54, 171–243.
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The American media had access to written and photographic evidence of
all the genocides mentioned above in real time, and the progressive outlets at
least did not stint in airing it. Commentators and op-ed writers often excoriated
the US government for its collusion in genocide. For instance, during the US
no-show while genocide was raging in Bosnia, Leon Wieselter wrote in The
New Republic:
The United States seems to be taking a sabbatical from historical serious-
ness, blinding itself to genocide and its consequences, fleeing the moral and
practical imperatives of its own power. . . . The American president is an
accomplice to genocide. . . . The president of the United States does not
have the right to make the people of the United States seem as indecent as
he is. He has the power, but he does not have the right.23
In light of such spirited criticism from at least part of the American fourth es-
tate, we have to ask how the US government has retained legitimacy in the
absence of decency.
In answer to this question we can briefly extrapolate five governmental
ploys from Power’s account. The first one—best illustrated by the govern-
ment’s non-response to the Cambodian, Iraqi and Rwandan genocides—is to
simply ignore the genocide. Not acknowledge it, not summon meetings of se-
nior advisors, not find any place for it on the policy agenda. The second ploy
is to trivialise the genocide, or present it as intractable, or both. When the first
ploy began to fail in the Rwandan case, and again in the Bosnian one, this sec-
ond one came into its own. US officials deplored mass death as a “tragedy”
due to “war” that arose out of “ancient tribal hatreds”; it was a question of
perennial internecine strife that no third force could possibly ameliorate, let
alone end. Perpetrators and victims were equally to blame.
The third ploy consists in discounting the evidence. The relevant genocides
all commanded widespread media coverage, while the US government had
its own lavish sources of intelligence, including (since the 1980s) high-res-
olution satellite imagery. Yet officials described all reports of genocide as
“unconfirmed,” or “lacking specific detail,” and thus insufficient to trigger
intervention. The fourth ploy is the populist self-referential argument that a
genocide does not threaten America’s “vital interests,” so no such interest is
served by initiatives to stop genocide.
But the fifth, most practised ploy has been to forbid US officials’ use of
the word “genocide” itself—the dreaded “g-word.” In extremis, officials could
23 Quoted in Power, “A Problem,” 430–31.
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use weasel formulations such as “acts of genocide” and “tantamount to geno-
cide,” all of which fall short of plain genocide, with all the moral and legal
imperatives it would attract. Power notes that some junior officials chafed at
these shabby word games, hence the State Department maintained an inter-
nal “dissent channel” through which they could vent their frustration into the
silence of the upper echelons without jeopardising their careers. In 1999 that
department endured its third “g-word” controversy in six years, and for the
first time it authorised the “tentative use” of the g-word 10 days before NATO
began bombing the Serbs. At the same time, in a first for the US presidency,
Bill Clinton referred to “deliberate, systematic efforts at genocide.”24
Samantha Power comes to the counterintuitive—but in-
eluctable—conclusion that US policy towards genocide has hardly proved a
failure:
Simply put, American leaders did not act because they did not want to.
. . . One of the most important conclusions I have reached, therefore, is
that the U.S. record is not one of failure. It is one of success. Troubling
though it is to acknowledge, U.S. officials worked the system, and the sys-
tem worked.25
This insight brings more questions into view. What purpose does this
perennial collusive policy serve? What other reasons of state (raisons
d’état) does it make room for? Is “the system” that Power refers to just
institutionalised moral nihilism, or is it a sub-assembly in a more en-
compassing system? What is the US’s gargantuan military establishment
for (given that genocide prevention clearly lies outside its remit)? Under
what conditions could the political will to prevent and punish genocide
arise—thus reversing the current longstanding bystander policy?
To answer these questions we have to go beyond the narrow disciplinary
confines of genocide studies, to consider the rationale of America’s post-war
relationship to the wider world, and the actual (as opposed to rhetorical) nature
of its political culture and system.
Empire versus law and democracy
America’s inertia in the face of genocide stands in stark contrast to its habit of
intervening—frequently, brutally, and uninvited—in the affairs of many other
24 Power, “A Problem,” 467–68. Quote on 468, emphasis added.
25 Ibid., 508.
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countries in pursuit of its “vital interests.” In the wider context of American
foreign relations, these extremes—of inertia on the one hand, and multiple
trespass on the other—constitute the two sides of the same imperial coin. As
against the US’s near-zero score for military operations to stop an ongoing
genocide, between the end of World War Two and 9/11 in 2001 it mounted
over 200 overseas military incursions—typically unprovoked,26 usually from
one or several of its hundreds of overseas military bases noted above. And
since 9/11, the American alliance has invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, spark-
ing still-ongoing wars, massive humanitarian crises, and genocidal risks that
have drawn in several neighbouring countries, either as unwilling battlefields
or willing participants. Thus, traditional US isolationism certainly does not ex-
plain that country’s absence from the struggle against genocide.
In our recent book, The Magnitude of Genocide, Colin Tatz and I dedicate
a chapter to pondering Steven Pinker’s thesis that violence (including war and
genocide) has tended to decline over the last five millennia, and that the de-
cline in question has steepened in the modern era. Pinker plausibly considers
the factors that have contributed to this trend, including democracy.27 “The
idea of democracy, once loosed upon the world, would turn out to be one of the
greatest violence-reduction technologies since the appearance of government
itself,” he writes.28 War has profound negative impacts on political commu-
nities that, if empowered through genuinely democratic representation, inhibit
warmongering. Most if not all democratic polities recoil from genocide.
The core members of the American alliance conventionally pass for fully-
fledged democracies, yet they demonstrably have no interest in meeting their
moral, legal and treaty obligations to curb genocide. At the same time, they
have repeatedly initiated war and disturbed the peace in other countries—in
flagrant contravention of post- Nuremberg international criminal law—thus
sowing the seeds of future genocides. If we assume for the sake of argument
that Pinker’s general claim for democracy holds water, we must now look
more critically into the democratic credentials of the American alliance. I will
turn to the travails of American democracy below, and to those of Western
countries in general in the next section.
Self-evidently American democracy rests on its 1787 Constitution—the
inspired work of framers steeped in Enlightenment thought (especially Mon-
tesquieu’s), the history and constitution of the Roman Republic (509–27
26 Johnson, Nemesis, 2007, 18; Johnson, Dismantling the Empire, 56. And see the list of US military incur-
sions at http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/interventions.html.
27 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 191–225; Pinker, The Better Angels, 2011.
28 Ibid., 194.
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BCE), and the development of English common law with its reigning concept
of the rule of law. The venerable civic-republican tradition united the Con-
stitution’s framers on the side of freedom understood as popular self-rule, as
against tyranny understood as the capricious, hubristic rule of one individual
or a closed cabal. The framers adopted Montesquieu’s schema of the separa-
tion of powers—legislative executive, and judicial, in that order—to provide
the checks and balances to prevent tyranny. The legislature in which “we the
people” were represented was to take pride of place.
Acutely aware as the framers were of the historic link between tyranny
and warmongering, they vested the power to declare war exclusively in the
legislature. “Of all the enemies of true liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to
be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other,” de-
clared James Madison (sometimes dubbed “the Father of the Constitution”) in
1795.29 The framers insisted that all expenditure of public funds be publicly
accounted for, as just one aspect of every citizen’s essential right to know what
public officials are doing, how and why. Without that knowledge, the public
cannot make informed decisions and exercise popular sovereignty over those
in positions of power. The framers bolstered the rule of law by insisting that
treaties, once duly entered into, constitute part of the law of the land. The
fourth amendment to the Constitution protects citizens’ privacy from “unrea-
sonable” searches and seizures by agents of the government, while the fifth
guarantees due process.
At this point Chalmers Johnson’s analysis becomes relevant. Apart from
his long career as a prominent American political analyst, he served as a naval
officer during the Korean War, and as a consultant to the CIA between 1967
and 1973. He identified with the US republican tradition and its constitutional
basis, but entertained dire fears for American democracy and constitutional
observance in the post-war era, not least since 9/11. I will briefly extrapolate
the main arguments from his four relevant books.30
In the post-war period four factors have driven the US to develop its “em-
pire of bases,” the present colossal extent of which is sketched above. The
first factor was “military Keynesianism”—the maintenance of high levels of
military spending to stimulate manufacturing, general economic activity, and
employment in the domestic economy.31 The second factor was Cold War ri-
valry with the Soviet Union. Clearly, these two factors have reinforced each
29 Quoted in Johnson, Nemesis, 18. This sentiment foreshadows Pinker’s thesis (mentioned above) that de-
mocratic governance constitutes an anti-violence “technology.”
30 See note 4. Of these, the third book is perhaps the most comprehensive.
31 Johnson, Nemesis, 271–78.
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other. The third factor was US dependence on imported oil, not least from the
Middle East. Together these factors drove US military self-projection onto the
world stage. They led to the hundreds of military incursions into foreign coun-
tries mentioned above, many of which were clandestine and kept secret from
the American public—at least until well after the event.
This pattern led to a fourth, fateful imperial dynamic: “blowback.” The CIA
coined this term as a contribution to its own tradecraft in 1953, after one of
its early staged coups against a democratic but inconvenient foreign govern-
ment, that of Iran. The term arose from the insight that such gross trespass
in the affairs of other countries could visit negative consequences on the US
itself. Johnson elaborates the concept to extend it to its effects on US do-
mestic politics. When the blowback comes, the American public is not able
to put it into context, given the clandestine nature of the original American
provocation, which it knows nothing about. Blowback—attacks on US mili-
tary assets, embassies and citizens overseas, and eventually on the US itself on
9/11—thus appears to the American public as gratuitous aggression. It fuels
popular mobilisation around hefty US retaliation, culminating in the invasions
of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively, and the heady warlike
mood at home.32 Seen in this light, blowback is not simply a question of one-
off events, but a vicious circle that puts the US and its core allies on a more
or less permanent war footing against a growing list of sworn enemies. The
President’s role as the executive of a constitutional democracy gives way to
his status as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in (real or rhetorical)
wartime—a commander in whose office the twin phenomena of empire and
militarism converge.
James Madison’s “dread” of war as a threat to the republican order was
thus prophetic. In the latter half of the twentieth century and in the current
one, a republican presidency has morphed into an “imperial presidency” that
comprehensively denies the citizens’ right to information, and overrules the
legislature, the rule of law, and the judiciary.33 All the features of the Con-
stitution mentioned above have been effectively curtailed, its checks and
balances now little more than ritualistic relics. Government has sunk ever
more deeply into illegality, such as holding prisoners indefinitely without trial
32 Johnson, Nemesis, 278.
33 The US presidency has developed the practice—energetically deployed by GW Bush—of issuing “signing
statements” when signing congressional bills into law. In these documents, the President purports to suspend or
modify the effect of the bill. This mechanism means that he can frustrate the legislature’s intent without issuing
a formal veto, which could in turn be overruled by a two-thirds majority in Congress: Johnson, Nemesis, 248,
257–60. The practice quashes the fundamental point in the Constitution (Article 1), that Congress shall have
exclusive power over legislation.
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under grotesquely inhumane conditions; routine, officially sanctioned kidnap-
ping and torture; and spying on the American citizenry—again flouting the
Constitution, treaties duly entered into, and domestic law.34
The main cause (as well as effect and beneficiary) of this fall from
legal and democratic grace has been the CIA itself. It began life in 1947,
as a replacement for the Office of Strategic Services, which had played
a progressive role, for instance, in servicing the American prosecution in
the first Nuremberg trial of 1945–1946. In contrast, the CIA has been set
up to serve the President only, by supplying intelligence and assessments
of threats to US security, and undertaking subsidiary “operations.” It soon
became (in Johnson’s term) the President’s secret private army, as its “op-
erational” functions overtook its intelligence-gathering ones.35 No president
has been able to resist using it as a private army. In the year of its es-
tablishment it interfered in Italian politics. Two years later it toppled the
democratic government of Syria (destroying that ill-fated country’s first and
arguably last chance of attaining stable, peaceful democratic government)
in order to advance the interests of the Arabian American Oil Company
(Aramco).36
The CIA’s orientation and main modus operandi were now set. It has di-
rectly or indirectly unseated a long list of democratic governments, replacing
them with brutal despotisms, among other places in Iran (as noted), Guatemala
(1954), Indonesia (1957–1958), Brazil and South Korea (both in 1961),
Greece (1964), Ghana (1966), the Philippines (on multiple occasions), and
Chile (1973). The CIA’s obsession with regime change has rubbed off onto
senior US policy-makers in general: it was the main motive behind the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003. The agency mounted the abortive 1961 invasion of the
Bay of Pigs in Cuba, and made several attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.
Its secretiveness confers unaccountability and “plausible deniability” for all
its transgressions on its one and only client—the US President.37 As Johnson
comments:
The CIA remains the main executive-branch department in charge of over-
34 Johnson, Nemesis, 204–05, 254–45, 258–89. See also US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Com-
mittee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Findings, Conclusions
and Executive Summary (Washington: US Senate, 2014); Sands, Lawless World, 205–23; Michael Hayden,
Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror (New York: Penguin, 2016).
35 Johnson, Nemesis, 92–93.
36 Charles Glass, Syria Burning: A Short History of a Catastrophe, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2016),
20–23.
37 The authoritative history of the CIA is Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York:
Anchor Books, 2008)—the fruit of 20 years of research.
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throwing foreign governments, promoting regimes of state terrorism, kid-
napping people of interest to the administration and sending them to
friendly foreign countries to be tortured and/or killed, assassination and
torture of prisoners in violation of international and domestic law, and nu-
merous “wet” exercises that both the president and the country in which
they are executed want to be able to deny.38
In direct contravention of the Constitution, its entire budget (14.7 billion USD
in 2013) is kept secret from the public and immune to congressional over-
sight—along with about 40 per cent of the overall US military budget.39
Long before 9/11—and as the essential precondition thereto—the CIA (in
league with its British counterpart, MI6) launched its most fateful operation, in
Afghanistan in July 1979. It armed and encouraged jihadi extremists, the mu-
jahideen, to revolt against the secular, modernising pro-Soviet government that
sought, among other things, to provide girls with schooling, which the extrem-
ists abhorred. The CIA aimed to lure the Soviet Union to come to the Afghani
government’s aid, whereupon the Soviets would bog down in a counter-insur-
gency and so get their own “ Vietnam.”40
The Soviet Union duly took the lure six months later, and the CIA and
MI6 ramped up their aid to the mujahideen. The CIA’s chief of station in Pak-
istan from May 1981, Howard Hart, took charge of clandestine operations
in Afghanistan. As he himself paraphrased his superiors’ orders, they were:
“Here’s your bag of money, go raise hell. Don’t fuck it up, just go out there
and kill Soviets, and take care of the Pakistanis and make them do whatever
you need to make them do.”41 Among the beneficiaries of the CIA’s tutelage
and largesse was a promising young Saudi fanatic called Osama bin Laden:
the CIA built him and his followers (al Qaeda) a base in Khost province in
eastern Afghanistan.42
The sequel is well known: the Soviet Union suffered 15,000 war dead,
and withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, only to collapse in 1991. Mission
accomplished, then. In the process, 1.8 million Afghanis were killed in the
CIA-staged civil war, and 2.6 million became refugees. One jihadi element,
38 Johnson, Nemesis, 102.
39 We only know the size of the CIA budget thanks to the leaker Edward Snowden and the Washington Post. The
US fields 16 intelligence services, which share 52.6 billion USD between them: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
us-canada-23903310. See also Johnson, Nemesis, 9.
40 Johnson, Nemesis, 110–11.
41 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Inva-
sion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), 33–35. Quote (from interviews with Hart) on 35.
42 Coll, Ghost Wars, 156–57.
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the Taliban, seized control of Kabul in 1996, while another, al Qaeda, turned
its attention (and CIA-sourced skills and weaponry) on the US itself.43 Such is
the backstory to 9/11 and today’s ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Presidential fury and hubris after 9/11 unleashed the CIA from the few legal
and moral restraints on it. As Commander-in-Chief in “wartime”—so desig-
nated by his “war on terror” slogan—President Bush claimed exemption from
legal and constitutional compliance. As Philippe Sands argues, the administra-
tion’s “war on terror” implied a “war on law”; it made “a conscious decision .
. . to propel its assault on global rules.”44 Tyranny breeds lawlessness at home,
too.45 Kidnap and torture, which had hitherto been a small and furtive part of
the CIA’s operations, now became a major part of it, with the President’s writ-
ten approval. The US is a party to the 1984 UN Convention against Torture
that (under the US Constitution) makes it part of the law of the land, so this
entire programme was felonious even in American domestic law.
Nonetheless, the CIA began kidnapping large numbers of people from
North America, Western Europe and the Middle East, and sending them to
torture-friendly allied countries (Egypt and Syria in the main), and to its own
“black sites” around the world, including its larger facilities such as Abu
Ghraib, Bagram air base, and Guantánamo Bay. Bush declared the victims
to be “bad people” and “unlawful combatants” to whom no legal protec-
tions whatever applied. They occupied (in Sands’ term) a “legal black hole”
that negated all applicable legal developments from Magna Carta to the pre-
sent day.46 Photographic, video and written accounts of the sadistic practices
inflicted in this black hole flooded the world media. In all the facilities men-
tioned, the CIA oversaw the torturing of its captives to extract “intelligence.”47
(In a rare moment of self-assertion, the US Senate inquired into this “extra-
ordinary rendition program” and found it to have been ill-conceived, poorly
managed, and fruitless. But the public is still not allowed to see the Inquiry’s
full report, only a comparatively short summary.)48
43 Coll relates in 588-page detail the history of the US-led imbroglio in Afghanistan, and lays bare the CIA’s
brutality and incompetence therein.
44 Sands, Lawless World, xii, 153.
45 See Naomi Wolf, The End of America: Letter of Warning to a Young Patriot (Burlington, VT: Chelsea
Green Publishing, 2007).
46 Sands, Lawless World, 143–73.
47 See Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and the Compromise of Law (London: Penguin,
2008).
48 Two NATO members—Italy in 2005 and Germany in 2007—issued arrest warrants and extradition
requests for 22 and 13 CIA agents respectively, for involvement in kidnap-and-torture operations within their ju-
risdictions: Johnson, Nemesis, 131–15; Matthias Gebauer, “Germany Issues Arrest Warrants for 13 CIA Agents
in El-Masri Case,” Der Spiegel, January 31, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/el-masri-kidnapping-
case-germany-issues-arrest-warrants-for-13-cia-agents-in-el-masri-case-a-463385.html. Readers with a taste for
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The framers of the 1787 US Constitution would have recognised this pattern
of constitutional, legal and democratic eclipse. They were acutely aware of the
fate that overtook the Roman Republic that they so greatly admired. Having
over-committed to territorial expansion and the militarism it entailed, the Re-
public signed its own death warrant by appointing Julius Caesar, a populist
military hero, dictator for the years 49–44 BCE, and then dictator for life. The
stage was then set for the long-lived imperial absolutism first exercised by Cae-
sar’s grandnephew, Augustus. This return to tyranny was precisely the fate that
the framers sought to spare their new American republic. “The collapse of the
Roman Republic offers a perfect case study of how imperialism and militarism
can undermine even the best defenses of a democracy,” Johnson comments.49
Just as the Caesars enjoyed pseudo-legal backing for their despotism, so too
the US imperial presidency found support in a neoconservative contribution to
jurisprudence called “the unitary executive theory of the presidency.” Among
other things, it asserts the President’s supremacy in all matter relating even
indirectly to foreign relations and war, thus overriding all existing laws (in-
cluding on due process and torture) that might otherwise have countermanded
his executive orders.50 Resort to the doctrine violates the Constitution’s central
principle—the sovereignty of “we the people” as exercised by elected law-
making representatives in congress. This neocon principle chimes with the
Nazi jurisprudence based on the Führerprinzip (leadership principle), which
declares it impossible for the Führer to break any law because his will is the
law. The doctrine formed part of the neocons’ mission to create a whole “new
legal regime,”51 one based on a single, simple principle: force majeure. It com-
promises the integrity of the whole international rule of law on which the
struggle against genocide depends.
gallows humour can visit the CIA’s statement of its “vision, mission, ethos, and challenges” on its official web-
site. Under the rubric “Integrity” it reads: “We uphold the highest standards of lawful conduct. . . . We maintain
the Nation’s trust through accountability and oversight.” This claim competes with Heinrich Himmler’s constant
insistence on the Anständigkeit (decency) of his SS mass-murderers: see Yitzhak Arad, Yisrael Gutman and
Abraham Margoliot, eds., Documents of the Holocaust: Selected Sources on the Destruction of the Jews of Ger-
many and Austria, Poland and the Soviet Union (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, with the Anti-Defamation League and
Ktav Publishing House, 1981), 344.
49 Johnson, Nemesis, 55.
50 Johnson, Nemesis, 253. As he relates, Bush appointed two proponents of the new jurisprudence to the
bench of the US Supreme Court in 2006. Much earlier, another justice thereof, Robert Jackson—the legendary
US chief prosecutor in the first Nuremberg trial—delivered a judgment in 1952 that explicitly denied that the
President had any special powers in wartime; even then his power “is subject to limitations consistent with a
constitutional Republic whose law and policy-making branch is a representative Congress.”
51 John Yoo, US Deputy Assistant Attorney General, announced this as the Bush Administration’s intention
in 2002. See Sands, Lawless World, 153–34. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own re-
ality,” Yoo’s fellow neocon, Karl Rove, famously asserted. See Richard Flanagan, “Does Writing Matter?” The
Monthly, October (2016), 23. The “new legal regime” took its place in that created reality.
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Johnson insists—and this is his central point—that democracy and the rule
of law on the one hand, and imperialism on the other, are irreconcilable, be-
cause the maintenance of empire abroad in the long run demands tyranny at
home. One or the other must give way. In Rome it was democracy and law that
foundered. Following Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism, John-
son cites a counter-example—the British Empire. In this case the empire was
dismantled (albeit often with the robust encouragement of the colonised) to
eradicate its threat to the democratic and law-bound order at home.52 On this
argument, the US must choose between the “ Roman” and “British” options.53
If the US continues down the present “Roman” path, Johnson wrote, it faces
“a devastating trio of consequences: imperial overstretch, perpetual war, and
insolvency, leading to a likely collapse similar to that of the Soviet Union.”54
At the time of writing, the US national debt (duly engorged by the lavish mil-
itary budget) comes to 19.34 trillion USD, or 106 per cent of GDP.55 The
Last Days of the American Republic—the sub-title of Johnson’s Nemesis—thus
refers not just to the country’s democratic and constitutional implosion,56 but
also to its current fiscal frailty as a nation-state.
If the US were to choose the “British” path, it would dismantle its empire
of bases, starting with the abolition of the CIA,57 and then be in a position to
return to its American first principles—restore its constitutional, democratic
and legal order. It might then resume the path it was treading in the 1940s
when it was promoting an international rule of law, one antithetical to aggres-
sive war and genocide, among other humanitarian violations. Unfortunately,
few signs point to such a return. Obama’s presidency saw the US faltering in
its slide into tyranny, but not going into reverse. It did not distance itself from
the criminality and lawlessness of its predecessor, let alone apologise or of-
fer restitution to those wronged. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq continue,
and have metastasised into Libya, Syria and Yemen. The CIA endures, as
does its “extraordinary rendition” programme, as does the Guantánamo hell-
hole58—all powerful symbols of the “Roman” path, and perhaps harbingers of
the “Soviet” fate. In the next section I will disclose more sources of resistance
52 Johnson, Nemesis, 88.
53 Johnson, Dismantling the Empire, 29.
54 Ibid., 183. Oddly, he fails to cite the case of the French First Republic (1792–1804) that morphed into the
ill-fated (Napoleonic) First Empire.
55 http://www.usdebtclock.org/.
56 In this context, see Naomi Wolf, The End.
57 Johnson, Dismantling the Empire, 28, 82.
58 Jonathan Hafetz, ed., Obama’s Guantánamo: Stories from an Enduring Prison (New York: New York
University Press, 2016).
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to a democratic revival, ones not specific (but still applicable) to the Ameri-
can case.
Before I turn to them, I will raise one more connection between the im-
perialism/militarism couple and collusion in genocide. As Colin Tatz and I
have argued, today’s genocidal threats are largely concentrated in the Middle
East and North Africa. Most of them take the form of ISIS, its allies, and its
fervid jihadi imitators. US-led aggression and subsequent military bungling
from July 1979, and especially in the wake of 9/11, let this “horde of genies”
out of their bottles and have provided them with four major failed states
(Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen) in which to spread genocidal mayhem.59
When we connect the causal dots, we lay bare the link between hubristic and
impulsive decision-making—the hallmarks of tyranny—in the US on the one
hand, and potentiating genocide elsewhere on the other. This link represents
the converse of Pinker’s thesis about democracy’s efficacy as a violence damp-
ener, and points up the third aspect of the American alliance’s collusion in
genocide mentioned in my introduction.
Post-democracy, bread and circuses
How might Western powers thwart today’s principal genocidal threats in the
Middle Eastern cauldron—ones that core members of the American alliance
have conjured forth since 1979, and especially since 9/11? The military and
intelligence specialist David Kilcullen concludes his analysis of the problems
and options here on a challenging note: the central resource we need to tap
into in this struggle is political will:
This—political will, not troops, not money, not time, not technology—this
is the scarcest resource, and without that political will at the level of entire
nations, nothing else we do will work. Preserving and strengthening the po-
litical will of our societies, the will to continue this struggle without giving
59 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 227–41. “Horde of genies” is David Kilcullen’s expression; we made
extensive use of his shrewd analysis in our discussion. Inter alia, he reinforces the general view that the 2003
invasion of Iraq was not only illegal, but a catastrophic misstep: “the greatest strategic screw-up since Hitler’s
invasion of Russia.” See David Kilcullen, “Blood Year: Terror and the Islamic State,” Quarterly Essay 58
(2015), 11. The UK government’s Iraq inquiry, headed by Sir John Chilcot, reported in July 2016 and came to
much the same conclusion. It spells out the deceit, chicanery and recklessness that underpinned the British de-
cision to join in the US-led invasion. But even this report pulled its punches on key points, such as on the sheer
illegality of the invasion: see Philippe Sands, “A Grand and Disastrous Deceit,” London Review of Books 38,
no. 15 (2016), 9–11. Australia’s more denialist political culture will probably preclude any such independent
inquiry into its own government’s decision to join in the 2003 invasion; were such an inquiry to come to pass,
however, its findings would probably replicate Chilcot’s.
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in to a horrific adversary, but also without surrendering our civil liberties
or betraying our ethics, is not an adjunct to the strategy—it is the strategy.60
As he makes clear, this struggle will be long and gruelling. By “political
will,” then, he does not mean fleeting popular assent to something like the
catastrophic 2003 invasion of Iraq, which then US Defence Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld sold to the public as a sure-fire quick-fix “cakewalk” (now a war in
its fourteenth year). Rather, the “political will at the level of entire nations”
needed to bring today’s genocidaires to ground has to replicate the sustained,
encompassing kind that galvanised the Allied home fronts during World War
Two, even if the present conflict itself is not on that scale. Only substantive de-
mocratic processes can engender such durable mobilisation, as they did then.
In addition to the obstacles already canvassed—the ongoing, genocide-
collusive thrust of the American alliance’s foreign relations since 1949, and
the corrosion of constitutional government and the rule of law in the US
itself—several writers point to other travails of democratic governance in to-
day’s West that militate against the formation of a durable democratic will of
the kind required. I will briefly introduce one influential strand in this litera-
ture, again focusing on the work of its main proponent.
In his book Post-Democracy, Colin Crouch sets up two ideal types of for-
mally democratic government over the past century. The first, “democracy”
as such,
thrives when there are major opportunities for the mass of ordinary people
actively to participate, through discussion and autonomous organizations,
in shaping the agenda of public life, and when they are actively using these
opportunities.61
In the core countries of today’s American alliance, democracy’s high tide ar-
rived in the mid-twentieth century,62 and they came at least a fair way to
achieving this ideal.
A half-century later, though, a new model—post-democracy—has sup-
planted it:
Under this model, while elections certainly exist and can change govern-
ments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed
60 Kilcullen, “Blood Year,” 87. Emphasis added in the first two italicised phrases.
61 Crouch, Post-Democracy, 2.
62 Ibid., 7.
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by rival teams of professional experts in the techniques of persuasion, and
considering a small range of issues selected by those teams. The mass of
citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to
the signals given them. Behind this spectacle of the electoral game, pol-
itics is really shaped by private interaction between elected governments
and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests.63
The trend towards post-democracy gained its impetus from the overlapping
Reagan and Thatcher years in the 1970s, when progressive politics in the West
foundered in the oil crisis and concomitant stagflation. Neoliberal ideology
then began its rapid rise to ascendancy, Crouch argues, to the point where Mar-
garet Thatcher could notoriously claim, “there is no alternative.” There has
certainly been no alternative to neoliberalism in the mainstream electoral lives
of the American alliance’s core members since at least the 1980s, hence the
narrow compass and impoverishment of political contestation to this day.
Post-democracy, far from mobilising and crystallising the political will
of “we the people,” empowers a new political class made up of corporate
elites (including media moguls), professional lobbyists, and politicians’ career
staffers, minders, spin-doctors, brand- and image-controllers, perception-man-
agers, and focus-group ringmasters—all united around neoliberal nostrums. In
this scenario, Crouch writes, citizens “have been reduced to the role of ma-
nipulated, passive, rare participants,” while “the content of party programmes
and the character of party rivalry become ever more bland and vapid.”64 The
closer the core members of the American alliance gravitate towards this model
of political life, the more remote becomes the prospect of generating an anti-
genocidal “political will at the level of entire nations.”
Indeed, “we the people” find ourselves denied access to our supposed rep-
resentatives—shouldered aside by corporate donors and professional lobbyists
representing well-heeled clients under the terms of the cash-for-access system.
“We the people” also experience increasing difficulty in finding the vocabu-
lary and syntax with which to express any political will at all, given the current
corruption of public language. Post-democracy imposes an idiom drawn from
the professional manipulators of the advertising industry, and “advertising is
not a form of rational dialogue,” as Crouch drily observes.65 It coaches politi-
cians and other members of the political class into uttering “sound bites”—or
63 Ibid., 4. On the role of (and benefits to) business interests in the alliance’s military adventures, see Naomi




performing more drawn-out speech-acts—that do not resemble normal speech,
but rather comprise Orwellian sequences of boiler-plate phrases, slogans, cant
and weasel words that “articulate a vague and incoherent set of policies.”66
This corruption of language, exemplified by today’s “retail politicians,” is an-
other hallmark of the tyranny that betokens democracy’s malaise.
In the absence of rational public dialogue, “we the people” are diverted
into choreographed rituals, hoop-la, and political spectacles that offer a mere
simulacrum of political participation (but supposedly display our countries’
democratic credentials). In reality they are little more than “media
events”—advertising platforms for self-selecting elements of the political
class, and therewith festivals of sloganising, posturing and cant.67 All of this
falls well short of Crouch’s desiderata for democracy quoted above.
The American primaries in the run-up to the November 2016 presidential
election made this point plainly enough: they constituted show business, not
democratic conversations.68 The campaign itself also illustrated a related but
even more hazardous side of post-democracy: its propensity to reduce large
segments of the citizenry to blind resentment at their socio-economic ex-
clusion and insecurity under neoliberal policy regimes,69 and their political
exclusion at the hands of the political class. These segments can then fall in
behind disreputable chancers who foment atavistic prejudices and entirely lack
experience in public office. This scenario invites comparison with the fall of
the German Weimar Republic in 1933 and its genocidal aftermath. We have
certainly come a long way from the preconditions for an anti-genocidal politi-
cal will at the level of whole nations.
Finally, the national governments and political elites of the American al-
liance rely on greater and greater secrecy to disempower their supposedly
fully informed democratic constituencies—something that James Madison
also foresaw as aiding the “gradual and silent encroachments of those in
power.”70 Earlier I referred to the secrecy surrounding vital elements of Amer-
66 Ibid., 27. Much of this “cant, gibberish and jargon,” as Don Watson calls it, also comes from contemporary
management argot. Watson’s mockery of contemporary political language serves a serious point in showing how
much is lost in “the decay of public language.” See Don Watson, Death Sentence: The Decay of Public Lan-
guage (Sydney: Knopf, 2003); Don Watson, Watson’s Dictionary of Weasel Words: Contemporary Clichés, Cant
and Management Jargon (Sydney: Vintage, 2005); Don Watson, Worst Words: A Compendium of Contemporary
Cant, Gibberish and Jargon (Sydney: Vintage, 2015).
67 Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 1992); Maria Wendt, Politik som spektakel: Almedalen, mediemakten och den svenska
demokratin (Stockholm: Atlas Akademi, 2012).
68 Eliot Weinberger, “It Was Everything,” London Review of Books 38, no. 16 (2016), 3–8; Christian
Lorentzen, “Diary,” London Review of Books 38, no. 16 (2016), 4.
69 See Crouch, Post-Democracy.
70 Speech delivered on June 6, 1788, at the Virginia Convention to ratify the Federal Constitution.
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ican foreign relations, military excursions, and covert operations. In each of
the core countries, applications for official documents made under freedom-
of-information legislation have long met with ever-stiffer resistance motivated
by vague references to “national security” or “national interests.” When doc-
uments are released, they are often “redacted” to the point of deliberate unin-
telligibility. “Welcome to Peak Secrecy,” the Australian journalist Sarah Gill
comments—thus pinpointing another integral feature of post-democracy.71
Conclusion
Colin Tatz and I ended our recent book on genocide with this sentence: “The
prevention of genocide is every citizen’s business.”72 To a large extent, the
genocidal risks that the world faces today arise from the political dysfunctions
and imperial overstretch of the US and its closest allies, and their catastrophic
long-run outcomes in the Middle East and North Africa. Thus for the citi-
zens of the core members of the American alliance, the business of preventing
genocide begins at home.
It begins by challenging our political and policy-making elites—their long-
standing, institutionalised moral indifference to genocide; their brazen assault
on the international rule of law on which the struggle against genocide de-
pends; their subversion of domestic law; their inured imperial mind-sets; and
their debauching of democratic rule at home. The task of building a political
will to prevent genocide at the level of whole nations demands nothing less
than reinstating our Western democratic politico-legal heritage so limpidly ex-
pressed in the 1787 US Constitution, and implicit in the Constitutions of the
UK and Australia. It also requires a retrieval of the political culture of the
1940s, when our countries were truly democratic, belonged in the mainstream
of Western civilisation, and energetically sought to nurture an international
rule of law that would suppress war and genocide, and promote human rights.
Can the American alliance stop colluding in genocide? We stand at a cross-
roads much like the one where the classical sociologist Max Weber located the
“iron cage” of capitalist society over a century ago in The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism:
No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end
71 Sarah Gill, “We’ve Reached Peak Secrecy, In a New Low Point for Transparency and Openness,” Sydney
Morning Herald, October 27, 2016. A draconian case in point is s.42 of the 2015 Australian Border Force Act
that threatens members of the caring professions with imprisonment for disclosing the conditions under which
imprisoned asylum seekers suffer.
72 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, 249.
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of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there
will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized pet-
rification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance.73
We citizens of American-alliance countries face well-entrenched and well-re-
sourced resistance to any attempt to recover our politico-legal patrimony in
our own homelands. But the stakes could hardly be higher: not only our own
civilisation and way of life, but also the lives of millions of potential genocide
victims far beyond our national borders.





Researching and writing about genocide is easier than teaching it. An art and
a craft, teaching young people and adults about the gruesome and grotesque
has particular problems. Generally speaking, while younger audiences may
be more inured to virtual violence, older listeners prefer good rather than bad
endings.
There are the faltering moments when students cannot handle the material,
cry, or rush from the room. This often occurs when viewing “Genocide,”
episode 20 of the 1974 Thames Television series The World at War. A few are
transfixed by the morbidity of it all. This documentary is replete with mass
shootings at the rims of pits, bulldozed corpses, and skeletal figures hanging
off electrified camp wire. It is meant to shock, and it does. By contrast, Claude
Lanzmann’s brilliant pastel-coloured marathon documentary, Shoah (1985),
sets out to unravel the bizarre and, in its educative way, it is far more com-
pelling and evocative than the shock-horror presentations.
Once under way, students not only engage but become curious, even en-
thralled by the case studies. They like unravelling what seems so incompre-
hensible, demystifying what is so surreal. Often there is zest in their studies
and assignments, as if on the road to making fresh discoveries about hu-
mankind, about good and evil, righteous and not so righteous behaviour, the
machinations of bureaucracy, the meanings of accountability and responsibil-
ity, the nature of crime and punishment, the politics of apology, the nature and
value of reparations, the vexed problem of wilful amnesia and outright denial-
ism, the legacies for the victim communities—and much else as it becomes an
intellectual pursuit.
Inevitably, awkward and often unanswerable questions arise. How would
I have behaved if conscripted into something like the Hitler Youth? Would I
have hidden a family at such danger to myself and my family? Would I have
disobeyed an order from above? Could “my kind of people” have performed
such deeds? Or if “my people” did do such things, how and why am I dif-
ferent? It is important to convince students of the hypothetical nature of such
questions: that this is now, not then, and they are here, not there.
Crucially, audiences learn that genocide is never spontaneous combustion,
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a sudden and totally unexpected eruption into mass violence as seemingly
happened in Rwanda in 1994. Every genocide trails history, and each builds
up, aggregates, in a succession of “building blocks” or an assembling of
“engine parts.” Whichever metaphor one uses, genocide is evolutionary, not
revolutionary. A holistic approach is needed, one that embraces anthropology,
biology, cultural studies, geography, history, law, philosophy, sociology, stud-
ies of religion, and more. Most teenagers are not conversant or comfortable
with that combination of concepts and the vocabularies involved. A different
kind of educative process is required that involves teaching students how to
confront some very large canvasses.
Some teachers use what I call the science-fiction movie approach—a group
of bad guys descended from an alien spaceship in 1933, wrought evil upon
the world and were then vanquished forever by the allied good guys a dozen
years later. What is sometimes called “slice-history” does not work for the
Holocaust or for any genocide. In the former case, it leads to ideas about a to-
tally new kind of event, something meta-historical or even meta-physical. The
Holocaust was many things: it is the central case in teaching, the tremendum
of modern times certainly, but always a genocide and therefore examinable in
the historical context of genocides.
What is regrettable is the lasting influence of American psychologist Gor-
don Allport who, in 1954, wrote The Nature of Prejudice. He posited a
syndrome, something directly connected, running together, and sequential:
1. Antilocution—bad-mouthing an ethnicity, a race, a people;
2. Then the social exclusion of such people;
3. Followed by physical attacks on the target groups, such as lynching,
desecration of tombstones;
4. Next, geographic exclusion of the targeted group from neighbour-
hoods, regions, nations;
5. Finally, their proposed, attempted or actual extermination.
American scholar Gregory Stanton has outlined 10 sequential stages of geno-
cide, and Winton Higgins and I have established a similar set of demonstrable,
connected steps—from formulation of the very idea to its actual implementa-
tion and aftermath.1 Yet the Allport “syndrome” was, and remains, historical
and empirical nonsense. These actions assuredly exist, but there is not any
science of syndrome, no sequence of indelible connectedness. Most societies
have had salon and literary antilocutions and yet have neither physically at-
1 Colin Tatz and Winton Higgins, The Magnitude of Genocide (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016), 112–13.
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tacked Jews, nor killed them. Jews have been socially and geographically
excluded from clubs, suburbs, schools and universities, yet not only survived,
but thrived. Many communities, including Jews in Australia, have had tomb-
stones shattered and synagogues set on fire without ensuing trade boycotts,
bannings from the public service, roundups, deportations and gassings. The
seemingly unshakeable problem is that so many believe “it has to start some-
where”—in the manner of Allport’s antilocution—and point to either radio
shock jock language, The Merchant of Venice, Oliver Twist, or to golf club ex-
clusions. They are not the passageways to genocide, and that is not the way to
teach about genocide.
Let me share some personal thoughts about teaching (and thinking) about
genocide, developed over the past 30 years. My approach is not that of an in-
struction manual, nor is it set in stone, but it has worked for my audiences over
the years, and for a number of former students who in turn have become teach-
ers of the subject.
Here I address some of the approaches that work well in unravelling the
“crime of crimes,” among others, the value of a broad and holistic opening,
a need to distinguish genocide from related crimes, the essential focus on the
Holocaust, the ways of coming to grips with the actors involved in the phe-
nomenon, and the ingredients common to most genocides.
The overview
Whatever it was called before Raphael Lemkin gave us the word genocide
in 1944, there was, all too commonly, attempted or actual extermination of
peoples in classical antiquity (roughly 800 BCE to 500 CE), the middle ages
(500 to late 1500 CE), and the modern era (1600 to the present). Geno-
cide is not simply a twentieth century horror story: there is a magnitude
to genocide in and across world history.2 The twentieth century warrants
especial attention, but for maximum effect students need to approach geno-
cide from the events in German South-West Africa [now Namibia] in
1904–1906, through to the Ottoman Turk genocides of Armenians, Assyr-
ians and Greeks from 1915 to 1923, through to the Holocaust era starting
in 1933. Then separately, traverse the dozens of genocidal episodes since
the placard in the Buchenwald camp proclaimed (in 1945) the now empty
catchcry of “Never Again.” These should include Bangladesh, Burundi,
2 See Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State (London: I.B. Taurus, 2005); Ben Kiernan,
Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007); Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude.
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Cambodia, Darfur, Guatemala, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Chechnya, East
Timor, Liberia, Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the cur-
rent genocidal jihadism of ISIS.
Gradations of genocide
Not all cases of genocide are alike, let alone the same. We need a measuring
rod—and that can only come from explaining that the only judiciable and
actionable instrument we have is the 1948 United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“the Genocide
Convention”), flawed as it is. There is no point going over the many defi-
nitions, even the improved ones that have come from scholars since 1948.
The Genocide Convention sets out five somewhat divergent acts that con-
stitute the crime of genocide, ranging from Article II (a) the physical killing
of people because they are those people, to Article II (e) forcibly removing
their children from their group to another group membership. And it re-
lates to only four categories of people: racial, ethnic, religious, or national.
Therein lies a problem in teaching about genocide: there are five essentially
differing actions defined, with rape now added by the courts as a genocidal
act. In spite of clear-cut differences, the five are co-equated and each can be
ruled genocide. The equating of child removal, a form of social and cultural
death, with physical death, presents a problem for many. Each is heinous
but the Convention allows no gradations between them. That is how inter-
national law defines it and that is what we will have to abide by for many
years to come.3
We need a metaphorical way of measuring, or at least appreciating the in-
tensity and the gradations of genocidal events. Inevitably, there are differences
in intent, motive, time-frame, scale, methods used, rescue and intervention ef-
forts, outcomes, impacts on victim groups, legacies, trials and accountability,
apologies, reparations, levels of denial, memorialisation, and so on. (Some-
times a nasty element intrudes: “my genocide” was bigger than or superior to
yours—a league table of horror, what historian Michael Berenbaum excoriated
as “a calculus of calamity” or a “suffering Olympics”.)4 In Rwanda in 1994,
800,000 people were killed in 100 days. In Australia, physical murder of Abo-
riginal people and child removal spanned almost 124 years, with killings in
3 The statute of the International Criminal Court in 2002 adopted verbatim the Genocide Convention
definition.
4 Michael Berenbaum, A Mosaic of Victims: Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis (New York:
New York University Press, 1990).
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sporadic “hunting party” attacks over weekends accounting for some 30,000
to 50,000 people, and child removal starting in late 1839 and ending in the
late 1980s, involving perhaps 30,000 children.5 Very different experiences, yet
both were cases of genocide.
A hierarchy of crimes
Confusion often arises between genocide, genocidal massacres, massacres,
pogroms, atrocities, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against
peace. There is no shortage of case studies to help illustrate the distinctions be-
tween them. Audiences are helped by examining events as seemingly remote
as the Chmielniki massacre of Jews in the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth
(now Ukraine) in 1648. Some 100,000 Jews perished in this Cossack rebellion,
but the aims were political against the ruling regime rather than the intended
elimination of most or all Jews. The scale of the events make it more of a
genocidal massacre. The term for such events is the Yiddish word pogrom—an
orchestrated attack on people and property as a warning, reprisal, or a chance
for booty. (There was, and is, a homicidal tenor to pogroms, hence the adjec-
tive “genocidal”.) What Lieutenant William Calley did at the village of My
Lai in Vietnam in March 1968 was an atrocity and a massacre (of some 500
men, women and children), not an action to eliminate all Vietnamese. What
the Nazis did to Jews in Poland was genocide, the extirpation of both a people
and the very idea of such a people; what it did to Poland was a series of war
crimes not to eliminate Poles but to dismantle the political entity of the Polish
state, and enslave the inferior Slavic peoples.6
Unlike the allied behaviours mentioned above, genocide is a specific crime
comprising the five acts specified in the Genocide Convention. The specificity
of the crime is important because of a popular penchant of people to reach for
the word “genocide” whenever they want to attract attention to a particularly
heinous event.
The actors
Holocaust teachers most often use a triangle to portray the actors and factors
involved in that crime: the perpetrators (on top), the victims, and the by-
standers whose indifference or acquiescence allows the actions to unfold,
5 Colin Tatz, Genocide in Australia: By Accident or Design? (Melbourne: Monash Indigenous Centre and
Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, 2011).
6 For a discussion of definitions, see Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, chap. 2.
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unhindered. I use a hexagon, sometimes a heptagon, including perpetrators,
victims, bystanders, beneficiaries, rescuers, denialists, and (on not too many
occasions) the punishers. These are the common actors in modern genocidal
events, each needing analysis and discussion.
The beneficiaries are little discussed and it is worth taking students through
some examples of profitable “neutrality” during World War Two—as with
Sweden, Switzerland and Spain. Sweden supplied Germany with steel and ma-
chinery for war; Switzerland provided war materials and acted as a banker for
Jewish assets looted by the Nazis; Spain contributed thousands of men to the
Nazi military and supplied rare minerals to Germany.
The rescuers include not only individuals designated as the Righteous
Among the Nations, but organisations like the Polish Catholic Zegota (Council
for Aid to Jews), whole towns like Le Chambon in France and Niewiande in
Holland, and such nation-states as Bulgaria and even Italy in World War Two.
They contrast sharply with those nations that did nothing, refused to do any-
thing, averted their eyes, or chose (and choose now) to ignore genocide as it
was (or is) occurring for fear of having to become involved.
However small rescue looms in genocide history, it is important for
audiences to have a glimmer of optimism to offset the blackness and ni-
hilism. Rescue is a form of intervention and students need introduction to
the few efforts to intervene physically to stop a genocide. Declaring a no-
fly zone (NFZ) in 1991–1992 to stop Saddam Hussein dropping chemical
weapons on Kurds in northern Iraq, and later, similar NFZs in Bosnia and
Libya, are among the few examples. A distinction must be made between
intervention and prevention. We have yet to see a successful attempt to
prevent what is a clearly foreseeable genocide, such as in the Nuba Hills
region of Sudan today.
Accessing the actors
How do we get to these participants, these actors? Even with libraries of
scholarly books, journals, as well as internet materials, the most effective
teaching is to have students examine original material such as documents,
archival materials, newsreel films, documentaries; and either to listen to a
survivor or read what would have been contemporary eyewitness accounts.
Post-event memories and memoirs are valuable but are at times corrupted by
memory loss, appropriation of other testimonies and historical accounts, and
by sheer time.
Holocaust documents are a start. They do not tell the whole story, but suffi-
cient thereof. The Documents of the Holocaust is a good volume from which to
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work.7 Students may find it easier to get to grips with actors from a somewhat
surreal collection by historian Raul Hilberg, titled Documents of Destruction.8
They can pick a short document for analysis: for example, an order placed
from Poland to Berlin for so many pounds of bread and marmalade to induce
Warsaw ghetto dwellers to “volunteer” for deportation; another for a huge
quantity of nuts, bolts and tools (for gas chambers); another showing a railway
timetable with loaded trains going to a destination (Auschwitz) and coming
back empty and needing to be cleaned (having been paid for by the Jews).
Most local Holocaust museums will have documents or facsimiles on dis-
play or in their archives. Accessing material online is now possible from
institutions like Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, the US Holocaust Memorial Mu-
seum in Washington, the Imperial War Museum in London, and the massive
resources held at Bad Arolsen in Germany. The Armenian Genocide Museum-
Institute in Yerevan is fast developing into a key resource. The Tuol Sleng
Genocide Museum in Cambodia’s Phnom Penh has become a “must” on visits
there and provides internet material. Australia’s National Archive in Canberra
holds important material on the Aboriginal Stolen Generations.
Transcripts of trials and judgments by courts are an excellent resource.
There is nothing quite like the spotlight of a forensic arena, under tight rules
of evidence, to provide insight into an event and the dramatis personae. The
Myall Creek Massacre in New South Wales in 1838, and the subsequent trials
and executions of those who had killed local Aboriginal people, tell us a great
deal about frontier society.9 Trials of Nazis, Serbians, Rwandans teach us that
“something happened” and what the something was—they are more than sim-
ply about crime and punishment. The Nuremberg trials, the doctors’ trials and
that of the Einsatzgruppen tell their own terrifying tales. An important trial in
more recent times was the Akayesu case in Rwanda.10 The International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established that direct and overt evidence is
not always needed to establish that something happened and that someone was
guilty: the context, preceding and surrounding history and circumstances can
as readily establish that genocide was not only intended but occurred.
Valuable lessons lie in looking at statutes, decrees, and regulations. Again,
the Holocaust era provides numerous examples of the Nazi rush to legislation
7 Yitzhak Arad, Yisrael Gutman and Abraham Margoliot, eds., The Documents of the Holocaust: Selected
Sources on the Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland and the Soviet Union (Jerusalem: Yad
Vashem, with the Anti-Defamation League and Ktav Publishing House, 1981).
8 Raul Hilberg, Documents of Destruction: Germany and Jewry, 1933–1945 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1971).
9 The Myall Creek Memorial Site was unveiled in 2000. It is vandalised regularly.
10 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998) ICTR-96-4-T (Aust.).
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immediately after coming to power in 1933. There are several Ottoman
statutes that legalised and legitimated deportations and confiscation of Armen-
ian property before the genocide began in 1915. Going to original sources
enables students to start thinking for themselves rather than being told what to
conclude from scholarly commentaries.
Finding a genocide survivor may be difficult. Ageing and diminished
memory do not detract from the excruciating experiences that unfold, but
their sense of general history is not always accurate. Eyewitness accounts
are now becoming common. (Social media technology provides images of
events as they happen.) Samuel Totten’s numerous volumes provide critical
essays, guides to the literature, and some startling witness accounts recorded
at the time.11
Film attracts attention. Segments of Lanzmann’s compelling and memo-
rable Shoah documentary convey the genocidal process without once resorting
to footage of killing or camp liberation. Part two of the 2007 series Racism
in History is “The Fatal Impact” and is essential viewing. The best and most
lurid of Nazi propaganda films is Der Ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew), a 1940
“masterpiece” of new film techniques and crudities. The 2010 documentary
Einsatzgruppen: The Death Brigades brings the viewer as close as one can get
to “the action.”
A vexing question arises when it comes to fiction, poetry, theatre, painting
and movies depicting genocide. Apart from the art versus reality debate, the
question is whether these art forms capture the reality of the time and achieve
impact on those who were not there. Even a movie like Schindler’s List (1993)
insists on a redemptive (happy or “happier”) ending. The Kramer Nuremberg
film, mentioned below, is a more accurate account, and more dramatic for its
sense of authenticity. László Nemes’ 2015 movie, Son of Saul, depicting a
day-and-a-half in the lives of the Sonderkommando, the Jewish prisoners in
Auschwitz forced to dispose of the corpses, is considered one of the best films
of all time.
The professions
The popular image of genocide is of a despotic regime in which the ruler or-
ders “mechanics,” the “field” thugs and guards, to go about the business of
punishing, pillaging, killing. Imagery lingers of hard-core prisoners in Turkey,
usually murderous Circassians, released on condition they kill Armenians on
11 See, among others, Samuel Totten and Robert K. Hitchcock, eds., Genocide of Indigenous Peoples: A
Critical Bibliographic Review (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2011).
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death marches, and of Brown Shirts (the SA) in Germany cutting off rabbini-
cal beards and burning books, seemingly at random and self-motivated.
The planning and specificity of gathering targeted populations, of relo-
cations to labour camps, concentration camps, or death factories, required
bureaucratic efficiency. Most of that came from the professions: architecture,
accountancy, biology, chemistry, education, engineering, law, medicine, phar-
macy, physics and zoology. Students are fascinated by this phenomenon and
disbelief soon enough becomes acceptance as they tackle projects such as
genocide and the law, medical ethics in the shadows of the Holocaust, and so
on. A riveting text for them is Stanley Kramer’s 1961 masterly Judgment at
Nuremberg, based on Abby Mann’s scripted account of the last of the Nurem-
berg trials, that of Nazi judges.
Books on the professions are not that plentiful, but Max Weinreich’s classic
Hitler’s Professors,12 written in 1946, and another immediate post-war ac-
count by Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke, The Death Doctors,13 are
crucial. Richard Grunberger’s 1971 Social History of the Third Reich exam-
ines the rush to join the Nazi movement by doctors and teachers in particular.14
In the 1990s, Konrad Jarausch probed the legal, educational and engineering
professions.15 Even the seemingly innocuous profession of accountancy was
heavily involved in keeping the ledgers of genocide.16
The centrality of the Holocaust
Holocaust studies overwhelm—in canvas, breadth, depth, scope, meticulous
detail. For any other single case study, there are at least a thousand Holocaust
items. The templates are there, the analytical tools are there, the over-re-
searched and the under-researched matters are there, the atlases, encyclopae-
dias, bibliographies are all there as models and paradigms. The trailer or
prequel of the Armenian Genocide is there and needs to be taught in its own
right of course, but also because of the precedent and prelude it set for the
Holocaust: the deportations and “relocations” of population, confiscation of
property, rounding-up of men for slave labour and death, medical experiments
12 Max Weinreich, Hitler’s Professors: The Part of Scholarship in Germany’s Crimes Against the Jewish Peo-
ple (1946; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
13 Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke, The Death Doctors (1949; London: Elek Books, 1962).
14 Richard Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich (1971; London: Phoenix, 2005).
15 Konrad Jarausch, The Unfree Professions: German Lawyers, Teachers, and Engineers 1900–1950 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
16 Edwin Black, IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance between Nazi Germany and America’s Most
Powerful Corporation (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2001).
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in hospitals, elementary gas chambers and the final death marches into Syria.
The Nazi regime learned much from the Young Turks. As Stefan Ihrig has re-
minded us, Kemal Atatürk loomed large in the Nazi imagination.17
Some genocide scholars seem to want to bypass the Holocaust, to engage
in a chosen case study strictly avoiding not just the substance of the Holocaust
but its echoes, shadows, metaphors and analogies. Hardly professional or aca-
demic, it is an approach unbecoming of scholarship. As noted above, the
templates and frameworks of analysis by eminent and acclaimed scholars over
the past 70 years are ever-present. Some scholars assert that the Holocaust
drowns or eclipses other cases: it may well do so, but the established and
tested templates are unassailable and cannot be swept aside merely in pursuit
of “new” lenses. The Holocaust perspectives have yet to be found wanting or
inappropriate.
Genocide and language
Inevitably, there is a flipside to these documented instructions and actions:
the unstated, unspoken orders to round up, deport, loot, kill. In many cases,
genocidaires invent new language, as with the Nazi euphemisms.18 Reset-
tlement, special treatment, and relocation “solutions” are but masks for the
killing fields and methods of death. Part and parcel of this attempt to hide
reality is the dehumanisation, animalisation and insectification of victims
as bacilli, viruses (Jews), pests and vermin (Roma), cockroaches (Tutsi).
Rowan Savage has analysed the language of dehumanisation: the sub-hu-
mans, fauna, wild beasts, vermin, rodents, insects, birds, pigs, monkeys,
snakes.19
Not all genocides are acts of commission: at times, genocide is an act of
omission, a deliberate failure to feed and water people for example. Again,
there are degrees and gradations of criminal intent, or gross negligence in-
volved—as in Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s, the deliberately low rations for
Jews in the Nazi era, some less than ambiguous agrarian practices in China,
Ethiopia and North Korea in more recent times.
17 Stefan Ihrig, Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2014). His new book, Justifying
Genocide looks at the connections between both cases more comprehensively.
18 Shaul Esch, “Words and Meanings: Twenty-Five Examples of Nazi Idiom,” Yad Vashem Studies 5
(1963), 133–67.
19 Rowan Savage, “ ‘Vermin to be Cleared Off the Face of the Earth’: Perpetrator Representations of
Genocide Victims as Animals,” Genocide Perspectives III: Essays on the Holocaust and Other Genocides,
eds. Colin Tatz, Peter Arnold and Sandra Tatz (Blackheath, NSW: Brandl & Schlesinger, 2006), 17–53.
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Disciplinary approaches
The most appropriate discipline for teaching genocide is history. There is
now strong attention from sociology, political science, law and more recently,
anthropology, philosophy, and two somewhat fuzzy subsets labelled human
rights and, increasingly, peace and conflict studies. “Human rights” is a term
now (fashionably) attached to studies of atrocities, mass death, and genocide.
It is an amalgam of many things: philosophical, religious, ethical, moral, legal.
The problem is not that particular admixture but the haphazard way in which
it is used as a mantra to cover a multitude of behaviours that co-equate issues
like poverty, poor education, exclusion from voting, ill health and life’s inequi-
ties with purposeful killings in Rwanda, Bosnia and Cambodia. The spectrum
becomes so broad as to be meaningless.
Rarely used is political geography. It is highly effective, especially with
the use of computer-generated maps. Thus, one can present a political map of
Africa in 1939 and then another of that continent by 1970. In 30 short years,
boundaries changed, new states emerged, and long-term colonial regimes that
were there have vanished. Some 30 genocidal events have occurred in Africa
as a result of colonial practices, and even more calamitous outcomes from
ill-considered decolonisation procedures. Or, one can show graphically and
demographically that Europe had 10 million Jews in 1939 and less than 2 mil-
lion 50 years later—and ask how and why?
Ethnic cleansing—so historian Norman Naimark tells us20—inevitably
bleeds into genocide. This is well illustrated by the cases of the Greeks, As-
syrians and Armenians in Turkey, the Soviet deportations of Chechens, Ingush
and Crimean Tatars, and the more recent Wars of Yugoslav Succession. The
present-day crises in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Syria, and the plight of
Kurdish peoples generally, lend themselves to the lens of political geography.
The race factor
Unfortunately, racism is the only single, flat word we have to cover a multitude
of attitudes and actions. Since earliest history distinctions have been made be-
tween “them” and “us” on the basis of tribal affiliation, kin membership, skin
colour, body form, ethnicity, religion, material culture, custom, language, and
geographic domain. Race-ism has to cover all such different attitudes and ac-
tions. Essentially, racism refers to real (or imagined) beliefs that a specific
characteristic, such as colour, language or religious belief, gives rise to cer-
20 Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 2001).
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tain undesirable social characteristics—and one can therefore legitimately take
action against such a target group. Thus, in shorthand, blacks were slaves be-
cause they were black, or corporeal Jews were invisible and dangerous viruses
to be eradicated.
Rare indeed is the genocide in history where race, in this sense, has not
been a key factor. Much of the Atlantic slave trade led to the destruction of
African and Caribbean family and ethnic life. Racism underlay the fate of
Nama and Herero peoples in South-West Africa, the Congo Free State, and
Native Americans. Similarly, the linguistically and religiously different Arme-
nians in Turkey; the Bengali-speakers of East Pakistan; the Christian tribes of
Darfur; the Chinese in Nanking at the hands of the Japanese; the Jews; the
Tutsi in Rwanda; the Vietnamese and Muslim Cham in Cambodia; Bosniaks
in the former Yugoslavia. And so many more.
The “science” factor
Appreciating the race factor also requires going through the growth of “sci-
entistic racism,” that is, the works of anatomists and physical anthropologists
who began to examine and compare the human form and then started to
attribute social characteristics to the physical ones. When physical forms
as such could not establish a “suitable” hierarchy of races, they turned to
measurements of “intelligence,” using craniology (skull measurement) as the
ultimate criterion. Researchers concluded that Caucasians—named after what
was thought to be the perfect (“white”) skull found in the Caucasus mountains
in Russia—had the largest brain casing (87 cubic inches), according to physi-
cian Samuel Morton in his Crania Americana (1839). Native Americans had
a mean volume of 82 cubic inches (measured using mustard seed) that, Mor-
ton deduced, made them slow of thought, averse to agriculture, vengeful, and
lovers of warfare. Ethiopian and black skulls held an even smaller quantity
of seed (78 cubic inches) but their owners’ bodies were the more muscular.
Thus laboratories spawned the brain versus brawn (or white versus black) di-
chotomy that is still prevalent in many circles. Australia’s Indigenous people
(“Australoids”) had less skull volume than any other people, and were ascribed
as having even more reduced capacities—a furphy propagated in Australian
school texts until the 1980s.
Craniology, sometimes called craniometry, fell from favour at the turn of
the twentieth century. That scientific nonsense gave way to another form of
“brain power,” the Stanford-Binet test of intelligence, the modern IQ test, still
in use, or misuse, today for streaming children into different levels of educa-
tion, for separating classes of people, the bright from the simple, and so on.
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(No matter what spin one puts on modern IQ testing, it remains of the same
genre and “scientific” validity as skull measuring.)21
Hand in hand with these developments was the emergence of eugenics, a
veterinary term, a “science” that intended turning society into a social labora-
tory in which nations and “races” could be regulated biologically to produce
desired citizens and breed out or otherwise exclude undesirable ones, like
Roma (even as this is being written). Eugenics was hardly a Nazi fantasy.
The United States had powerful elements that wanted nothing more than a
white, Protestant America—to the detriment and, preferably, the exclusion of
all who did not fit: Blacks, Catholics, Jews, Hispanics.22
There was another significant point about eugenics and “racial hygiene.”
Rulers no longer had to rely on religious canon to justify superior over inferior,
slavery, “the white man’s burden,” imperial destiny and the like; science, with
men in white lab coats and academic gowns, could now “prove” the fitness of
the fittest to rule.
The governance factor
Two eminent scholars—Yehuda Bauer in Israel and Richard Dekmejian in the
United States—have listed what they see as the prerequisites of twentieth cen-
tury genocide: an ancient hatred or similar ideological imperative; a brutal
dictatorship; a war setting; a compliant bureaucracy; and a use of some form
of technology.23 That template may well fit the Armenian and Jewish ex-
periences, but it does not have universal application. Some genocides have
occurred in (international) peacetime. But the main issue to convey to students
is that genocide is not the sole domain of brutal dictatorships. Democracies are
as capable of genocide in their way. One can point to Wilhelmine Germany at
the start of the twentieth century, to Belgium in the Congo’s history and that of
both Burundi and Rwanda, to French behaviour in territories like Algeria, to
some dubious British behaviour in the Empire’s heyday, to Canada, the United
States, and Australia in their frontier and later eras.
Following the Genocide Convention, one has to look at child removal prac-
tices in Canada and the United States, with children taken from families and
sent to compulsory residential boarding schools for up to 12 years, denied va-
21 Leon Kamin, The Science and Politics of I.Q. (London: Penguin Books, 1974).
22 See Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton, 1981); Leila Zenderland, Mea-
suring Minds: Henry Herbert Goddard and the Origins of American Intelligence Testing (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
23 Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude, chap. 4.
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cation time with kin, in the hope that their “Indian-ness” would be eradicated
at the end of that time.
A much starker case of “decent democrats” committing the crime is Aus-
tralia, with both a physical killing era and, later, massive and wholesale child
removal practices. Under a Westminster system of constitutional governance,
with reverence for the rule of law, with claims about a remarkable record of ac-
cording and affording human rights, contrived—from 1896 to approximately
1985 (in Queensland)—to have Aboriginal people live under separate and spe-
cial statutes that granted not one right in the amalgam we call human rights.
They were “citizens” but could not enter or leave a reserve without permis-
sion, could not sell their labour on the open market, earn the national basic
wage, marry non-Indigenous people without permission, have sex across the
colour line, vote, drink, go within stipulated distances of licensed premises,
carry firearms, join trade unions, own land or property, make wills, have legal
guardianship of their children, apply for passports, or give evidence on oath in
court. In several jurisdictions, they could be jailed by local administrators and
missionaries (quite outside the domain of the national criminal justice system)
for offences that only they could commit, like playing cards, being cheeky, be-
ing idle, refusing to work, or committing adultery.24
Dealing with denialism
People have difficulty dealing with denialism, especially of the Armenian and
Jewish events. Students (and lay people) need to learn that the onus is not on
them to prove that certain things happened, but that the burden lies on the de-
nialist to show that they did not happen. For example: give the students a copy
of the SS Statistics on the “Final Solution of the Jewish Question” March 23,
1943.25 Let them confront a denialist and insist on being shown how and in
what way that document was a forgery, who did the forging, on what paper and
with what inks and typewriters and official stamps. Students need to appreciate
that denialists never offer proof but simply assert; and that these are not de-
batable issues on which there are alternative views. Turkish denialism is much
harder to deal with, given that the whole apparatus of the Republic of Turkey
dedicates itself to denying the events of 1915 to 1923. Nevertheless, students
need to know that some 23 nation states have recognised that genocide, as
have some 48 American states, two Australian parliaments, the European Par-
liament, the Council of Europe, and the Vatican, among others. The onus is on
24 Colin Tatz, Australia’s Unthinkable Genocide (Bloomington: Xlibris, 2017).
25 In Arad et al., The Documents, 332–34.
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the denialists to show why it is that there has been such widespread “conspir-
acy” among reputable people and organisations to besmirch Turkish honour.
Conclusion
The social sciences engage in advocacies, with differing and even antithetical
viewpoints. Genocide is unique: there cannot be a (legitimate) “pro-genocide”
stance and there can be no alternative point of view as to its “merits.” It is rare
indeed to have a subject that does not have another “side”—except perhaps in
today’s upside-down world of ISIS and its confident claims that the killing of
all infidels worldwide is warranted, no, commanded by the Quran.
There have been some lame attempts at justification of genocidal practices,
notably the North American system of compulsory residential boarding
schools, and Australia’s forcible removal of children, both claiming this was
“in their best interests.” While the Genocide Convention conveys, from its
1948 context, that “with intent to destroy” meant to destroy with malice and
male fides, there is no definition (or court interpretation) of the nature of “in-
tent.” Arguing that the intent was “good” is to trivialise and relativise the
action. Australian philosopher Raimond Gaita has pinned down the matter:
“the concept of good intention cannot be relativised indefinitely to an agent’s
perception of it as good.” If we could, Gaita writes, then we must say that Nazi
murderers had good, but radically benighted intentions, because most of them
believed they had a sacred duty to the world to rid the planet of the race that
polluted it.26
We have a sense of universalism about genocide, its perpetrators, its nature,
horrors, outcomes, and legacies. The conundrum remains: why then do so
many nations, governments, institutions and agencies look the other way, pre-
tend it is not happening, ponder or dither over intervention when prevention
and pre-emptive action was well warranted? There is no shortage of signposts,
of some obvious “at-risk” factors when one examines—as intelligence agen-
cies undoubtedly do daily—gross poverty, scarcity of resources, historical
animosities, geographic and geopolitical conflicts, internecine and religious
wars, territorial claims, and a sequential set of circumstances clearly suggest-
ing prior or imminent attacks on targeted groups. Indifference is said to be
a major, if not the major factor in genocide—that without the indifferent by-
standers the event cannot take place.
Yehuda Bauer teaches that there is often an adjective involved: hostile in-
26 Raimond Gaita, “Genocide and Pedantry,” Quadrant, July–August 1997, 41–45; Raimond Gaita, “Geno-
cide: The Holocaust and the Aborigines,” Quadrant, November 1997, 17–22.
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difference. A tautology on the face of it, nevertheless there is a real sense in
which averting the eyes is more than just “not wanting to be involved”: it em-
anates a sense of not considering the victims as worthy people.
Many years ago, when Elie Wiesel— survivor of Auschwitz and Nobel
Laureate for Literature—was asked about what anyone could do about the
Holocaust, he replied that one must teach, and teach again. Teaching, of
course, will not prevent genocide, but it will lay bare the essences of that be-
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